Bog Standard – Is?
What Sandy said – plus:-
Superficial surface stuff before we dig down into the 'way things really are' being obliged to cover all corners. Regulatory reform and CASA responsibilities are in desperate need of serious attention, no argument about it. RA Aus could do with a tune up, its a great notion but wide open to abuse. CASA have spent, literally, millions of tax payer dollars developing a 'system' which loads responsibility anywhere but on their system. The 'system' also protects the government of the day, welcomed and blindly espoused out of 'political' self interest. The 'effects' of the CASA approach and system demand some serious inquiry and reform; but, before that we must address P2's question below, as it is pertinent to the 'safety' conundrum.
P2 - “on how the flight training standards in Australia can hopefully get back to basics,”
Wow! A one line conundrum, one which could see a vast hall, filled by 'experts' (in their field) ending up in a riot. I guess the conflicts could be resolved (maybe) if the 'standards' required were melded into 'Basic, Better, Best'. Which, in reality, is how the 'system' works. The variable elements in the equation are the 'person' the requirements, the standards and the 'expectations'.
However, this 'event' in Tasmania – HERE – begs questions of 'the system'. A fit, young pilot, holding an ATPL, instrument rating, multi engine, operating scheduled services; experienced, checked and familiar with the route, the options and the weather. The decisions made, one by one, led to tragedy. Why? All the boxes ticked, airline quality qualifications and yet despite that; decisions were made that a freshly minted VFR pilot would never make. Why? The ATSB report covers nearly every aspect, except the Why? Had the pilot survived it would be beneficial to examine the 'thought process' which led to the decisions made. Did the 'training' system fail or was it simple human error? What was the motivation driving the thought process? The answer to that may assist in preventing future pilots in low performance aircraft tangling with high performance weather systems.
“Ah, but my dear sir, the why must never be obvious. That is the whole point.”
Now I have really digressed – So, reset and back to 'systems'. 'Basic' -(IMO) is the 'toughest row to hoe' - for the regulator, the operator, the instructor and the 'student'. Where to set the basic bar? The time honoured 'rough but safe' standard is difficult to cast in law, even harder to quantify. There is a complex 'collision' of expectations at this juncture, which involves all parties. How to define a 'standard'?– Take 'stall and recovery' for example. In the training area: a bright, windless day, student briefed (properly), area checked clear, gentle approach to the stall and recovery as per the book. Tick. Three times with improvement – all good (rough but 'safe') – sign off, all done and dusted. Never to be practiced again outside of commercial operations. It begs a question; is this good enough? Percentage wise, in ruthless probability calculations - yes. In 'theory' - VFR Private operations have no business tangling with cloud, ice and darkness; or, any other situation which may demand 'advanced' training or 'skill'. But, they do, and so, with Statistics in support, the basic system works well, provided all operations are conducted according to 'the standard' as scripted. Legal, tidy with no 'blame' allotted to the basic 'training'.
The regulator has produced documented 'standards', the Flight School has met those requirements, has a 'license' to protect and a business to manage. The 'student' has a budget and 'expectations'. No matter the 'expectations or ambitions' the foundations must be built. The airline 'wannabe' is no problem because the commercial operators will knock off any rough edges and skill decay, as they must. But, the 'private pilot' is a whole different animal. Once licensed the checks and balances become a matter of 'personal' preference. The vast majority, particularly those who own aircraft are solid, sound, sensible folk, operationally 'plugged in'. But there is an element which habitually 'bites off more than they can chew'. This is not the 'fault' of basic training, although any 'rough' element sketched around or 'let go by' will eventually, return to haunt as the accident reports often relay. Basic qualifications demand a personal interest in 'developing' very basic skills and honest self assessment. Nothing wrong with that; nor the standards set. The 'best' of the basic crowd have passed 'scripted' examinations and they have progressed to be first class (mostly).
So, where is the base line to be drawn? That depends don't it. The rates and rules at entry level must encompass many disparate elements: for once qualified there is no telling how, or even if the individual will 'honor' the teachings, the rules, common sense and weigh in any lack of experience – with say (for example) weather flying. This (again IMO) defines the under laying 'fault' in 'tick-a box' training, which can be exploited. Stalls – 3 required – 3 done – tick. Steep turns 3 required – 3 done tick. This ain't 'basic' not by a long shot it ain't. It is Russian roulette: the student either can or cannot 'manage' a situation to a competent standard. Masters stalls in three; bravo – shows any sign of getting it wrong; then more training required and sod the 'minimum' demanded.
“Climate is what we expect, weather is what we get.”
Regarding aircraft, weather, and the immovable planet earth colliding, there's not too much a training outfit can do – bar instrument rating – to prevent it all happening again. This becomes a matter between the two options any pilot must acquit – 'Go or Don't go'. Pay your money and take your chances. But if 'Go' is your choice, then at least plan an escape route or diversion point; or, pray that you survive that one bad experience and vow to never, not ever do it again. One dose of the very real dangers and a fright should cure the urge for a reckless repeat performance.
“I'd rather be pleasantly surprised than fatally disappointed.”
Ramble over, nearly. Pilots and aircraft operations are but one element; the Authority which governs the industry and the motivation for the current muddle must be examined. It seems to have devolved into a 'protection racket' excelling in obfuscation, iron clad alibis and ever increasing cost. But that will keep for another day. Ramble courtesy of P2 who will forfeit his Tim Tam ration for a 12 month at least and no beer at the indaba.
