Mount Non-compliance & upcoming ICAO/FAA audit?

Dear Barnaby, Pip & CO - L&Ks KC and the AMROBA Band


A large proportion of the civil aviation industry have diametrically opposed views of the current regulatory reform direction that CASA is pursuing, based on Byron’s decision to follow EASA. This direction has resulted in so many lodged differences to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Annexes, that it is now very obvious why other countries and their NAAs are not accepting Government/CASA product certification documents and Australian civil aviation engineering products and services.
Civil Aviation Aircraft.
Based on the number of aircraft, ASTM created this chart to demonstrate comparison with numbers of types of aircraft.
The far majority of the industry didn’t want the EASA engineering system and still don’t. This was passionately demonstrated by all attendees at the GA meetings in Tamworth and Wagga. Unanimous support for FARs.
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The civil aviation engineering fields of design, manufacture and maintenance prefer the FARs.
Does anyone in government/CASA properly understand Australia’s obligations under the Convention that it signed in 1947? They seemed to have been ignored over the last 2 decades.
1. Why is CASA so diametrically opposed?
A)   Why is CASA following the European regulatory system when industry continues to support the adoption of the USA FAR system as originally supported by politicians and bureaucrats when the CAA was created?
Both Australia and New Zealand were developing congruous regulations based on the FAR system in the 1990s until Byron, early 2000, changed the course of CASA without support or consultation from the whole civil aviation industry.
So began the era of ‘you get what we give you and not what you want’ attitude and this is why the views between industry (FAR supporters) and CASA (EASR supporters) are so diametrically opposed.
B)   Why is CASA un-intentionally or intentionally damaging the global reputation of Australian civil aviation engineering businesses?
CASA/government seem to be determined to insult Australia’s aviation engineering businesses globally by promulgating copious differences to the Annexes’ standards that informs all foreign NAAs, countries and international aviation companies, that we are not compliant with Annexes’ standards. This is damaging the prospect for trade.
Instead of a regulatory focus to be Convention Annex standards compliant, CASA has created so many differences that no mature aviation regulator (NAA) or international aviation engineering business would respect any Australian engineering businesses output. No wonder there is frustration.

C) Why hasn’t CASA/Government kept our regulatory system current with new global standards specified in the (treaty) Convention Annexes?

The Convention Annexes are consistently being amended to implement safer global standards that other NAAs adopt and implement into their regulatory system. Annex 8 is a good engineering example of CASA’s “no action” process. 
  • 7/3/2021: Due to observation that small aircraft below 750 Kg are more engaged in international air navigation, Annex 8, Part V[A] aircraft between 750 – 5700Kg has been replaced by Part VB that covers all new aircraft designs below 5,700 Kg. The 750 Kg lower limit no longer exists and has been removed for all new designs. 
  • 7/3/2021: NAAs should balance risks and rigor in determining compliance based on an acceptable level of risk determined for the product. Note: for aircraft below 5700Kg, how to balance risk and rigor is contained in the 4th edition of Doc 9760, Airworthiness Manual. 
D) Why has CASA lodged so many differences to the Convention Annexes? 

Past politicians and CASA management understood that less differences and harmonisation with the FARs would lead to less differences and open global aviation markets once country to country bilateral agreements were made by the government.

Minimum Annex differences and harmonisation with the FARs should be the expectation of the Minister from CASA. Industry supported. 

CASA/Government must realise that differences to the ICAO standards means other NAAs may not accept our businesses, certifications by CASA, products and services. 

CASA obviously has little understanding of the Convention and its Annexes and how they are used as the standard by other NAAs to review whether a country is keeping abreast of changes. All countries promulgate their differences for others to view.

E) Why can’t CASA certificate aircraft above 5700Kg anymore? 

4/11/2020: Many design standards changed in the Annex for certification of all new aircraft. Differences lodged indicates Australia no longer has the skills to certificate aircraft and products for other than aeroplanes below 5700Kg. 
  • CASA skills demise meant a difference stating CASA can’t certificate aircraft above 5700Kg is a setback for a developing manufacturing industry. 
  • Has CASA employed or training qualified manufacturing inspectors expertise to assess manufacturing?
Apparently not, it is the only reason for lodging a difference when industry has conglomerates and skills who want to build larger aircraft in Australia. CASA’s technical expertise limitations is the only reason that is stopping manufacturing of larger aircraft and products. Industry has the technical expertise and qualifications to build larger aircraft and products.

Government has not met a Convention obligation to staff its engineering sectors with people that have industry equivalent qualifications and experience.

F) Why hasn’t CASA adopted the Annex 8 global standard for formatting maintenance organisation certificates?

5/11/2020: Annex 8 states the State of Registry shall ensure compliance with Chapter 6 of this Annex. The purpose of Chapter 6 is for global standardisation of maintenance organisation certificates to improve global recognition and trade. 

Annex 8, Chapter 6 Appendix contains a template for a global standard maintenance organisation certificate and details what the certificate should contain. 6.1 states previous issued certificates shall be amended before 5 November 2022.

Global Recognition: “  As of 5/11/2020, when approving a maintenance organisation or accepting the approval of a maintenance organisation issued by another Contracting State, the State of Registry (CASA) shall ensure compliance with the Standards of Chapter 6 of this Annex. 

5/11/2020: “Safety management provisions also apply to maintenance organisations.”

G) Why hasn’t CASA adopted changes to Annex 6, Part 2, Chapter 2.6 Aeroplane Maintenance, that set standards of who can do maintenance. 

5/11/2020 and on: new “ the owner or the lessee shall not operate an aeroplane unless maintenance on the aeroplane, including any associated engine, propeller and part, is carried out: a) by an organisation complying with Annex 8, Part II, Chapter 6 that is either approved by the State of Registry of the aeroplane or is approved by another Contracting State and is accepted by the State of Registry; or b) by a person or organisation in accordance with procedures that are authorised by the State of Registry. And there is a maintenance release in relation to the maintenance carried out” 

5/11/2020: “As of 5 November 202, when maintenance is not carried out by an approved organisation, the maintenance release shall be completed and signed by a person appropriately licenced iaw Annex 1 to certify that the maintenance work performed has been completed satisfactorily and iaw data and procedures acceptable to the State of Registry.” 

The AMO issues the M/R but the LAME issues the M/R when the maintenance is not carried out in an approved AMO. 

The above changes also support the FAR FBO-SASO system we need. 


We could go on and on with the differences and the impression other countries and their NAAs will make when reviewing Australia’s differences to the Convention Annexes. The number of differences are at odds with CASA’s ICAO Annex compliance self-audits results. Which provides the real summary of Australia’s Annexes’ standard compliance record? Differences or self-audits?

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MTF...P2  Tongue

Dots and Dashes to Harfwit ICAO NON-COMPLIANCE on ANNEX 14??Blush

Ref thread post:

(07-17-2021, 08:55 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  QON answered - QON unanswered?? -  Rolleyes 

Via RRAT Estimates page:

Quote: Senator RICE: I want to go to issues with Brisbane airspace design and the use of dependent separation approaches in Brisbane's airspace design. What can Airservices Australia say about whether the use of dependent separation approaches is compliant with ICAO standards? Mr Harfield: I will ask Mr Curran to answer those questions if he can. Mr Curran: If I may, I would like to take that on notice with regard to the ICAO compliance. Senator RICE: Have you done any review of whether it is compliant with the ICAO standards? Mr Curran: As a part of the process to implement the Brisbane new parallel runway, there was both a design and an implementation safety analysis undertaken. It was to assess the safety of the design and whether it could be implemented safely. It was committed to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for endorsement. Whether that actually directly linked to ICAO I would have to take on notice. 

Answer: There are two types of dependent separation approaches used for the parallel runways at Brisbane Airport – dependent parallel visual approaches and dependent parallel instrument approaches. There are no International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards for dependent parallel visual approaches. Australia’s dependent visual parallel runway approach standards are set by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and implemented by Airservices Australia (Airservices).

There are ICAO standards for dependent parallel instrument approaches and Airservices can confirm compliance with these standards. The dependent parallel instrument approach standards were reviewed following a change by ICAO in 2018 and updated in February 2020.

Referring to the arrogant Curran AQON, which appear to be taking the piss on the fact that this QON was (perhaps naively) asked by an ill informed Green's Senator (concerned more with breaches of noise abatement procedures), the following are some dots and dashes that IMO point towards a total disconnect by the ASA executive with their aviation safety compliance obligations with both ICAO and indeed (ironically) CASA... Confused

First reference the following link to the original 2004 ICAO MOS in regards "SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS ON PARALLEL OR NEAR-PARALLEL INSTRUMENT RUNWAYS"


Quote: 1.1.1 The use of parallel or near-parallel runways to maximize aerodrome capacity is an old concept. In Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 3, 3.1.10 it is recommended that, where parallel runways are provided for simultaneous use under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) only, the minimum distance between their centre lines should be 210 m when the runways are intended for use by medium or heavy aeroplanes. However, under instrument flight rules (IFR), the safety of parallel runway operations is affected by several factors such as the accuracy of the surveillance radar monitoring system, the ability of controllers to intervene when an aircraft deviates from the instrument landing system (ILS) localizer course or the microwave landing system (MLS) final approach track, the precision with which aircraft can navigate to the runway, and the controller, pilot and aircraft reaction times.

The part in bold is basically what currently occurs in places like the secondary airports with parallel runways like Bankstown, Moorabbin, Jandakot etc..etc. However the line by Curran in the AQON... "There are no International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards for dependent parallel visual approaches" IMO a deliberate bureaucratic obfuscation of weasel words and needs to be called out as such... Dodgy


"..The dependent parallel instrument approach standards were reviewed following a change by ICAO in 2018 and updated in February 2020.."

Next (in reference to above) take note of the following link which summarises the consult to the 2018 ICAO amendment to the Annex 14 standards for parallel instrument runway operations:

Quote from the SOC:

Quote:About this consultation

ICAO standards, published around 2001, require operations to independent parallel runways to use instrument landing systems (ILS) for final approach guidance and air traffic control (ATC) to manually vector all arriving aircraft onto final approach. These standards were included in Part 172 MOS when it was first made in 2005.

In November 2018, ICAO amended the standards for parallel runway operations to allow the use of Ground Based Augmentation System Landing System (GLS), the Required Navigation Performance Authorisation Required (RNP AR) approach specification and Approach Procedures with Vertical Guidance (APV) as well as ILS for final approach guidance. In addition to vectoring, air traffic control (ATC), gained the ability to clear aircraft to intercept final approach for a parallel approach operation using a published arrival and approach procedure.

In response to requests from industry, CASA proposed to remove the limiting Part 172 MOS provisions and adopt the new ICAO standards.


In total, there were 6 respondents. Of the respondents, 3 consented to having their comments published and 3 requested their submissions be confidential.

Responses were received from 2 airlines, an organisation representing pilots and navigators, an aerodrome operator, an air traffic service provider and an aviation consultant.

Summary of feedback

All except one respondent agreed (without comment) with the proposal to remove subsection 10.4.2 — Independent parallel approaches in IMC. A respondent annotated their response to 'Agree with changes' and made the following comments in relation to the proposal:

• The spacing between parallel runways at one Australian aerodrome requires an RNP value of 0.27 for independent approaches using RNP AR. The respondent sought the ability to avoid publishing RNP 0.3 minima for the RNP AR procedure (as normally required by Performance-based Navigation design standards) as this might be misleading for operators at the aerodrome.
• The ICAO standard for independent parallel approaches using RNP AR requires aircraft to confirm established on the RNP AR procedure. The respondent proposed an alternative standard  whereby an aircraft would be deemed to be established on an RNP-AR approach if the aircraft has been cleared via the Initial Approach Fix (IAF), is observed by surveillance to be tracking in accordance with the approach, and has not reported being unable to conduct the approach.
• The ICAO standard for independent parallel approaches precludes breakout instructions once an aircraft descends through 400ft on final approach. The respondent proposed an alternative standard where the height limit would be marked on the controller display a distance from the threshold at which an aircraft on 3 degree descent angle will pass 400ft.
• For each of these comments, the respondent said it would seek approval for an Alternative Means of Compliance (AMC)or an exemption from the relevant standard.

The respondents agreed (without comment) with the proposal to remove the following subsections of the MOS and replace them with the equivalent ICAO standard:

• 10.4.3 (Dependent parallel approaches in IMC)
• 10.4.4 (Independent Parallel Departures).

All except one respondent agreed (without comment) with the proposal to remove subsection 10.4.7 of the MOS — Segregated Parallel Operations in IMC. The other respondent indicated 'Undecided / Not my area of expertise'.

All except one respondent agreed (without comment) with the proposed consequential amendment to subsection 10.5.5 of the MOS. A respondent annotated their response to 'Agree with changes' and indicated that, while they were confident about meeting the November 2019 final implementation date for one aerodrome, implementing at another aerodrome by 8 November 2019 would be challenging because of the significant lead time required to reconfigure precision radar monitoring equipment at the aerodrome. The respondent said it was preferable for the changes to take effect 27 February 2020 with the ability to ‘opt in’ prior to that date.

One respondent said that the existing MOS standards for independent parallel visual approach (IVA) should be updated at the same time as the parallel instrument approach standards. The respondent stated that not doing so is a significant lost opportunity for Australia’s airline industry. The respondent recommended a number of changes to the existing IVA standards.

One respondent made a general comment that adopting the new ICAO standards is a sensible approach to parallel runway operations and is supported by the respondent's organisation.

Another respondent made a general comment about the ICAO requirement for ATC, when vectoring an aircraft, to ensure a period of level flight prior to intercepting the glide path from below. The respondent said this was not optimal or flexible, as flight crew ideally prefer a constant descent path, with energy managed to ensure compliance with any speed requirements etc. The respondent asserted that the existing MOS procedure is more flexible because it only requires a period of level flight as necessary to dissipate speed prior to G/S intercept required (in other words, only when requested by the flight crew).

