First coffee and stray thought whimsy.
First coffee with the Essendon flight path graphic; just put it up on screen and let the mind wander, picking up the stray thoughts and tugging at loose ends, cursing the lack of hard data. Nine seconds start to finish. 0858:43 to 0858:52 was all the time granted to ‘sort it’. In my time I have had some ten second experiences which seemed to take for ever to pass; also some ten second periods which flashed by, the adrenalin too slow only kicking afterwards. The time taken to transit between reaction and positive action is an important element to flight; the time between the Oh crap moment and the nodding of thanks to the gods while the heart races. Then there is the setting of priorities; what to manage first; what can wait. The problem with hypothesis is situational subjectivity. The solution to one ‘situation’ may not work for all. A ‘flame out’ during take off (simple engine failure) is not the same animal as an uncontained fire with shrapnel caused by a failing turbine wheel. But the lessons learnt have created rules, written in blood, sealed by fire. In any event ‘control’ is the key, basic factor. Any pilot worth his salt will tell you the first few seconds of any ‘failure’ event during take off are critical, control of speed and direction vital. The aircraft must have a forward speed which will provide the essential lift; and, directional control to avoid hitting anything which will impede that forward progress.
Back to the graphic: there are three basic questions which have not, as yet been answered. Those answers could be pivotal to any analysis:-
![[Image: ao2017024_figure-1.png]](http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5772607/ao2017024_figure-1.png)
(i) When did the failure occur? The graphic is of no value here; the flight path @:43 shows a marked deviation from runway direction. One could, quite reasonably expect to see a positive correction to this by the @:46 had the ‘failure’ occurred @43. Using the distance radians provide by MPB, there appears to be 109 meters between abeam the runway and the impact obstacle (the DFO). One fifth of that distance is 22 meters. At the :46 mark, the aircraft has deviated (approximately) that far from the runway without a noticeable correction; why? The speed is good 116 KIAS is a workable number; flatten the climb a little, correct the tracking pick up another five or six knots and there is a fighting chance of survival. I’d bet 98% of pilots would have had the basic ‘corrections’ made by :46 clearly visible by :47. No matter what was occurring ‘under the bonnet’. Speed and direction, looking for height, routine, 101 stuff taught from the first time a multi engine aircraft is strapped on. It is almost an ‘instinct’ to remain within the confines of the runway, a matter of pride and long habit. So the continued deviation becomes important.
(ii) Why was the speed allowed to decay from a healthy 116 KIAS to a danger zone 108KIAS? In combination with the deviation it speaks of a lack of control. Even a small heading correction would have seen the aircraft clear, by a whisker, the DFO; a little nose down would have brought the speed back to the 116, even 110 would have been fine to be going on with. Does this come down to a pilot with a heart attack (or similar). Could it be a combination – a freak – simultaneous engine failure and pilot failure. Figure the odds of that happening for a choc frog.
(iii) Flap was deployed and anecdotally at least the aircraft seemed ‘lazy’ , took a little while longer than ‘usual’ to reach rotation. Contradictions by the shed load. Firstly, we need to know that flap was deployed and whether the flap was retracted; it seems the undercarriage was not. The flight manual calls for Gear up, then flap. Flap is used to shorten the ground run, but there is a potential performance penalty airborne. So why use it at Essendon, a more than adequate runway length, then the long ground roll? Was there an incipient failure early in the piece ignored or not spotted; or, was the flap inadvertently extended beyond the setting used for take off? Been done before and it would go a long way to explaining some of the anomalies. Asymmetric flap another potential killer on the long list.
Aye well, only first coffee thoughts based on fresh air and a poor graphic. But for the budding multi engine pilot it is, without peer, a classic training picture. It should be made poster size and sent to every flying school in the land; for it illustrates the importance of getting the basics ‘spot on’.
Yes, yes, I know where my knitting is; I shall retrieve it directly.
Toot -toot.
P7 edit; my bold, my two bob bet.
First coffee with the Essendon flight path graphic; just put it up on screen and let the mind wander, picking up the stray thoughts and tugging at loose ends, cursing the lack of hard data. Nine seconds start to finish. 0858:43 to 0858:52 was all the time granted to ‘sort it’. In my time I have had some ten second experiences which seemed to take for ever to pass; also some ten second periods which flashed by, the adrenalin too slow only kicking afterwards. The time taken to transit between reaction and positive action is an important element to flight; the time between the Oh crap moment and the nodding of thanks to the gods while the heart races. Then there is the setting of priorities; what to manage first; what can wait. The problem with hypothesis is situational subjectivity. The solution to one ‘situation’ may not work for all. A ‘flame out’ during take off (simple engine failure) is not the same animal as an uncontained fire with shrapnel caused by a failing turbine wheel. But the lessons learnt have created rules, written in blood, sealed by fire. In any event ‘control’ is the key, basic factor. Any pilot worth his salt will tell you the first few seconds of any ‘failure’ event during take off are critical, control of speed and direction vital. The aircraft must have a forward speed which will provide the essential lift; and, directional control to avoid hitting anything which will impede that forward progress.
Back to the graphic: there are three basic questions which have not, as yet been answered. Those answers could be pivotal to any analysis:-
(i) When did the failure occur? The graphic is of no value here; the flight path @:43 shows a marked deviation from runway direction. One could, quite reasonably expect to see a positive correction to this by the @:46 had the ‘failure’ occurred @43. Using the distance radians provide by MPB, there appears to be 109 meters between abeam the runway and the impact obstacle (the DFO). One fifth of that distance is 22 meters. At the :46 mark, the aircraft has deviated (approximately) that far from the runway without a noticeable correction; why? The speed is good 116 KIAS is a workable number; flatten the climb a little, correct the tracking pick up another five or six knots and there is a fighting chance of survival. I’d bet 98% of pilots would have had the basic ‘corrections’ made by :46 clearly visible by :47. No matter what was occurring ‘under the bonnet’. Speed and direction, looking for height, routine, 101 stuff taught from the first time a multi engine aircraft is strapped on. It is almost an ‘instinct’ to remain within the confines of the runway, a matter of pride and long habit. So the continued deviation becomes important.
(ii) Why was the speed allowed to decay from a healthy 116 KIAS to a danger zone 108KIAS? In combination with the deviation it speaks of a lack of control. Even a small heading correction would have seen the aircraft clear, by a whisker, the DFO; a little nose down would have brought the speed back to the 116, even 110 would have been fine to be going on with. Does this come down to a pilot with a heart attack (or similar). Could it be a combination – a freak – simultaneous engine failure and pilot failure. Figure the odds of that happening for a choc frog.
(iii) Flap was deployed and anecdotally at least the aircraft seemed ‘lazy’ , took a little while longer than ‘usual’ to reach rotation. Contradictions by the shed load. Firstly, we need to know that flap was deployed and whether the flap was retracted; it seems the undercarriage was not. The flight manual calls for Gear up, then flap. Flap is used to shorten the ground run, but there is a potential performance penalty airborne. So why use it at Essendon, a more than adequate runway length, then the long ground roll? Was there an incipient failure early in the piece ignored or not spotted; or, was the flap inadvertently extended beyond the setting used for take off? Been done before and it would go a long way to explaining some of the anomalies. Asymmetric flap another potential killer on the long list.
Aye well, only first coffee thoughts based on fresh air and a poor graphic. But for the budding multi engine pilot it is, without peer, a classic training picture. It should be made poster size and sent to every flying school in the land; for it illustrates the importance of getting the basics ‘spot on’.
Yes, yes, I know where my knitting is; I shall retrieve it directly.
Toot -toot.
P7 edit; my bold, my two bob bet.