09-30-2017, 08:17 AM
(This post was last modified: 09-30-2017, 08:33 AM by thorn bird.)
Awww K. The poor old bastard child of CAsA is simply following the screaming Skull protocols.
These are invoked in the case of RPT operators, especially those that have made significant "donations" to politicians.
They consist of:
"The pilot Dun nit" protocol, which is the primary tenet.
If its difficult to establish the pilot dun nit the "Skew the report" protocol is invoked.
This requires requires any perceived deficiencies by the pilot brought to the forefront in the report, everything else hidden in a maze of gobbledygook. If this doesn't look to convincing we then move on to the "Clutching at straws" protocol. This involves employing a myriad of "experts", for credibility, to forensically examine ever facet of the pilots perceived actions or inactions, then drafting, opinions, fiddled figures, or simply made up stuff into the report to strongly imply the pilot dun nit. Of course this protocol can be incredibly expensive, experts like G. Thomas don't come cheap.
Love to know whats been spent so far on the Pelair report.
Over on UP a post to send a shiver up your spine.
Quote:
Well I can tell a few stories about non-standard SOPs at JQ...
I joined JQ about a decade ago. New to AB but many many years on Boeings. Early line training taught the JQ go-around "double-tap" technique, where you briefly advance the thrust levers to TOGA and immediately pull them back. No documentation. No SOPs. No FCOM amendment. All word-of-mouth. I queried and remember saying that it was a set-up, bound to trap someone and at the very least, it should be documented and run by AB. Told to wind my neck in, quite abusive actually and treated like an idiot.
If I'd put in paperwork I'd have been a hero for predicting exactly what occurred in YMML six months later when a JQ aircraft went within 50'AGL during a mis-handled GA, where the very technique I was criticising failed for the exact reasons I gave. However it transpired that the paperwork for THAT incident was suppressed by JQ and not passed to CASA, so I have long comforted myself with the theory that if I had said anything at the time my efforts would have been similarly suppressed, as well as facing the possibility of becoming known as a trouble maker, and that being held against me when it came to command upgrade.
During command training while on a turn-around we had a minor maintenance issue, that I duly wrote up in the Tech Log, annotated with the correct MEL actions. This was allowed at outports with no maintenance support if the MEL only had "O" actions, and no "M" actions. A reasonable and sensible policy. However the Checker queried my actions because it would make us late. I had a copy of the turn-around sequence, where everything is mapped out and timed to the minute, to make turn-arounds 35 minutes. I pointed out that no where on this sequence allowed any time for maintenance actions, therefore if there is any Tech Log/maintenance duties we would automatically be late. His response: I should leave all Tech Log/maintenance/MEL actions to be done at the end of the day, after the last leg, and disregard the MEL on turn-arounds. He was smart enough not to put that in writing, but he wrote me up badly, especially highlighting how I could not "manage time during a turn-around".
Pressure to not follow CASA rules. On the MEL. From a checker. On command upgrade.
Again I should have put paperwork in, directly to CASA. At the very least this checker should have lost his quals as a checker, but as it appeared to be unofficial JQ policy the whole attitude of JQ needed adjusting. I needed the job and the upgrade, so I kept quiet.
A friend had a loss of hydraulics on take-off from Melbourne. Followed the ECAM. Second hydraulic system failed. Flew circuit, returned on the blue system (this is the tiny little third system -practically nothing on it - for those not familiar with AB). Called into office and bollocked. Why didn't you turn off the PTU* they asked? I followed the ECAM he said. Oh, but everyone KNOWS that's what you do with loss of fluid to prevent a double hydraulic failure, they said. He stood his ground, said he followed the ECAM**.
*(PTU might be a Boeing term, after so long I can't remember the AB name). It powers either of the two main hydraulic systems from the other main one. With loss of fluid in one system it seizes, causing a loss of hydraulics in both mains. There is an AB mod for it to automatically shut down, but JQ didn't purchase the mod. JQ ALSO did not amend their documentation so that pilots knew to do this manually. The end result: piss poor SOPs, pilot disciplined. JQ said it was all his fault. This was after he flew an exemplary double-hydraulic failure approach and landing (not trivial in an AB).
**(again, memory fails me. It MIGHT have been in the ECAM at the time, but buried way down the list. In AB, the first ECAM following a loss of hydraulics is that the gear won't retract, so they were dealing with that ECAM first (as per AB procedures), and the loss of hydraulics is later in the ECAM list, and possibly somewhere in there is the instruction to turn off the PTU***) ***or whatever the damn thing is called.
I learnt to not trust JQ SOPs. Nor management.
A while later, Adelaide base closed. Friend of mine there was told on Anzac Day (? or maybe just after) and he had ten days to start work in Darwin. Ten days to cancel his rental contract, lose his bond, find new accommodation, get his wife a new job and find schools for his kids. His description of the "help" given by JQ was astonishing, and too long for here. In the end he got tired of his questions being unanswered (I think he had to get a boat and a dog to Darwin, and wanted to know if that would be reimbursed) so he just billed JQ anyway. He said towards the end the liaison office didn't even bother to answer phone calls or emails.
