Thread Rating:
  • 0 Vote(s) - 0 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
Mount Non-compliance & upcoming ICAO/FAA audit?
Nepal makes honest progress to improving aviation safety record - Wink

Via Kathmandu Post:
Quote:Nepal offloads Icao safety concern tag
Flies out of global civil aviation watchdog’s bad books after four years

- SANGAM PRASAIN, Kathmandu


[Image: graph1-22072017081107-1000x0-22072017083004-1000x0.jpg]

Jul 22, 2017-

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (Icao) has removed the “significant safety concerns” (SSC) tag it had put on Nepal four years ago.

The Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (Caan) on Friday made an official announcement that Nepal “is no longer” in the global civil aviation watchdog’s bad books.

[Image: graph2-22072017081107-22072017083004.jpg]
“We have passed the safety audit conducted by Icao’s Coordinated Validation Mission (ICVM),” said Caan Director General Sanjiv Gautam at a press meet in Kathmandu on Friday. “Our safety standard has improved better than expected,” he said. “But this is not the end. We have many challenges ahead. We all need to be careful about safety as its indicators keep on fluctuating all the time.”

The UN supervisory body had put the SSC tag on Nepal’s aviation sector in its audit report in 2013—a follow up of 2009 audit-after assessing that Nepal’s safety standard had not improved on par with the global standards.

Nepal’s largest helicopter Shree Airlines was the first casualty of the SSC. Its international chartered services with the United Nations World Food Programme were immediately withdrawn. 

As fallout of the SCC, Nepal Airlines Corporation (NAC) was prevented from obtaining an operating authorisation in China. It has also affected the private carrier Himalaya Airlines’ plan to expand its wings to Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia and some other countries.

NAC’s worry had grown of late with the Icao SSC tag, for it has plans afoot to connect London and Australia after acquiring Airbus A330 jets. International airlines and travellers hesitate to travel to a country whose air safety is questioned by Icao.

The 2013 audit report had pointed that Nepal’s score of 55.01 percent in effective implementation (EI) of critical elements of safety oversight system was way below the global average of 60 percent. But the latest audit has given Nepal a score of 66 percent for effective implementation of safety standards—way above the benchmark of global standard of 60 percent.

Icao monitors Nepal’s aviation safety oversight capabilities through the ICVM. The mission is generally invited by a state when it is fully confident that it has fully complied with the international safety standards. The mission led by Icao operations expert Captain Eugene Voudri and airworthiness expert Edmund Bohland carried out an on-site audit on July 4-11.

Among eight critical elements of aviation safety—primary legislation, organisation and safety oversight functions, personnel licensing, aircraft operations, airworthiness of aircraft, aerodromes, air navigation system, and accident and incident investigation, the Icao experts had audited legislation, organisation, operations and airworthiness.

In July 2013, an Icao mission visited Nepal to validate the corrective measures taken by the country to address the deficiencies pointed out by the global aviation watchdog in 2009. But it found several lapses during the on-site audit held on July 10-16, 2013.

Icao had raised the red flag on “operations”, among the eight critical elements of safety oversight, due to a sharp rise in the number of air accidents and incidents between 2009 and 2012.

Based on the SSC, the European Commission (EC) had blacklisted all Nepali carriers in December 2013 for the worst record of air safety oversight. Nepali carriers had to pass SSC for the EC to remove them from its blacklist. “We now have a strong base to request the EC to remove Nepali airlines from its air safety list,” said Gautam. “Nepal’s agenda will be included on the EC’s air safety committee meeting scheduled to be held in Brussels, Belgium in November.”


Published: 22-07-2017 07:54


MTF...P2  Cool

Ps Thorny asked: "..Is this proposal the beginning of subtly devolving oversight to a third party? .."

Yes I think so and from an organisation renowned for jealously protecting it's trough fund, it is actually very clever by Carmody, as the operational cost savings would far out weigh the quid pro quo arrangements with IATA. Remembering of course that IATA will be ultimately looking for commercial benefits for it's members in the APAC region.
Reply
Is Australia on it's last GASP with ICAO??

Reading up on the latest version of the ICAO GASP and being hot on the inconsistencies of Australian reporting to the ICAO ADREP/iSTARS system (more on my discoveries very soon); I cannot help but think we are close to the long drop of international ridicule when it comes to walking the talk on aviation safety risk mitigation... Blush  

Following on from the 'Singers' theme on the Search 4 IP post #191 I would like to further highlight the strange and disturbing dichotomy between 'us' and 'them' on the world stage of belief (not weasel words) in the ICAO principles of effective implementation of an SSP (Annex 19) and compliance with the ICAO SARPS.

