[Peetwo]

Dear Betsy RE: Bring back Lachie; & where's the ICAO report please?

Sorry to All - However we seem to be stuck in at least a 5 year Ground Hog Day and things are only getting worse...  

Ref:

The 2023 ICAO focused safety audit and assessment

In February 2024 ICAO completed its final report following a focussed aviation safety audit held in September 2023. The report reaffirmed that Australia has an effective aviation safety oversight system. The report highlighted areas where Australia could more fully realise the benefits of closer alignment with ICAO’s standards and practices and these areas will be responded to through corrective action plans agreed with ICAO and updates to our State Safety Program (SSP) and National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) this year. ICAO also undertook a State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment in September 2023. ICAO assessed Australia as having a mature aviation safety system overall that proactively identifies, manages and mitigates safety risks.

Refer to correspondence (24/02/18) from Lachie (and my reply), a former Senior Bureaucrat, from the Department of Infrastructure in the Aviation and Airports division, with the title of Director International Standards: 

Dear Lachie -

Correspondence from the Department of Infrastructure etc..etc:

---

Dear P2,
 
In responding to this chain of correspondence I have tried to summarise some questions for ease of reading.
 
For questions on the provision of accident reports, the ATSB remains committed to meeting its international obligations in providing reports to ICAO, noting it has already acknowledged the circumstances relating to previous delays.  The ATSB requested a full audit from ICAO in relation to their implementation of Annex 13 which was conducted in April 2017.  This resulted in no findings relating to its reporting processes.  ICAO is not currently awaiting any further reports from the ATSB.
 
In relation to the recruitment of Australia’s nominee to the Air Navigation Commission, this was advertised publicly.  As per Departmental policy this was advertised on the APS Jobs website as well as the Seek website from 16th May to 2nd June.  The nominee to the ANC is a non-ongoing employee with the Department.  There is no conflict of interest in the role, as they are providing Australian expertise to an international aviation body which focuses on defining global standards to facilitate safe and efficient international air services.
 
For comments on filing of differences, as per Article 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), of which Australia is a signatory, we file a range of differences with ICAO. Airservices Australia regularly publish these in the Aeronautical Information Publication available on their website.  Australia takes a proactive and conservative approach, updating its differences often and reporting any point of difference to allow operators the information they need to conduct safe operations.
 
Due the subjective nature of filing differences, the comparison of numbers of differences is not regularly used as a measure.  State’s safety oversight arrangements at ICAO are benchmarked through an assessment process leading to an effective implementation score.  Australia was assessed in October 2017 by ICAO auditors and while the results are yet to be made public it places Australia in the top 10 States for safety oversight compliance. 
 
An earlier email refers to a trigger of 20 aviation fatalities for an audit, however this is not the case.  ICAO maintain their own risk profile for conducting audits and accident rates are compared, particularly relative to air traffic volumes.  This is one factor along with outcomes from recent assessments, State’s level of updating differences, responding to ICAO correspondence, aviation growth, political stability and maturity of safety systems amongst others.
 
Regards,
 
Lachlan Phillips
Director International Standards
Aviation Environment Branch | Airports & Aviation Division
Department of Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
T: +61 2 6274 6869 | M: +61 432 756 844 

---

& my reply... 

---

Dear Lachlan,



Thank you for responding to my questions which were originally addressed to our permanent representative to ICAO Sam Lucas to be forwarded to the ICAO Secretariat. For your ease of reading, and in order to properly summarise what we (PAIN) require from the department, I have attempted to address each of your ‘summary points’ in an abbreviated Q&A paragraph format. 
    

To begin you said: 

“..For questions on the provision of accident reports, the ATSB remains committed to meeting its international obligations in providing reports to ICAO, noting it has already acknowledged the circumstances relating to previous delays…The ATSB requested a full audit from ICAO in relation to their implementation of Annex 13 which was conducted in April 2017.  This resulted in no findings relating to its reporting processes.  ICAO is not currently awaiting any further reports from the ATSB…” 

Q/ When you said - ‘circumstances relating to previous delays’ - did you mean the ATSB response to Karen Casey in the DIP process to the VH-NGA re-investigation final report? (See attached at ATSB response to K3)


Your response and the ATSB DIP reply comment fails to address the identified safety concern that was relayed to Sam Lucas in PAIN’s supportive report for and on behalf of Karen Casey (see attached).

Quote:
 Due to the Norfolk inquires, serious investigations began in 2015. This revealed that a ‘modified’ PDF copy of the preliminary Pel-Air ditching report did exist on the ICAO data base. Tracking of the document shows no changes were made. It appears that the document was ‘on-file’ within the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) from ‘created’ date - 15 January 2010; but, was not provided to the ICAO before 10 November, 2015.
 
Further investigation of preliminary and final reports between 2009 to 2015 revealed that almost every report entered between 2009 and 2011 was uploaded by an ATSB officer during the same week the ‘modification’ of the Pel-Air ditching took place.
 
