The Sunday Brunch Gazette.

The 'End' game?

Caution - Ramble - It had been a long, tough weekend for a 'hanger rat' - aircraft in, aircraft out, fuelling and keeping the 'schedule'; we had banner towing going on, so time needed to set up the banner and gear; get the tow aircraft ready, stand out there with the 'bats' to guide the pick up; return later to pick up the dropped banner, put aircraft away on the return and set up for the next days operations. Flogged; by 1800 it was time to go home; totally focused on a cold Ale, a hot shower, followed by two whole days off. Going fishing. 0500 o'clock, next day the C182 was where I'd left it, my three mates were on their way; flight plan ready, all set by 0530. The CFI arrived just as I'd made coffee, I made him one (as he liked it) and we chatted. I told him of my plans for the day and he went quiet. "Got the met?" says he; Yuss says I. "what do you make of it" he asked. Well, it was all there; temperatures for the afternoon about ISA +10 maybe 15; gusty NW winds, front arriving later in the evening. "What's the take off weight for the return leg?" he asked; I told him. "How long is that strip?" he asked, I told him. "whats the Density altitude for the take off and can you do it from that strip?" Stumped. You can see where this was heading MSL strip (clay) DA about 3500/ 4000' heavy aircraft and serious turbulence airborne. "We play for keeps in this game and it is best to have a plan for the worst". He nodded and ambled off, leaving me with a serious lesson in the realities of flying. As a junior PPL soon to be CPL the lesson was proven many times to keep my nether regions out of a sling. This 'book learning stuff' matters; it really does. I ramble on here, now, to try, in my small way to emphasise the lesson taught to me, hopefully to avoid another fatal, like yesterday's.  -HERE -. High temperature; good size load, gusty turbulent conditions. Density altitude definitely not MSL and the Hearse follows. PA 32 LANCE performance.

Aye, so much for the nuts and bolts; but what of the other end; the 'administration' of aviation?

“Begin at the beginning," the King said, very gravely, "and go on till you come to the end: then stop.”

Good advice is that; but, where to begin; that is a good question. That the 'rot' set in a good while ago is self evident, probably about the time 'self administration' began; Ministers off the hook and self governing provided all the latitude needed to let the 'authority' run rampant without either check or balance. P2 has presented the video of the latest Estimates. FWIW I did a quick 'summary' - HERE -. But, watch the video anyway, then decide if this land is getting value or service for the massive cost of the ever more increasing in size and power these 'departments' have; or, any ministerial control of excess. Then try to make sense (if you can find 'em) of the answers to the QON. I will save you time and bandwidth - there ain't any of any significance and those answered make sod all difference. ATSB, ASA and CASA - an expensive exercise in self justification and doing as little as possible - when it suits. For example. The WA Senator - Whitton asks why a remote operator in WA must 'await CASA's pleasure' to conduct a simple matter of interviewing a proposed HOTAC. The operation is currently 'grounded' and has been for a while, staring down going out of business. Yet, a video link, via the internet would take perhaps a morning - maybe two sessions; but no. It has to be done at great expense 'on-site' for a long established operation, presenting a suitably qualified candidate; working within the CASA accepted 'operations' systems.  Its BOLLOCKS.

“It has sunk him, I cannot say how much it has sunk him in my opinion. So unlike what a man should be!-None of that upright integrity, that strict adherence to truth and principle, that distain of trick and littleness, which a man should display in every transaction of his life.”

This endless, costly, unproductive pantomime of 'Estimates' needs to stop; or, stop messing about in the face or, better the farce of a clearly defined 'piss take'. The Senators know, full well, they are being deflected and powerless; despite the rhetoric. There is help available; but even so, the situation demands actions, not words or toddling off with promises and answers to QoN which will be lost in the ether of being 'seen' to act, rather than act in the interests of the public who pay the bills for these endless 'talk and no action' time wasters. Australian aviation is buried, mired and frustrated by home spun rules and practices. Time ICAO stepped in if the Senators can't and government wont.

Ayup, I know - but it is my wind, wasted as pleased me best. Now I have a sick donkey to see to and a BBQ to get going. Best I get on, before the war department starts asking questions. Aye, we all must answer to someone.

Selah.-.
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Of ancient Traps, Book learning and 'Automatics'.

