A soupçon of sympathy.
Believe it or not, I do occasionally feel some sympathy for the 'authority'. The report into this 'accident' brought about a head shake in answer to a question which has always remained unanswered. To wit – how do you prevent stupidity? I get the same feeling whenever we see a fatal VFR into IMC without an escape path being defined prior to entry; and, half a dozen other similar events which end up with someone else having to examine the wreckage, move the bodies, explain to the families and begin the whole process of investigating another completely avoidable 'accident'. I always think that 'accident' is a misnomer:-
“an event that happens by chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause”
The Bristell (LoC) event – HERE - defies the dictionary definition. The aircraft was deliberately – for whatever reasons – placed in harms way several times. Had the event occurred over a built up area, once again, there could have been lives lost, property and infrastructure damaged etc. Hence, my 'sympathy' for the regulator who must find a way to prevent this type of behaviour. But how? Wannabe an aerobatics star – fine; get qualified on an aircraft fit for purpose; get the advanced training, do the practice, learn the rules and responsibilities; do more practice then get qualified – off you go, fill your boots. But until you do all that don't push your luck too far. Lest it push back.
"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree
than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."
ATSB - “The avionics system fitted to the accident aircraft had data storage capability and also backup storage capability by way of a secure digital (SD) card which could be fitted to the avionics system. An SD card was not fitted as standard equipment when Bristell aircraft were delivered to operators from new. Further, the operator was not aware (bollocks) of the additional memory card storage capability and had not installed SD cards in any of their Bristell fleet.
ATSB -”The Bristell light sport aircraft (LSA) operating instructions prohibit excessive angles of bank, aerobatics and intentional spins. This was clearly defined and the information relating to spin avoidance was also presented by way of a placard in the cockpit.
The data recorded that at about 1230, while the aircraft was overhead the built-up area shown in Figure 2, it was operated significantly outside of its allowable flight envelope. This included banking to 94° while manoeuvring between 600-1,300 ft above a populated area.
At 1319, the recording captured a 91° roll to the left followed by a pitch down to 40°. The data also recorded a climbing right turn to 91° angle of bank at 1323, followed by a pitch down to 38° then a rolling left pull out turn. Whilst pulling out, the instrumentation system recorded a peak normal acceleration of 4.4 G. That loading exceeded the aircraft’s positive load limit of 4 G.
From 1340, there was significant variation in the magnitude of pitch, roll and load factor, consistent with additional aerobatic manoeuvring during the final minute of the flight (Figure 9).At 1340:36, while the aircraft was operating at:
• about 90 kt indicated airspeed
• a pitch-down angle of about 50°
• high angle of attack and positive load factor it abruptly pitched down to 90° and rolled significantly to the left. That behaviour was consistent with the aircraft experiencing an accelerated aerodynamic stall.6
Subsequent variation in the recorded parameters indicated that the aircraft then entered a counter-clockwise upright spin at a rotation rate of about one full turn every 1.5 seconds and a vertical descent rate of over 3,000 ft/min at the time of impact. The engine power level remained at a constant high setting prior to the spin entry.6Ac
“Stupidity cannot be cured. Stupidity is the only universal capital crime; the sentence is death. There is no appeal, and execution is carried out automatically and without pity.”
The analysis above speaks well for the integrity of the airframe and the robust margins provided within the certification data; hard to blame the 'aircraft' this time. Not one for making things 'mandatory' – however,
ATSB - “The avionics system fitted to the accident aircraft had data storage capability and also backup storage capability by way of a secure digital (SD) card which could be fitted to the avionics system. An SD card was not fitted as standard equipment when Bristell aircraft were delivered to operators from new. Further, the operator was not aware of the additional memory card storage capability and had not installed SD cards in any of their Bristell fleet.”
If the avionics have this capability, there can be no excuse for not utilising it. Mighty handy for operational analysis – it won't bother honest folk.
Toot – toot...
Believe it or not, I do occasionally feel some sympathy for the 'authority'. The report into this 'accident' brought about a head shake in answer to a question which has always remained unanswered. To wit – how do you prevent stupidity? I get the same feeling whenever we see a fatal VFR into IMC without an escape path being defined prior to entry; and, half a dozen other similar events which end up with someone else having to examine the wreckage, move the bodies, explain to the families and begin the whole process of investigating another completely avoidable 'accident'. I always think that 'accident' is a misnomer:-
“an event that happens by chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause”
The Bristell (LoC) event – HERE - defies the dictionary definition. The aircraft was deliberately – for whatever reasons – placed in harms way several times. Had the event occurred over a built up area, once again, there could have been lives lost, property and infrastructure damaged etc. Hence, my 'sympathy' for the regulator who must find a way to prevent this type of behaviour. But how? Wannabe an aerobatics star – fine; get qualified on an aircraft fit for purpose; get the advanced training, do the practice, learn the rules and responsibilities; do more practice then get qualified – off you go, fill your boots. But until you do all that don't push your luck too far. Lest it push back.
"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree
than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."
ATSB - “The avionics system fitted to the accident aircraft had data storage capability and also backup storage capability by way of a secure digital (SD) card which could be fitted to the avionics system. An SD card was not fitted as standard equipment when Bristell aircraft were delivered to operators from new. Further, the operator was not aware (bollocks) of the additional memory card storage capability and had not installed SD cards in any of their Bristell fleet.
ATSB -”The Bristell light sport aircraft (LSA) operating instructions prohibit excessive angles of bank, aerobatics and intentional spins. This was clearly defined and the information relating to spin avoidance was also presented by way of a placard in the cockpit.
The data recorded that at about 1230, while the aircraft was overhead the built-up area shown in Figure 2, it was operated significantly outside of its allowable flight envelope. This included banking to 94° while manoeuvring between 600-1,300 ft above a populated area.
At 1319, the recording captured a 91° roll to the left followed by a pitch down to 40°. The data also recorded a climbing right turn to 91° angle of bank at 1323, followed by a pitch down to 38° then a rolling left pull out turn. Whilst pulling out, the instrumentation system recorded a peak normal acceleration of 4.4 G. That loading exceeded the aircraft’s positive load limit of 4 G.
From 1340, there was significant variation in the magnitude of pitch, roll and load factor, consistent with additional aerobatic manoeuvring during the final minute of the flight (Figure 9).At 1340:36, while the aircraft was operating at:
• about 90 kt indicated airspeed
• a pitch-down angle of about 50°
• high angle of attack and positive load factor it abruptly pitched down to 90° and rolled significantly to the left. That behaviour was consistent with the aircraft experiencing an accelerated aerodynamic stall.6
Subsequent variation in the recorded parameters indicated that the aircraft then entered a counter-clockwise upright spin at a rotation rate of about one full turn every 1.5 seconds and a vertical descent rate of over 3,000 ft/min at the time of impact. The engine power level remained at a constant high setting prior to the spin entry.6Ac
“Stupidity cannot be cured. Stupidity is the only universal capital crime; the sentence is death. There is no appeal, and execution is carried out automatically and without pity.”
The analysis above speaks well for the integrity of the airframe and the robust margins provided within the certification data; hard to blame the 'aircraft' this time. Not one for making things 'mandatory' – however,
ATSB - “The avionics system fitted to the accident aircraft had data storage capability and also backup storage capability by way of a secure digital (SD) card which could be fitted to the avionics system. An SD card was not fitted as standard equipment when Bristell aircraft were delivered to operators from new. Further, the operator was not aware of the additional memory card storage capability and had not installed SD cards in any of their Bristell fleet.”
If the avionics have this capability, there can be no excuse for not utilising it. Mighty handy for operational analysis – it won't bother honest folk.
Toot – toot...