[Kharon]

'the more they stay the same.

P2 - Thanks for the link back to the UP thread; it was a good one.  Not too many like that one these days, even read old W8’s rubbish ….  Some of the better posters made good contributions, making the whole thing worth the time and effort.  I don’t miss the UP, especially these days when it’s my turn on UP watch, but I do miss the banter, feed back and wider knowledge base of some of the ‘real’ posters– aye well.  Anyway – I did manage to find some old posts of mine, I was trying to remember the forces and system management for splitting the control channels and other details; nice to find them and take a stroll down memory lane.  Cheers mate.

I have cribbed some bits of posts past; not for any other reason but to highlight a salient fact: the questions we were asking back then remain, to this day, unresolved at the official level.  No doubt VARA sorted their ‘internal’ problems long ago, that’s a given.  But that will, for obvious reasons remain firmly ‘in-house’ – as it should be.  But what of the ATSB?, what of the public and what of the lessons industry can glean?  

Whichever way you slice it up – ATSB have failed and continue to do so in almost every element of their remit.  To me, this latest non event is a disgraceful continuance of the lazy, inutile system of ‘aberration’.  One aberration i.e. Pel-Air has, I believe graciously, been tolerated.  The second Pel-Air report needs to be spot on if ATSB are to retain any credibility whatsoever; but I digress.  The trend in recent years shows a downward spiral toward ATSB reports being of no consequence and that children is borderline criminal (IMO).  Aye well; just a breeze over an ATSB tea cup - from the past:- FWIW -

So, for starters, is the split yoke story even true?? The very idea that two 'competent' pilots could manage to exert (accidentally?) enough 'diametrically opposite' force during the translation of a 'bumpy' situation, with enough 'grunt' to separate the yokes is, stand alone; (when you think about it): a terrifying thought. The notion that two of them even exercised any serious control force, let alone 114 lbs, in an 'opposite direction', while correcting a trimmed flight attitude deviation simply begs questions. Industry cannot wait for another two years just to see what the ATSB eventually makes of it all and I'd bet a beer VARA won't be waiting about. Were there two sets of hands on the controls?, if so, why?. Was the AP engaged?. Any ideas on Speed, ROD, configuration at the time? SOP's?
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Solved a couple of puzzles: the force required to spit the yokes, through the pitch coupling system is 114 pounds (52 daN).

For those with a curious mind (or not type rated) the link- HERE – takes you to an ATR-F.C.O.M. which at least provides some clarification and information on the aircraft pitch control system. Pages 253, 257, 464, 465, 468, 490, 492, 493, and for Beer Baron, page 510 are of interest.
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The turbulence about Canberra is, on rare occasions, as bad as anywhere in the known world. A known fact, operational wisdom handed down, from Father to son. Seconds may go by where the aircraft is simply not 'manoeuvrable'. A wise child will not, in the first instance overload the airframe. But rather offer short prayers to pagan gods that this all stops soon, stabilises the airframe attitude early and 'works with it' to go quietly through the lumps with light hands, tender words and an understanding of basic aerodynamics. Once reunited with terra firma, (and having recovered some cool); it is time to scream for the 'grown ups'. "Please sir, I've just given this airframe a hell of a beating, to the extent that the FA has broken a wing" (hint-hint). "Could you have a real butchers-hook at the old girl (not the FA ya pervert) and see that all is well".
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Was the FA strapped down, long before the expectation of bumps?. Were the bumps forecast? Was the crew made aware that conditions that day were within the range of the real McCoy severe turbulence, Canberra style?, was a precautionary allowance made for just such an event (just in case)? You could reasonably expect the crew to have this sorted, so how come a busted leg?
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Now I wonder, is there a specific briefing in the VARA port operations manual sections which clearly warns pilots of the so very real dangers which, once or maybe twice in a career, can be found on approach to Canberra. Or is there just some mind numbing CASA pacifying 'buzz words'; slightly hysterical 'guest etiquette' briefings and other associated, stultifying twaddle. Are there specific notes on how to manage a Canberra approach, when it's 'cooking'?. Notes specifying caution during certain temperature/ wind range combinations, noting the inherent stability of the weather patterns which "may" just start the pot boiling. Not knocking the crew or standards here, but forewarned and forearmed is always better.

No doubt Beaker, font of all knowledge, will provide a lucid, tough but fair, factual report from his Mum's reading of the tea cup leaves - when the time is right...

Toot toot.