The ATSB did not have a great deal to work with in this event – HERE-. Tough job; and the report, while factual (and acceptable) has, for me at least, triggered some deep thinking. From here I intend to 'ramble on' a little, FWIW in hope of making an effort to prevent another, similar event: be it CFIT or weather related or both. I believe there is a small element missing in 'essential' thinking in these modern days. Been wrong before, but it is my Two Bob's worth.

Way back in time I was gifted certain things by Grandfathers, Uncles and my own Papa. Instant love affairs; a Collie puppy from working stock; a Pony from brilliant blood stock; a fishing rod. hand made in split cane and a reel turned by an Uncle; a set of old chisels and a battered wooden hand plane and the big one a BSA Batam powered by a Villiers 98 cc monster. These 'gifts' were never just 'given'. The training of the pup was overseen by a man who loved and understood the breed. The pony came from a 'Master of Hunt' - unbroken, together we learned how to behave. The fishing rod and reel needed to be mastered and the tools demanded hours of training. The motor bike opened up new worlds and, strangely, the rules of 'learning' applied. There's more, but I hope you see the common thread. Each, in their own way, demanded an 'understanding' insight and knowledge. Non of the 'learning' was tick, flick and forget. It showed a way to 'see', to think and 'understand' what it was; of itself, in escence.

Enter the aircraft; Uncle Sam, a Viscount (among other beasts) Captain. Many journeys between boarding school and wherever 'home' was were spent with Sam, even the rough ones; full explanations and running commentary always, even after journey's end. Thus; the die was cast. To me, ground school, flight training and every lesson offered was soaked up like a drunk on a pub crawl. These things mattered and it seemed to me 'important' that I understood as much as possible; as per preconditioning. My first pup won a sheep dog trial; Grandpa smiled and said “ain't you glad you did it properly.” So it is with 'flight'.

Do 'professionals' take risks?  No, they do not – BUT (a great big one) ignorance and 'ego' are not in the equation. Often, a decision must be made; to make 'that' decision invokes many conscious and sub-conscious 'lessons'. Experience matters, but 'hours' in the log book don't always reflect the 'deep' lessons, those not learned (or taught). It is a complex process. That said, supporting any 'decision' is 'education' lessons learned and taken into practical application. This is important stuff. It forms a solid base for any future decision made; but now sharpened with actual 'experience' makes for the professional mind of honest personal 'operating' limitations.

End of Ramble: now the latest accident report. -HERE -. Read it and weep. Not too much for the dead; but for those left behind from a completely preventable event which claimed another four lives from the growing pile of 'flight into unsuitable conditions' and the failure to recognise trouble, long before it gains the upper hand. Take look at the picture below; a trap: well set and flawlessly operational. The ATSB did a good job on this one, as best they could, considering all. I have but one question, why? Why continue to climb into icing? One look at the pretty clouds, the temperature, the forecast and the limitations of the aircraft ; Why is a bloody fair question. Let us think now on what the ATSB could not say.

ATSB - “According to the aircraft owner, when either the altitude hold or vertical speed modes were selected, the autopilot would not disengage automatically. Also, when in these modes and the flight controls were manually manipulated, the system would apply trim in the opposite direction to maintain the selected altitude or vertical speed.”

Let's just disregard 'real' autopilots and leave them in out of this equation for a moment. I have no doubt that this model is an excellent tool for cruise legs or even climb and descent in 'fair' weather. But, given the limitations noted, would it not be prudent to hand fly the 'climb' into suspect, icing conditions weather?  Cloud like that and the 'mixing' and the hills affecting the wind flow – this is not the time for coffee and letting the AP do the work; it ain't as efficient as a pair of eyes and hands working together, 'feeling' the conditions and those effects to get the maximum out of the air-frame.

ATSB. “The POH indicated that, any failure or malfunction of the electric trim or autopilot could be overridden by manually manipulating the control yoke. Further, if a trim runaway occurred, the pilot was to de-energise the circuit by pulling the circuit breaker (PITCH TRIM, ROLL TRIM, or AUTOPILOT) and land as soon as the conditions permitted.

BUT! Where is the 'alarm? -  “Hoi, wooden head, I can't do this”...Nope, not there, not required and should not be needed, a pilot should 'know' when the aircraft is “struggling” and needs guidance and assistance to a 'softer passage'.