There exist four (4) examples of the 2009/2010 reports which were, apparently, submitted to ICAO ADREP in the first week of November 2015, presumably by an ATSB data input officer.
 
These are attached as PDF copies. To allow a determination of when the PDF copy of the [i]occurrence report was actually created, click on FILE, go to 'Properties' in the drop down box and click. Then view date 'created' date.[/i]
 
Research indicates a ‘selective’ approach to reporting and categorising of incident and accident.
 
The PAIN data base reflects the manipulation of categorisation and subsequent lack of reporting clarity – even where an investigation as actually been carried out. ICAO reporting aside, the significant, progressive reduction in SR made since the fatal accident at Lockhart River, 2005 is of grave concern to the industry.     
 
For your information PAIN has access to both the ICAO iSTARS ADREP and ECCAIRS databases, to which there is considerable evidence that these reports are not being properly disseminated to industry.
 
Now it could be, as you say and have obviously been led to believe, that these ICAO reporting aberrations have been addressed from the ATSB/Australian end. This would then suggest that the disconnection of Australian AAI reports being made publicly available could be somewhere in the downstream communication with ICAO. Therefore the ATSB excel file (see attached), containing 108 ATSB completed investigations between November 2015 till November last year, could provide a valuable reference for both Australia and ICAO to cross reference to check the integrity of the ADREP system and the downstream dissemination of these valuable air safety reports.
 
You said:
 
“..In relation to the recruitment of Australia’s nominee to the Air Navigation Commission, this was advertised publicly.  As per Departmental policy this was advertised on the APS Jobs website as well as the Seek website from 16th May to 2nd June.  The nominee to the ANC is a non-ongoing employee with the Department.  There is no conflict of interest in the role, as they are providing Australian expertise to an international aviation body which focuses on defining global standards to facilitate safe and efficient international air services…”
 
Comment: Thank you for that, I guess I didn’t go back far enough inside of the Seek website to which I regularly refer. On the comments on COI I guess I’ll have to agree to disagree but PAIN will be actively monitoring the performance of Mr Tiede in both his roles. Especially in light of the ongoing ATSB/Coroner investigation(s) into YMEN B200 DFO accident and it’s tie in with the Senate Inquiry into the Airport Amendment Act 2016 and the 41 pages of Australian notified differences to ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 (see attached pic).
 
You said:
 
 “…For comments on filing of differences, as per Article 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), of which Australia is a signatory, we file a range of differences with ICAO. Airservices Australia regularly publish these in the Aeronautical Information Publication available on their website.  Australia takes a proactive and conservative approach, updating its differences often and reporting any point of difference to allow operators the information they need to conduct safe operations. 

Due the subjective nature of filing differences, the comparison of numbers of differences is not regularly used as a measure.  State’s safety oversight arrangements at ICAO are benchmarked through an assessment process leading to an effective implementation score.  Australia was assessed in October 2017 by ICAO auditors and while the results are yet to be made public it places Australia in the top 10 States for safety oversight compliance…”  

Comment: I am fully cognisant of the Airservices AIRAC publication but disagree with some of the premises and assumptions that you make in the above paragraphs.
 
To begin here is the link for the latest ASA notified differences AIRAC: http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/...7-h136.pdf
 
I guess it could be argued that the AIP SUP does allow operators the information they need to conduct safe operations ?? However whether that information can be easily disseminated when you consider the many 100s of pages and thousands of notified differences that AIP SUP links to is an entirely different matter.
 
In comparison please refer to the five pages of GEN 1.7 of the Singaporean CAAS AIP:  https://www.caas.gov.sg/docs/default-sou...1feb18.pdf
 
The following is a quote from the KC_ICAO_1 PDF (see above or attached) which we believe summarises why it is that we have such a huge number of notified differences to ICAO and why we think this is a significant safety issue concern:
 
“.. In general, it must be stated that the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has an unique approach to ICAO compliance, with record number of ‘notified differences’. Many of the notifications may, at face value, seem insignificant. It is our opinion that the noted differences are structured to support the complex, contradictory, flawed rule set in place. Reform of this rule set has been in train for thirty years, with successive government ministers and directors of civil aviation promising to complete the task ‘within the next three years’. This is an important consideration as it reflects on the operational approach taken to both open reporting of ‘incident’ or event; and, the tangible fear of prosecution. Australia’s Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) are founded on the ‘criminal code’ and ‘strict liability’; this, standing alone, provides a strong disincentive to openly reporting safety related matters. This attitude is reflected in the government safety bodies approach to ICAO compliance and reporting…”
 
PAIN understands that the department policy is to place very little importance on notified differences being a ‘measure’ on aviation safety standards of ICAO signatory States.
 
Reference: 1.2 Supplementary to submission 1 (PDF 60 KB) 
 
Did the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development collate and analyse the differences lodged with the ICAO by Serbia and Vanuatu when their respective Memoranda of Understanding and proposed Air Services Agreements were being negotiated?
 