Next steps

CASA notes the responses from respondents to all the proposed changes and appreciates all comments received.
Regarding the comment about not publishing RNP 0.3 minima for particular aerodromes, CASA sought advice from a PBN specialist. The response was that including an RNP 0.3 minima, despite a lower value being required for independent parallel approach operations, is beneficial for other types of approach operation, such as dependent parallel approaches. The risk of publishing only lower RNP minima is an increased probability of ‘Unable RNP’. CASA considers the matter as being outside the scope of this Part 172 MOS amendment and proposes to engage with the respondent to address compliance aspects.

Regarding the response about alternate means of confirming an aircraft is established on the RNP AR procedure, CASA has been advised by members of the technical working group, who developed the new ICAO standard, that a voice report is not the sole method for confirming an aircraft is established on an RNP AR approach. Observation of the aircraft to be tracking in accordance with the approach, using the surveillance system, is a valid method and was recently implemented at an aerodrome in Canada.

CASA has no in-principle issue with the proposed methodology. However, CASA would need to assess the procedure in the context of a formal proposal from the ATS provider.

Regarding the advice that the respondent proposes to mark the 400 ft breakout instructions limit on the controller's display as a distance from the threshold, CASA has no concern in-principle, and again would need to assess the formal proposal.

Regarding the request to defer the implementation date, CASA is mindful about the need for changes to be implemented in a systematic and safe manner. CASA is willing to amend the effective date to 27 February 2020 while retaining the option for early opt in.

Regarding the recommendation to also update the IVA standards, CASA does not believe it is necessary or appropriate to amend these standards at this time. This is for several reasons:

• Unlike the standards for parallel instrument approaches, the existing IVA standards do not specifically preclude the use of GLS or RNAV guidance - the references to 'localiser' only apply when localiser guidance is used. 
• The MOS does not specifically require vectoring in all circumstances. Sub-paragraph © -  'when vectoring an aircraft to intercept the final course …' - is a conditional statement of action when (and only when) an aircraft is vectored. This does not preclude other methods for intercepting and following final approach.
• The new ICAO standards underwent many years of development, with significant involvement from Australian experts. Changing the IVA standards based on a single respondent's recommendation would require safety work which would significantly delay the introduction of the ICAO standards. The new parallel instrument approach standards are particularly essential for introducing parallel runway operations at Brisbane.

Notwithstanding this, Airservices, industry and CASA are currently reviewing IVA standards and operations. This review and the associated safety work will be the appropriate basis for any update to the IVA standards. CASA will await the outcomes of this review before commencing action to amend the IVA standards.

Regarding the comment about level flight requirements, CASA does not agree that the new standard is significantly more restrictive than the existing standard in terms of allowing a continuous descent until glide path intercept. Both the standards require ATC to 'provide' a period of level flight (the ICAO standard specifies a distance in level flight).  Both standards require ATC to assign descent with enough time to allow aircraft to level off and dissipate speed if this is required. Neither requires ATC to ensure the aircraft actually levels off, and a pilot may fly a continuous descent path if desired.

In addition, the new standards introduce the use of the RNP AR approach specification for parallel runway operations. As a three-dimensional pre-programmed operation, an RNP AR approach is intended for constant descent path operations. Compared to manual vectoring, accurate flight path tracking also reduces the probability of aircraft deviating across the runway centreline, which is a specific safety hazard during closely spaced parallel runway operations. It is therefore appropriate that RNP AR approach operations can be implemented to facilitate constant descent operations. However CASA does not believe it is necessary to vary from the ICAO standards that also allow vectoring during parallel runway operations.

CASA intends to proceed with the proposed change to Part 172 MOS. The final implementation date will move from 8 November 2019 to 27 February 2020.

Regulation impact statement

For the amendment to the Part 172 MOS relating to Air Traffic Control Standards for Parallel Runway Operations, the Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) determined that no further analysis in the form of a Regulation Impact Statement was required (OBPR ID: 25296).

"..In response to requests from industry, CASA proposed to remove the limiting Part 172 MOS provisions and adopt the new ICAO standards..."

Fancy that CASA to 'ADOPT' the new ICAO standards for parallel instrument runway procedures??? - Not according to the ASA executive feeding off the seemingly bottomless OneSky trough...  Dodgy

MTF...P2  Tongue

Why did CASA adopt European standards instead of American ones?


Look at where the meetings that CASA liaison staff are held. My bet is that the European junkets are preferable to being stuck in Burbank, Everett or the less salubrious parts of DC.

Same with RAAF purchases. Who wanted a posting to Fisherman’s Bend when Toulouse, St. louis and suchlike were on offer.

Baffle 'em with Bullshit?

P2 - "Referring to the arrogant Curran AQON, which appears to be taking the piss on the fact that this QON was (perhaps naively) asked by an ill informed Green's Senator (concerned more with breaches of noise abatement procedures), the following are some dots and dashes that IMO point towards a total disconnect by the ASA executive with their aviation safety compliance obligations with both ICAO and indeed (ironically) CASA..

Answer: There are two types of dependent separation approaches used for the parallel runways at Brisbane Airport – dependent parallel visual approaches and dependent parallel instrument approaches. There are no International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards for dependent parallel visual approaches. Australia’s dependent visual parallel runway approach standards are set by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and implemented by Airservices Australia (Airservices).

There are ICAO standards for dependent parallel instrument approaches and Airservices can confirm compliance with these standards. The dependent parallel instrument approach standards were reviewed following a change by ICAO in 2018 and updated in February 2020.

It seems the reply to Sen. Rice QoN has raised some eyebrows. Airspace design and the language combined with a general lack of knowledge within the 'aircrew' lexicon makes it a 'black art' - beyond direct interest or control. However, most working pilots have operated into and out of 'parallel' runway systems, without a care in the world - fully dependent on and trusting in the ATCO's and the ICAO standards set; across the planet.

We can (and have) reached out to a couple of folk who are involved in airspace design; problem being they are likely to reply using terms which are alien to the working pilot and the Senate committee. It is a 'technical' complex subject for the layman to grasp. So, while we wait, I have referred to Goggle and found the following link. 

Parallel Runway Operations. (PRO).

On first read it seems that P2 is (once again) onto yet another ASA 'shortcut' initiated to save the money Halfwit and his mates blew on the failed scam of 'Big Sky'. I do wonder when the improvements which were sidelined to accommodate the 'impossible dream' will happen. Aye well; that will keep for another day. But take a squint at the 'explanations' provided in the PRO text - before trying to unscramble Curran's weasel worded answer to a QoN.

Toot - toot....

(07-27-2021, 11:27 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  AMROBA Newsletter - July 2021.


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Mount NCN shrinking but Airports still loom as biggest risk?? Undecided 

Via the AuntyPru email chains, extract to multiple interested parties:

Quote:The attached doc gives you a sense of the trajectory of CASA's strategic direction for this financial year.

Quote:CASA will ensure the directions of the Australian Government, as presented in the Minister’s Statement of Expectations, are implemented effectively and efficiently. CASA’s Corporate Plan fully details the activities and initiatives to be undertaken by the organisation to meet the expectations.

The Australian Government has set out some clear objectives relevant to CASA including:

- to continue to focus on aviation safety as the highest priority
- to consider the economic and cost impact on individuals, businesses and the community in the development and finalisation of new or amended regulatory changes
- to take a pragmatic, practical and proportionate approach to regulation as it applies to different industry sectors having regard to risk
- to implement its regulatory philosophy, with the philosophy being reflected in relevant policies, procedures, manuals, and when CASA personnel are carrying out their day-to-day operations.
CASA’s comprehensive planning framework fully incorporates the Australian Government direction and ensures the relevant requirements are implemented effectively and efficiently. CASA aims to achieve its commitment to aviation safety through its three key goals. They are:
- to maintain and enhance a fair, effective and efficient aviation safety regulation system
- to engage collaboratively with the wider aviation community to promote and support a positive safety culture
- to continuously improve organisational performance.
Each goal is supported through a number of key performance areas (KPA) and indicators (KPI). The progress and achievement against the KPIs are monitored by a comprehensive performance management and reporting process. CASA will continue its commitment to making further improvements to the way it operates and continuously strive to achieve its high-level goals.

IMO the above highlights the importance of industry of having input to the re-writing of the current Ministerial SOE.

 This is also significant IMO (part in bold):

Quote:As a key priority, CASA continues to develop and implement new safety standards and regulations, taking into account the Australian Government’s regulatory reform agenda. CASA will stay abreast of changes within the aviation industry by carefully analysing safety and operational data to look for trends and emerging risks which need to be addressed. This approach will further focus CASA on its core activity - the regulation of aviation safety.

What is the current Government 'regulatory reform agenda'? Does the RRA consider the underlying philosophy of COAG 'competition principles agreement'? If not shouldn't the SOE and CASA strategic direction (above) have the CPA included?

Finally I note the following from table on page 262:

Quote:CASA maintains the Effective Implementation (EI) Score determined by International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP)/Maintain or improve EI score/Target expected to be met

Note: The current EI score is still I believe only a self-assessment.

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Referring to the 2nd attachment (extract above, from Dr Kennedy to the RRAT committee, 21 February 2018), this was apparently the total number of differences from the beginning of 2018. Despite the weasel words, this IMO highlights the importance of discovering what the current number of notified differences are and also reviewing how those differences are negatively impacting industry competitiveness both internationally and domestically through non-harmonisation and non-compliance with ICAO.

Referring to the above, I have just completed the rather onerous task of collating the latest list (May 2021) of Australian ICAO NCNs (see HERE).

Although probably not a 100% accurate (lost count and place a number of times) the total figure for notified differences from my calculations has in fact gone down from the high of 4280 calculated by the department in February 2018.

Currently there is 321 pages with a total of 2712 NDs, an average of 8.5 per page. This would suggest that the Dept has been conscious of the problem (ie extreme non-compliance with ICAO from at least 2018) and have been progressively reducing NDs since it was brought to their attention by both the Senate  RRAT committee and by association AuntyPru.

The most disturbing figures for NDs is within Annex 14 (Airports & Heliports, Vol 1 & 2) with a total of 127 pages and 1018 NDs. 

The question is why is it so hard for the Australian authorities to reign in, what is surely a major international embarrassment, our growing non-compliance with ICAO defined safety-risk mitigation (Annex 14) around airports/heliports and the surrounding airspace?

Slight thread drift but the following was a horrific but fascinating video find (that Ventus recently shared with me) that perhaps helps join the dots on my (above) question:    

Although 45 years apart the parallels with the tragic Essendon DFO accident are IMO quite remarkable and highlight how much of a bullet was dodged on 21 February 2021. However the big difference from the two accidents was that the Americans actually learnt from the NTSB accident report and proactively put in place safety risk mitigation policies and actions, including the subject of urban land use around airports. 

Quote:“The second circumstance which added to the catastrophe was the location of the ice cream parlor. The construction of the shopping center was accomplished in accordance with existing statutes of the various jurisdictions. Although some of the structures exceeded the height standards of Part 77, the FAA determined that the obstructions did not constitute hazards to air navigation. The city, county, and State governments all generally agreed that once the shopping center was built, the subsequent addition of the ice cream parlor and sign had little effect on aircraft operations. This conclusion was an obvious extension of the initial rationale that ‘… the construction (of the shopping center) would affect operations no differently than other existing structures such as a gasoline sign, television antennas, traffic signal standards, etc.”….” (NTSB-AAR-73-6, p. 17.)

From Appendix E to NTSB-AAR-73-6, Safety Recommendation A-72-210 thru 223 (to the FAA), dated December 28, 1972:

“…The built-up area around the Sacramento Executive Airport raises serious questions with regard to the suitability for airshows of this and similar airports, especially when one considers the practicability of applying the following sample of a special provision from the pertinent handbook: “The holder of the airshow waiver shall insure that roads adjacent to the airport, as specified below, are devoid of vehicular traffic and the property adjoining the airport shall be free of spectators.” This provision was not incorporated in the certificate of waiver for the Sacramento airshow; if it had been, it would have been very difficult to implement….” (NTSB-AAR-73-6, p. 31.)
NTSB: “Probable Cause.

Pilot in Command – Improper Operation of Flight Controls
Pilot in Command – Failed to Obtain/Maintain Flying Speed
Pilot in Command – Lack of Familiarity with Aircraft
Remarks – Overrotation of Acft due inadequate Plt proficiency & misleading visual cures hit ice cream parlor.”

(NTSB. NTSB Identification: OAK73AP008.) “Ultimately, the accident forced the closure of Runway 12-30 to jet traffic, became the impetus to a comprehensive land-use plan for the area around the airport, and resulted in a $5 million settlement for the survivors and the families of those who died, but only after years of legal maneuvers, concluding in May of 1976.

P2 comment: One could hypothesise that this accident was the prelude that ultimately led to the internationally recognised California Airport Land Use Planning Handbook in regards to public safety zones around airports -  Rolleyes

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Meanwhile at Essendon Fields airport there the DFO still sits? -  Dodgy 

MTF...P2  Tongue

Swiss cheese and the observance thereof.

Since its formation and I'm not sure if by accident or design, CASA has enacted regulation in an attempt to mitigate risk.
NOT risk attached to the safety of aviation, as it alludes is its primary function, but to mitigate its own risk from liability.

I suspect this was front of mind of the iron ring when CASA was reconstituted from the old DCA and CAA. CASA and its staff were no longer exempt from liability for their decisions or actions and could be sued individually or collectively. Therefore it is not surprising that senior management set out by regulation to mitigate as far as possible the risk of getting sued.

The result is the regulatory malaise the industry endures today and why the regulations are written in obtuse legalise and why CASA could never countenance adopting US FAR's or New Zealand regulations written in plain english, easy to understand and comply with. It also could explain why they chose to follow unproven EASA regulations that proved such a disaster for European GA.

