“Risk comes from not knowing what you're doing”
Hitch - "And it all goes back to the GAAN strategy, minister's Statement of Expectations and the Aviation White Paper. That's a lot of written words all condensed into the FRP, which in the long run is the plan that matters. This is some serious transparency, and we need to acknowledge the merit in that.
Hitch - "But, what we aren't seeing is any plans to reform oversight and enforcement, perhaps what is needed the most."
Hard to disagree with the statement above; in either theory or principal. However, it is a chicken and egg sort of discussion, particularly when 'criminal' law is in play. Consider the way the Police are required to operate in the 'drink/drive' area. "Oversight" is almost impossible, they can (and do) spell out, very clearly, that this is not on. It is dangerous, and most definitely illegal, the consequences are serious, the penalties severe and for airmen it can be a career wrecker. So far so good, but, for the enforcement side 'random' checks are an expensive exercise, the cost of prosecution is added to the bill and the time spent for officers in court, rather than 'on the street' an added double barrel burden. This is before the unseen cost of insurance, hospital and effects of trauma to families, not to mention tow trucks and needing new wheels after a stack. The old adage applies; if you think 'safety' is expensive; try having an accident, then of being 'done' over the limit. QED.
The questions that begs answer are, would increased 'over-sight' improve the situation? Would more education assist? Would more Bobbies 'on the beat' assist? Has the current practice reduced the accident rate? Where is the pivot point where someone knows what they are about to do is not only illegal, but dangerous? Now, we enter the realms of the unknown: actions, results and consequences. It is a percentage game, say 70% never drink and drive; 10% may think about it once in a while; 10% may if they know there's every chance of not getting caught; the rest just take their chances.
Same -same with aviation; there are those who will 'push' the boundaries; or worse, push others into taking a punt on Lady Luck; a fickle mistress at the best of times. VFR into IMC a classic; aircraft with known defects another; etc. etc. The second most dusty manual in many offices is the Company Operations Manual; the most dusty is the Safety Management System manual. It is a brave junior who says "but Boss, the manual says not to do this." CASA is then immediately 'off the hook' - should the manual be compromised. All parties in the muck, except -.-.-...?
Hitch - "The way CASA does audits, takes regulatory action and deals with infringements desperately needs to be overhauled. Whilst I recognise that there is a serious shortage of qualified people willing to put on a CASA vest, the feedback I get is that the audit program seems to be without form, misdirected and almost without fail conducted under an overcast of angst."
I'll drink to that. It is, IMO, a case for 'conflict resolution'. Aye; easier said than done, I know; but a good target nevertheless. The good example of 'resolution' that springs to mind was the Flight Safety 'CFIT' analysis. You ticked the boxes pertinent to the proposed operation, which provided a 'number'. At the end of the form, the numbers were totalled against the company tabulated 'risk' matrix. Nothing prevented the operation; but, the crew were fully aware should there be an elevated risk of a potential CFIT. Not perfect, not saying it was BUT; operator off the hook, crew off the hook and the Authority off the hook - had they approved the system for use. As said, not perfect; but, a way of reducing the 'tension' between 'legal and considered' operator risk and Authority approval of 'operations' without it exploding in anyone's face.
Negotiated 'settlement' - 'out of court' before the fact with 'risk' analysed, reduced and agreed before operations, a give here, a take there, much better than 'Gestapo' tactics, after the event; or intimidation before hand. Would you drink and drive? Well, that depends, don't it?
"A pilot may earn his full pay for that year in less than two minutes. At the time of incident he would gladly return the entire amount for the privilege of being elsewhere.”
Toot - toot...
Hitch - "And it all goes back to the GAAN strategy, minister's Statement of Expectations and the Aviation White Paper. That's a lot of written words all condensed into the FRP, which in the long run is the plan that matters. This is some serious transparency, and we need to acknowledge the merit in that.
Hitch - "But, what we aren't seeing is any plans to reform oversight and enforcement, perhaps what is needed the most."
Hard to disagree with the statement above; in either theory or principal. However, it is a chicken and egg sort of discussion, particularly when 'criminal' law is in play. Consider the way the Police are required to operate in the 'drink/drive' area. "Oversight" is almost impossible, they can (and do) spell out, very clearly, that this is not on. It is dangerous, and most definitely illegal, the consequences are serious, the penalties severe and for airmen it can be a career wrecker. So far so good, but, for the enforcement side 'random' checks are an expensive exercise, the cost of prosecution is added to the bill and the time spent for officers in court, rather than 'on the street' an added double barrel burden. This is before the unseen cost of insurance, hospital and effects of trauma to families, not to mention tow trucks and needing new wheels after a stack. The old adage applies; if you think 'safety' is expensive; try having an accident, then of being 'done' over the limit. QED.
The questions that begs answer are, would increased 'over-sight' improve the situation? Would more education assist? Would more Bobbies 'on the beat' assist? Has the current practice reduced the accident rate? Where is the pivot point where someone knows what they are about to do is not only illegal, but dangerous? Now, we enter the realms of the unknown: actions, results and consequences. It is a percentage game, say 70% never drink and drive; 10% may think about it once in a while; 10% may if they know there's every chance of not getting caught; the rest just take their chances.
Same -same with aviation; there are those who will 'push' the boundaries; or worse, push others into taking a punt on Lady Luck; a fickle mistress at the best of times. VFR into IMC a classic; aircraft with known defects another; etc. etc. The second most dusty manual in many offices is the Company Operations Manual; the most dusty is the Safety Management System manual. It is a brave junior who says "but Boss, the manual says not to do this." CASA is then immediately 'off the hook' - should the manual be compromised. All parties in the muck, except -.-.-...?
Hitch - "The way CASA does audits, takes regulatory action and deals with infringements desperately needs to be overhauled. Whilst I recognise that there is a serious shortage of qualified people willing to put on a CASA vest, the feedback I get is that the audit program seems to be without form, misdirected and almost without fail conducted under an overcast of angst."
I'll drink to that. It is, IMO, a case for 'conflict resolution'. Aye; easier said than done, I know; but a good target nevertheless. The good example of 'resolution' that springs to mind was the Flight Safety 'CFIT' analysis. You ticked the boxes pertinent to the proposed operation, which provided a 'number'. At the end of the form, the numbers were totalled against the company tabulated 'risk' matrix. Nothing prevented the operation; but, the crew were fully aware should there be an elevated risk of a potential CFIT. Not perfect, not saying it was BUT; operator off the hook, crew off the hook and the Authority off the hook - had they approved the system for use. As said, not perfect; but, a way of reducing the 'tension' between 'legal and considered' operator risk and Authority approval of 'operations' without it exploding in anyone's face.
Negotiated 'settlement' - 'out of court' before the fact with 'risk' analysed, reduced and agreed before operations, a give here, a take there, much better than 'Gestapo' tactics, after the event; or intimidation before hand. Would you drink and drive? Well, that depends, don't it?
"A pilot may earn his full pay for that year in less than two minutes. At the time of incident he would gladly return the entire amount for the privilege of being elsewhere.”
Toot - toot...