No. Air services arrangements provide an economic framework in which airlines can consider serving a market. Differences lodged by States, among other more pertinent kinds of safety-related information, may be taken into account by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in the assessment of applications for the operation of foreign aircraft into and out of Australia.
 
Regards
Gilon Smith
Director (a/g), Air Services Negotiations
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
gilon.smith@infrastructure.gov.au Ph: 02 6274 6634

 
However the above departmental answer to the QON would seem to have been contradicted in the other supplemental submission:  1.1 Supplementary to submission 1 (PDF 78 KB) 
 
“..The process of notification of differences provides a structured way for each State to communicate its aviation rules by measuring itself against the neutral framework of the ICAO standards…”
 
Q/ Given this conflict in interpretation of notified differences as a ‘measuring’ stick of aviation standards and the fact that the department was obviously responsible for creating the Serbia/Vanuatu/Australia 10696 notified differences table, for the benefit of the Senate RRAT committee and industry stakeholders, would it not be possible for the department to collate a similar table for say the top 50 ICAO signatory States?
 
Q/ For the benefit of the committee would it be possible (in camera if required) for the department to forward the:
 
a/ 2017 ICAO audit report of the ATSB;
b/ The 2009 FAA IASA audit report of the CASA;
c/ The 7 December 2009 CASA Board minutes;


Finally, considering the positive feedback the department has received from ICAO’s October 2017 audit, would it be possible for the committee to view that report prior to it’s public release? Would it also be possible for the department to suggest that CASA invite the FAA IASA auditors back to audit and compare whether all the 2009 FAA IASA audit findings have been properly and proactively addressed? 
  
PAIN and associates look forward to your response and welcome the dialogue the department has opened up with industry.
 
Kind regards,

P2

I believe not one of the multiple of serious safety issues we (PAIN) uncovered back then has been addressed and if anything the drift away from compliance with ICAO international safety standards has gotten far worse. At least (six years ago) we had someone (Lachie) whose job it was to create the illusion that we cared about appearing to be more closely aligned with the ICAO SARPs...

Question to add to above (to hopefully Lachie's replacement??), can we please have a copy of the latest ICAO audit report??   

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

ICAO compliance: The Exemplar (Singapore) vs the Normalised Deviant (Australia) -

First an excellent article from the North Carolina University Journal of Law (Fall 2004), titled 'Compliance & Enforcement in International Law: Achieving Global Uniformity in Aviation Safety'. This article is well worth a full read for a layman's better understanding of the original spirit and intent and international legal obligations for compliance with the ICAO Annexures standards IE SARPs:

PG 10: "..Article 12 of the Chicago Convention requires every
contracting state to keep its regulations uniform, to the greatest
extent possible, with those established under the Convention. 29
Article 37 of the Convention attempts to achieve uniformity in air
navigation, by requiring that every contracting state cooperate in
achieving the "highest practicable degree of uniformity in
regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to
aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in
which uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation."3
The sentence that follows provides that, "[t]o this end [ICAO]
shall adopt and amend from time to time... international
standards and recommended practices and procedures" addressing
various aspects of air navigation.31 Therefore, ICAO's 188
member states have an affirmative obligation to conform their
domestic laws, rules, and regulations to the international leveling..

..standards adopted by ICAO.32

In 1948, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution encouraging
contracting states to adopt "so far as practicable, the precise
language of those ICAO Standards that are of a regulatory
character .... ICAO has drafted its Annexes in a way to
"facilitate incorporation, without major textual changes, into
national legislation. 34 Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing),35 Annex 6
(Operation of Aircraft),3 6 and Annex 8 (Airworthiness of
Aircraft) 37 require ICAO's 188 member states to promulgate
domestic laws and regulations to certify airmen, aircraft, and
aircraft operators as airworthy and competent to carry out safe
operations in international aviation.3

" Subject to the notification of
differences, the legal regime effectively assumes that states are in
compliance with these safety mandates. 39 Thus, although member
states retain the right to restrict particular aircraft from their
skies,4

" they lose the right to ignore the safety mandates of the..

..governing international organization - ICAO." This assumption
of universal compliance goes further with the Chicago Convention
requirement that an airman or operator certificate, or certificate or
airworthiness, issued by one contracting state shall be recognized
as valid by all others.42

Under Article 33, states are obliged to recognize the validity of
the certificates of airworthiness and personnel licenses issued by
the state in which the aircraft is registered, so long as the standards
under which such certificates or licenses were rendered are at least
as stringent as those established under the Chicago Convention.43
But this principle of mutual recognition works only if all states are
implementing the SARPs with an equal degree of diligence. Too
often, it is too difficult or impossible to tell." The negative
implications of Article 33 are that if a state fails to comply with
"the minimum standards which may be established from time to
time pursuant to this Convention,, 45 then other states are not
obliged to recognize the validity of the certificates of
airworthiness issued by the delinquent state, and may therefore
ban such aircraft from their skies. This is an important incentive
for compliance with the international obligations established by
ICAO.."