One can hardly blame the development sharks, having been gifted prime real estate worth billions to the detriment of the Australian public and a monopoly position with no oversight, to get on with removing as much aviation as they could from the airports. This they did utilising their monopoly power and predatory behaviour. Then commence construction of massive industrial complexes, also with no oversight or safety management of the risks these structures posed to aviation.

CASA of course insured they bear no responsibility or liability.

When the inevitable happens, as I fear it will, just who ends up liable? Its going to make a lot of lawyers very wealthy finding out.

An Aerial Perspective... Rolleyes

Via GlenB's UP thread:

Quote:Originally Posted by Paragraph377 View Post:
Quote:Glen B; “It’s a cunning use of phraseology they use, that leads people to believe that we did not have full operational control. CASA never state which rule was breached or what we did to raise concerns, because there is nothing”.

The misuse and/or personal interpretation of rule and law is what CASA is famous for. Over many decades they have made up their own minds as to what certain rules and regulations mean and they written them in a way that gives them an ace up their sleeve because when it suits them they like to apply whatever ‘intent’ or ‘meaning’ they see fit. And usually that is to suit their own nefarious agenda. Glen, they used this ‘ace’ to nail you to the wall, and others before you.

Lead balloon; “The only person whose opinion counts is that of a judge. Unfortunately, as you and many others have found out, first-hand, the costs and risks of taking on a scare-mongering 'safety authority' are prohibitive. The practical 'standard' is whatever someone in CASA wakes up each day and decides it is”.

Again, so very true. CASA are like a ‘woman choosing which shoes to wear each day’. On any given morning it will normally be a different pair of shoes to the previous day. And some days there will be multiple changes throughout the day, all depending on each wearers personal taste and the days agenda. To try and follow this process or the methodology/thought pattern behind it is next to impossible.

The overarching Civil Aviation Act is shit. It is a convoluted dogs breakfast and the starting point for reform is rewriting the Act. And what a dream come true that would be. By contrast, as a retired pilot and businessman I have also dealt with The Marine Safety National Law Act 2013 (may have been updated more recently, not sure) under which AMSA regulate. And also the Biosecurity Act 2015 under which the Department of Agriculture regulate. Both Acts have both been rewritten and updated in the past 8 years. They aren’t perfect but they are much more clear and precise (maybe lacking some teeth) compared to what they used to be. The 1988 Civil Aviation Act is an outdated load of cobblers and remains that way so that certain CASA legal folk can use it as a weapon when it suits them. It may be fun and games to them (you know who you are) but it negatively impacts and costs Australia’s economy many many millions of dollars in revenue each year. Since 1988, that figure is probably in the billions. If Australia wanted to get serious, the Government would follow the example of my beloved New Zealand who took only 4 years to rewrite the rule set into a more manageable and sensible suite of regulations which sit under a more succinct Civil Aviation Act. CASA is a pathetic joke.

Bravo. Bravo.

I remember the late eighties/early nineties and 'harmonisation' being discussed in NZ and AU - the difference was, as you say, NZ had it done in 4 years (Civil Aviation Act 1990).

To be fair (well, to give some hope), CASR Parts 91, 119, 121, 125, et al come into force on December 2nd this year, effectively wiping out nearly all of the previous CARs and CAOs and getting somewhere approximating what NZ took 4 years, to our 35 years and still not complete.......

As an interesting aside, there is actually no 'head of power' that enables the Commonwealth to Regulate Aviation and Aerospace under the Constitution. Section 51 ("Parliament shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:.......) mentions nothing about aviation.

An attempt was made in the Post War Reconstruction and Democratic Rights Bill (a Bill to Amend the Constitution) to, among other things, grant the Commonwealth power to regulate aviation and navigation. This followed a similar Referendum in 1937 to do the same, both failed to achieve the required majority of voters in a majority of States and a majority overall.

The ONLY reason the Commonwealth is able to regulate aviation is because Parliament DOES have a 'Treaty Power'. The Chicago Convention 1944 is effectively a 'Treaty' so the Federal Government uses it's 'foreign affairs power' as the font from which it is able to make laws to give effect to the Articles of the Convention.

Just shows how out of date the Constitution is in many ways and perhaps the overly onerous method of amendment should be eased somewhat.

Anyway, may be telling everyone something they already knew but I just thought that was an interesting aside.

And... Wink :

Quote:Originally Posted by Lead Balloon View Post

Quote:The interstate trade and commerce power, the corporations power and the incidental power cover a lot of aviation safety regulatory ground, too, but not completely.

There are a number of sub-sections of s51 that add on the end "... and similar matters...."

You'd think with hot air balloons already existing and the likelihood that the aeroplane would be a reality within 3 years of the Constitution being enacted that "... and similar matters...." added on the end of shipping and navigation would have covered it but no.

Needless to say, the external affairs power (not the foreign affairs power as I erroneously identified it) has come in very handy for establishing a right to legislate in matters that the Constitution is silent on.

While s128 is onerous, I tend toward supporting it on the basis that if it were much easier to amend the constitution, goodness knows what governments of both stripes would have done to it over the years.

I do however think that a dual system, such as having a second amendment method based on that in the US Constitution (extremely erroneous in their political landscape) where the Parliament must pass something by a special majority (2/3rds), then it must be ratified by the legislatures of 2/3rds of the States might still retain the check on unbridled changes, while allowing a bit more evolutionary change to occur. the disconnect -  Dodgy

"..The ONLY reason the Commonwealth is able to regulate aviation is because Parliament DOES have a 'Treaty Power'. The Chicago Convention 1944 is effectively a 'Treaty' so the Federal Government uses it's 'foreign affairs power' as the front from which it is able to make laws to give effect to the Articles of the Convention..."

Now refer back to this post: Mount NCN shrinking but Airports still loom as biggest risk??

Quote:Referring to the above, I have just completed the rather onerous task of collating the latest list (May 2021) of Australian ICAO NCNs (see HERE).

Although probably not a 100% accurate (lost count and place a number of times) the total figure for notified differences from my calculations has in fact gone down from the high of 4280 calculated by the department in February 2018.

Currently there is 321 pages with a total of 2712 NDs, an average of 8.5 per page. This would suggest that the Dept has been conscious of the problem (ie extreme non-compliance with ICAO from at least 2018) and have been progressively reducing NDs since it was brought to their attention by both the Senate  RRAT committee and by association AuntyPru.

The most disturbing figures for NDs is within Annex 14 (Airports & Heliports, Vol 1 & 2) with a total of 127 pages and 1018 NDs. 

The question is why is it so hard for the Australian authorities to reign in, what is surely a major international embarrassment, our growing non-compliance with ICAO defined safety-risk mitigation (Annex 14) around airports/heliports and the surrounding airspace?

[Image: Untitled_Clipping_091018_103524_AM.jpg]
References: Chairman Dan calls in CASA Iron Ring favour on non-safety TRA & Vic Coroners Essendon DFO crash inquest begins

Last but definitely not least, I came across this dude on Linkedin who has worked exclusively for Dr A for the past 9 years -  Angry 

Quote:Senior Policy Officer, International Relations
Company Name Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Dates Employed Oct 2012 – Present
Employment Duration 9 yrs
Location Canberra, Australia

Manage CASA’s capacity building projects through the Indonesia Transport Safety Assistance Package and work with Government colleagues to establish a work program in Papua New Guinea.

Contribute to Australia's multilateral engagement in international aviation safety, including through International Civil Aviation Organization governing meetings and regional forums.

Foster bilateral policy relationships with civil aviation partners including the US Federal Aviation Administration, European Aviation Safety Agency, New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority and other regional counterparts.

And this is the dude's quals:

Quote:The Australian National University
Degree Name Master of International Affairs Field Of Study International System, China, Humanitarianism, US Security Policy, Intelligence & Security
Dates attended or expected graduation 2009 – 2012

University of Canberra

Degree Name Bachelor of Communication Field Of Study Public Relations, Politics
Dates attended or expected graduation 2000 – 2002

Considering that this dude was employed by Dr A in the same year that the Senate PelAir inquiry began and was there through the subsequent Forsyth review, the TSBC ATSB peer review, the 2016 BASA US FAA airworthiness treaty and the 2017 ICAO Oz (self-)audit, one has to ask what exactly has the dude actually achieved -  Huh     

MTF...P2  Tongue

ps Out of curiosity I did a ring around of several of our esteemed BRB members (who have regular dealings with CASA in this area - ie treaties and BASA/trade agreements) whether they had heard of this dude and to date I am yet to get a positive response - WTD?  Dodgy

Mandarin Atkinson releases SSP and white washes Industry input? -  Dodgy

Via the Airports thread:

(11-16-2021, 07:41 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  Second the City of Kingston call for a proper inquiry into Federally leased Airports Wink

Finally in reference to the recently released "Aviation State Safety Programme (SSP)
and National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) consultation – Stakeholder issues and responses" document, I note the following AAA concern:

Quote:(NASP) a key airport-related issue is mitigation of risk to air safety through inappropriate development around airports. Government should strengthen linkages between National Airports Safeguarding Advisory Group (NASAG) and aviation safety bodies, and improve links from NASAG and National Airports Safeguarding Framework (NASF) into state and territory planning systems to control inappropriate development around airports.

And the Dept/CASA (Dr Aleck) typical weasel worded response:

Quote:Noted, no change to NASP required. Government aviation agencies will continue to use NASAG and NASF to promote safety risk mitigations in land use planning around airports. While the Australian Government can continue to encourage uptake, State and Territory Governments decide the extent to which and how specific elements of NASF are adopted in their respective planning controls and legislation.

There are also individual airport committees that can be used to address local safety issues including airport, Government agency and industry representatives. Any serious safety issues can also be raised with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in terms of compliance with the relevant airport regulations.
That's my second... Rolleyes

Read it and weep... Confused

Which brings me to the totally unannounced, zero fan-fair release by Dept Secretary Atkinson of the tick-a-box ICAO Annex 19 SSP:


Australia’s aviation safety system plays a vital role in ensuring that we have a safe, efficient and competitive aviation industry. Australia will continue to seek closer alignment with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices and adopt international best practices in its aviation safety system.

The Australian Government has endorsed the following safety principles that underpin the future aviation safety system.

1. Safety is the primary consideration of Australia’s aviation agencies and industry in the performance of their functions.
2. The highest safety priority should be afforded to passenger transport operations.
3. Australia’s regulatory approach and responses are based on sector-based risk assessments.
4. Aviation agencies and industry collaborate to identify aviation safety risks and ensure that the most appropriate methods, practices and technologies are adopted to address and reduce these risks.
5. A strong ‘just culture’ approach underpins information sharing between industry and safety agencies to assist in preventing future safety events.
6. Recognition that Australia’s safety regulatory system plays an important role in ensuring that Australia has a safe, efficient and competitive aviation industry.
7. Australia’s aviation regulatory procedures, processes and approach to regulation is fair, transparent and promotes nationally consistent outcomes.
8. Active and ongoing engagement by industry and safety agencies will help inform future regulatory priorities and the development of simpler regulations, standards and orders.
9.The safety performance of our aviation safety system will be continuously monitored and measured through the State’s aggregate safely performance indicators as well as service providers safety performance indicators.
10. Sufficient financial and human resources for safety management and oversight will be allocated; and staff will be equipped with the proper skills, knowledge and expertise to discharge their safety oversight and management responsibilities competently.

Simon Atkinson
Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications

Hmm...why is the Dept Mandarin signing off on this bollocks document? Isn't that the responsibility of the oversighting Crown Minister?

Here is the Foreword from the 2016 SSP:


Aviation is an essential part of Australia’s economy and community.

Australia has an enviable record in aviation safety, among the best in the world, which has been
built on a strong safety governance system, forged over many years.

Australia was a signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) in
1944, and has been a member of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since its

From the beginning Australia has been an active participant in, and a strong supporter of ICAO’s
activities. The availability of safe, regular and efficient air services within Australia and between
Australia and the rest of the world is critical to our national interest.

Australia was one of the first countries in the world to have a State Safety Programme (SSP)
consistent with ICAO requirements and has worked hard to develop one of the most respected
aviation safety systems globally.

However even a mature safety system must look for continuous improvements to ensure the
system reflects growing diversity within the aviation industry which increasingly sees new types of
aircraft and operations emerging.

Australia’s SSP plays an important part in identifying, monitoring and maintaining the effectiveness
of the various elements of our safety performance.

The SSP sets out our key safety principles that will continue to underpin our future aviation safety
system as well as establishing short, medium and long term safety objectives. This approach is
consistent with that established by ICAO’s Global Aviation Safety Plan.

Australia’s aviation agencies and the aviation industry have significant roles to play in delivering
quality safety outcomes.

Australia’s SSP recognises it is important for everyone in aviation to work closely and cooperatively
to identify safety risks and ensure that the most appropriate practices and technologies are
adopted to address and reduce these risks.

It is essential Australia remains flexible and adaptable in responding to the challenges created by
rapidly changing domestic and international aviation markets, and our aviation safety system will
continue to play an integral part in meeting these challenges.

Darren Chester
Minister for Infrastructure and Transport
May 2016

Hmm...I wonder if the Mandarin gave Barnaby a 'heads up' that he was going to release the SSP, while effectively (with a few exceptions) giving industry consultation on the SSP the Royal Bird -  Huh

[Image: middle-finger-veronica-mars.gif]

MTF...P2  Tongue

Regional regulatory harmonisation and the #PICASST (Pacific Aviation Treaty)? -  Rolleyes   

I couple of weeks ago I noted our miniscule tweeted this:

Quote:Proud to join DPM Tapaitau and aviation ministers from across the Pacific at the Regional Aviation Ministers’ Meeting.

Australia is committed to working closely with and listening to our Pacific partners as we together maintain and strengthen safe aviation across the region.