Via UnitingAviation.com:

Quote:Deepening our understanding of safety risks to better support States

- Mar 30, 2017
[/url]
[Image: Checklist.Safety.Plane_-800x500.jpg]
Encouraging trends are putting ICAO’s aspirational safety goal of zero fatalities in reach, ICAO’s Deputy Director of Aviation Safety Catalin Radu told delegates at the [url=https://flightsafety.org/summit-seminar/sass2017/]Singapore Aviation Safety Seminar
(SASS 2017), but the challenge of managing safety is becoming greater in the dynamic and complex environment caused by the predicted doubling in air traffic volumes over the coming years. His keynote address at the event outlined the measures ICAO is undertaking with its stakeholders to address this.
 
The SASS 2017 event which is currently taking place and jointly organized by the Flight Safety Foundation and the Singapore Aviation Academy (SAA), is an annual safety seminar designed to provide a platform for aviation professionals to share the latest safety challenges, issues, developments and initiatives to raise the safety standards in the Asia Pacific region. The theme for SASS 2017 is “Stepping up Safety: A Systematic Approach”.
 
[Image: Singapore-Aviation-Safety-Seminar-March-...24x534.jpg]
 
Although the number of fatal accidents has been decreasing steadily since 2011, and it would be logical to deduce that the aviation sector is on its way to achieving its safety goal, Radu warned that “the path however, is not that obvious.” He identified three main issues: the effective implementation of ICAO’s Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), ICAO’s Safety priorities (operational risks) and current and emerging issues. “These issues can also be interpreted as opportunities”, he said, since they have encouraged the development of a vast array of systemic initiatives.
 
To carry out the effective implementation of SARPs, ICAO has put into place what it calls iMPLEMENT, an initiative designed to facilitate data-driven decision making at the top management levels. It has also established, inter alia, the GASP 2017-2019 roadmap to ensure that safety initiatives deliver the intended benefits associated with the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) objectives and initiatives while ensuring the efficient and effective coordination of complementary safety activities between all stakeholders. Not to mention the Regional Aviation Safety Groups (RASGs) that have been created to identify activities to support the GASP implementation in the regions and the Regional Safety Oversight Organizations (RSOO), which secure a more effective fulfillment of a State’s oversight obligations and an efficient way to pool resources.
 
This work had previously been based on the Effective Implementation score, a flat model that measures States’ implementation of SARPs . “Moving from the Effective Implementation score to a more comprehensive model was essential” Radu continued. “For that reason, we have introduced the Safety Margins, a risk-based prioritization model based on a State’s Traffic and the level of Effective Implementation (EI) in the related technical areas at risk, namely operations, air navigation and support functions”.
 
In addition, at the forum on RSOOs for Global Aviation Safety, held in Ezulwini, Swaziland from 22 to 24 March 2017, a global strategy and an action plan were endorsed to implement the Global Aviation Safety Oversight System, with the purpose of empowering and strengthening regional mechanisms (RSOOs for example), and with ICAO maintaining an inventory of competent safety oversight providers and the tasks and functions that they provide.
 
RSOOs (and other safety oversight providers) would have to demonstrate competence in the tasks and functions that they provide and qualify as an ICAO recognised safety oversight provider. “ICAO would act as a library of such providers that States would peruse for their State Oversight Audit Results”, Radu said.
 
Radu also outlined the development and importance of the RASGs. Initially leading regional definition of global targets to be reflected in ICAO’s future Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP), RASGs later evolved to assist States in defining their own specific targets based on an acceptable safety margin score. Today, RASGs constitute the perfect platform to harmonise and avoid overlaps between States, but also among RASGs.
 
[Image: SAFETY_EN.png]
 
Enhancing information is also key to the achievement of ICAO’s Safety priorities, specifically operational risks, Radu declared. “To reduce other accident priorities, a big framework for sharing information has been developed, one that covers much of the industry.”. This has been realized through the development of Core Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), which constitute an essential element of State Safety Plans (SSPs). International organizations (ACI, CANSO, IATA, ICCAIA and IBAC) representing service providers (airports, ANSPs, Airlines, Manufacturers among others) also participated in this endeavour, with the development of proposed sets of SMS KPIs. Through its iMPLEMENT initiative and the tools it has developed to manage hazards, many of which can be accessed through ICAO’s web-based iSTARs system, ICAO is collecting safety and efficiency datasets provided by the industry to produce safety, efficiency and risk analyses, thus helping States prioritize implementation.
 
Finally, Radu outlined the challenges and progress being achieved in current issues in aviation safety, such as conflict zones, global aircraft tracking, drones (RPAS), space transportation, and cyber safety, which will be the focus of ICAO’s Cyber Summit and Exhibition, taking place from 4 to 6 April 2017. He also highlighted the need to identify new emerging issues, like mental health, GPS interruption, cargo safety and supersonic aircraft, all of which require establishment of programs where States, the Industry and other stakeholders will contribute.
 