ATSB “ a freezing level of 4,000 ft in the south and 7,000 ft in the north [Canberra was centrally located within the south region”.

P7 - The perfect trap shown below.

[Image: AO-2023-045-Figure%20%288%29.png?itok=HHiyOTxP]

ATSB - “The estimated freezing level of 7,000 ft at Canberra and forecast broken cumulus/stratocumulus from 5,000 ft to 10,00 ft indicated the forecast depth of the icing layer overhead Canberra had increased to 3,000 ft. Figure 6 depicts the NSW-E GAF, current at the time of the pilot’s last NAIPS area briefing request. Information relevant to the flight is labeled and highlighted. This forecast included a freezing level of 9,000 ft for the area containing Scone (area B) and a freezing level of above 10,000 ft for the area containing the destination of Armidale (area A).”

I will leave it there for generalities. Had the pilot actually taken note of the Met lessons (mixing) and the effect of Ice accretion on air-frame performance, and 'understood' the forecast then perhaps, just maybe, remembering the old old rule of icing layers and their 'mixing' perhaps could have opted for a slightly longer, less risky track, burned off an extra $100 in costs and lived to pay the bill. Perhaps understanding the limitations of engine performance with altitude; ice accretion on air frame performance and 'weight' increases then inherent risks associated with buggering about with limited options, low performance aircraft and dynamic weather, they may all be having an Ale and talking about how an 'educated' pilot saw the all safely home; through knowledge, skill and judgment. Or, just by taking a humble, less limiting route for the aircraft.

No apology offered; too many funerals; far too many. Learn what is necessary to survive, not what is required to pass the exam. It matters.

Selah.
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Of - Dollars and Sense.

Or: value for money. The MOSAIC program has great potential to benefit the general aviation community, world wide, in so many areas, much to the benefit of the nations adopting it. I imagine that the total cost (soup to nuts) of producing the 'system' has been significant, seriously significant. Bravo, well done and thank you to all involved. For ICAO compliant nations the adaption of the system will be a relatively simple process; yes it will, indeed it must. Bound to involve the 'administration' in some tweaking and shuffling of the standing regulations to accommodate the changes. But that, essentially, will boil down to 'editing' the existing rule set. Amendments rather than a re write of the ICAO compliant 'structures' affected. For nations like NZ and Singapore etc. the new system will almost seamlessly 'slot' in without huge sums and man-hours and waiting 'time' being consumed. But what of Australia?

“The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. “

Years ago the Kiwi's (NZ) rewrote their 'rules' to world best practice (ICAO). Generously, (Peppercorn) they offered those systems to Australia, the odd man out. “Try these -they work just fine; cheap as chips to you.” Offer declined, the rest is history. The AMROBA association have provided a list of the unique regulations which afflict and restrict the Australian industry which will need (demand) to be 'amended' in order to accommodate the MOSAIC system. It will take years and cost millions to rework and rejig. If (big one) that is even possible.

The cost of CASA to the nation is mind bending; the estimated time wasted is unbelievable by airline standards; and, the results unspeakable, unfit for service and will only perform design function on the whim, if and when it serves or suits. Selected law and purpose built dictates will apply. For examples: - Rhodes, Buckley (and many others) hammered into oblivion; and yet Broome and the Croc  Jock allowed free reign and board visits - until a fatal event (think rats and ships). While the cost of CASA may (just) be 'acceptable' if expertise, efficiency and an even hand was bringing tangible improvement and increased 'safety' (legal and operational) then perhaps, maybe it all could be justified. Alas.

“Sheep don’t need the shepherd to be what they are. The shepherd needs sheep to be what he is.”

MOAIC is a brilliant, carefully worked, properly executed boon for the 'general aviation' industry; I could, if the gods moved me, post a tote odds board for bets on which nation will rapidly, efficiently and effectively adopt the system and prosper. Long, seriously very long odds on CASA leading the pack. A second board for 'cost' - least cost in time, money and 'ease' of compliance; long CASA odds against, once again. However, on a third board CASA would be very short odds to win the race toward obfuscation, complication and equivocalness.

But enough, chase up AMROBA or even AOPA – both worth the minutes; but do avoid Senate Estimates, it will break your heart.