A while after that, more Ansett pilots came back from the ME and I was told I had to go to Darwin. I said no, seniority meant blah blah. I was told how that wasn't fair to the Ansett pilots because they needed to back in Melbourne and told a sob story of how hard their life was. Basically I was told to shove it, I would not get the aircraft type I wanted (in seniority), the base I wanted (in seniority) nor the C+T upgrade I was trying for (based mainly on previous Boeing experience).
Put on a four sector flight. First sector a C+T in the right seat (not my check, they were short of FOs). We got a manual loadsheet. He had no idea how to check it, I had to teach him. We got airborne. He had no idea about ETOPs. Got to ToD and told to cross waypoint X at time blah. He couldn't figure that out either. In conversation he told me he joined in 1989, was originally a low hour bush pilot and if it wasn't for what went on then he'd never have gotten his career. I don't hold his choice against him, but he was clearly still a marginal pilot now, twenty years later. Obviously coasting. This was a C+T and I was being told I couldn't get that because Ansett pilots deserved it better.
[color=#3333ff]Second sector: new FO. Had flown with this FO in the sim four weeks prior. He failed the sim - not by a little bit, but by a lot. He was well below standard. Sim instructor after much hemming and hawing said he would give a "conditional pass" (whatever that means) and would schedule the FO for some extra sim sessions to "catch up". So I asked the FO about the extra sim sessions. He never got them, nothing. I flew the entire way thinking that if anything happened I would be single pilot ops.[/color]
Landed. Spoke to a friend in the ME. Resigned from JQ. Had no job to go to at the time. Never regretted it, never looked back.
Got a nice letter from the Chief Pilot asking me why. I never replied to him but I should have, and I should've told him the above story. I had no rancour or bitterness, it was just that I didn't want to be part of a company that treated people this way, and had such a poor standard of C+T. I wish I'd been braver about standing up to regs being breached, but I know I would have risked my career and nothing would have changed. The CP wasn't bad, but he clearly couldn't change things. IIRC he left a little after me.
I fly in China now. Aircraft are better maintained, never a single thing wrong with them. All ops according to the manual. Any time I've seen a (very slight) deviation, all I have to do is pull out the FM or the MEL, and there is no problem. Everything is standard. Compared to JQ, it's a dream job, very easy to fly. No special procedures, nothing non-standard.
These are invoked in the case of RPT operators, especially those that have made significant "donations" to politicians.
They consist of:
"The pilot Dun nit" protocol, which is the primary tenet.
If its difficult to establish the pilot dun nit the "Skew the report" protocol is invoked.
This requires requires any perceived deficiencies by the pilot brought to the forefront in the report, everything else hidden in a maze of gobbledygook. If this doesn't look to convincing we then move on to the "Clutching at straws" protocol. This involves employing a myriad of "experts", for credibility, to forensically examine ever facet of the pilots perceived actions or inactions, then drafting, opinions, fiddled figures, or simply made up stuff into the report to strongly imply the pilot dun nit. Of course this protocol can be incredibly expensive, experts like G. Thomas don't come cheap.
Love to know whats been spent so far on the Pelair report.
Over on UP a post to send a shiver up your spine.
Quote:
Well I can tell a few stories about non-standard SOPs at JQ...
I joined JQ about a decade ago. New to AB but many many years on Boeings. Early line training taught the JQ go-around "double-tap" technique, where you briefly advance the thrust levers to TOGA and immediately pull them back. No documentation. No SOPs. No FCOM amendment. All word-of-mouth. I queried and remember saying that it was a set-up, bound to trap someone and at the very least, it should be documented and run by AB. Told to wind my neck in, quite abusive actually and treated like an idiot.
If I'd put in paperwork I'd have been a hero for predicting exactly what occurred in YMML six months later when a JQ aircraft went within 50'AGL during a mis-handled GA, where the very technique I was criticising failed for the exact reasons I gave. However it transpired that the paperwork for THAT incident was suppressed by JQ and not passed to CASA, so I have long comforted myself with the theory that if I had said anything at the time my efforts would have been similarly suppressed, as well as facing the possibility of becoming known as a trouble maker, and that being held against me when it came to command upgrade.
During command training while on a turn-around we had a minor maintenance issue, that I duly wrote up in the Tech Log, annotated with the correct MEL actions. This was allowed at outports with no maintenance support if the MEL only had "O" actions, and no "M" actions. A reasonable and sensible policy. However the Checker queried my actions because it would make us late. I had a copy of the turn-around sequence, where everything is mapped out and timed to the minute, to make turn-arounds 35 minutes. I pointed out that no where on this sequence allowed any time for maintenance actions, therefore if there is any Tech Log/maintenance duties we would automatically be late. His response: I should leave all Tech Log/maintenance/MEL actions to be done at the end of the day, after the last leg, and disregard the MEL on turn-arounds. He was smart enough not to put that in writing, but he wrote me up badly, especially highlighting how I could not "manage time during a turn-around".