In summary, Radu believes the aviation community has developed a wide range of programmes, products, databases and tools to enhance and support safety performance. “By combining State audits with State and Industry operational data through SMS and SSP, and by guaranteeing the protection of information or operational data through Amendment 1 to Annex 19, ICAO lies at the heart of its safety Agenda and acts as a major player in moving closer to its zero fatalities aspirational goal,” Radu concluded.
  
The sincerity and belief (not weasel words) from ICAO’s Deputy Director of Aviation Safety Catalin Radu, is IMO very much at odds with the Australian 'head in the sand' obfuscation to our aviation safety obligations to the ICAO GASP... Sad


MTF...P2 Cool
Reply
Fawcett on drones, SMS & closing safety loops. 

Quote from the foreword of ICAO Annex 19:

Quote:The Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) in this Annex are intended to assist States in managing aviation safety risks. Given the increasing complexity of the global air transportation system and its interrelated aviation activities required to assure the safe operation of aircraft, this Annex supports the continued evolution of a proactive strategy to improve safety performance. The foundation of this proactive safety strategy is based on the implementation of a State safety programme (SSP) that systematically addresses safety risks.

Now a quote from M&M's SSP Chapter 2 on safety risk management:

Quote:..However, a modern approach to aviation safety management necessitates a systems approach to managing safety risks, encompassing organisational structures, policies and procedures—the SMS approach.


Safety risk management of the Australian aviation industry is a shared responsibility between industry and government aviation agencies. It is important that the aviation industry and the aviation safety agencies work collaboratively to produce the best safety outcomes.

The SSP recognises the need for a transition to a systems-based approach to safety oversight along with risk-based surveillance. This shift places more responsibility on regulated organisations and changes how regulators undertake oversight and monitoring roles.

The identification and management of aviation safety risk is undertaken through a multi-layered process which permits the aggregation of system and risk information into higher order categories, culminating in an assessment of the level of risk across the aviation industry.



And from M&M's SSP Appendix E:

...Aviation safety risk management in CASA


Consistent with the increased international emphasis on a state safety risk management programme, and as highlighted in ICAO Annex 19 (Safety Management) and ICAO Doc 9859 (Safety Management Manual), CASA adheres to the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management principles and guidelines to effectively identify, evaluate, control (where CASA has risk ownership) and monitor aviation safety risks.

As outlined in Chapter 2—State Safety Risk Management, management of Australian aviation safety risk is undertaken through a multi-layered process that has the capacity to identify and manage risks at various levels of the aviation industry...

There is at least one person in Australian politics that fully understands the principles and advantages of an effective aviation safety management system in proactively addressing identified safety risk issues, that person is Senator David Fawcett... Wink

 Last week we were witness to Senator Fawcett's deeper understanding of an SMS and the important role the Government's aviation safety agencies are proactively supposed to play to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the Australian version of the ICAO Annex 19 SSP.

Unfortunately it would appear that these agencies still lack the insight to understand the holistic, all inconclusive approach required to turn the SSP into a document of more than just words... Dodgy

In the following Hansard excerpts/Youtube vid,  Senator Fawcett proves that these agencies a seemingly content to stand back and watch the drone related accident occur, instead of collectively working together to proactively work on solutions, as much as possible, to mitigate the risk:       
Quote:Senator FAWCETT:  My last question goes to the issue of risk. You've talked about risk assessments. As you do your risk assessments are you relying on CASA's evaluation, which essentially supports their two-kilogram threshold? Or are you aware of more recent studies, for example from the UK and their Military Aviation Authority, that indicate, certainly for GA aircraft and for rotor craft, that much smaller drones present still catastrophic risk?

Dr Weaver : I'm aware of and have read that study from the UK. Our approach is to take all data sources on board. In some respects once somebody has entered controlled airspace we look at how we manage the risk, no matter what the size of the aircraft or the drone is. So, our risk assessment is focusing on what we can do. Obviously it will also focus on what we can encourage other parts of government and industry to do as well. But we're targeting it down to our role, our controls and our mitigations that we can put in place.

Senator FAWCETT:  Lastly, if we were to go to a model where we have a whole-of-government approach where the importation and sale is limited to the kinds of systems that DJI are putting out with that off-the-shelf, very limited operating envelope, and then we have a qualification regime where people can expand that a little bit to what our current requirements are—no closer than three kilometres, no more than 400 feet et cetera—and then another one to a commercial standard, from Airservices' perspective, who do you see should actually be conducting that training and licensing? Is that something that you see should be done by CASA, as it is for air crew at the moment? Could that be done by a commercial provider? Who do you think should be doing that?