Perhaps this article should be required reading for Betsy, Su_Spence, Harfwit Popinjay and their bloated minions...

Especially when you consider the following WWC (weasel word confection), from Betsy's Department of everything website under the heading of 'Australia and ICAO', where it states:

As a foundation member of ICAO, Australia has contributed significantly to ICAO – including as a Part 1 State of Chief Importance on the ICAO Council - for more than 70 years. Australia participated in the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, and was one of the first States to ratify it.

Since ICAO’s inception, Australia has demonstrated a strong commitment, dependability and leadership in the international civil aviation sector.

We work collaboratively with the international community, regional neighbours and the ICAO to enhance standards and guidance for safety, security and facilitation, air navigation, and environmental protection.

In particular, in the Asia Pacific region where air travel is vital to the economic development and social connectivity of the Pacific Islands, Australia works closely with our Pacific neighbours through providing capacity and capability building assistance on transport safety, air navigation and security issues.

Australia has maintained a Permanent Mission in Montreal for ICAO since 6 June 1945, and is represented on the ICAO Air Navigation Commission. We were successfully re-elected to Part I of the ICAO Council at the 40th Assembly in Montreal in September 2019 as one of the States of chief importance in air transport.

If Betsy & CO want an incentive to truly uphold any of that waffle and their commitment to harmonisation and compliance with ICAO SARPs, then perhaps the following extract from AMROBA's latest Newsletter will provide examples and motivation for a rethink on the current (take the piss) strategy/policy when it comes to international diplomacy on Aviation safety standards:

Differences with ICAO Annexes

The 2023/2024 ICAO audit/report “highlighted areas where “Australia could more fully realise the benefits of closer alignment with ICAO’s standards and practices (SARPs)” and these areas will be responded to through corrective action plans agreed with ICAO”. 

Those “corrective action plans” should be made public. It has nothing to do with security or secrecy. AMROBA has been recommending adoption of ICAO standards for 20 years.  Differences lodged with ICAO are very misleading to any other nations assessing our differences. For instance, Annex 1, Chapter 4 difference:

This is misleading information being provided to ICAO and other nations, stating Australia has competency-based training and qualifications but not working with ASQA or recognising AQF AME qualifications for helicopter and unpressurised aeroplanes in regulatory requirements.

All the major regulatory systems “provide specific guidance material on the design and development of training programs for aircraft maintenance personnel, especially EASR Parts 66/147 that were partially adopted.” 

By government not providing specific guidance material on the design and development of training programs for aircraft maintenance personnel, compliance with ICAO SARPs have not been implemented, nor has harmonisation with EASR Parts 66/147 A & B regulations.

• Australia now has a critical shortage of aircraft maintenance personnel.
• Australia is not a major regulatory system.

The USA, EU, Canada, Brazil, UK are major regulatory systems.

It is no wonder why ICAO stated that Australia (industry) would benefit from adopting SARPs.

Remember, past CASA CEOs stated they would urgently realign Part 21 with FAR Part 21 but have done nothing.

Ever since CASA decided to use EASA regulations as the model for CASRs, the differences with the ICAO Annexes SARPs have continued to rise.  Why haven’t governments met the intent of the Convention?
“ICAO: These ICAO standards are essential because they ensure uniformity and consistency across the global aviation industry. When countries adhere to ICAO SARPs, they can be confident that their aviation practices meet internationally recognized safety criteria. This uniformity is particularly crucial for international flights, where aircraft and personnel from different countries must operate seamlessly together.
ICAO monitors member states’ compliance with its safety standards and recommended practices through safety oversight audits and reviews.
These audits identify areas where member states may be falling short in implementing safety standards and recommend corrective actions. This proactive approach ensures that countries continuously work towards improving their aviation safety systems and practices.
The harmonization of aviation safety standards promotes global connectivity by removing barriers and ensuring compatibility among aviation systems worldwide. This enables smoother international travel, trade, and cooperation, ultimately benefiting economies and societies around the globe.”
• Why is government/CASA living in the past?  Nobody knows.
• Why won’t they look to the future?   Nobody knows.  
• Why won’t they implement ICAO SARPs?  Nobody knows.

ICAO provides courses for NAA staff on how to “Plan and Implement ICAO SARPs.” 

Next, let's rewind to page 1 for the original intent of this long running thread and with reference to the infamous UP Senate Inquiry thead...

Newsflash: JQ is Gobble's new chopper pilot in Montreal!

I was half way up Mt Noncompliance contemplating yet another FF crevasse followed by a geyser of FF pony pooh, when lo and behold JQ and Gobbles were hovering above me in a shiny new Bell 406. Gobbles manned the winch and within minutes I was pass the FF PNR onwards and upwards….we proceeded to a point 343 metres above sea level and this is what we found…



Note: Creamy touched on this NCN briefly but perhaps it needs a bit more exploring to test the FF veracity on their proposed actions/inactions (by proxi notified differences) and it is also relevant in regards to the inquiry i.e. Flight recorders err OBRs…err CVRs!

