Ross Air Conquest accident.
There are 81 pages in the just released report from ATSB into this accident. Most of it seems reasoned and reasonable – considering the lack of 'finite' data. There is quite a bit both the IIC and we don't know. But you have to start somewhere. My favourite is a 'skip -read' – skipping the padding and fluff and just reading the bits that catch the eye. These are most helpful as when you worry 'em and toss 'em about, questions turn up and a deeper read is needed to find those answers. This report is worth a 'careful' long read; the investigators were not given too much to begin with and left with much to puzzle out. That said, it is too early to weigh and measure a report which has been subjected to some very careful editing.
What we don't know is a greater number than 'proven' fact. There are questions which have not been fully answered; it seems the investigators have gone to some trouble to find satisfactory explanations to those awkward questions. No point in speculating, not until the report has been digested (in full). Anyway – below is my 'grab-bag' from a first read – there are questions within which require careful consideration. Engaging brain before opening gob is always a good start point. ('aircraft' not that horrible USA airplane ). No matter- FWIW:-
ATSB - “The aircraft maintained the runway heading until reaching a height of between 300-400 ft above the ground (see the section titled Recorded flight data). At that point the aircraft began veering to the right of the extended runway centre line (Figures 1 and 15). The aircraft continued to climb to about 600 ft above the ground (700 ft altitude), and held this height for about 30 seconds, followed by a descent to about 500 ft (Figures 2 and 13). The information ceased 5 seconds later, which was about 60 seconds after take-off
ATSB - “Manual mode refers to the engine power output being directly controlled by the power lever position rather than by a signal sent to the engine by the electronic engine control unit (EEC). The power system is designed so that fuel scheduling is lower in manual mode than it is in normal (automatic) mode. Higher power lever positions are therefore required to maintain engine power when in manual mode compared to normal mode. This means that if a fault is detected in the EEC and the engine operation automatically reverts to manual mode the engine will have a reduction in power for that particular power lever setting. If that occurs the power can be restored by advancing the power lever as required. ('K' Consider near Vmca speed recovery).
ATSB - “The VMCA published in the Cessna 441 pilots operating handbook (POH) was 91 kt indicated airspeed. The POH further stated that:The airplane must reach the air minimum control speed (VMCA) before full control deflections are able to counteract the roll and yaw tendencies associated with one engine inoperative and full power operation on the other engine. VMCA with wing flaps in take-off position is indicated by a red radial on the airspeed indicator. VMCA with wing flaps in the UP position and the airplane in an en-route climb configuration will be buffet limited and occur at a higher speed. In addition to the published VMCA the POH also listed an ‘intentional one engine inoperative’ indicated airspeed of 98 kt with advice that:Although the airplane is controllable at the air minimum control speed, the airplane performance is less than optimum. A more suitable speed with wing flaps positioned in take-off is 98 KIAS [kt indicated airspeed]. This speed is identical to the normal rotation speed, thus the pilot can direct more of this attention to determining and securing the inoperative engine than to achieving a speed not normally associated with take-off. This speed also provides additional safety for controllability and allows easier maintenance of altitude during the period of gear retraction and securing the inoperative engine. (Worth checking the speed diagram - questions there)
ATSB - “This procedure directly referenced related guidance in the POH, applicable to the demonstration of VMCA, which stated:One engine inoperative procedures should be practised in anticipation of an emergency. This practice should be conducted at a safe altitude (5000 ft AGL), with full power on both engines, and should be started at a safe speed of at least 98 KIAS. As recovery ability is gained with practice, the starting speed may be lowered in small increments until the feel of the airplane in emergency conductions is well known. It should be noted that as the speed is reduced, directional control becomes more difficult. Emphasis should be placed on stopping the initial large yaw angles by the IMMEDIATE application of rudder supplements by banking slightly away from the yaw. Practice should be continued until: (1) an instinctive corrective reaction is developed and the corrective procedure is automatic, and (2) airspeed, altitude and heading can be maintained easily while the airplane is being prepared for a climb. The POH did not contain any procedure relating to simulation of an engine failure during the actual take-off phase.
Food for thought there. - MTF after the midnight oil is burned.