[Image: FV5f-IuacAA4-jS?format=jpg&name=small]


Curious I tracked the relevant hashtags etc to a helpful twitter handle ( ) that provided a series of eight tweets which gave an excellent summary of what went down at the #RAMM2 (regional meeting):

Quote:Pacific Aviation Ministers have committed to revising the Pacific’s civil aviation treaty and completing a 10-year regional aviation strategy to strengthen aviation safety and security and improve air connectivity post-pandemic. #RAMM2 #PASO #PICASST /1

[Image: FWkMqj3UEAEucCS?format=jpg&name=small]
I wonder what input (other than the obvious multi-million dollar tax payer funded cheque) our miniscule had to this meeting?

This then got me thinking back to when we (AP/BRB) covered off on the PASO in relation to the 1st and 2nd ATSB Pelair VH-NGA ditching investigations and innevitably this led me to this Mount NCN post from five years ago:  Blueprint for RRP harmonisation - i.e. Adopting NZed rule set.

In particular this passage:

Quote:New Zealand Law as Model Law

2.78 As noted above the global approach to civil aviation safety is highly dependent upon

all Chicago Convention contracting States giving effect to the provisions of the

Convention and the SARPs in their national law. This should mean that, regardless

of regional arrangements, a high degree of uniformity or harmonisation of law should

be achieved among all the contracting States. However as noted in the LTR the

correct implementation in national law of the key provisions of the Chicago

Convention and the many thousands of SARPs is an extremely challenging task.

The significance of the collaborative regional arrangements agreed in PICASST

therefore is that the parties to that treaty have agreed that New Zealand aviation law

can be used as model law.

2.79 On analysis it can be seen that the objective of achieving harmonisation of aviation

law among PASO member States involves two levels. At one level the object is to

achieve harmonisation between the SARPs and national law; and at another more

practical level the PASO member States propose to harmonise their national law

among themselves based on New Zealand law. In other words, the practical

harmonisation exercise should achieve compliance with SARPs as well...

New Zealand Secondary Aviation Legislation

2.103 A feature of the New Zealand regulatory system is that there are very few statutory

regulations and orders (i.e. made by the Head of State) in favour of extensive civil

aviation rules (i.e. made by the Minister of Transport)...

2.107 The most significant body of secondary aviation legislation therefore consists of the

Civil Aviation Rules divided into numerous different parts based upon the same

subject matter part numbers used in the United States Federal Aviation Regulations.

The current list of New Zealand Civil Aviation Rules in force is as follows...

Hmm...I wonder if anyone pointed out to the miniscule that Australia is totally on the outer in conforming with the fundamental principles of the PASO PICASST and maybe they may have highlighted the huge national economic benefits that would flow through to our aviation industry in the region if we were (like the rest of the PASO nations) simply to adopt the New Zealand aviation laws and regulations?

MTF...P2  Tongue

Excellent work P2. Wonder if our new Minister can be persuaded to ask why is it that NZ gets certain aero maintenance approvals, and the work attached, when we don’t because we are not recognised for international compliance?

The Minister might wonder, if she’s ever aware, that because of the CASA extreme and counterproductive pilot training regime, we are fast running out of instructors? The few left are being snapped up by desperate airlines as they gear up once more. CASA has destroyed much of the training industry with loss of hundreds of flying schools because of its completely unnecessary, super expensive and complex compulsory structures and all sorts of strictures of bewildering number.

Please! - Explain.......

Given the state of play across the Pacific region, I reckon the new Minuscule could score some much needed points by asking the top brass at CASA for a comprehensive, no Pony-Pooh explanation of why, in these troubled times are we not forging closer ties with our near neighbours. The act of aligning Australia with those ICAO compliant, expanding aviation nations using the FAR/NZ regulatory system would be of value and help us to keep our fiends 'closer' - not to mention generating much needed revenue and political points at home. There is a 'history' which defines the 'when' Australia decided to go it alone - but little in the way of the 'why' along with the supporting logic. Alignment just makes good sense, on many levels, not least of which would be a serious gain in support for the government - So, if not, then why not?

History - verbatim - from the horse's mouth. Courtesy of AMROBA.

"During the 1990s, politicians, public service and CASA were all pushing harmonisation to open Australia’s civil aviation market to mainly the Pacific Rim countries by working closely with New Zealand in developing aviation regulations harmonised with the USA Federal Aviation Regulations.

Politicians and public service understood that this had to be done to create thousands of jobs and to stop high tech Australian civil aviation manufacturers from moving off-shore to have their products recognised in major civil aviation markets like the USA.

I know, because I was a CASA GM, Regulatory Reform Office for a while before I retired in early 2000. At that stage, Australia was close to signing agreements with Canada and expanding the bilateral agreement with the United States. This was based on FAR based regulations being developed in conjunction with New Zealand.

When CASA changed direction in the early 2000s, when it come under new management, New Zealand continued and, today, most Pacific Island nations and PNG adopted a close version of the New Zealand FAR based regulations.  Australia is still struggling to develop a set of regulations that would harmonise, from an industry perspective, with the FAR based system used in this region and with New Zealand.

You must be harmonised to trade freely.

The damaged done to the potential of the Australian civil aviation engineering fields of design, manufacturing and maintenance services has been immense. Today the industry cannot train personnel to international standards used by our trading countries, therefore we have a shortage of maintenance personnel outside the airline sectors. Many successful companies move off-shore because of lack of recognition globally of Australian businesses.

Industry is now subject to change that does not support harmonisation so Australia can compete on a level playing field.

Unlike NZ, Australian civil aviation businesses have to seek other nations approvals to trade in their countries.

Frustrating that the 90s approach was not continued, civil aviation is a job creating industry, properly harmonised."

Toot - toot.

Dear Dan - L&Ks...Sandy

Reference; KC's Pacific/rest of the world Oz non-harmonisation history lesson... Wink 

(07-13-2022, 07:16 AM)Kharon Wrote:  Please! - Explain.......

Given the state of play across the Pacific region, I reckon the new Minuscule could score some much needed points by asking the top brass at CASA for a comprehensive, no Pony-Pooh explanation of why, in these troubled times are we not forging closer ties with our near neighbours. The act of aligning Australia with those ICAO compliant, expanding aviation nations using the FAR/NZ regulatory system would be of value and help us to keep our fiends 'closer' - not to mention generating much needed revenue and political points at home. There is a 'history' which defines the 'when' Australia decided to go it alone - but little in the way of the 'why' along with the supporting logic. Alignment just makes good sense, on many levels, not least of which would be a serious gain in support for the government - So, if not, then why not?

History - verbatim - from the horse's mouth. Courtesy of AMROBA.

"During the 1990s, politicians, public service and CASA were all pushing harmonisation to open Australia’s civil aviation market to mainly the Pacific Rim countries by working closely with New Zealand in developing aviation regulations harmonised with the USA Federal Aviation Regulations.

Politicians and public service understood that this had to be done to create thousands of jobs and to stop high tech Australian civil aviation manufacturers from moving off-shore to have their products recognised in major civil aviation markets like the USA.

I know, because I was a CASA GM, Regulatory Reform Office for a while before I retired in early 2000. At that stage, Australia was close to signing agreements with Canada and expanding the bilateral agreement with the United States. This was based on FAR based regulations being developed in conjunction with New Zealand.

When CASA changed direction in the early 2000s, when it come under new management, New Zealand continued and, today, most Pacific Island nations and PNG adopted a close version of the New Zealand FAR based regulations.  Australia is still struggling to develop a set of regulations that would harmonise, from an industry perspective, with the FAR based system used in this region and with New Zealand.

You must be harmonised to trade freely.

The damaged done to the potential of the Australian civil aviation engineering fields of design, manufacturing and maintenance services has been immense. Today the industry cannot train personnel to international standards used by our trading countries, therefore we have a shortage of maintenance personnel outside the airline sectors. Many successful companies move off-shore because of lack of recognition globally of Australian businesses.

Industry is now subject to change that does not support harmonisation so Australia can compete on a level playing field.

Unlike NZ, Australian civil aviation businesses have to seek other nations approvals to trade in their countries.

Frustrating that the 90s approach was not continued, civil aviation is a job creating industry, properly harmonised."

Toot - toot.

Sandy's fwd email to his local member Dan Tehan

Quote:Dear Dan,

Thank you for your letter advising that you have forwarded my request to have CASA disbanded and its functions taken over by a Department of Government.

There has been a meeting, 22 June, of the Aviation Ministers of the Pacific aviation treaty group (Pacific Aviation Safety Office) of which we are a Member hosted by the the Government of the Cook Islands and attended by Minister Catherine King.

It’s evident that all the other contracting States have largely adopted the NZ regulatory regime and this confers a degree of harmonisation that we, unfortunately, cannot match.

The forwarded letter below from Mr. Ken Cannane, a retired CASA General Manager, Regulatory Reform Office, explains the situation which continues to be highly detrimental to Victoria, as a populous state with an industrial base, and Australia’s overall interests.

Please make representations on my behalf to Minister King to correct the position.



MTF...P2  Tongue

KC's dive through the history of non-compliance with ICAO??

Courtesy KC of AMROBA legend, via the AP email chains:


Did a little research and the attached resolution that the Department and CAA used as the basis to regulatory change in the early 1990s

The Resolution is still in force and Australia still has not adopted harmonised regulations.
1992 – 2023 still hasn’t been achieved. Long time non-compliance with ICAO resolution that Australia supported but not adopted..

I can remember Baldwin’s direction to harmonise with the FARs unless we find an equivalent individual provision the industry preferred.
All we need is a FAR AIM & FAR AMT that list all relevent regulations and guidance.

[Image: image003.jpg]

[Image: thumbnail.png]

[Image: ASSEMBLY-29th-Session-resolution-29-3-Ha...ion529.jpg]

Followed by:


This resolution was for harmonised aircraft/product certification with either FAA or EASA.

We added to the Preamble of CASRs that we base our harmonisation with the FARs.
The bearcats attending in 2000 voted for this Resolution but did not adopt at home.
Virtually, Aviation Policy section of the Department stopped directing CASA.
Makes great reading how our biquadrates enjoy their jollies to ICAO vote for but don’t direct adoption on returning.
Falsely stating to the world, we adopt these standards and not adopting.

Might explain the differences.

[Image: image003.jpg]

[Image: Resolution-A33-11544.jpg]

Here is the link for the ICAO 33rd session resolutions: 

MTF...P2  Tongue

Proactive FAA safety summit vs our WOFTAM ICAO Annex 19 SSP?? 

Before I begin, please refer to the 1st Post of this thread - Shy  :

Just over 7 years ago this was the basis for the creation of this thread:

Quote:Okay so the reason for creating this thread is to; a) kick around and review Murky's latest bollocks SSP; b) attempt to scale (ICAO) Mount Non-compliance and establish whether c) it is possible to reign in the significant growth of NCNs prior to the upcoming ICAO/FAA audit... Big Grin

For those interested here is the (soon to be renewed) current version of the SSP:

From pg 17 of that document it says:

Quote:SSP working group meetings

SSP working groups are operational working groups established to address a specific hazard or risk function and draw together specific Australian Government agencies and where needed industry experts. Such working groups link into the broader SSP governance structure and can escalate items for further attention through the SSP-CAT. The SSP-CAT may also request advice and information from these working groups. Details on the chair, attendees, and frequency and role of current SSP working groups are at Annex 1. has any of the above occurred (IE escalation) in the cases of the Darwin TRA occurrence - HEREWith regard to a Thing of Wonder, ie the Darwin TRA occurrence… & Refreshing - (but scary). - and the QF28 occurrence etc..etc??

If not...why not??

Now, yet another point of comparison... Rolleyes

Via Aviation Week:

Quote:Opinion: Advancing The Safety Of All Who Fly

P. Barry Butler, Robert L. Sumwalt and Kristy Kiernan April 25, 2023

[Image: vwpt17_joepriesaviation-net_promo.jpg?itok=ti6QM6Rs]

At an FAA safety summit in March, experts stressed that a recent string of close-call incidents should serve as a warning signal to the industry. Those events included serious runway and turbulence incidents and a failure of the Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) alert system.

Government officials and regulators acted swiftly to convene the March 15 summit, where breakout sessions sought input from more than 200 safety leaders. The meeting resulted in an “aviation safety call to action” bulletin, a plan to mandate that cockpit voice recorders capture 25 hr. of information instead of only two and plans for upcoming Commercial Aviation Safety Team meetings.

While these reactions were warranted, the accident record among U.S. carriers has reached a level that was once unthinkable. Between 2000 and 2010, 24 fatal accidents occurred among U.S. airlines. During the subsequent 10-year period (2011-21), five occurred, according to data compiled by the NTSB, FAA and Transportation Department.

Airline accidents worldwide are also at an all-time low. The International Air Transport Association, which released its 2022 airline safety performance report in March, found that the accident rate nearly halved to 1.21 per million flights last year from 2.31 per million flights in 2013. A five-year (2009-13) rolling average of 2.65 accidents per million flights dropped 52%, to a five-year (2018-22) average of 1.26 accidents per million flights.

Despite this strong record, the recent incidents suggest that something is amiss with the system, akin to a fever in the human body that may signal a more serious illness. Leaders at the FAA summit underscored that aviation safety is at a critical juncture. They cited the need to train a new workforce amid massive turnover, scale up safety management systems (SMS) and implement new technology in a cost-effective manner—all in increasingly crowded skies.

Challenges to aviation safety need to be treated in the same way that the best academic medical institutions focus on diseases. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University’s newly named Boeing Center for Aviation and Aerospace Safety will—like a top teaching hospital—advance safety research, education, training and consulting. To improve knowledge and practice, the center will provide a neutral, level playing field where companies and researchers can share their best ideas for advancing the safety of all who fly, regardless of the carrier or airframe.