1) FF said they were going to file a difference with ICAO by 31 October 2008! Did they?
Well after much teasing, fluffing, huffing and puffing mixed in with a series of expletives (FFS there must be literally thousands of notified differences to ICAO!) while reading over the extremely convoluted AIP SUP H12/11, I finally think I’ve found it in the Annex 6 section.
Here is what it says at Para 3.6.3.4.2.2…“No standards are specified in Australian legislation for the preservation of flight recorder records.”

"..Okay so the reason for creating this thread is to; a) kick around and review Murky's latest bollocks SSP; b) attempt to scale (ICAO) Mount Non-compliance and establish whether c) it is possible to reign in the significant growth of NCNs prior to the upcoming ICAO/FAA audit..."

So the thread has developed since September 2016 highlighting that, when it comes to compliance with ICAO, Australia is clearly taking the piss with it's notification of differences lists to ICAO SARPs.

Extract from post #8:

..It is worth noting that of the listed 10,696 notified differences from the three countries, 4024 were from Australia, this is a disturbing 38% of the total. But what is more disturbing is the figure in the 'Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented' category (in other words the 'up yours' category... ), which was an UDB 2078, compared to 41 Serbia & 9 Vanuatu... :

4024 notified differences for Australia?? Recently I had collated from the 2015 AIP GEN 1.7 SUP that notified differences had grown to a total of 3116. However in actual fact between the 2011 SUP the figure had grown to 4024 but due to the loose ICAO arrangement of only listing NDs every 3 years this was missed. So from my approximate estimate from 2011 to 2014 the NDs had grown by 2500.

This means that in actual fact in the period between 10 February 2014 till November 2015 the Department has managed to reduce the notified differences by 908.

Still got a long way to go but perhaps this highlights more than anything else the impact that the Senator Fawcett inquisition had way back on the 10 February 2014...

Okay so that was the ND count back then and I believe, for a brief period, the total of NDs actually dipped below 3000 and less than 300 pages. However I have now conducted a rough count (with tired eyes maybe skipping or adding here and there?) and unfortunately the total ND count is on the way up again with over 400 pages and 3100 notified differences - see here: https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip...ndards.asp if you wish to verify.

The worst example of non-compliance with any of the Annexes was by a country mile Annex 14, with 69 pages and a 1024 NDs... I guess that's what you get when a Government and it's bloated Bureaucracy decide that is an acceptable safety risk to build massive shopping centres alongside active ILS runways...

Incidently when you review the 'Safety Audit Results: USOAP interactive viewer' for the latest self-assessed results for Australia for 'Aerodromes', Betsy and his Minions believe we are over 87% compliant with ICAO - UDB??

Next, Singapore has been a member State of ICAO since 19/06/1966, therefore a mature enough signatory State (IE working under the ICAO SARPs for more than 50 years) and in our region for a 'Chalk & Cheese' comparison. Therefore I refer you to the following AIP Singapore CAAS link: https://www.caas.gov.sg/docs/default-sou...y-2024.pdf

So therefore their GEN 1.7 totals 4 pages...









For Annex 14 there are 5 notified differences - WOW 5 vs 1024...

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

ICAO compliance: Normalised Deviant (Australia) - TICK TOCK!! FAA (IASA) audit??

Latest from KC and AMROBA...

Via AP emails:

To all members, 

Making regulations to give effect to the ICAO (engineering) SARPs would provide benefits to the engineering sectors.

We all know that.

The government’s adopted harmonisation policy in the 1990s was on target to achieve these benefits.

CASA 2003/4 decision to go EASRs changed all that. 

The engineering benefits cannot be achieved with multiple differences lodged with ICAO against Annex 8, in particular.

When will government policy return to be in compliance with the SARPs? 

The first step is to adopt ICAO defnitions so we all use the global aviation terminology and meanings.

We are not unique, just another civil aviation country that is more focused on being unique and not harmonised. 

Maybe the recent ICAO audit findings may change government policy. 

Many say we would be better off if we kept the ANRs/ANOs 

Read the attached document that we will be putting on the website.

 Ken Cannane

Executive Director

AMROBA

Phone: (02) 97592715

Mobile: 0408029329

www.amroba.org.au

Safety All Around.

Ref: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...-1-pdf.jpg



 

Plus today, KC with a work in progress...

ICAO Compliance numbers

"As I put the numbers in it is alarming..."

Ref: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...ance-1.pdf

P2 in reply to numerous recipients -  :

FYI (see attached) plus:

1.  ICAO compliance: The Exemplar (Singapore) vs the Normalised Deviant (Australia)

2. Mushrooms v Bubble Heads (Round 28).

Q/ How much has been lost (over the last 20+ years) from our GDP in earnings from lost potential international aeronautical industry export and domestic aviation productivity, with the draconian, isolationist,  internationally disharmonised aviation standards and Big-R regulatory policy of the Australian Aviation Safety Bureaucracy?