Dr Weaver : When I look globally, I see a range of alternative approaches that occur. You see commercial providers of drone training internationally, and then you see some where it's more regulatory based. I guess, as the air traffic service provider, I'm agnostic as to how that's implemented. I'm interested in the outcome of preventing access to controlled airspace.


Quote:CHAIR: I want Senator Fawcett to have as much time as he needs. But I want to come back to estimates of 23 May—a Tuesday—this year when we had sitting at the table Mr Chris Manning, a former Qantas chief pilot who is now commissioner at ATSB. The words ring in my head. Although, I can't say them verbatim. Commissioner Manning said to us, 'Anything in airspace is a concern.' I get all that. So I want to ask the experts. We haven't had an incident—which is great. That's lucky. We don't want one. But, Mr Nagy, when you hit the pelican is there any way that something like this could do more damage to a fixed-wing aircraft?

I'm not going to won't worry about helicopters because that's Senator Fawcett's area of expertise. Would or could it do more damage than a birdstrike if it hit the engine or something like that?

Mr Hood : If I may, I would like to table this, an ATSB report where a wedge-tailed eagle, weighing about four kilograms, actually went through the cockpit of an Glasair aircraft near Bathurst in 2015. The pilot was temporarily blinded and broadcast a mayday. He had dead bird throughout the cockpit and in his lap, so the bird actually did go through the windscreen—a four-kilogram bird went through the windscreen. If you equate that to a four-kilogram RPA, obviously that is possible in light aircraft. Am I able to table that, please, Chair?

CHAIR: I can appreciate that, because I know a bloke who was minding his own business north of Pardoo one night when a bush turkey came through the bloody windscreen, mate—I've got a tell you, apart from crapping myself, lucky I wasn't at 30,000 feet.

Mr Hood : Apologies to Senator O'Sullivan, I will get a copy of that report sent to you electronically.

Senator O'SULLIVAN:  Thank you.

CHAIR: We've heard evidence about lithium batteries and all that. I want you to tell me. Do we just say, 'Oh, if it's a bird or one of those, it doesn't make any difference—it's the same'?

Mr Hood : I think this is where we don't understand enough. This is where we're very interested in the UK report and what the difference is between striking an RPA and striking a bird. We have about 2,000 bird and animal strikes per year in Australia. Most of them bounce off to little effect, but, of course, the one in the report in front of you did enter the cockpit, breaking the canopy.

Senator FAWCETT:  I think the UK report is very explicit on that. It highlights that the degree of give in the plastic of a plastic-covered drone has a very different impact to, perhaps, the homemade one where there are exposed metal components. So with the bird analogy, with lots of soft flesh tissue around, it will have an even more absorbent impact than the plastic. The UK report's actually pretty definitive on that point. A drone with exposed metal components, even at 400 grams, will have significant impact on a helicopter when it comes to dynamics components but even on a GA aircraft. That brings me to the issues around likelihood and consequence, which underpin risk. It brings me to issues of compliance and culture and, lastly, capacity. All of that will lead me to question you, as one of the safety experts, as to what work you are doing to contribute to a systems safety approach to this issue, as in a whole-of-government approach.

In terms of likelihood, Mr Holman, you very dutifully gave the answer that a DJI can only fly to 400 feet because that's the rule, and we had evidence here that you can't fly beyond line of sight. Can I tell you, the culture amongst the operators is different. Go and have a look at the DJI Forum online. These are people who fly DJIs for fun. A post earlier this year said, 'The FAA's 400-foot rule is not a rule; it's only a guideline.' Some bush lawyer has gone through and looked at all kinds of regulations going back into dim, dark history and statements in congress et cetera to justify why people can ignore the 400-foot rule. That's the culture. What that says is that, despite CASA's app and despite the piece of paper they put in the packet, the live culture that is dictating how the people among the 49,000 that the chair is concerned about operate these devices is that the likelihood of them being in places where they should not be is high and probably growing. It's also growing because things like the DJI off the shelf are more and more capable with every evolution. Therefore, there are more of those 49,000 who are flying more high-capacity aircraft. Putting that likelihood together with the consequence that we've seen from the British report, which you've very usefully highlighted again for us, what's your assessment of risk now compared to perhaps a year ago?

Mr Godly : The British report definitely provided a lot of information to us. Six months ago, when we were talking at the estimates committee, there wasn't really any of that real research, just mathematical models, basically based on birdstrikes and not much else. So that report really has informed us and what it has informed us is fairly consistent with what the models were suggesting would happen. In particular, for airliner-type aircraft, the risk of a collision—in particular, the windscreen—is probably limited to that cruise speed, because at the approach and descent speeds the bird strike certified windscreens don't seem to be compromised. And when you take into account the likelihood of that—we are seeing that three per cent of our encounters are above 10,000 feet, but the majority are obviously below that. So when you put likelihood and consequence together, for at least the high-capacity aircraft it's probably a fairly low risk.