One crucial area of focus will be data analytics, including the use of machine learning and algorithms to predict the likelihood of incidents, from unstable approaches and runway incursions to loss of control. Improving SMS is another significant priority, cited on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements for 2021-23. The Airspace Operations and Safety Program within NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate has identified the need for what it calls an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System as well.

Novel data streams that represent routine operations, along with methods to combine disparate data sources to provide real-time, data-driven conclusions, are essential to creating a more holistic approach to risk.

Meanwhile, a pilot shortage means many new pilots will be coming online and upgrading more quickly. The center is well positioned to study methods to make pilot training more efficient without compromising rigorous safety standards. In addition, the center will provide opportunities for students to partner with faculty on key safety research questions. Those students will go on to become the next generation of aviation safety leaders.

The center will operate independently, governed by Embry-Riddle in close consultation with an advisory board comprising high-level professionals from multiple sectors of aviation. Research outcomes are generally airframe- and manufacturer-agnostic. Airlines and manufacturers will be able to share sensitive safety data that has been anonymized and aggregated. Embry-Riddle is in talks with one major U.S. airline, and we hope others will soon follow.

New challenges for aviation safety include the advent of AI-enabled autonomous systems, the integration of uncrewed aircraft and the increasing complexity of the aviation ecosystem. The new center will tackle these known operational challenges—and others that are rapidly emerging on the horizon.

Spot the difference??  Shy

MTF...P2  Tongue

SSP ignores Airport and ATC safety issues?? -  Dodgy

References: Dots-n-dashes on ICAO GRSAP, the SSP and the CASA O&O of the NRSG?? 

Quote:The GRSAP recommended actions and initiatives was adopted in principle by the Australian Aviation Safety bureaucracy and subsequently embedded and became a theoretical function of our latest version of our tick-a-box Annex 19 SSP (refer pg 37 NRSG).

The NRSG is oversighted and administered by CASA: Ref -

Quote: Wrote:1. Purpose

The National Runway Safety Group (NRSG) is a State Safety Programme (SSP) hazard-specific working group and has been established to facilitate State-level visibility and continuous improvement in safety performance, specific to runway safety in Australia.

&.. Of Skeletons and closets.....

Quote:..There are several worthy of the time taken to consider; the Chicago Convention for one. A binding agreement, made in good faith with the very best of intentions at its core; all happily manipulated to a fare-thee-well with the tacit, twice removed approval of successive governments, happy to be rid of any and all direct responsibility. Another large pile comes from the august aviation pinnacle body, ICAO. Spirit, intent and obligations all reside within that mouldering pile; yet treated with same disrespect, disdain and blatant manipulation to suit purpose. But, these things are now more matters for history than resurrection: Alas...There is however a more modern document gracing those shelves; another that began it's life full of promise, hope and good intentions; this too is being mauled in the same suffocating damp, stagnant, turgid atmosphere; I refer of course to the SSP.

Freely available _ HERE_. “Australia's fifth edition of its Aviation State Safety Program (SSP) and the inaugural National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP), have been finalised following stakeholder consultation.”

The indefatigable P2 (legend) has for a long while now monitored the 'use', application and results of the SSP tenets and principals in relation to 'real life' events. One could expect that a high profile, important, expensive 'program' – with some real teeth – would be well supported and active; alas. Take for example the sterling (gold star) work done by Aus ALPA in one narrow, but essential to 'safety' area of air operations; - HERE – and again – HERE - . Serious commentary, completed by professionals based against a wide range of 'experience', exposure and current operational knowledge. Then (for a Choc frog) find the SSP response and actions either promised or delivered. Anyway; it is P2's hobby horse, and there is much MTF. Suffice to say that once again; good advice is consigned to the basement; the expense and spin remains, once again, unchecked; and, not only does the nation pay for this glossy top cover – but has little of intrinsic or practical value to show for the investment (once again)....

&.. The rooted cause:  

Quote:Mr. Approach 

Note, there is no mention of "aviation safety performance". So what is that and did Airservices maintain it? This also begs the question, "is Mr. Harfield in possession of a document from Ms. Spence that allows him not to provide commensurate services"? In a way he is because CASA also has approved Airservices contingency procedures, but prolonged lack of staff is not the reason ICAO allows for such procedures to exist.

To return to the question, clearly, if Airservices was not providing an air traffic service in otherwise controlled airspace (Classes A, C, D and E in Australia) then they were also not maintaining "aviation safety performance" in that airspace. The latter, which presumably means nobody died, was, in fact, being maintained by the pilots in the now uncontrolled airspace.

As for "transparency and accountability", these are qualities that every public servant claims for their work. It seems that the only way the public ever sees this accountability is when the politicians see the need to appoint a Royal Commission. If there ever is one into the debacle that Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, it's seven ministers, CASA and Airservices has become then Robodebt will look like an amateur production...


Put aside the eternal need to keep the incumbent minister and the DoIT out of the morass, ignore the many academic and scientific methods available and the expensive folks who 'can do' the research and draft the 'paper'. Let's get down to 'brass tacks'.

That the entire ATC system is a world class cluster of ducks is a given. Ironically, those who created the mess and should no longer be there to create even more mess; are the ones anointed to 'fix it'. Think about it – can you imagine the upheaval should the government admitted to an expensive, flawed, toxic, second world air traffic system, being run on the fumes left behind after the executive level had finished ensuring their well being; or that financial brain farts had ensured the inevitable (forecast) result we see today. Can you contemplate the ramifications if the public ever discovered that there was much more concern with fine line 'legal' abrogation than to ensuring an efficient, first world system to prevent the unthinkable possibility of two loaded aircraft colliding?

That however is not the resident evil, scratch off the glossy top cover and study where the real liability resides; the parts that elegantly and eloquently remove minister, department and management from any and all responsibility. Oh, its there. No long bow drawn. The blame will be sheeted home to the ATCO and flight crew. No expense will be spared to prove, beyond reasonable doubt (and insurance pay-out) that the government, ASA management and the system was in no way at fault.

In follow up to both Mr Approach and Kharon's excellent OBS about what has become a normalised deviance to our air traffic control system (as managed by the ASA executive management and it's Board), I noted the following CASA answer to Senator McKenzie's written QON in regards to the 'close prox' incident that occurred at YSSY on 29th April: 267. CASA - Stakeholder Satisfaction Survery.pdf

Quote:7. Regarding the close call of two Qantas 737's in Sydney on April 29, did you work with Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and Airservices Australia (ASA) on this matter to determine the cause of the matter?

8. What course of action has been taken to ensure this does not happen in the future?

9. Was human error or staff fatigue a factor in the incident?

10. Were staff shortages in air traffic control a factor in the incident?

11. In the view of CASA what was the cause of the incident?


7. CASA has been advised that Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is investigating this incident and is available to support ATSB if needed.

8. Pending the outcome of a formal investigation, CASA is satisfied that Airservices is initiating actions to minimise the risk of a similar occurrence.

9. CASA awaits the outcome of the formal investigation to understand possible contributing factors to this incident.

10. CASA awaits the outcome of the formal investigation to understand possible contributing factors to this incident.

11. It would be inappropriate for CASA to speculate on the causes of this incident and will await the outcome of the formal investigation by ATSB. surprises there I guess with the way that was answered?? -  Dodgy 

However to this statement: "CASA is satisfied that Airservices is initiating actions to minimise the risk of a similar occurrence..."

On what are they basing this assessment? Is it based on the findings of a parallel investigation; or a co-operative initiative instigated through the ATSB/CASA MoU and their published responsibilities to the ICAO Annex 19 SSP? Ref pg2:


3.1 ATSB and CASA are committed to ensure the effective implementation of the State Aviation Safety Programme, as published by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. Cooperative priorities for improving implementation of the Programme during the period of this MOU include, but are not limited to:

(a) Improving information collection and sharing processes, having regard to the standards and recommended practices in Annexes 13 and 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago 7 December 1944
(b) Cooperative research and analysis to review safety trends and identify areas for safety improvement
© Public communication and education on aviation safety matters.

On the matter of the 'close prox' at YSSY and the other growing list of TIBA near misses, mid-air collisions, MAYDAY fuel diversions and ATCO REPCONs, I cannot understand why these obvious safety risk issues haven't been escalated to an urgent meeting of both the SSP Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA) Working Group 

Quote:The USOAP CMA Working Group is a working level cross-agency team with representative of all agencies with ICAO Annex responsibilities. The objective of the USOAP CMA Working Group is to promote civil aviation safety by ensuring Australia adheres to ICAO’s safety oversight standards.

; or perhaps the Joint Agency Aviation Safety Analysis Coordination Group (JAASACG):    

Quote:To facilitate the exchange of safety-related data and analyses between agencies, for the sole purpose of maintaining and improving aviation safety; and to identify joint safety analysis projects that utilise the combined capabilities of agencies to produce outputs of aviation safety benefit.

Instead we get the 'nothing to see here' response from CASA (above), where they are quite happy to wait on the final report from the ATSB , who you will remember were reluctant to even investigate this incident: Ref - TICK TOCK goes Harfwit's Oz Aviation DOOMSDAY CLOCK??

Quote:A couple of OBS here: 1/ This incident occurred over 2 weeks ago, how is it that it has taken over 2 weeks for Popinjay to decide to investigate? 2/ Given this incident involves our national carrier Qantas, why hasn't there been any media briefing about this investigation from Popinjay; or one of his many Director's of Transport Safety??
Of passing strange coincidence, have just visited the investigation page for the April 29th 'close prox' at YSSY and it actually had an unnotified update, on the 2 June, to the 'Summary' that bizarrely reads more like a prelim/interim report??

Quote:UPDATED 2 June 2023: The ATSB is investigating a close proximity event involving 2 Boeing 737 aircraft, registered VH-VZM and VH-VZW, at Sydney Airport, New South Wales on 29 April 2023. Both aircraft were using runway 16L: VH-VZM departing and VH-VZW arriving.

It was reported that at 1747 local time, after a preceding flight had vacated runway 16L, the controller issued VH-VZM with a take-off clearance, and there was a close proximity event with VH-VZW on approach. The controller reportedly instructed the flight crew of VH-VZW to conduct a missed approach and then vectored the aircraft onto a diverging track.

The ATSB has commenced the examination and analysis of the initial evidence collected.

To date, the ATSB investigation has included:
  • interviewing the flight crew and air traffic controllers
  • analysis of air traffic control recordings
  • analysis of flight recorder and air traffic surveillance data.

The continuing investigation will include further analysis of:
  • operational documentation
  • training practices
  • flight recorder and air traffic surveillance data
  • related occurrences.

A final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation. Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify relevant parties, so that appropriate safety action can be taken.
Couple of OBS here, this investigation is still listed as "Short", therefore due to a 'notified difference' to ICAO Annex 13 - para 7.2:

Quote:Detail of Differences: Australia will comply with the standard for the more complex accidents. However, for some less complex investigations Australia does not prepare a Preliminary Report.

(PS: I note with the recent update to the NDs that there is no longer a difference to para 7.4 IE the 30 day rule. Yet the ATSB continue to be non-compliant with that rule - WTF?)

I would argue that given the 'close prox' incident, the other ASA incidents, the REPCONs etc..etc that there is a strong argument for the ATSB to be tasked by the SSP to open up a combined 'systemic' investigation into the administration and oversight of the ANSP Airservices Australia. Yet what have we got?? 


MTF...P2  Tongue



(12-22-2023, 09:55 AM)Peetwo Wrote:  Popinjay leaks Skerrit Ghost review; & CASA author ATSB corporate plan?

Remember this?

(11-10-2023, 08:02 AM)Peetwo Wrote:  Miniscule Dicky King trainwreck interview: Skerritt the panacea for Transport Safety agencies??  Dodgy

Via Su_Spence saga thread:

(11-09-2023, 06:14 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  Miniscule Dicky King weighs in on CASA ineptitude on Broome R44 fatal??Rolleyes

Still no official announcement from miniscule DK or her Department, however I did notice the Senator Gerard Rennick did make a Instagram post referring to Skerrit Ghost Review: 

Quote:Can you believe this?

Skerritt has landed some plum job chairing a committee that will be nothing but a flick and tick exercise.

The RRAT Senate committee should be reviewing Infrastructure, not some unelected bureaucrat, especially Skerritt.

I have also discovered that DK was in fact not the 1st to leak the existence of the "Australian Transport Safety and Investigation Bodies Financial Sustainability Review". In fact the first person to make/leak (30 August 2023) an unofficial announcement of the review was Popinjay himself, in the current ATSB Corporate Plan:

Quote:Corporate Plan 2023-24

[Image: R51L1553_Angus_Mitchell-2_250.jpeg?itok=E5bpyc_Q]

I am pleased to present the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Corporate Plan for the period 2023-24 to 2026-27.

This Corporate Plan has been prepared consistent with paragraph 35(1)(b) of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 and the relevant provisions of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (the TSI Act), which establishes the ATSB. The Corporate Plan is also consistent with the Statement of Expectations 2023-25 (SOE) for the ATSB, as notified under Section 12AE of the TSI Act, by the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.

The SOE sets out clear expectations relating to the ATSB’s governance, strategic direction, key initiatives, and stakeholder engagement, such that the ATSB’s resources be used in an efficient, effective, economical, and ethical way, following best practice principles and guidelines. I look forward to continuing to work with the Government to ensure the ATSB remains well positioned to meet these expectations.

I note there have been calls stemming from several inquiries and associated reports seeking to extend the ATSB’s services through an expanded remit. The ATSB will continue to provide input into such inquiries although any decisions to change the ATSB’s operating parameters are a matter for Government. My priority, since becoming Chief Commissioner in late 2021, has been to ensure the ATSB is funded adequately to perform the role defined by its existing remit. In this context, the ATSB will actively participate in the recently announced Australian Transport Safety and Investigation Bodies Financial Sustainability Review, which will consider and evaluate the ATSB’s current operational and funding arrangements.