Q/ How long before ICAO are forced to call in the FAA IASA team to properly audit Australia?

Ref: https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iasa 

---

The traveling public expects aviation to be the safest mode of transportation around the world, and the FAA's International Aviation Safety Assessment program – called IASA – is one of its proven, longstanding instruments to make sure those expectations are met.

Through this shared commitment among the FAA and civil aviation authorities around the world, the IASA program helps identify areas to strengthen aviation safety oversight and meet the United Nation's International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards.

When another country's air carrier flies into the U.S., or codeshares with a U.S. air carrier, they must meet safety standards set by the ICAO. Through the IASA program, the FAA focuses on a country's ability, not the ability of individual air carriers, to adhere to those international safety standards and recommended practices.

You can find more details about these standards and practices such as personnel licensing; operation of aircraft; and, airworthiness of aircraft, within the ICAO "Chicago Convention".

Specifically, the IASA program assesses and determines a country's compliance with these international standards on the ICAO's eight critical elements of effective aviation safety oversight in the ICAO Document 9734, Safety Oversight Manual. Those eight critical elements include:

1. Primary aviation legislation
   
2. Specific operating regulations
   
3. State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions
   
4. Technical personnel qualification and training
   
5. Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety critical information
   
6. Licensing, certification, authorization, and approval obligations
   
7. Surveillance obligations
   
8. Resolution of safety concerns
   

The IASA program is administered by the FAA Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (AVS), Flight Standards Service (AFS), International Programs and Policy Division (AFS-50). Supported by the FAA's Office of International Aviation (API), these divisions further work with countries who request additional assistance based on the IASA program's findings.

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

KC updates ICAO Compliance Numbers -

Via the AP email chains:

"..I have updated the differences chart.

Each part/volume is linked to the ASA website.

Have added department/agency responsible for each annex. 

Makes interesting reading.."

Ref: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...ance-3.pdf



As another point of comparison for ICAO compliance, the following is the current list of NDs for the State of Qatar... - Ref: https://aim.gov.qa/eaip/2018-09-13-AIRAC...en-GB.html

GEN 1.7 DIFFERENCES FROM ICAO STANDARDS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

1. ANNEX 1 — PERSONNEL LICENSING, Eleventh Edition, July 2011:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 Annex 1, 4.3.2 and 4.4.1.4 exceeds Qatar had adopted Class 1 medical certificate for air traffic controllers instead of Class 3 Qatar has adopted more stringent medical requirements for ATCOs.
2. ANNEX 2 — RULES OF THE AIR, Tenth Edition, July 2005: NIL differences.
3. ANNEX 3 — METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE FOR INTERNATIONAL AIR NAVIGATION, Eighteenth Edition July 2013:
NIL differences
4. ANNEX 4 — AERONAUTICAL CHARTS, Eleventh Edition, July 2009:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 Chapter 4 Not applicable Intentionally left blank SARPS not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
2 Chapter 5 Not applicable Intentionally left blank SARPS not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
3 7.6.3 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
4 7.8.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
5 8.8.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
6 9.8.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
7 10.8.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
8 11.3.3.2 Not applicable Intentionally left blank Recommendation not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
9 11.4 Different in character Recommendation not adopted 210 x 148mm (A4 as the standard size of paper for IAC)
10 11.9.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
11 12.4 Different in character Recommendation not adopted 210 x 148mm (A4 as the standard size of paper for IAC)
12 16.7.12.1 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain.
13 17.7.12.1 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain.
14 Chapter 18 Not applicable Intentionally left blank SARPS not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
15 Chapter 20 Not applicable Intentionally left blank SARPS not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
5. ANNEX 5 — UNITS OF MEASUREMENT TO BE USED IN AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS, Fifth Edition, July 2010: NIL differences.
6. ANNEX 6 — OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT, Part 1 – Ninth Edition, July 2010:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 6.2.2.1 Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented Implementation date is 31 December 2018 instead of 31 December 2016 for halon-free extinguishers Implementation date is 31 December 2018
7. ANNEX 6 — OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT, Part 2 – Eighth Edition, July 2014:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 Section 2- 2.4.2.3 Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented Implementation date is 31 December 2018 instead of 31 December 2016 for halon-free extinguishers Implementation date is 31 December 2018
8. ANNEX 6 — OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT, Part 3 – Seventh Edition, July 2010:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 Section II 4.2.2.1 Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented Implementation date is 31 December 2018 instead of 31 December 2016 for halon-free extinguishers Implementation date is 31 December 2018
2 Section III 4.1.3.2 Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented Implementation date is 31 December 2018 instead of 31 December 2016 for halon-free extinguishers Implementation date is 31 December 2018
9. ANNEX 7 — AIRCRAFT NATIONALITY AND REGISTRATION MARKS, Sixth Edition, July 2012: NIL differences.
10. ANNEX 8 — AIRWORTHINESS OF AIRCRAFT, Eleventh Edition, July 2010: NIL differences.
11. ANNEX 9 — FACILITATION, Fourteenth Edition, October 2015: NIL differences.
12. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol I – Sixth Edition, July 2006: NIL differences.
13. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol II – Sixth Edition, October 2001: NIL differences.
14. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol III – Second Edition, July 2007: NIL differences.
15. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol IV – Fifth Edition, July 2014: NIL differences.
16. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol V – Third Edition, July 2013: NIL differences.
17. ANNEX 11 — AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES, Thirteenth Edition, July 2001: NIL differences.
18. ANNEX 12 — SEARCH AND RESCUE, Eighth Edition, July 2004: NIL differences.
19. ANNEX 13 — AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION, Tenth Edition, July 2010: NIL differences.
20. ANNEX 14 — AERODROMES, Vol I – Sixth Edition, July 2013: NIL differences.
21. ANNEX 14 — AERODROMES, Vol II – Fourth Edition, July 2013: NIL differences.
22. ANNEX 15 — AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION SERVICES, Fifteenth Edition, July 2016.
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 5.1.1.1 Partially implemented Item (u) – pertaining to volcanic activity No volcanic activity in the State of Qatar.
2 5.2.3 Not applicable SNOWTAM No snow in the State of Qatar.
3 5.2.4 Not applicable ASHTAM No volcanic activity in the State of Qatar
4 5.3.4 Partially implemented ASHTAM is excluded ASHTAM not being issued by the State of Qatar.
5 7.1.1.1 Partially implemented Item (20) not adopted. Snow plan is omitted in the list.
6 7.1.1.2 Not applicable Snow plan Not applicable due to local climate.
23. ANNEX 16 — ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Vol I – Seventh Edition, July 2014: NIL differences.
24. ANNEX 16 — ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Vol II – Third Edition, July 2008: NIL differences.
25. ANNEX 17 — SECURITY — SAFEGUARDING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE, Ninth Edition, March 2011: NIL differences.
26. ANNEX 18 — THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY AIR, Fourth Edition, July 2011: NIL differences.
27. ANNEX 19 — SAFETY MANAGEMENT, First Edition, July 2013: NIL differences.