Aye well; must leave it their, typing with one hand is difficult; my poor left paw is still in plaster, victim of a mighty wallop, and confined in plaster for a couple of more weeks; but, the universal specific seems to soothe the grumbles; time to medicate methinks.  Cheers.

Selah.
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Don Quixote Lookalikes:-

Or: those in the new world, tilting at wind farms. Bored rigid and unable to get anything done (due to plaster casts {Port wing/starboard oleo} ) offered a chance to 'study' the Senate Estimates last session with CASA in the front row. There was a question asked about wind turbines and the CASA involvement with these monstrous things. “Nothing to do with us” was the stern reply. Google came to help, the size of these things depends on what and where they are located but they occupy quite a large chunk of sky. Height (averaged 490:: 885') is a factor; higher and 'bigger' all the better for producing their product. The diameter of the blades, typically 295 feet. But nothing to do with CASA - ??

“Several of them would have protested if they could have found the right arguments.”

So who is 'mapping' the locations, estimating the area affected, reworking the LSALT for IFR and where required amended instrument approach paths and when will the data be available? Perhaps someone could ask ASA the question. Why? Well, The large wind farms 'qualify' for marking on charts, they do affect MOCA and MEA; those tolerances 'close-in' to aerodromes, within the instrument approach 'pattern' will need adjustment. These 'safe' heights matter, when the weather is poor and at night. Night and bad weather offers another potential hazard if the strobes (lights) on top of the towers are in cloud and rain – think about it. So, perhaps CASA have farmed out this work to the ASA; even so, these 'farms' exist, are they on the current map series aircrew are using? An answer would be great..  Those operating under the IFR will need this information; the risk levels may be slightly elevated, but most likely addressed by company safety committees. Etc, But what of the VFR/ hobby pilots? Many have eschewed 'paper' for GPS and electronic maps,  There is cohort within this body which often 'tempt' fate and chance their luck against vertical dirt and low cloud (fact). What used to be a known 'hill' or mountain easily 'stepped' over could have a veritable 'plantation' of whirling steel lurking within the murk.  Don't know about you, but I for one, would really like to know where they are, how high and how many.  Pity CASA have no interest or input ain't it.  Maybe, next time ASA are in the hot seats, someone could ask the right questions; maybe even get an answer - eventually - off notice.

“We, the unwilling, led by the unknowing, are doing the impossible for the ungrateful. We have done so much, for so long, with so little, we are now qualified to do anything with nothing.”

Aye, too much coffee and not much to do probably, poor dogs; they just don't understand the 'no load' instructions. Not many days now and the cursed plaster will in the bin, with my heartfelt good riddance. That's it

Selah.
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An ages old,two headed dilemma.

Throughout the eons, whenever two opposing forces 'faced off' both had 'problems' to solve. Those defending and those attacking needed to find away of 'winning' the argument. Engineering projects face a similar quandary, dams for example where the opposition is the water and the dam must retain, - the water has other ideas. But should the dam wall crack open, just a little, then a serious amount of destruction is highly on the cards. Diametrically opposed forces in absolute conflict. Enter Buckley and his assault on the CASA dam. The pubic foray signaling a heavy weight rematch is posted – HERE -on Pprune. This iteration 'feels' as though it has the potential to develop into a no holds barred, drawn out battle, and both protagonists have much to loose. The CASA defence will be both ruthless and ferocious, for there is much to loose. A loss to CASA will literally open the flood gates to some much delayed, much needed litigation. Make no mistake about it, if Buckley kicks a goal, the battles which will assuredly follow have the potential to ring in a Royal Commission. So the defenses against Buckley mounted will be on the other side of ferocious, bitter and ruthless; although ultimately, endlessly self destructive. They must be: should the research, investigation and analysis of many, many past 'events', be given even a small ray of light, given a chance to shine, the house of cards which CASA has become must tumble. This all will depend on how good a case Buckley has built and his legal team – they will need to be top drawer and prepared to battle a dragon. A knife to a shootout against big guns is not only dangerous, but futile. Good luck Glen. 



CASA AC139.E-05v1.1
CASA - “2.2.6.3 Turbulence is a risk to aircraft and aerodrome operations. Studies have proven that for wind turbines of less than 30m Rotor Diameter (RD) the wake vortices will impact aircraft located up to 5 RDs downwind and 2 RDs vertically”….

