Curse you P2.
P2 - “to open up the conversation on how the flight training standards in Australia can hopefully get back to basics, because clearly they have drifted to beyond just complacency to a world of ignorance and blind bravado/Darwin award candidates, in the GA and in particular some of the RAA ranks of private pilot trainees and PPL licence holders (plus maybe, God help us, in the commercial pilot fraternity”.
The excellent Unicomb series posted above brings back many happy memories; not of actual 'stall/ low slow' training received, but of the excellent men who patiently taught a young “K' the exact same thing – in every airframe listed on the licence. Back then an 'endorsement on type' was required, from Tiger to Mustang. Great fun – if approached with the right attitude from both parties; and, of great value later in life. Little 'paper-work' and definitely no 'tick and flick' and, once the basics were clearly stamped in the 'flying brain' - it became automatic. Great value in situations which demanded prompt correct action dealing with 'ice' and turbulence. The ingrained awareness of what the airframe was telling you and the 'good' habits of managing the same, prevented the adrenaline rush and 'panic'.
Of course, even way back the 'cost' of anything was a consideration; much the same as it is today. But; the 'paper-work' mattered much less; if it took an extra hour to reach the desired standard; then, like it or not, that hour had to be paid for. Personally, I don't like the 'tick-a-box' method, to me it seems to open the door to achieving a 'minimum' requirement of 'compliance' rather than competence. But it's a complex situation; legal and financial elements of operating a flight school can (could) collide with 'satisfactory' standards. That however becomes a matter of conscience for both 'student' and 'operator'. Which leaves the 'Authority' off the hook and blameless at Coroners inquiry.
But:: we do have a 'chicken and egg' puzzle; one supported by 'accident' statistics. Events during the 'training' stage (pre-licence) are rare; not too many first solo prangs, few incidents of solo students stalling and loosing it; very few 'major' shouting matches after first solo nav etc. The 'biggest' number of 'fatal' events are deliberate penetration into weather. Why has always been a puzzle to me. It would be easy to lay blame on auto flight and GPS providing an 'incentive' to push on; but that would be a stretch, handy tools are they. There is a school of thought which believes finding a paddock and landing if trapped by weather; but that don't signify. Not many arguments pass the 'Pub'' test. Not too many 'silver bullets' either.
Aye, many, many tall tales and fables and bull-shit stories exist; the only ones worth a squirt are from those who 'survived' and vowed, most solemnly, to never, not ever again push their luck. Why? Well, take time to read and consider this excellent report from the ATSB – HERE -. IMO it is worthy of a 'night' at the aeroclub for the messages, lessons and conclusions demand discussion and careful consideration.
Not even Murphy could be blamed for this event; not CASA for their problems are 'political' and 'internal'. BoM blameless; the forecast was pretty much spot on; ATSB did a fine job on an event which should never have occurred. The event pilot, like any other pilot had several options. The puzzle is why choose the most potentially lethal one, given the forecast? Toss a coin or figure it out; well, that's up to you, on the day ain't it?
Toot – toot.
P2 - “to open up the conversation on how the flight training standards in Australia can hopefully get back to basics, because clearly they have drifted to beyond just complacency to a world of ignorance and blind bravado/Darwin award candidates, in the GA and in particular some of the RAA ranks of private pilot trainees and PPL licence holders (plus maybe, God help us, in the commercial pilot fraternity”.
The excellent Unicomb series posted above brings back many happy memories; not of actual 'stall/ low slow' training received, but of the excellent men who patiently taught a young “K' the exact same thing – in every airframe listed on the licence. Back then an 'endorsement on type' was required, from Tiger to Mustang. Great fun – if approached with the right attitude from both parties; and, of great value later in life. Little 'paper-work' and definitely no 'tick and flick' and, once the basics were clearly stamped in the 'flying brain' - it became automatic. Great value in situations which demanded prompt correct action dealing with 'ice' and turbulence. The ingrained awareness of what the airframe was telling you and the 'good' habits of managing the same, prevented the adrenaline rush and 'panic'.
Of course, even way back the 'cost' of anything was a consideration; much the same as it is today. But; the 'paper-work' mattered much less; if it took an extra hour to reach the desired standard; then, like it or not, that hour had to be paid for. Personally, I don't like the 'tick-a-box' method, to me it seems to open the door to achieving a 'minimum' requirement of 'compliance' rather than competence. But it's a complex situation; legal and financial elements of operating a flight school can (could) collide with 'satisfactory' standards. That however becomes a matter of conscience for both 'student' and 'operator'. Which leaves the 'Authority' off the hook and blameless at Coroners inquiry.
But:: we do have a 'chicken and egg' puzzle; one supported by 'accident' statistics. Events during the 'training' stage (pre-licence) are rare; not too many first solo prangs, few incidents of solo students stalling and loosing it; very few 'major' shouting matches after first solo nav etc. The 'biggest' number of 'fatal' events are deliberate penetration into weather. Why has always been a puzzle to me. It would be easy to lay blame on auto flight and GPS providing an 'incentive' to push on; but that would be a stretch, handy tools are they. There is a school of thought which believes finding a paddock and landing if trapped by weather; but that don't signify. Not many arguments pass the 'Pub'' test. Not too many 'silver bullets' either.
Aye, many, many tall tales and fables and bull-shit stories exist; the only ones worth a squirt are from those who 'survived' and vowed, most solemnly, to never, not ever again push their luck. Why? Well, take time to read and consider this excellent report from the ATSB – HERE -. IMO it is worthy of a 'night' at the aeroclub for the messages, lessons and conclusions demand discussion and careful consideration.
Not even Murphy could be blamed for this event; not CASA for their problems are 'political' and 'internal'. BoM blameless; the forecast was pretty much spot on; ATSB did a fine job on an event which should never have occurred. The event pilot, like any other pilot had several options. The puzzle is why choose the most potentially lethal one, given the forecast? Toss a coin or figure it out; well, that's up to you, on the day ain't it?
Toot – toot.