In the past 12 months the ATSB has continued to demonstrate itself as a highly-capable agency releasing a number of complex and industry-significant investigation reports that carry wide-ranging safety learnings to the relevant transport modes. One such example is the ATSB’s final report into the collision with terrain of a Lockheed C-130 large air tanker during the 2019-20 Australian bushfire season. That investigation produced multiple key safety lessons relating to the tasking and operation of large air tankers – an operation becoming more prevalent in Australian firefighting.

Another fine example from the last 12 months was our final report into an investigation of a rail collision in Far North Queensland, which resulted in multiple safety actions being taken. The collision occurred due to a brake pipe not being properly connected when the train was coupled, and our investigation also made findings around survivability aspects in how the locomotive was manufactured. Pleasingly, this led to action being taken by the operator, the industry standards board, and the locomotive’s design owner.

In the marine sector, we also finalised a significant investigation into the sinking of a pair of tugs in Devonport, Tasmania, after they were impacted by an Australian-flagged bulk carrier, when its crew failed to select the correct steering setting during a turn in the port’s swing basin. This investigation made findings – and resulted in safety action by the operator – relating to bridge resource management, a key component of all safe marine operations. It also reflected on the response by the port operator, with more safety lessons emerging for that side of the industry as well.

As a relatively small, operationally-focused agency, the ATSB needs to anticipate change and adapt to ensure we are meeting the needs of government, industry, and the travelling public. Accordingly, during 2023 we launched our inaugural strategic plan, detailed later in this report. This plan was developed from extensive work with staff from across the agency. It clearly identifies the key objectives, strategies, and actions to be given priority over the short to medium term, with a focus on:
  • enhancing our products and stakeholder engagement for improving transport safety
  • fostering organisational resilience
  • affirming our role as the national transport safety investigator.

One area of that plan which has already yielded significant benefit has been a greater utilisation of audio-visual content. Through an expansion of the ATSB’s digital media production capabilities, we are able to develop more animations and videos to support our report releases. These products not only provide a better understanding for the audience already engaged in our reports; they also bring more people into the safety conversation, with high engagement levels across social media, and a high utility for television and online media outlets.

Over coming years, the strategic plan will aim to further improve the ATSB’s ability to provide greater value for persons and organisations seeking to use our products to take safety action.

Based on my interactions with a range of peer international safety investigation bodies since joining the ATSB, it is evident the agency remains highly regarded, and among the world’s leading transport safety agencies. I remain fully committed to continuing to work innovatively and collaboratively with all relevant stakeholders to enhance and amplify our contribution to improving transport safety, both domestically and internationally.

Angus Mitchell

Chief Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer
"recently announced" - Yet it took another month for EWB's Dept to publish the details of the review, a further month to publish the ToR, then  a further 2 weeks for EWB's crew to unofficially publish that Skerrit had the job and for DK to publicly leak both the existence of the review plus the identity of the imminent reviewer??

As a significant sidebar, in the course of tracking when the ATSB Corporate Plan was first created, I visited the document properties for the PDF version of the CP:

Quote:Document properties
File name: ATSB Corporate Plan 2023-24.pdf
File size: 733 KB
Title: -
Author: Lloyd Petty
Subject: -
Keywords: -
Created: 8/29/23, 10:13:37 AM
Modified: 8/29/23, 10:13:54 AM
Application: Acrobat PDFMaker 23 for Word
PDF producer: Adobe PDF Library 23.3.20
PDF version: 1.6
Page count: 24
Page size: Varies
Fast web view: Yes

Note that the author's name is Lloyd Petty, this individual is a long term employee for CASA with his most recent listed on LinkedIn as:

Quote:Civil Aviation Safety Authority
7 yrs 9 mos

Manager, Resource Planning & Reporting

Why is a CASA officer writing the four year 'strategic plan' for a supposedly fully independent government statutory agency?

MTF...P2  Tongue

(12-22-2023, 08:38 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  Bollocks Broome R44 crash and ICAO SSP audit??

Still catching up on some Oz articles that featured the many aberrations of the Troy Thomas aviation activities and operations in the NW Kimberley.

Courtesy the Oz:

Quote:Complaint videos sent to CASA show pilot Troy Thomas illegally landing on Cockatoo Island

[Image: ab2923826df56ebd6361b51063be32f7?width=1280]

Videos of unsafe flying – sent to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority with written complaints about dangerous incidents in the Kimberley – show the helicopters involved were not only owned by West Australian tourism stalwart Troy Thomas, but on at least one occasion he was also the pilot.

The Australian revealed last month CASA had investigated and dismissed a spate of dangerous flying allegations involving helicopters owned by Thomas and his companies a year before the Broome crash that killed him and 12-year-old Amber Millar.

Documents obtained by The Australian under Freedom of Information laws revealed CASA in 2018 received five written complaints, accompanied by photo and video evidence, of “unsafe behaviour” involving aircraft badged Horizontal Falls Seaplane Adventures, which Thomas founded and owned at the time.

When The Australian last month revealed CASA dismissed the complaints in 2019, a year before his fatal crash, the regulator said it “refutes the allegations”.

“Each of the 2018 incidents was investigated and acted on by CASA and not one of them involved Mr Thomas,” a spokesperson said.

However, The Australian has now obtained video evidence – through a further Freedom of Information application – that appears to show Thomas as the pilot in at least one of the incidents.

The 2018 reports to CASA sparked a noncompliance investigation into Helibrook, the aviation business of Outback Wrangler star Matt Wright, because Thomas’s choppers were operating under his Air Operator’s Certificate.

Helibrook’s chief pilot from 2018, Fraser Kenworthy, yesterday told The Australian that he recalls the Cockatoo Island incident.

“I remember the day,” he said. “But you see the thing is, I was the chief pilot for the commercial operations but he (Thomas) wasn‘t a commercial pilot so he flew the same aircraft that we were using commercially but it had nothing to do with my operation.

“I never had to answer to anything that he was doing because his was a private operation … so ultimately it had nothing to do with me.”

[Image: 46be998406b20d79c065185d6e05ce4d]

Last month CASA denied any knowledge of Thomas’s involvement in the incidents.

“CASA does not normally investigate the owners of aircraft involved in accidents or incidents – as many are owned under complex financial and shareholding arrangements,” the regulator said in a lengthy statement published on its website.

“CASA was aware of only one previous incident that Mr Thomas was involved in prior to his fatal accident. That incident resulted in enforcement action being taken against Mr Thomas.”

In one of the videos – filmed on July 2, 2018 – a pilot who appears to be Thomas lands his Robinson R44 Clipper II, registered VH-ZGY, on Cockatoo Island in Western Australia. The chopper’s passenger doors open, someone approaches, something yellow is put on the back seat and the pilot flies off.

At the time, a Cockatoo Island resident complained to CASA that the chopper made “an unauthorised landing on our property” and that it had happened multiple times “by the same operator in the past few weeks”.

[Image: d7061582517da9395a2b0a0b4c6d8c60]

The other three videos supplied to CASA show helicopters badged Horizontal Falls Seaplane Adventures flying dangerously low and through narrow gorges at Horizontal Falls, about 270km northeast of Broome.

Footage filmed from another aircraft shows a helicopter – possibly VH-ZGY – flying dangerously low towards a 20m-wide gorge in the McLarty Range.

In an incident filmed from a boat at Talbot Bay, a helicopter flies back and forth through a narrow channel in the Horizontal Falls. “That’s close,” someone says as the chopper flies low through a narrow 10-metre wide cliff passage.

A person on board the boat below tells a companion to “film the chopper doing that stuff”.

“It’s really very illegal,” a man is heard saying. “It’s very, very illegal.”

[Image: 4e467f271697c79fd78730d904c3b41b]

A separate video, filmed from another boat, captures the blue-looking helicopter flying low into a narrow gorge.

“You’re kidding,” someone on the boat says. “Even I know you can’t do that.”

In 2019, Thomas crashed the chopper he had landed on Cockatoo Island – VH-ZGY – off the top of his vessel High Calibre at Raft Point, north of Broome.

The incident, in which passengers were seriously injured and the aircraft was lost, was not reported to authorities.

CASA investigated a separate 2017 incident in which one of Thomas’s helicopters, VH-SCM, crashed off the top of a boat and into the water at Talbot Bay but never inspected the destroyed helicopter.

The written-off choppers belonged to Thomas’s company, Avanova Pty Ltd.

He operated five helicopters for private, business and commercial purposes.

[Image: 6783a3fd6eff08d654419613f2980d87]

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s final report into Thomas’s fatal Broome crash stated the 40-year-old had demonstrated “a high-risk appetite”, a history of noncompliance with aviation laws, was unlicensed to fly the destroyed Robinson R44 and knew there was a serious issue with it before taking off on that final fatal flight.

Last month, Amber’s parents, Fiona and Clint Benbow, said CASA had “blood on its hands” over their daughter’s death and called for an inquiry into the federal regulator over its perceived failure to act on complaints about Thomas.

They have also begged WA Coroner Ros Fogliani for a coronial inquest.

WA Premier Roger Cook recently said an inquest “looks like being the only vehicle that we can now rely upon to do that level of investigation”.

“There‘s an absolute dearth of people on the ground and commitment by CASA to investigate and follow up these things or to maintain a regulatory oversight of tourism and helicopter aviation generally,” he said.

And 2 weeks ago:

Quote:Injured chopper passenger Chelsea Cortese sues dead pilot Troy Thomas’ company Avanova

[Image: c3179bafd5c28dcf495ee1e4ba125bff?width=1280]

A Western Australian woman injured in a serious chopper crash with pilot Troy Thomas, less than a year before the fatal incident that killed him and a 12-year-old girl, is suing the late tourism stalwart’s aviation company.

Documents obtained from the Perth District Court reveal that passenger Chelsea Cortese is suing Thomas’s company Avanova Pty Ltd – which owned and operated his helicopter fleet – for damages over injuries she suffered in an unreported 2019 helicopter crash.

In July 2020, Thomas and Perth schoolgirl Amber Millar were killed when his Robinson R44 – registered VH-NBY – crashed immediately after takeoff from an industrial site in Broome.

But less than a year earlier, Thomas was the pilot in another serious helicopter crash in the Kimberley which injured everyone on board and destroyed the aircraft.

In July 2019, Thomas crashed his Robinson R44 – registered VH-ZGY – off the top of his catamaran, High Calibre, which was moored at Raft Point off the coast of Broome.

[Image: 4e3fc2b00f6a73a50640ef8c3631b0a3]

On the morning of July 12, Thomas, his operations manager Bryce McGlashan and Ms Cortese had boarded the helicopter to return to Thomas’s Horizontal Falls Seaplane Adventures pontoon.

Mr McGlashan, also a pilot, was sitting in the front passenger seat while Ms Cortese sat behind him.

The weather was fine and the water in the bay was calm but as soon as Thomas tried to takeoff, the helicopter yawed left, tipped forwards and rolled to the right.

The main rotor blades struck the starboard side of the vessel. The helicopter then hit the water and sank.

Mr McGlashan sustained serious physical injuries and Thomas, who was unlicensed at the time, suffered severe bruising and a sore neck.

Ms Cortese, who was aged 20 at the time, suffered severe injuries after almost drowning.

In its final report into the fatal Broome crash, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau said no-one reported this incident involving VH-ZGY to authorities.

The ATSB only discovered the crash, which was by law “immediately reportable”, during its three-year investigation into the Broome fatalities.

[Image: 6cf11af8db9bce07aacf8fadc37faff1]

Ms Cortese’s statement of claim states that VH-ZGY crashed because it was still tethered to High Calibre when Thomas tried to take off from the helipad.

“As the helicopter began to take off, there was a holding strap still attached on the underside of the helicopter towards the front, which was pulling the helicopter down, when Troy Thomas manoeuvred the controls of the helicopter to the right, which resulted in the helicopter tilting to the right, and slicing the right hand side of High Calibre, shattering the glass windows, before nose diving into the water,” it says.

“The defendant was negligent in attempting to take off and climb the helicopter while it was still strapped to High Calibre causing a loss of control and the defendant failed to perform adequate pre-flight checks to ensure that the helicopter was not strapped to High Calibre before taking off and failed to exercise sufficient care and skill in the operation of the helicopter to prevent the accident.”

[Image: 73cfe78dd301345f5889f11b87adfd08]

The 24-year-old claims she has since suffered from – and required extensive medical treatment for – severe injuries as a result of the accident.

“As a result of the accident the Plaintiff has experienced pain and suffering and a loss of enjoyment of life,” her lawyer Maureen O’Connell wrote.

“The Plaintiff has been incapacitated and has required and will require in the future the provision of services.

“The Plaintiff has required time off from her employment as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident and has sustained past economic loss and a loss of superannuation and will do so in the future.”

Ms Cortese is suing Avanova for damages, interest and costs.

In court documents Ms O’Connell claims that Avanova owed Ms Cortese a duty of care “to ensure she did not sustain injuries while a passenger in aircraft operated by the company” and that it was vicariously liable for any breach by people employed by or working for it including Thomas.

The Australian’s application to the Perth District Court for a copy of the defence pleadings was refused.

Ms Cortese’s claim against Avanova is expected to proceed to trial early next year.

Sophie Thomas, who was appointed director of Avanova weeks after her husband’s death, declined to comment.

Refer page 48 of AO-2020-033 Final Report:

Quote:It was reported to the ATSB that 2 people required transfer to another helicopter (VH-NBY) located nearby on-shore, to return to Broome. A witness stated that VH-ZGY had been used twice already that day and had landed to load a third passenger without shutting down. Simultaneously, friends and family of the vessel’s owner were due to arrive at Raft Point via seaplane to holiday aboard High Calibre. It was reported that the transfer to VH-NBY in VH-ZGY needed to be completed in time for the owner to get back to High Calibre and meet their guests.