Last week, I was banging on about wind turbines in the vicinity of aerodromes. The folk on the Pprune site have a fairly sedate thread running with some sensible discussion related to the 'operational' side. My initial concerns related to the  location of these 'farms' as information on instrument approach and en route charts and upgrade of GPS units, for 'see and avoid'. The presence of tall structures close to aerodromes and the wind shear/ turbulence associated with same. Wake vortices from aircraft are another well known hazard, albeit dealt with quite well, analysed and published. The wind towers and their blades present two potential hazards. Runways are 'traditionally' located to take advantage of the local prevailing winds (give or take) but so are the windmills. This aligns their wake turbulence with the take off and landing paths (+/) with the wake 'spreading'. I can see an occasional alignment of Reasons famous cheese slices; particularly for IFR and VFR alike. Nothing to do with CASA they claim. I wonder..
[Image: img_0416_50610a9fceb35852213caa2000067e66b8202dce.jpeg]
SEE HERE - better idea of wake effects. a must see. 


[Image: img_0509_b9f7fd6be4035185b54e8c5ef9fb5c91299804c7.jpeg]


That's it, 7 more sleeps and I can be shed of the plaster shackles; it's not their fault but can't wait. The urge to grab the sheers and set 'em free is resisted (*just). Extra Ale tonight, two hand typing with a plaster that insists on hitting the caps lock is a wretched business. E&OE. 

Selah..
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Long ramble warning.!

Of Ass Hats & Croc eggs.

Well, according to the ABC – HERE – the Jury is released, verdict given, the Judge has ruled and the appeals to yet be lodged. Only one sinner in the dock, a righteous crucifixion ordered. Case closed – well for the public at least as the twenty second 'updates' disappear from the screens replaced by sports news and advertisements. Such is the way of the world, I'd bet good money that the average air traveler has no more idea than the average journalist about the parlous state of genuine 'safety' in this wide brown land. First, it must be understood there is 'legal' safety and 'operational' safety. Simply put; it may be 'legal' to cross on foot a busy highway against the lights after looking left and right etc. But is it operationally 'safe'? Well that depends, don't it. Hit by a truck legally crossing on a 'green' light is a clear cut case; hit by the same truck dashing for the bus across the road, against the lights – well you know the rest.

“Well, God give them wisdom that have it; and those that are fools, let them use their talents.”

So, when the lines between 'operational safety' and 'legally safe' become 'blurred'; a problem exists, then it becomes a court matter. Enter the Croc Clown and his hapless cohorts. #1 in the Dock; #2 a witness, #3 one who knew the tale; and, # 4 one who signed it all off and made it all 'Legally' safe for his outfit. Lets' take a brief look at the man in the dock and his cohorts

“Now, my co-mates and brothers in exile,”

We really should begin with #4. Every single commercial aviation business in Australia is 'accepted' (and /or approved) by CASA, from the A380 en-route to London, to the single engine joy flight along the beach – anything carrying  passengers for hire or reward. Then there is commercial 'air-work' : cargo, bush fire suppression, Ambulance, Police, Mustering, Crop Spraying etc, etc. All on CASA's books and, in theory, all kept 'up to the mark'; as writ in 'accepted' manuals and statements.  One off  'approved' audit, surveillance and 'spot-checks' are part of that system. It is no understatement to say that those 'checks' are an essential part of any safety culture.  Audit sorts out rorts and 'fiddles'. Surveillance a net to trap any errant breaches; and the Audit. A soup to nuts check of 'the way things are. Bravo and often 'helpful' – done right, with a 'good attitude' on both sides of the combat.

“Life is 10 percent what you make it and 90 percent how you take it.”

But then, what happens when the system breaks down? For example - the 'Board' of directors CASA were so 'delighted' with the 'reports' from the NT helicopter operations that they decided to depart Canberra and travel all the way to Arnhem Land to visit the 'You-Tube' legendary 'Croc Jock'. Clearly, the reports back of a squeaky clean, model operation must have been stellar indeed to tempt them out and to make the long journey (at great public expense). Clearly no mention was made pre-departure of the shocking operational scandals in Broome and the 'close' association with the Croce-Jock AOC on loan as and when required by a private pilot operating out of his backyard. Perhaps not; maybe the potential (missed) operational (self initiated) dangers associated with the Croc egg harvesting operation where never mentioned. Well the Board stated they had a lovely time and a ride in a Chopper to top off a splendid day. Meanwhile, behind the scenes, many operational 'safety' opportunities were being either ignored or worse, not noted or even mooted.