For general aviation it's probably a different story. They generally don't have bird strike certified windscreens. And as the British report showed, there's a much greater chance of penetration of a windscreen, and also things like damaging the wings and rotors of helicopters. So in my opinion the biggest risk is for general aviation aircraft.

Senator FAWCETT:  Well, perhaps I can put to you, because your submission highlights this, that the percentage of incidents for rotor craft as a percentage of hours flown shows that they are actually probably in the zone of having the most likelihood of an interaction. And perhaps I can also put to you that unlike a strike on the wing of a GA aircraft, which may put a dent in it or may even rupture a fuel tank, in worst case, a strike on a tail rotor of a helicopter probably is going to mean the loss of that helicopter. Whilst the military used to train, somewhat hopefully, to teach people to land a helicopter without a tail rotor functioning, and the centre-of-gravity impacts and rotational impacts et cetera, I'd argue that the majority of your pilots would probably struggle to land a helicopter without a tail rotor, which means you've got whole loss and life loss. So, the consequence is incredibly high. The consequence for your RPT aircraft, whilst it may not crash—we've already seen at Gatwick, incidentally, on 2 July, the same day we had the Fokker incident in Brisbane, aircraft having to divert, or hold, which means cost disruption—other than the windscreen, you've got two or maybe four very large intakes to engines. The cost of one of those going through an engine would be very large. So whilst we're not talking about life necessarily, there is a cost and a consequence across the whole range.

Coming to recognising, as you said in your submission, your priorities and your capacity to investigate things, CASA likewise has capacity constraints. Does it not suggest, if we have high risk and capacity constraint within a regulator like CASA and organisations like yours, that we need a whole-of-government safety system approach to this which includes a prohibition on the import of devices that are capable of these kinds of operations unless they are, as one previous witness told us, off the shelf, geofenced to a very small bubble—100 or 200 feet—around the operator, with increases to that operational capability allowed only when they demonstrate that they have complied with a level of training? And I would argue that the first level of training is an independently invigilated exam that shows that they understand the safety implications of the current envelope—three miles or three kilometres around airports, 400 feet et cetera—and that the geofencing is expanded to a hard limit of 400 feet and the other area and then a final level, which is commercial, all the normal commercial considerations that currently exist, would remove those limitations from the device. That kind of whole-of-government, importation, customs-type restriction as well as CASA, as the regulator, surely, given your capacity constraints, is the sort of model we should be looking at. Have you done any work as the premier safety body to look at a systems based safety approach involving the whole of government as opposed to limiting your thinking to the current aviation environment—which is yourselves, Airservices and CASA?

Mr Hood : As I mentioned before, we're informers of policy and we're working very hard on this issue to ensure that we inform those we are required to inform. Certainly under the CASA ATSB MOU we're feeding the stats and our analysis of those stats to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the department. We have also added RPAS to our safety watch. We have nine areas of focus—safety watch, that's called—and RPAS is certainly one of those. We certainly are gaining our own experience in relation to the operation of RPAS—for example, the grounding on our very first sortie, if you like, to use the drone for investigation: on the train, heard the helicopter, let's put it on the ground.

So it's kind of a learning experience for us, being an operator ourselves in the RPAS environment. Our view is that we are working very hard to ensure that we also inform the travelling public of the emerging risk. I did take out something from the previous discussion with the Airports Association that maybe we could do a better job of highlighting those maps that we put in our submissions in terms of local councils and airports, to say, 'These are the near encounters in your area.' Potentially that would inform them in relation to the signs. But I know what you're saying—the policy objective: we're informing the policymakers.

Senator FAWCETT:  But what I'm asking is: are you looking for broader policy recommendations than perhaps you have traditionally taken? You know as well as the rest of us do that ministers tend to respond to recommendations of departments. If they go beyond recommendations of departments then, as Sir Humphrey says, 'That would be a very brave, Minister'! So, if departments come only with recommendations that are constrained by their current thinking—and from evidence that we've heard in this inquiry to date it seems that nearly every agency is constrained by the current construct of their role—CASA tells us, 'Well, we don't control importation', and you tell us you don't control regulation and Airservices says the same, who is doing that whole-of-government systems-type thinking to bring a recommendation to the minister saying, 'There is a way we can tackle this, but it will involve cross-departmental action and policy that brings in a number of arms of government'? I'm not hearing from any of you that anyone is doing that level. And if you, as the nation's premier safety experts, can't approach this from a broader systems perspective, asking what are all of the levers of government that we can bring to bear to this, then on what basis can we expect the minister to take action?

