[Kharon]

Adventures in -Muddy waters.

Disclaimer - without the Helbrook 'COM' to reference some of the statements from the court leaves many questions unanswered; - to a professional eye that is. The ATSB report demands careful study, it is thorough and IMO, sends subtle messages which should not be ignored. That said, the way the Barristers would 'use' it in their work, may not be the way an operating company would. There are significant differences between operational flying thinking and the 'Legal' mind. It all comes to a nebulous point, a seriously overworked and misunderstood word  - 'Safety'.

In short, in aviation, there are three versions of 'safety'. Legally safe; operationally safe and personally safe (in aviation parlance). Two of those are 'gates' to open before opening the aircraft's cabin door. Gate 1 - is this flight 'legal' in all respects; Gate 2, are the 'risks' involved in the operation fully mitigated; and, then at the aircraft door, is the machine 'fit for purpose'?  Easily said; easily 'sketched' around; and, on a percentage basis, compliance with ALL the 'roolz' (more like a high percentage prayer) are likely to tick all the boxes. Until the day (or night) when the wheels come off. Then, it falls back to the 'legal'' departments. CASA, ATSB and the friendly Insurance company; mighty foes, well heeled and armed; all well fed and all with rice bowls to protect.

“You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time.” (Lincoln?)

Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this occasion"

"The third respondent [Mr Wright] denies that he was Mr Wilson or Mr Robinson's employer pro hac vice and denies that he was vicariously liable for the acts of Mr Robinson as alleged or at all," it reads.

"But in a cross-claim filed with the court last month, CASA claims Mr Wright "was the person ultimately responsible" for ensuring Helibrook and its workers complied with the terms of the regulator's approval".

Gate # 1: Many 'operators' employ pilots on a casual (as needed) basis. Sensible pilots would have their own 'company' (business name etc). They would be responsible for their own upkeep in terms of ratings, currency, medical expenses, and flight and duty times etc. etc. But; it is incumbent on the operator to ensure all those boxes are ticked. Then we arrive at Gate #2. The operator has 'obligations' to the CASA and the Insurance provider. To meet those the casual pilot must be 'inducted' - a file raised with the pertinent details and checks noted: then - sign the Company Operations Manual, thus binding the pilot to the company's Standard Operating Practice (SOP). In short, can the operator 'safely' use a casual pilot within the legal impositions of CAR and the terms and conditions imposed on not only the proposed operation; but by the company, CASA approved statements governing commercial operations. . For example; medical certificate current; time on type acceptable; passed a company 'check flight'? These all may be skipped around until there is an 'event'. Then, those items relevant to the AOC terms and conditions really matter. The operator has 'inducted' and contracted a pilot to operate under those terms and conditions on a commercial basis (see CASA) , under an AOC and is insured under those terms. The pilot is 'operating' as part of the company, on company revenue flights, under the terns agreed to and signed. To all intents and operational demands; the pilot is, on that day 'employed' by the company and insured for that day by the company insurer. Unless there exists a separate approval. Imagine if there had been tourists on that flight and the crash was due to fuel exhaustion. Wow.....

"The third respondent contends that the applicant and Mr Robinson were independent contractors and not employees of Helibrook or the third respondent."

Then, we arrive at the aircraft door. Even if a pilot is familiar with the aircraft, the first checks are the MR, to see if any 'snags or faults or 'expired' items have been noted, rectified and signed off. Then check that a noted time limit on scheduled maintenance will not expire during the operation; next how much fuel is inboard and how much is needed to complete the scheduled operation; and, the weight remaining for the proposed 'load' is within bounds. The 'problems' for the contracted itinerant pilot is, but should not be, are the operational 'hours' remaining before maintenance is due 'valid'? So the 'tech log' and MR must be 'accurate' real and honest. Time expired overhaul demands not noted render the whole operation 'illegal'.

The aircraft involved in the 'Croc Egg' event as noted by the ATSB, was due for serious maintenance. The simple 'fact' is that the Hobbs was occasionally disconnected and the ATSB notes this is grounds for rigorous investigation. The lack of close monitoring by CASA, given the nature of the operation clearly defines a normalised deviance allowed to continue until a serious event claimed lives. But no matter; I am certain the CASA bored had a spiffing lunch enjoyed the joy flight and fluttered in the flattery of their own munificence; while the bloke in the back shed cooked the books. I mean - seriously ??



Who's to bless and who to blame? That conundrum is now in the hands of the legal fraternity. But, plenty to go around IMO.

Toot - toot. ..-.  -.-. .-.--