Toot – toot.
There are 81 pages in the just released report from ATSB into this accident. Most of it seems reasoned and reasonable – considering the lack of 'finite' data. There is quite a bit both the IIC and we don't know. But you have to start somewhere. My favourite is a 'skip -read' – skipping the padding and fluff and just reading the bits that catch the eye. These are most helpful as when you worry 'em and toss 'em about, questions turn up and a deeper read is needed to find those answers. This report is worth a 'careful' long read; the investigators were not given too much to begin with and left with much to puzzle out. That said, it is too early to weigh and measure a report which has been subjected to some very careful editing.
What we don't know is a greater number than 'proven' fact. There are questions which have not been fully answered; it seems the investigators have gone to some trouble to find satisfactory explanations to those awkward questions. No point in speculating, not until the report has been digested (in full). Anyway – below is my 'grab-bag' from a first read – there are questions within which require careful consideration. Engaging brain before opening gob is always a good start point. ('aircraft' not that horrible USA airplane ). No matter- FWIW:-
ATSB - “The aircraft maintained the runway heading until reaching a height of between 300-400 ft above the ground (see the section titled Recorded flight data). At that point the aircraft began veering to the right of the extended runway centre line (Figures 1 and 15). The aircraft continued to climb to about 600 ft above the ground (700 ft altitude), and held this height for about 30 seconds, followed by a descent to about 500 ft (Figures 2 and 13). The information ceased 5 seconds later, which was about 60 seconds after take-off
ATSB - “Manual mode refers to the engine power output being directly controlled by the power lever position rather than by a signal sent to the engine by the electronic engine control unit (EEC). The power system is designed so that fuel scheduling is lower in manual mode than it is in normal (automatic) mode. Higher power lever positions are therefore required to maintain engine power when in manual mode compared to normal mode. This means that if a fault is detected in the EEC and the engine operation automatically reverts to manual mode the engine will have a reduction in power for that particular power lever setting. If that occurs the power can be restored by advancing the power lever as required. ('K' Consider near Vmca speed recovery).
ATSB - “The VMCA published in the Cessna 441 pilots operating handbook (POH) was 91 kt indicated airspeed. The POH further stated that:The airplane must reach the air minimum control speed (VMCA) before full control deflections are able to counteract the roll and yaw tendencies associated with one engine inoperative and full power operation on the other engine. VMCA with wing flaps in take-off position is indicated by a red radial on the airspeed indicator. VMCA with wing flaps in the UP position and the airplane in an en-route climb configuration will be buffet limited and occur at a higher speed. In addition to the published VMCA the POH also listed an ‘intentional one engine inoperative’ indicated airspeed of 98 kt with advice that:Although the airplane is controllable at the air minimum control speed, the airplane performance is less than optimum. A more suitable speed with wing flaps positioned in take-off is 98 KIAS [kt indicated airspeed]. This speed is identical to the normal rotation speed, thus the pilot can direct more of this attention to determining and securing the inoperative engine than to achieving a speed not normally associated with take-off. This speed also provides additional safety for controllability and allows easier maintenance of altitude during the period of gear retraction and securing the inoperative engine. (Worth checking the speed diagram - questions there)
ATSB - “This procedure directly referenced related guidance in the POH, applicable to the demonstration of VMCA, which stated:One engine inoperative procedures should be practised in anticipation of an emergency. This practice should be conducted at a safe altitude (5000 ft AGL), with full power on both engines, and should be started at a safe speed of at least 98 KIAS. As recovery ability is gained with practice, the starting speed may be lowered in small increments until the feel of the airplane in emergency conductions is well known. It should be noted that as the speed is reduced, directional control becomes more difficult. Emphasis should be placed on stopping the initial large yaw angles by the IMMEDIATE application of rudder supplements by banking slightly away from the yaw. Practice should be continued until: (1) an instinctive corrective reaction is developed and the corrective procedure is automatic, and (2) airspeed, altitude and heading can be maintained easily while the airplane is being prepared for a climb. The POH did not contain any procedure relating to simulation of an engine failure during the actual take-off phase.
Food for thought there. - MTF after the midnight oil is burned.
Toot – toot.