Mr Hood : I might make a couple of points. Australia does have an aviation policy group. The ATSB is not a member of the policy group, because it may well be that we have to investigate policy decisions. The department, Defence, CASA and Airservices are all members of the aviation policy group in Australia.

The other point I might add is the ATSB is very much the canary in the mine—and let me tell you, we will sing. But we're not going to sing prematurely, and we're not going to sing without the evidence to sing appropriately. You may be aware, from the other committee, of our report on the ATR aircraft. We have formed a strong view in relation to that aircraft. We published two interim reports and we've got a third one coming. So, we're not afraid to exercise that authority and have our say when we think it's appropriate. In this particular case I suppose it still comes down to the fact that we don't think we have enough evidence yet in relation to the consequence.

Senator FAWCETT:  Okay. Thanks, Chair.





Senator FAWCETT: Sorry. You've completely derailed my train of thought, Mr Crawford.

CHAIR: I've been trying to do that for the last six years you've been here and I've never succeeded!

Senator FAWCETT: You have. You'll have to take some lessons. CASA has previously expressed some concern about the maturity of technology such as geofencing. I've actually just been going through your submission again, and I thought you'd mentioned something in here that some of those technologies could potentially introduce risks. But we heard a comment before about DJI as an OEM—and I haven't been able to clarify whether this is their intent or whether this is what they are doing now—and that their product off the shelf is limited to a 100-foot bubble around the operator. If that concept is viable and mature enough that an OEM is doing that, why would we not look at a whole-of-government approach where we limited imports and sales to only OEMs that were prepared to take that approach so that we completely avoid the example of the Christmas present with an ill-informed operator who happens to fly it under a helicopter route or near an airport? And if it is true that DJI have put this in place, then it says that it's mature enough that it's commercially viable, therefore it's probably reliable enough that we can actually start limiting the 90 per cent of the unintentional incidents due to lack of knowledge. Why would we not take that as a key approach to the government?

Mr Carmody : Firstly, I'm not sure that it's true. One of my colleagues might know, as we stay as closely as we can to these sorts of developments. If geofencing—and I'll call it 'geofencing' in that context—or limiting a bubble around a drone is technically feasible, does mature and does become that way, that is certainly one of the methods that you could use to control drones and manage some elements of the risk. I'm not certain that it's as mature as advertised as yet. They're a very big marketer of drones—the biggest in the world. They're obviously trying to stay the biggest in the world, or get bigger. I'm not sure how it actually interacts with other technologies as well. So, I think that the jury is out. It sounds logical and sensible, and we will certainly consider it. But in terms of whether it is there yet, I'm not sure.

Senator FAWCETT: Could you undertake to have one of your people contact them, and OEM, and ascertain and come back to the committee with a view on that.

Mr Carmody : Certainly.

Senator FAWCETT: Because, if it's technically feasible and we limit the market to only manufacturers who meet that technical bar, as sure as apples come from trees, other manufacturers will reach that bar if they want to sell into the market. That then gives us a starting point where, over five years, with degrading batteries and all the rest of it, the old fleet will disappear and we'll be in a much better space for those 49,000 recreational users to encourage, through capability, their requirement to increase their level of knowledge before their machine becomes more capable.

Mr Carmody : We certainly will, Senator. We'll certainly take it on notice. We'll ask the question. I was hopeful we might even have the answer, but I assume we don't. We'll ask the question and come back to the committee and let you know what we find. I think, conceptually, in isolation, it sounds like a very positive outcome. I would just like to see how it fits.

Senator FAWCETT: Don't get me wrong. I applaud the range of efforts in issues like the cinema and things like that. It's fantastic in terms of informing people. But I think you were here before, when I talked about the DJI blog site, or the forum. Despite all of the training and licensing that we give to professional pilots, you get the occasional person who thinks it will be fun to beat someone up or push the boundaries et cetera. If you have a large population who have never been through that rigour, nor understand the risks that emanate from their conduct, then that kind of culture that's reflected in the blogs says that trying to regulate and educate through what is essentially a voluntary system is going to be almost unmanageable. That is why I think we need to have a system where we use the technology to limit the exposure to other aviation users, and only allow it to expand as you do at the moment. The commercial RPAS licence regime is very thorough, and it's great for people who want to operate commercially. What's missing is the middle piece between someone who can essentially buy a toy that they can fly to 100 feet around them and someone who wants to operate something with more capability.