Pressure to not follow CASA rules. On the MEL. From a checker. On command upgrade.
Again I should have put paperwork in, directly to CASA. At the very least this checker should have lost his quals as a checker, but as it appeared to be unofficial JQ policy the whole attitude of JQ needed adjusting. I needed the job and the upgrade, so I kept quiet.
A friend had a loss of hydraulics on take-off from Melbourne. Followed the ECAM. Second hydraulic system failed. Flew circuit, returned on the blue system (this is the tiny little third system -practically nothing on it - for those not familiar with AB). Called into office and bollocked. Why didn't you turn off the PTU* they asked? I followed the ECAM he said. Oh, but everyone KNOWS that's what you do with loss of fluid to prevent a double hydraulic failure, they said. He stood his ground, said he followed the ECAM**.
*(PTU might be a Boeing term, after so long I can't remember the AB name). It powers either of the two main hydraulic systems from the other main one. With loss of fluid in one system it seizes, causing a loss of hydraulics in both mains. There is an AB mod for it to automatically shut down, but JQ didn't purchase the mod. JQ ALSO did not amend their documentation so that pilots knew to do this manually. The end result: piss poor SOPs, pilot disciplined. JQ said it was all his fault. This was after he flew an exemplary double-hydraulic failure approach and landing (not trivial in an AB).
**(again, memory fails me. It MIGHT have been in the ECAM at the time, but buried way down the list. In AB, the first ECAM following a loss of hydraulics is that the gear won't retract, so they were dealing with that ECAM first (as per AB procedures), and the loss of hydraulics is later in the ECAM list, and possibly somewhere in there is the instruction to turn off the PTU***) ***or whatever the damn thing is called.
I learnt to not trust JQ SOPs. Nor management.
A while later, Adelaide base closed. Friend of mine there was told on Anzac Day (? or maybe just after) and he had ten days to start work in Darwin. Ten days to cancel his rental contract, lose his bond, find new accommodation, get his wife a new job and find schools for his kids. His description of the "help" given by JQ was astonishing, and too long for here. In the end he got tired of his questions being unanswered (I think he had to get a boat and a dog to Darwin, and wanted to know if that would be reimbursed) so he just billed JQ anyway. He said towards the end the liaison office didn't even bother to answer phone calls or emails.
A while after that, more Ansett pilots came back from the ME and I was told I had to go to Darwin. I said no, seniority meant blah blah. I was told how that wasn't fair to the Ansett pilots because they needed to back in Melbourne and told a sob story of how hard their life was. Basically I was told to shove it, I would not get the aircraft type I wanted (in seniority), the base I wanted (in seniority) nor the C+T upgrade I was trying for (based mainly on previous Boeing experience).
Put on a four sector flight. First sector a C+T in the right seat (not my check, they were short of FOs). We got a manual loadsheet. He had no idea how to check it, I had to teach him. We got airborne. He had no idea about ETOPs. Got to ToD and told to cross waypoint X at time blah. He couldn't figure that out either. In conversation he told me he joined in 1989, was originally a low hour bush pilot and if it wasn't for what went on then he'd never have gotten his career. I don't hold his choice against him, but he was clearly still a marginal pilot now, twenty years later. Obviously coasting. This was a C+T and I was being told I couldn't get that because Ansett pilots deserved it better.
[color=#3333ff]Second sector: new FO. Had flown with this FO in the sim four weeks prior. He failed the sim - not by a little bit, but by a lot. He was well below standard. Sim instructor after much hemming and hawing said he would give a "conditional pass" (whatever that means) and would schedule the FO for some extra sim sessions to "catch up". So I asked the FO about the extra sim sessions. He never got them, nothing. I flew the entire way thinking that if anything happened I would be single pilot ops.[/color]
Landed. Spoke to a friend in the ME. Resigned from JQ. Had no job to go to at the time. Never regretted it, never looked back.
Got a nice letter from the Chief Pilot asking me why. I never replied to him but I should have, and I should've told him the above story. I had no rancour or bitterness, it was just that I didn't want to be part of a company that treated people this way, and had such a poor standard of C+T. I wish I'd been braver about standing up to regs being breached, but I know I would have risked my career and nothing would have changed. The CP wasn't bad, but he clearly couldn't change things. IIRC he left a little after me.
I fly in China now. Aircraft are better maintained, never a single thing wrong with them. All ops according to the manual. Any time I've seen a (very slight) deviation, all I have to do is pull out the FM or the MEL, and there is no problem. Everything is standard. Compared to JQ, it's a dream job, very easy to fly. No special procedures, nothing non-standard.