Hmm...fairly close to the Singaporean version of GEN 1.7, plus it includes the NDs for PANS-OPS:

29) PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (PANS-ATM, DOC 4444) 16th Edition Amendment 7A: NIL differences.

30) PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS Volume I - Flight Procedures, 5th Edition Amendment 7: NIL differences.

31) PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS Volume II - Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight Procedures, 5th Edition Amendment 7: NIL differences.

Hmm...funny how the QatarGATE matter had nothing to do with Aviation Safety - see HERE (from the Conversation) - but merely a protection racket for Qantas and any form of serious international airline competition in the Oz airline market?? Seriously if Qatar wanted to take the Albo Government to task it would be easy enough for them to expose our serious non-compliance issues in regards to our obligations to be as closely compliant to the ICAO SARPs as 'one of the States of chief importance in air transport' - UDB!

MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Things that make you go Hmmm!

Its not really idle speculation, more of an 'I wonder' or a 'what if'  - more the sort of thing you'd bring up at the Pub; hardly worthy of a scribble, but curious to see what wiser heads may have to say. Here is the 'Line' which started the notion; that, the FAA video and P2- HERE - which set me to thinking about Australia's 'differences' lodged' with ICAO.

"Therefore, ICAO's 188 member states have an affirmative obligation to conform their
domestic laws, rules, and regulations to the international levelling"..

Now, its not only Qantas who operate in the USA, there are other States which are really ICAO and IASA compliant; have to be, 'them's the 'rooles'. In turn, other national carriers who are 'used' to operating in ICAO/IASA 'compliant' countries come to Australia, with the expectation of systems and aerodromes etc. being on a par. Yet they are not. How many flight crew have read through the hundreds of pages of 'differences' and, more to the point, how many 'operators' have ploughed their way through those differences and drafted 'special' procedures and warnings for flight crew operating into Australian airspace and aerodromes?

Of course, non of this matters in day to day routine operations; esoteric perhaps, maybe even irrelevant on a routine - just another shift at the mill day: operationally. Until something goes wrong and the casual world of 'routine' operations ends up in a court. Just suppose a 'difference' - practice or procedure was deemed the radical (or even partial) cause of a hull loss (for example) - what then? Insurance legal top dogs don't mess about; if there is even a slim argument that an Australian 'difference' was part of the causal chain, that would be exploited? Could an ICAO or IASA compliant national carrier be held to account for being 'non compliant' with their own 'systems' operating into a national system which is non compliant? See the turn about - the national carrier's book work says 'Thou shall't not'  - but due to the 'differences' - technically (legally) - are they in breach of their own tenets? A lawyers picnic I reckon.