This is my final question for you. Let's say we did go down that three-tiered system, where, without constraint, you can buy a toy, but you've got a technical constraint that you can only fly it in a little bubble, and, at the other end, we already have your commercial system, but in the middle there's the technology piece—and we'll explore that—but then there's the education and licensing approach. I've raised before the example of the maritime radio operators' licence, where, dangerous as that device is, every user has to actually pass an independently invigilated exam. Would CASA be the right body to take your current rule set—around three nautical miles, 400 feet et cetera—and create an online course or syllabus that perhaps could be run by the private sector and then an exam that people would sit so that they could then, with a number saying, 'I have demonstrated a degree of knowledge and competence by passing this exam,' go back to the OEM to get that technical unlock to operate in that middle recreational space? Would CASA be the person to do that?

Mr Carmody : You could do that, in reality. It is achievable. You've gone through quite a number of steps. There's a fair bit of complexity in that, I might say. But yes. We are the regulator. It is fundamentally our responsibility. The question would be—and that's one of the things that we're looking for in our survey—how much education would be enough? How much do you actually need? As you indicated, quite rightly, in the commercial sector there is a significant amount of rigour. How much, verging from nothing to that, do we actually need? And how would you manage such an arrangement? And how would you link it if the government decided to register every drone, for example? How would you make all of these things fit together? As I said, I think there is a fair bit of complexity in this space. But, on its face, it's achievable. But it would cost.


MTF...P2 Cool
Reply
Obfuscation of ICAO - A how to? Dodgy

I note that in recent days ICAO have lifted their 2015 red flag on Thailand's aviation safety standards - Bravo to Thailand! Wink 

The following article (via the Oz) highlights what it means to Thailand in terms of economic stability and growth in their tourism industry: 
Quote:Thailand gets aviation safety upgrade
  • Aukkarapon Niyomyat And Wirat Buranakanokthanasan
  • Reuters
  • 4:45PM October 9, 2017

The UN International Civil Aviation Organisation has removed a red flag against Thailand over safety concerns, the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand says, sending shares in Thai airlines sharply higher.

Thailand was downgraded in June 2015 after its regulator missed a deadline to resolve significant safety concerns, meaning that airlines in Thailand were unable to add further international routes, though they could continue to operate routine flights.

The Thai aviation authority said on Monday the ICAO had made the decision after a meeting on Friday.

The Montreal-based UN agency was not immediately available for comment, but the red flag which appeared against Thailand on its website had disappeared.

"Although lifting the red flag is a significant turning point for her aviation industry, Thailand as well as CAAT need to carry on their missions to improve the aviation safety standards," the CAAT said on its website.

CAAT director general Chula Sukmanop told a news conference the removal of the red flag would give Thai airlines a chance to start new flights to China, Japan and South Korea.

Shares in Thai Airways climbed nearly 8 per cent on the news before falling back to trade at over 5 per cent higher.

The biggest beneficiaries of the decision would be smaller carriers, such as Thai AirAsia X, NokScoot and Thai Lion, said Corrine Png, the CEO of Singapore-based transport research firm Crucial Perspective.

"The ICAO downgrade had seriously impeded these new entrants' growth to lucrative markets such as Japan and South Korea," she said.

"These airlines can now grow more aggressively. This would, however, imply increased competition for Thai Airways when they expand."

ICAO's red flag was based on its audit of the regulatory body, rather than individual airlines.

Some major Thai airlines, including Thai Airways, Bangkok Airways, Thai Lion and NokScoot, have passed the International Air Transport Association Operational Safety Audit, a benchmark for global safety management in airlines.

Aviation safety is particularly important for Thailand given that tourism accounts for around 12 per cent of its economy, the second largest in Asia.

The countries which still have red flags against them are Djibouti, Eritrea, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan and Malawi, according to the ICAO list.

Meanwhile in Australia the aviation safety bureaucracy continues to blinker and confound our NFI minister with the mystique of aviation safety... Confused

Extracts from 6D AGAD speech to Safeskies are empty skies gobfest... Undecided

Quote:..Australia continues to have one of the safest aviation industries in the world and this is testament to you, our aviation community and Government...

...Australia's aviation safety system is recognised internationally as one of the best in the world...

While the minister has obviously acquired an acute strain of aviation safety induced AIOS...

Reference: AIOS - & the 21st Century??
Quote:The industry has "acquired institutionalised ostrichitis syndrome" (AIOS).