“And thus I clothe my naked villainy
With odd old ends stol'n out of holy writ;
And seem a saint, when most I play the devil.

Get to the point shout the BRB; I shall oblige. Both pilot and aircraft are tied to time limits with legally enforceable limits. These limits matter. Was there ever a holistic investigation into the veracity of the quoted figures; if so where are the reports justifying the legality of the the operation? Where is the computer data v the noted data from surveillance?  There ain't any from CASA. We could if serious, have an off the record with the maintenance company; or better yet have been present, with an expert engineer, at an inspection. But never before the event was there even the slightest suspicion that engines and air frames were 'over- time'. Tick and Flick audits by those who thought they should be doing 'bigger/ better' things than sodding about with rough operation in the middle of nowhere.

How was the 'pop the clock' edict not noticed? Pilots log books should reflect (give or take) the time entered onto maintenance document by about 6 minutes (0,1+/- hrs). Has there been an examination of 'pilot hours' v maintenance hours logged? Engineers can actually determine if the 'wear' and if the state of an engine reflects the MR time claimed. The 'limits' set matter, particularly to helicopters, in particular to those which are 'ridden hard and put away wet'  Then, there is the total fuel bill (bought in) against that used and that placed in cans v fuel burn for the hours operated. All fully available on audit – fuel burnt against hours claimed in operations – easy to sort out.

Then, there are the questionable 'safety' measures approved. Sling load requires an approval after training. Maximum 'drop off' height should be specified and enforced. i.e, Not above 30 feet (survivable height) into a clear area; any engine trouble; winch 'em back in (just hit the 'Up' button). Tracking of aircraft, and 'check-in' calls; i.e. landed @ Mud Lump 1230 – Departed Mud=Lump 1340 next check in 1445. Logged and noted at HO. Even a simple measure like Spider Tracks or similar so 'someone' knew where the crews are and when they may be expected at the next nest.

Enter the Croc Clown and his four hapless assistants. #1 in the Dock; #2 a witness, #3 one who knew the tale; and, # 4 one who signed it all off and made it all 'Legally' safe for his outfit.

Aye: #1 in the Dock and IMO lucky to have escaped. Yet a modicum of sympathy is to be afforded; he got away with what were normalized deviance's, which should have been picked up during 'proper' surveillance and audit and corrected through 'advice' and 'enforcement'.  In short “knock it off or else”. 

#2 The witness – a crippled pilot. The 'survivor' a man who paid a hellish price for 'following along the road to perdition'. Two options party hard and play along or, walk away and find a job with an outfit that played the game 'properly'. Young, impressionable, easily manipulated rather than 'educated' in the 'right way' to tackle potentially 'dangerous' operations. “ No wukkas mate; she'll be right”. Alas.

#3 The engineering company. I've spent decades working with these clever folk. They 'know' when a system time limit is being artificially 'extended'. But business is business and they always fall well short of knowingly breaching a requirement, or of turning a blind eye to a 'dangerous' fault or part. They neither can nor will allow a dangerous aircraft out of the hanger. Operational practice is not within their remit. But 'they know'.

“If you are distressed by anything external, the pain is not due to the thing itself, but to your estimate of it; and this you have the power to revoke at any moment.”

The overt, inherent dangers within this 'croc egg collection' lark, boiled down are few, very few, provided it is done 'correctly'. Winch down the collector, wait for the recall, haul him up and onto the next. Conducted within the constraints of 'sound' operational practice; it is a straightforward 'day at the  office' – until stretched and pulled out of the 'normal' envelope. Then, Spades are trumps and the Devil takes those caught out. Properly over sighted, by CASA, this event never, not ever should have happened. Blame who you like for it; but I know where my dollar bet will be placed.

Sorry for the long ramble; but I now have both port wing and starboard oleo fully operational (MR issued: boredom endeth).  Time methinks to whistle up the dogs (and cat) and head out into a beautiful summer's evening, though the orchard and into the 'wild woods'. Crutches destroyed with a vengeance.  Big Grin

Selah.
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