Toot – bloody - toot.![[Image: huh.gif]](https://auntypru.com/forum/images/smilies/huh.gif)
What Sandy said – plus:-
Superficial surface stuff before we dig down into the 'way things really are' being obliged to cover all corners. Regulatory reform and CASA responsibilities are in desperate need of serious attention, no argument about it. RA Aus could do with a tune up, its a great notion but wide open to abuse. CASA have spent, literally, millions of tax payer dollars developing a 'system' which loads responsibility anywhere but on their system. The 'system' also protects the government of the day, welcomed and blindly espoused out of 'political' self interest. The 'effects' of the CASA approach and system demand some serious inquiry and reform; but, before that we must address P2's question below, as it is pertinent to the 'safety' conundrum.
P2 - “on how the flight training standards in Australia can hopefully get back to basics,”
Wow! A one line conundrum, one which could see a vast hall, filled by 'experts' (in their field) ending up in a riot. I guess the conflicts could be resolved (maybe) if the 'standards' required were melded into 'Basic, Better, Best'. Which, in reality, is how the 'system' works. The variable elements in the equation are the 'person' the requirements, the standards and the 'expectations'.
However, this 'event' in Tasmania – HERE – begs questions of 'the system'. A fit, young pilot, holding an ATPL, instrument rating, multi engine, operating scheduled services; experienced, checked and familiar with the route, the options and the weather. The decisions made, one by one, led to tragedy. Why? All the boxes ticked, airline quality qualifications and yet despite that; decisions were made that a freshly minted VFR pilot would never make. Why? The ATSB report covers nearly every aspect, except the Why? Had the pilot survived it would be beneficial to examine the 'thought process' which led to the decisions made. Did the 'training' system fail or was it simple human error? What was the motivation driving the thought process? The answer to that may assist in preventing future pilots in low performance aircraft tangling with high performance weather systems.
“Ah, but my dear sir, the why must never be obvious. That is the whole point.”
Now I have really digressed – So, reset and back to 'systems'. 'Basic' -(IMO) is the 'toughest row to hoe' - for the regulator, the operator, the instructor and the 'student'. Where to set the basic bar? The time honoured 'rough but safe' standard is difficult to cast in law, even harder to quantify. There is a complex 'collision' of expectations at this juncture, which involves all parties. How to define a 'standard'?– Take 'stall and recovery' for example. In the training area: a bright, windless day, student briefed (properly), area checked clear, gentle approach to the stall and recovery as per the book. Tick. Three times with improvement – all good (rough but 'safe') – sign off, all done and dusted. Never to be practiced again outside of commercial operations. It begs a question; is this good enough? Percentage wise, in ruthless probability calculations - yes. In 'theory' - VFR Private operations have no business tangling with cloud, ice and darkness; or, any other situation which may demand 'advanced' training or 'skill'. But, they do, and so, with Statistics in support, the basic system works well, provided all operations are conducted according to 'the standard' as scripted. Legal, tidy with no 'blame' allotted to the basic 'training'.
The regulator has produced documented 'standards', the Flight School has met those requirements, has a 'license' to protect and a business to manage. The 'student' has a budget and 'expectations'. No matter the 'expectations or ambitions' the foundations must be built. The airline 'wannabe' is no problem because the commercial operators will knock off any rough edges and skill decay, as they must. But, the 'private pilot' is a whole different animal. Once licensed the checks and balances become a matter of 'personal' preference. The vast majority, particularly those who own aircraft are solid, sound, sensible folk, operationally 'plugged in'. But there is an element which habitually 'bites off more than they can chew'. This is not the 'fault' of basic training, although any 'rough' element sketched around or 'let go by' will eventually, return to haunt as the accident reports often relay. Basic qualifications demand a personal interest in 'developing' very basic skills and honest self assessment. Nothing wrong with that; nor the standards set. The 'best' of the basic crowd have passed 'scripted' examinations and they have progressed to be first class (mostly).
So, where is the base line to be drawn? That depends don't it. The rates and rules at entry level must encompass many disparate elements: for once qualified there is no telling how, or even if the individual will 'honor' the teachings, the rules, common sense and weigh in any lack of experience – with say (for example) weather flying. This (again IMO) defines the under laying 'fault' in 'tick-a box' training, which can be exploited. Stalls – 3 required – 3 done – tick. Steep turns 3 required – 3 done tick. This ain't 'basic' not by a long shot it ain't. It is Russian roulette: the student either can or cannot 'manage' a situation to a competent standard. Masters stalls in three; bravo – shows any sign of getting it wrong; then more training required and sod the 'minimum' demanded.
“Climate is what we expect, weather is what we get.”
Regarding aircraft, weather, and the immovable planet earth colliding, there's not too much a training outfit can do – bar instrument rating – to prevent it all happening again. This becomes a matter between the two options any pilot must acquit – 'Go or Don't go'. Pay your money and take your chances. But if 'Go' is your choice, then at least plan an escape route or diversion point; or, pray that you survive that one bad experience and vow to never, not ever do it again. One dose of the very real dangers and a fright should cure the urge for a reckless repeat performance.
“I'd rather be pleasantly surprised than fatally disappointed.”
Ramble over, nearly. Pilots and aircraft operations are but one element; the Authority which governs the industry and the motivation for the current muddle must be examined. It seems to have devolved into a 'protection racket' excelling in obfuscation, iron clad alibis and ever increasing cost. But that will keep for another day. Ramble courtesy of P2 who will forfeit his Tim Tam ration for a 12 month at least and no beer at the indaba.
Toot – bloody - toot.