[P7_TOM]

Placebo or real fix?

The fitting of torso restraints is probably not too bad an idea; why not mandate air bags while you’re at it. Of course a much better notion would be to prevent this type of accident ever happening.

I’ve been to some trouble today to get some ‘real’ information, from those who know of what they speak, about ALA inspection SOP, beach landings and ‘sudden’ engine failure of the type this pilot experienced. For, therein lays the real cause of death.

In short; the engine type requires but three elements; in the right proportion to keep operating – unless there is a gross loss of lubricant i.e. oil. A seizure due to oil (lack thereof) is easily discernible; no evidence that lubrication was an issue. Which leaves us with the ‘three amico’s’ – air, spark and fuel. Aircraft engines of this type are really ‘basic’. The more basic, the better; less to go wrong, less to mishandle, less weight and more reliability, due to the straightforward, no frills design. Plenty of air available, filtered to prevent nasty stuff getting in and doing damage. Fuel supply is simplicity – gravity feed to a simple carburettor, heating available to prevent or cure carby ice, not too much else to worry about there; and, last ‘spark’ two sets of spark plugs, two sources of ‘juice’ each magneto capable of keeping the spark where it should be, as and when required. Basically a simple engine with the known problems covered. Gods know hour many reliable, trouble free hours of operations, in all climes, these engines have provided. Fantastic reliability statistics – provide proper care and attention to maintenance is provided. So why did this particular donkey keel over at a crucial time of a dangerous situation? I, for one would like to know.

ATSB have done what they may – but; to be unable to answer the basic question leaves many more unanswered. Like – can this ‘failure’ occur again; at short notice with no prior warning? I’d reckon there would be many folk who like to know that answer. Can my tested, tried, true, well maintained engine quit without warning, at any tick of the clock? 
Sorry ATSB; “Dunno” is nowhere near good enough.

DG - "I reckon a few of us could hazard a pretty good guess what caused that engine to quit. But as you say, we shouldn't have to. It's supposed to be their job, not ours. But with 129 pages in the report, you'd think they could have spared a paragraph to discuss how the carby float bowl ended up dry. I'll just leave that there."  Choc Frog.

Now, to the ATSB provided photographs. The last one in the sequence (#4) shows exactly where you would not want an engine failure. So why was the aircraft in that position at all. Fig. #3 and #4 graphically illustrate how to perfectly box yourself in. There is no safe exit, no wriggle room and while it may all seem like ‘derring-do’ and jolly good fun - it ain’t.





Rather than see some wishy-washy, feel good twaddle about ‘torso restraints’ being mooted; how about CASA make certain that every operator who conducts ALA operations has a sound procedure in place, with either ‘strip reports’ or pilot assessment procedure - which allows for ‘an out’. CASA probably have not got that type of expertise on tap – but plenty in the industry have and can back it with rock solid, real life experience. Prevention being much better than cure and a lot more helpful than ducking ‘torso restraints’ (a.k.a. shoulder straps).

Rather than a pathetic “we don’t know” –  how about ATSB gets off it’s collective arse and works out why a reliable, millions of operational hours, bog standard engine quit. These engines just do not pack it in for no reason; I’m sure every user of the engine, world wide, would love to know “Why”.

If this report had taken a half year, I’d say what’s the hold up. But 30 odd months to reach no conclusion – bloody well taking the Mickey ain’t it. 

Lord – the engine quit, the pilot crashed – takes 10 seconds to write. We knew that, on the day. Is ‘torso restraint’ the real answer to a rather large ‘safety question’.  I think not.