The owner of the helicopter was piloting the helicopter and sat front right. One passenger sat front left, and the second passenger sat rear right. It was reported that upon take off the helicopter yawed left and then tipped forwards and rolled to the right. The main rotor blades contacted the starboard side of the vessel (Figure 32). The helicopter then collided with water and sank...

[Image: AO-2020-033%20Figure%2031.png?itok=FL9GS3du]
Source: Western Australia Police Force annotated by ATSB

...The front left occupant had serious injury, the owner sat front right, had severe bruising, and the rear right passenger had minor injuries. The helicopter was destroyed. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority confirmed the loss of VH-ZGY with an insurance agent, and the helicopter was not recovered. High Calibre had significant damage and the hull was penetrated above the water line. High Calibre was repaired in a remote location 11 days later...

...Under section 18 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 a responsible person with knowledge of an immediately reportable matter must report it. The loss of VH-ZGY was not reported to the ATSB.

Hmm...I wonder when CASA 'confirmed the loss of VH-ZGY'... Huh

Next and I believe directly related with all the aberrations of both the ATSB Croc-o-shite and Broome cover-up reports, I note the following throwaway paragraphs imbedded in the latest Su_Spence bollocks briefing:

Quote:Also this year, it was our turn to be inspected by the International Civil Aviation Organization as it assessed Australia’s state safety programs and conducted a focused audit.

It was a good reminder that audits, rather than something to be feared, provide useful insights into what we do well and where improvements need to be made.
ICAO audit...who knew? Digging around I did manage to find the following statement from the 'Civil Aviation Safety Authority Annual Report 2022-23':

Quote:Performance criteria: CASA maintains the Effective Implementation (El) score determined by ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP)

Target - Maintain or improve EI score


Australia’s EI score was 94.89% (valid to 30 August 2023), which is unchanged from last year and reflects the outcome of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) validation mission undertaken in 2017. The EI score is a State score based on the performance of all 9 Australian State Safety Program agencies.

Australia is scheduled to undergo an ICAO State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA) and Focused Audit under the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP), from 30 August to 19 September 2023.

BRB OBS: "..I reckon that reads like - ‘trying to turn a negative into a positive’. Being a potential international embarrassment for Australia, a SSP audit will always result in significant reaction to criticism. That may explain lots of oddities at present - interesting days. Popinjay’s lack of independence is still a major risk for the SSP..."

Very much a live 'major risk' I would say: Ref:  Popinjay leaks Skerrit Ghost review; & CASA author ATSB corporate plan?

Quote:1.3 Accident and incident investigation

The State has established an independent accident and incident investigation process, the sole objective of which is the prevention of accidents and incidents, and not the apportioning of blame or liability. Such investigations are in support of the management of safety in the State. In the operation of the SSP, the State maintains the independence of the accident and incident investigation organization from other State aviation organizations.

Reference ICAO Annex 19 ATTACHMENT A

Update: FOI requests??

From FOI Disclosure Log:

Quote:Date: 25 August 2023

Details: All documents and correspondence that mention either Gerard Butler or Jimmy Kimmel

Exemption(s) applied: s47F

Freedom of Information (FOI) 25 August 2023 – All documents and correspondence that mention either Gerard Butler or Jimmy Kimmel (PDF, 2.38 MB)

This was the video footage (from 9 years ago) that I think the released FOI DOCs relate to:

This was the outcome of the SCN (show cause notice) that was issued to the pilot of the Robbo involved in that reported incident:

[Image: all-documents-correspondence-mention-eit...mmel-1.jpg]

For what ever reason the rest of the FOI DOCs are totally blacked out. However I don't believe that Matt Wright was directly involved in the video segment but was associated as the black R44 was registered to him.

Next I refer to the following YouTube video, as I believe it goes to the normalised deviance to aviation safety standards that the Matt Wright operation had drifted to over more than a decade:

Further to last and in connection back to the Troy Thomas illegal aviation activity, seemingly ignored by CASA, I note the following CASA FOI released docs: Certificate of airworthiness and surveillance findings 1 of 2

(Note the released DOCs include Troy Thomas's 1st mishap with an R44 take off from a (House) boat.)

..& Certificate of airworthiness and surveillance findings 2 of 2

(Note the dates of the many non-compliances and illegal activities go back more than a decade)

Finally from the FOI DOCs released the following tale of CASA complicity of Croc egg collection HEC approvals for the last 5 years: CASA.CARRY instruments

Much more to follow??...P2 Tongue

Back to the Future on non-standardisation and non-compliance with ICAO SARPs!! Dodgy 

Reference PG 9 (28/03/2021) of this thread:

(03-28-2021, 07:02 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  The DARD and continued non-compliance with ICAO?? -  Rolleyes 

Quote from this week's SBG:

Quote:...As recently as this week, there was a serious, deep and meaningful pow-wow held between the department and some serious industry players (top draw not the usual riff-raff). It seems the new head of ‘the department’ is not only a straight shooter with brains, but his team are of the same calibre. Not to embarrass anyone, I won’t mention names, but will say that the seriously experienced crew from industry had nothing but praise for the folk from DoIT. Can you imagine how good it feels to have something positive to say about that department; it is a rare and welcome treat. There were some pretty hard heads at that sit-down; not ones to gripe or grumble, but seriously involved. The facts related to ‘the Act’ and the current situation and the simple remedies for that insupportable situation were not only well received, but, brilliantly – they were understood...

...Australia used to be a world leader don’t ya know; reduced now to almost an international pariah through non compliance, idiotic rule sets, a dodgy Act and a mindset which beggars logical, rational minds. Is there yet hope for a urgent reset of the ethos? Reform, regeneration and a return to sanity?... 

I have it on good authority that in the course of the mentioned (above) meeting there was much discussion about international aviation regulatory standardisation, international treaties and our non-conformance with ICAO SARPs (Standards and Recommended Practices).

This inquisition from the Dept is due in large part of their being made aware of many horror stories from the Department's international counterparts, when it comes to dealing with our aviation safety administrator, in the areas of aeronautical trade, commerce and aircraft certification.

This brings me to the reason why the likes of McDermott Aviation (plus others that trade internationally) were present at that meeting - remember this?

Back to our aviation safety bureaucracy's propensity for obfuscating and taking the piss out of ICAO, the Department only need refer to the previous Department Seceretary Dr Kennedy's answer to RRAT Estimates QON in 2018: ref -
Quote:[Image: DIRDC-1.jpg]

[Image: DIRDC-2.jpg]

Which of course brings me to the point of bringing back to life this thread, for the benefit of the DARD here are some historical morsels I've dug up from the back of the AP stables... Tongue        

ICAO notified differences & the 'snowball effect'

Murky & his minions - A bureaucratic dictatorship?

Obfuscation of ICAO - A how to?

Barry O, Mr McFixit and the ICAO snowjob

Three decades of Australia taking the piss out of ICAO

Hmm...and there's plenty more where that came from... Wink

[Image: SBG-8-11-20.jpg]

Plus from PG 10 of the Mount NCN thread:

(06-30-2021, 10:29 AM)Peetwo Wrote:  
(06-30-2021, 07:10 AM)Kharon Wrote:  "The first task for these new leaders is to develop and promulgate a new Aviation Safety Program that at least looks to the future and is written in support of the Convention." Amen...........

For a while now, most of the best advice, common sense and very sound logic provided in assistance to government departments, in relation to whats' left of the aviation industry has been provided by AMROBA.

The simple, plain English statement above, in a nutshell identifies and provides solution to almost every single anchor preventing the aviation industry from moving forward.

The blatant abuse and manipulation of the 'convention' has produced the worlds largest, most incomprehensible, undemocratic 'rule' set. Volumes and volumes of the stuff - arranged to ensure that no matter what - the administration have complete control of industry and can, on a whim or a 'say-so' ensure 'safe conviction'. The ways in which 'law' has been used to create a 'fear' of challenging the administration has been demonstrated many times, to the disgust and bemusement of many senior legal; counsel and Judges.

Australia is a signatory to the Chicago Convention; that is enshrined within the Constitution (51.1 from memory - stand corrected). The 'administration' is authorised to 'administer' an ICAO compliant regulatory suite - nothing else - just that. The spirit, intent and purpose of the Chicago convention has been twisted and warped into a hideous parody of that. This done through manipulation and 'differences'. What have we now - 4000 odd registered differences. These 'differences' are not of the "we say tomato - you tomayto" type. The majority reflect a cynical, even sinister manipulation which empowers CASA while denying industry any means of defence. Strict Liability being just one of many aberrations cunningly disguised as 'safety'.

The  new leadership need do a little more than 'look' at returning to ICAO compliance and the convention. It should be a sworn pledge, to this nation - to return the administration and regulation of the aviation industry back to sanity.

Government may only take one of two pathways. Spend another decade and an army of lawyers to unscramble the existing rule set : or, adopt the NZ. PNG, USA rule set and see industry revitalised within a twelve month. But either way - ICAO compliance is what we signed up for in Chicago, not some mad home made manipulation supported by 4000 'differences'. No Sir, indeed we did not.

Toot - toot.

P2 addendum: CASA obligations to the Chicago Convention and ICAO SARPS

First from Part II section 11 of the CA Act:

Quote:11 Functions to be performed in accordance with international

CASA shall perform its functions in a manner consistent with the
obligations of Australia under the Chicago Convention and any
other agreement between Australia and any other country or
countries relating to the safety of air navigation.

Next from Herbert D Ray's (slightly disjointed) submission to the ASRR:

Quote:Each submission displays how various matters are regulated by CASA’s FAR sterile
rules to contribute those rules to not being capable of administering and producing FAA
class one level aerospace products and only being capable of administering and
producing FAA class two level Australian aerospace products.

Our safety regulator has never being classed by the ICAO universal safety oversight
program (USOP) auditors as a ‘compliant ICAO treaty State and never being capable of
administering and producing FAA level one only level two rated aerospace products.

The submission to the ATSB displays how VH TWJ an MA18 Dromader that had a wing
failure near Ulladulla on the 24 Oct 2013 had been operating with illegal CASA 6600kg
auw CASA approved instructions certifying the operation of VH TWJ to operate by
2850lbs (1290kg) overweight to an ‘N’ registered Dromader in the US.

The CASA not FAA approved instructions are not recognized by the FAA which rates
the aircraft as a class two level aircraft that is not eligible to operate in US or any other
compliant ICAO treaty State airspace.

Each ICAO treaty State that has pledged to uphold the Chicago Convention international
treaty to internationalize their national civil aviation law to respond in concert with
international standards all have the objective regulating their national civil aviation law to
be capable of administering and producing FAA level one aerospace products.

ICAO treaty States are aware that only FAA level one rated aerospace products can
operate as an N registered aircraft or be installed on N registered aircraft and are
eligible to safely operate and navigate US and ICAO Treaty States airspace.

The ICAO treaty States are compliant ICAO Treaty States when they maintain the FAA
level 1 rating as a standard for aerospace products being eligible to safely operate and
navigate a States airspace.

An ICAO Treaty State audited by the ICAO universal safety oversight program rates a
State as being a ‘compliant ICAO Treaty State’ when its national civil aviation law can
administer and produces FAA level one rated Aerospace products.


Quote:US rehabilitates Israeli air safety, a lesson for Australia
Ben Sandilands | Nov 02, 2012 8:05AM | EMAIL | PRINT

The US Federal Aviation Agency’s rehabilitation of Israel as a Level 1 state in relation to air safety ought to be read as the clearest of warnings to Australia to get its act together without delay.

If Australia is busted down to Level 2, which on the evidence, it should be, the consequences include the prohibition under US law of code shares between Australian flag carriers and those of America.

The managements of Qantas and Virgin Australia need to carefully consider what losing their respective code share deals with American Airlines and Delta would mean, and ask whether the craven acceptance of the dismal state of affairs in CASA, the ATSB and AirServices Australia is worth the damage such a downgrade would inflict on their shareholders, employees and commercial reputations.

When Israel flouted its responsibilities and was busted for almost four years, it failed to lobby its way out of trouble, which was quite surprising. But as Wikileaks showed earlier this year, when Australia provisionally failed the necessary audits to retain Level 1 status, our lobbying efforts saved the day.

Since then matters if judged by recent events, have gone backwards in CASA, the ATSB and AirServices Australia, and the risk of a safety downgrade and all of its commercial consequences should be treated (as it may already be in high places) as being severe and imminent.

This is the FAA statement concerning Israel, released overnight:

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today announced that Israel complies with international safety standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based on the results of an October FAA review of Israel’s civil aviation authority.

Israel is now upgraded to Category 1 from the Category 2 safety rating the country received from the FAA in December 2008. Israel’s civil aviation authority worked with the FAA on an action plan so that its safety oversight system fully complies with ICAO’s standards and practices. A Category 1 rating means the country’s civil aviation authority complies with ICAO standards.

A Category 2 rating means a country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with minimum international standards, or that its civil aviation authority – equivalent to the FAA for aviation safety matters – is deficient in one or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record keeping or inspection procedures With the International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Category 1 rating, Israeli air carriers can add flights and service to the United States and carry the code of U.S. carriers.

With the Category 2 rating, Israeli air carriers were allowed to maintain existing service to the United States, but could not establish new services As part of the FAA’s IASA program, the agency assesses the civil aviation authorities of all countries with air carriers that operate or have applied to fly to the United States and makes that information available to the public.

The assessments determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are meeting ICAO safety standards, not FAA regulations In order to maintain a Category 1 rating, countries with air carriers that fly to the United States must adhere to the safety standards of ICAO, the United Nations’ technical agency for aviation that establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

This is the situation in Australia, in terse form: CASA is accused in multiple places, including under parliamentary privilege before the Senate, of conspiring with the ATSB, to withhold vital safety information contrary to the provisions of the Transport Safety Information Act of 2003 in order to protect the reputation of operator Pel-Air in relation to the ditching of one of Westwind jets off Norfolk Island in 2009, in the final report into the crash published by the ATSB on 30 August.