It is the horror story at Essendon which prompted the thoughts; well that and the DFO parked within the runway confines and the foreign aircraft turning up for service at Bombardier. The intriguing part is what is 'causal' - aircraft hits building - building responsible for causing damage; but not party to the cause for the event? No brainer; the building is arguably 'illegal' - (lost cause) - but not responsible for the aircraft hitting it: i.e. not 'causal'. Intriguing ain't it.



Ref: https://www.australianflying.com.au/late...ice-centre



Ref: https://auntypru.com/essendon-dfo-accide...christine/

Anyway; too much time spent already on the legendary 'Chicken and Egg' argument. Just needed to file and forget these stray notions.

Toot - toot.......

[Peetwo]

Things that make you go Hmmm! - Part II

Previous:

Its not really idle speculation, more of an 'I wonder' or a 'what if'  - more the sort of thing you'd bring up at the Pub; hardly worthy of a scribble, but curious to see what wiser heads may have to say. Here is the 'Line' which started the notion; that, the FAA video and P2- HERE - which set me to thinking about Australia's 'differences' lodged' with ICAO.

"Therefore, ICAO's 188 member states have an affirmative obligation to conform their
domestic laws, rules, and regulations to the international levelling"..

Now, its not only Qantas who operate in the USA, there are other States which are really ICAO and IASA compliant; have to be, 'them's the 'rooles'. In turn, other national carriers who are 'used' to operating in ICAO/IASA 'compliant' countries come to Australia, with the expectation of systems and aerodromes etc. being on a par. Yet they are not. How many flight crew have read through the hundreds of pages of 'differences' and, more to the point, how many 'operators' have ploughed their way through those differences and drafted 'special' procedures and warnings for flight crew operating into Australian airspace and aerodromes?

Of course, non of this matters in day to day routine operations; esoteric perhaps, maybe even irrelevant on a routine - just another shift at the mill day: operationally. Until something goes wrong and the casual world of 'routine' operations ends up in a court. Just suppose a 'difference' - practice or procedure was deemed the radical (or even partial) cause of a hull loss (for example) - what then? Insurance legal top dogs don't mess about; if there is even a slim argument that an Australian 'difference' was part of the causal chain, that would be exploited? Could an ICAO or IASA compliant national carrier be held to account for being 'non compliant' with their own 'systems' operating into a national system which is non compliant? See the turn about - the national carrier's book work says 'Thou shall't not'  - but due to the 'differences' - technically (legally) - are they in breach of their own tenets? A lawyers picnic I reckon.

It is the horror story at Essendon which prompted the thoughts; well that and the DFO parked within the runway confines and the foreign aircraft turning up for service at Bombardier. The intriguing part is what is 'causal' - aircraft hits building - building responsible for causing damage; but not party to the cause for the event? No brainer; the building is arguably 'illegal' - (lost cause) - but not responsible for the aircraft hitting it: i.e. not 'causal'. Intriguing ain't it.



Ref: https://www.australianflying.com.au/late...ice-centre



Ref: https://auntypru.com/essendon-dfo-accide...christine/

Anyway; too much time spent already on the legendary 'Chicken and Egg' argument. Just needed to file and forget these stray notions.

Toot - toot.......

While on the subject of the Bombardier facility at Essendon Fields airport, Bombardier is a recognised first class Canadian aircraft manufacturer, with a long and proud history of producing a economically competitive and ICAO safety compliant commercial aviation product. Therefore it is with interest that I reviewed the latest 132 page Canadian Transport iteration of the AIP GEN, which includes GEN 1.7 and the 37.5 pages (refer from pg 26) of NDs that Canada submits to ICAO...   

Out of interest there are 9 pages of NDs listed under Annex 14: (ref: GEN 1-50 to GEN 1-60):

Things that make you Hmmm??

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Things that make you go Hmmm! - Australian Non-compliance with Annex 11 TIBA??

Via IFALPA: https://www.ifalpa.org/media/4060/24sab0...rspace.pdf

Operations in Australian Traffic Information
Broadcasts by Aircraft (TIBA) Airspace
Operations in Class A, C, D or E Airspace without ATC Services

NOTE
This Safety Bulletin was distributed by IFALPA Member Association AusALPA. IFALPA
believes it to be relevant to the global pilot community and is reproducing it here for
your information. In all cases please follow the guidance of your operator and local
regulator.

Please review and share widely wherever relevant.

ATTACHMENTS
Four (4) page Safety Bulletin, Operations in Australian Traffic Information Broadcasts by
Aircraft (TIBA) Airspace – Operations in Class A, C, D or E Airspace without ATC Services
24AUSALPASAB01, April 2024

©2024 The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations. This publication is provided for information purposes only, in all cases pilots should follow their company’s guidance and procedures. In the interest of flight safety, reproduction of this publication in whole or in part is encouraged. It may not be offered for sale or used commercially. All reprints must credit IFALPA.

---

MTF...P2