The ATSB has admitted that the report is not one it can be proud of, through its chief commissioner Martin Dolan, and the general manager, air safety investigations, Ian Sangston, deposed that he didn’t even know what safety questions had been asked of the survivors, but signed off on a report that did not even say whether the safety equipment on the jet worked. (It didn’t.)

AirServices Australia has recently lost at least two airliners in Australian controlled airspace, and in the case of the Virgin Australia 737 that it lost track of for most of the way between Sydney and Brisbane, lied about to the media, and has not addressed evidence that the notification of the incident to the ATSB was so inaccurate in the first instance that it had to be amended after the fact.

There are many more areas of administrative and competency failures, as regular readers of Plane Talking would be aware. The damage the situation in CASA, the ATSB and AirServices Australia can do to life, property and the economic interests of this country are considerable. They are conveniently ignored in the general media and public life. The inconvenience that will arise without determined and urgent corrective action cannot be understated.

If anyone thinks these serious issues, as an original signatory to the 1944 Chicago (ICAO) Convention, of non-compliance with the ICAO SARPs has since been addressed, think again because it has actually gotten worse.

Courtesy of AMROBA, via the AP email chains:

Quote:[Image: thumbnail_image002.jpg]

CASA senior management refuse to promulgate EASA Part 66/147 AME class hours.

This also means the ICAO SARPs are not being met – not compliant with SARPs.

This is the real reason why the shortage has happened. 

We don’t have specific EASA helicopter or piston powered aeroplane courses.  After a decade and half since Part 66 introduced, we still haven’t seen EASA training course standards applied. Is there an unwitting bias against these sectors of aircraft maintenance.

Oh, how we would have like the B2L of EASA to enable a progressive licence.

We would also liked CASA to adopt the Group ratings associated with Part 66 licences. 

It is fairly simple, when Part 66/147 was introduced, CASA and ASQA should have worked together to implement an ASQA training that meets the CASR Part 66 modules. Why does CASA approve Part 146 MTOs? They have no CASA approved basic licence training courses. 

CASA is out of step with Australia’s trade training system within the NVET system. 

The latest Breaking News makes it clear to all. 

How will civil aviation helicopter and piston powered aeroplanes sectors ever get training back into the VET system so apprentices can be employed leading to a helicopter of piston powered aeroplane AME tradespersons can become a reality? 

We all agree that under the current management, there is little hope they will change.

When will government wake up that there is a critical shortage under the current regulatory system. 


[Image: image003.jpg]



I agree, this leadership of CASA has no understanding of Annexes SARPs and are captured by individual operator/organisations and non commercial sectors of aviation. 

The real issue is that the CASA Executive is not technically qualified to do the ICAO course:

Managing Compliance with ICAO SARPs 

It should be compulsory for all public service managers (Infrastructure & CASA) involved with regulation development andmonitoring to complete this basis course.

Pre CAA/CASA, the Department’s globally recognised training school taught this to basic inspectors; so important in the engineering and maintenance fields as aircraft are global products maintained to global standards. 

Since the inception of an agency, the non-airline sectors have been targeted. 


And this afternoon from KC to all AMROBA members... Wink

Quote:To all members,

Are we still recognised as a top 10 nation, compliant with Convention Annexes Standards & Recommended Practices?

Engineering no longer seems to have political or public service support as an industry that can go global as well as domestic.

Regulatory requirements are at least 15 years behind modern major civil aviation nations restricting all aspects, including job qualifications. 

2023-2024 Engineering Project Proposed. Ctrl Click link

We are proposing an engineering project to become fully harmonised with major civil aviation markets globally to reduce current administrative costs. Those manufacturing and maintenance services businesses that want to expand globally need a regulatory system that will enable global recognition to keep jobs in Australia.  Currently, this system prevents recognition.

Step 1.

The first hurdle that government must overcome is the inability of current departments and agencies to give effect to the Convention Annexes’ Standards and Recommended Practice (SARP). All public servants involved must have industry experience and must complete the ICAO’s training course  “Managing Compliance with ICAO SARPs” so all Department and CASA senior and middle managers can plan, manage and continuously monitor the implementation of continually upgraded Standards And Recommended Practices (SARPs). Upskill department/agency staff to ICAO standards for personnel employed by aviation authorities.
  • This should ensure that Civil Aviation Act, Regulations and Standards give effect to the Convention Annexes SARPs.
  • This should remove just about all the differences lodged by Australia with ICAO.
  • By removing differences, bilateral/multilateral agreements enabling Australian manufactured products and approved organisations to be recognised by other nations.

Step 2.

Passing responsibility to develop regulations and standards to Agencies that administer these regulations and standards has not worked and has ended with Australia not being fully compliant with these Convention Annexes SARPs.   Only the Department is regulatory responsible to give effect to the Convention Annexes SARPs.  An international treaty with very specific standards and recommended practices.

Government must, to comply properly with the Air Navigation Act, reallocate all policy back to the portfolio department including the responsibility to submit new regulations, or amendments, that give effect to the SARPs, to the Minister for making.
  • Agencies may make submissions to the department for change.
  • The industry may make submissions to the department for change.
  • Without compliance with SARPs, global participation is a mirage.

It is obvious when reviewing aviation regulations and standards that they do not give effect to the Convention’s Annexes as stated in the Air Navigation Act.

Air Navigation Act

26 Regulations

(1) The Governor-General may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act:

(a)     prescribing all matters which by this Act are required or permitted to be prescribed or which are necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act;

(b)    for the purpose of carrying out and giving effect to the Chicago Convention, as amended by the Protocols referred to in subsection 3A(2), any Annex to the Convention relating to international standards and recommended practices (being an Annex adopted in accordance with the Convention) and the Air Transit Agreement;

©     in relation to air navigation within a Territory or to or from a Territory;

(d)    in relation to air navigation, being regulations with respect to trade and commerce with other countries and among the States; and

(e)     in relation to air navigation, being regulations with respect to any other matter with respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws.

The loss of industry experienced experts from the public service management levels over the last 2 decades is a major reason why we dd not stay compliant with the Convention Annexes’ Standards and Recommended Practice. They once provided leadership but the industry has much higher skilled workforce today because of the technology they manage day by day.

[Image: image003.jpg]

From ICAO course link:


This course aims to enable CAA senior and middle managers to plan, manage and continuously monitor the implementation of ICAO SARPs in their States.

See video here:

Hmm...Shirley Betsy and Su_Spence could spot several of their Dep Secs and Execs the $1250 USD to complete a virtual course for a better understanding of our obligations to be as closely compliant with the ICAO SARPs...Shirley..err anyone??  Rolleyes

MTF...P2  Tongue

KC does a chalk and cheese review of Annex 8; & Airworthiness bilateral agreements -  Wink

Via the AP email chains:

Quote:To all members,

The February Newsletter is now on the AMROBA’s website.

We wonder why Australia has to do business in a dated regulatory system that has not kept pace with the rest of the world?

Well, the answer is government departments/agencies have totally lost their expertise of pre agency times, who kept Australia current with ICAO ANNEX SARPs.

AMROBA did some comparisons and we simply do not deserve to be classed as a top 10 ICAO States of chief importan
ce in air transport.

1. Differences with ICAO Annex 8 comparisons makes interesting reading.
a. No wonder civil manufacturers are forced to move their businesses to the USA and EU nations.
b. Brazil, with no Annex 8 differences, is world’s best practice.
                                                               i.      Followed by China, Canada, Japan, USA & UK.

                                                             ii.      The USA system addresses older/vintage aircraft (needed in  Australia) better than others.

c. Australia also lodges more differences to other comparable nations.

Root Cause:       Australia “monitors” Annexes but have no programs to maintain currency.

2. We looked at the benefits to industry with harmonised Standards.
a. ICAO is very clear in the reasons for harmonised Standards.
b. We reviewed the Singapore/USA Bilateral that includes a Maintenance Agreement
 c. We reviewed the Singapore/EASA agreement that includes a Maintenance Agreement
d. We reviewed the UK/USA agreement that includes a Maintenance Agreement.
e. We reviewed Australia/USA agreement that does not include a Maintenance Agreement.

Root Cause:       Government does not have an aviation foreign office dedicated to negotiating agreements (FTA)

3. We look back at the problem with maintaining older aircraft maintenance where there is little to no approved maintenance data how to do maintenance because manufacturers passed that responsibility to the LAME.
a. The preamble to these manufacturers MM usually includes a statement that states this MM is a guide to the A&P mechanic and does not override the responsibility of the mechanic.
b. It wasn’t till the introduction of the ATA format in the 70s/80s that more detailed maintenance instructions appeared.
c. CAR 2A has always been based on the ATA formatted manuals but also excludes instructions issued by NAAs.
d. The FAA has both approved maintenance data and acceptable maintenance design for all US made aircraft.
e. Older/ageing aircraft safety is in the hands of experienced LAMEs which have kept safety levels acceptable.
f. However, we do get, mainly airline/military, from time to time, AWIs that expect what they are used to in modern aircraft MMs to be available to the GA LAME.
g. AMROBA has again raised this issue with CASA.

Root Cause:       Awaiting regulatory changeto adopt the FAA system that will introduce the approved/acceptable FAA ATA system.

4. Why LAME skills are so important to Safety.
a. The FAA Aircraft Maintenance Technician (our LAME) is honoured in the USA by having a national day – May 24th
b. The history of this is really no different to the Australian LAME.
c. A day in the life of an AMT/LAME is no different the world over.
d. A GA LAME has no Tech Services to support them, they are their own TS and access manufacturers more often.

Root Cause:       The (N)VET trade training system has failed to adjust to modular training supporting multi trade pathways in the avionic and mechanical trade streams of the past.

Ken Cannane

Executive Director


Phone: (02) 97592715

Mobile: 0408029329

Safety All Around.

Via the Newsletter:

[Image: Volume-21-Issue-2-Februay-2024-1.jpg]

[Image: Volume-21-Issue-2-Februay-2024-2.jpg]

[Image: Volume-21-Issue-2-Februay-2024-3.jpg]

[Image: Volume-21-Issue-2-Februay-2024-4.jpg]

MTF...P2  Tongue

ICAO audit report released...err apparently?? -  Dodgy

Not sure where the final report is but apparently Betsy and Co are now privy to the results, via Club Betsy:

Quote:The 2023 ICAO focused safety audit and assessment
In February 2024 ICAO completed its final report following a focussed aviation safety audit held in September 2023. The report reaffirmed that Australia has an effective aviation safety oversight system. The report highlighted areas where Australia could more fully realise the benefits of closer alignment with ICAO’s standards and practices and these areas will be responded to through corrective action plans agreed with ICAO and updates to our State Safety Program (SSP) and National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) this year. ICAO also undertook a State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment in September 2023. ICAO assessed Australia as having a mature aviation safety system overall that proactively identifies, manages and mitigates safety risks.

Australia’s results can be viewed via the ICAO website.

Australia’s State Safety Programme (SSP) and National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) 

The SSP is the primary publication used to describe how Australia ensures the effectiveness of our aviation safety system. It is a summary of all Australian aviation safety-related legislation, risk management and assurance processes, as well as safety promotion mechanisms, that support Australia’s aviation safety system. The NASP summarises Australia’s safety-related activities and establishes Australia’s safety goals, safety risks and priorities for enhancement. The department, working closely with CASA and other aviation safety agencies, is in the process of updating our SSP and NASP. The department will be finalising drafts of these plans, taking into account ICAO’s recent recommendations, for industry and public consultation in the first half of this year. The Australian Government expects to publish the updated SSP and NASP in mid-2024.

Hmm...passing strange that Su_Spence in her latest spin-n-bollocks briefing didn't mention the wonderful results from the ICAO audit??  Rolleyes

Quote:Director of Aviation Safety, Pip Spence

Improving safety is a complex topic that keeps us on our toes, generates passionate industry feedback and delivers valuable lessons.

Being open to reviewing how things went, learning from those lessons and remaining flexible have been crucial components of both our regulatory philosophy and our approach to transitioning to the flight operations regulations we introduced more than two years ago.

As we work our way through the third year of phasing in the new rules, we remain dedicated to realising the safety improvements they promise.

Central to this is being adaptable and attentive to industry feedback on any challenges encountered during the transition period without losing sight of what we are trying to achieve.

We have been engaging with industry on a sector-by-sector basis to better understand the readiness of operators and any support they require in adopting the provisions we deferred when we first introduced the new regulations.

We are evaluating each stage and looking for opportunities to improve before we proceed with our plans for subsequent stages.

If you're an air operator I encourage you to read the article below for information on what is next.

Just as safety is a fundamental function of CASA, innovation and flexibility are key to facing the challenges of an evolving aviation industry.

We are tweaking our organisational structure and introducing new initiatives through programs such as our General Aviation Workplan and National Oversight Plan.

We were also joined in mid-February by two new senior executives who will be familiar to many of you.

Former Regional Aviation Association of Australia (RAAA) chief executive Steve Campbell joined us as executive manager of our National Operations and Standards Division and former Recreational Aviation Australia (RAAus) chief executive Matt Bouttell started as executive manager of our Regulatory Oversight Division.

Steve has been RAAA’s CEO for 3 years and previously served as aviation advisor for former Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Michael McCormack.

Matt started his career at Qantas and worked in roles ranging from maintenance to analyst and principal strategy advisor.

Both bring with them a wealth of aviation experience and may already be familiar to some of you.

The new senior management appointments followed a highly competitive recruitment process, and they round out what I believe will be a highly positive, collaborative and engaged executive leadership team here at CASA.

It will be dedicated to a regulatory approach based on sound risk assessment, flexibility and meeting our obligations to optimise safety for the aviation community.

All the best,


MTF...P2  Tongue

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