[Image: crisis.gif]

...it is worth pondering whether our aviation safety system is in fact any better than the Thais; or are our bureaucrats very effective at covering up our deficiencies... Huh

From recent research for a submission to the Australian Mission to ICAO, PAIN is of the opinion that the Department of Infrastructure & Regional Development and it's three aviation safety agencies, are merely paying lip service to the ICAO... Dodgy

Extract from that submission:

Quote:...It is difficult to treat the interrelated elements in isolation or define the categories in order of weight and importance. On balance, as the ICAO ADREP/iSTARS system is of global significance to aviation safety, we propose to restrict opinion to the reporting of fuel related events to the ICAO as example:-

1) Accurate reporting to ICAO of ‘fuel’ and forecast weather related incidents; and the
Classification of operations.
2) The treatment and reporting of a ditching event, which was both fuel and weather
related.

In general, it must be stated that the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has an unique approach to ICAO compliance, with record number of ‘notified differences’. Many of the notifications may, at face value, seem insignificant. It is our opinion that the noted differences are structured to support the complex, contradictory, flawed rule set in place. Reform of this rule set has been in train for thirty years, with successive government ministers and directors of civil aviation promising to complete the task ‘within the next three years’. This is an important consideration as it reflects on the operational approach taken to both open reporting of ‘incident’ or event; and, the tangible fear of prosecution. Australia’s Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) are founded on the ‘criminal code’ and ‘strict liability’; this, standing alone, provides a strong disincentive to openly reporting safety related matters. This attitude is reflected in the government safety bodies approach to ICAO compliance and reporting.

The ‘unique’ Australian approach to ‘Fuel planning’ and alternate aerodrome requirements may be clearly demonstrated through a history of the ‘fuel related’ events which do not appear to have been captured on either ICAO iSTAR or ECAIRS data base; thus denying the accumulation and evaluation of safety critical, fuel/weather related incidents. Concerns that the number of fuel and or weather related incidents are being down played, not critically analysed and supported by Safety Recommendations appears to be denying vital safety information to the international industry and safety analysts; those who rely on accurate data sets to formulate policy...


..The ATSB reporting of this singular, rare event has been the subject of a Senate inquiry resulting in some 30 significant Senate, disregarded recommendations; followed by a ministerial inquiry conducted by an independent, internationally recognised panel which provided more than three dozen significant, disregarded recommendations. The report was subjected to an independent peer review, by the Canadian TSB, under narrow terms of reference which also made a list of recommendations, which remain lambent, but disregarded.

The analysis of the flight is, radically, a simple one; the aircraft ran out of fuel. How this came to pass is not complex, every shortcoming within the entire safety system was involved; from fatigue to systematic failure. Once again, the safety net failures were easily corrected; and, had those failings been honestly admitted and corrected, there would have been little need for the raft of inquiries and subsequent recommendations (deemed to be opinions).

Both government investigations called for public submissions. As a small part of the PAIN
submission the general reporting to ICAO was tracked. During research it became apparent that there seemed to be unexplained anomalies, which were variously described as ‘taxonomy’ problems, data base error, human error etc. We submit that there are too many ‘anomalies’ to be ignored. This is either a failure of system or; could, reasonably, be construed as deliberate manipulation. Accurate statistics are a vital part of safety analysis, flawed or manipulated reporting is not only misleading but could form part of a causal chain...

"...In general, it must be stated that the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has an unique approach to ICAO compliance, with record number of ‘notified differences’..."

Further to the embarrassing - Blush - number of Australian notified differences to the ICAO SARPs it is worth referring again to my previous post and the DoIRD submission to the Parliamentary JSCOT inquiry into the Serbia/Vanuatu Airservices agreements/treaties: Post #8

Quote:Coming back to that 'categories of differences' table:
[Image: Untitled_Clipping_090416_105822_PM.jpg]
My hope is that due to Senator Fawcett's questioning and in collating that data for the sup submission, the Department may have suddenly come to the realisation that Australia is far from being anywhere near adhering to the spirit and intent of most of the ICAO SARPs.

It is worth noting that of the listed 10,696 notified differences from the three countries, 4024 were from Australia, this is a disturbing 38% of the total. But what is more disturbing is the figure in the 'Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented' category (in other words the 'up yours' category... [Image: dodgy.gif]), which was an UDB 2078, compared to 41 Serbia & 9 Vanuatu... [Image: confused.gif]

4024 notified differences for Australia?? Recently I had collated from the 2015 AIP GEN 1.7 SUP that notified differences had grown to a total of 3116. However in actual fact between the 2011 SUP the figure had grown to 4024 but due to the loose ICAO arrangement of only listing NDs every 3 years this was missed. So from my approximate estimate from 2011 to 2014 the NDs had grown by 2500.

This means that in actual fact in the period between 10 February 2014 till November 2015 the Department has managed to reduce the notified differences by 908.

Still got a long way to go but perhaps this highlights more than anything else the impact that the Senator Fawcett inquisition had way back on the 10 February 2014... [Image: wink.gif]

Couple the alarming statistics of Australian non-compliance to the ICAO SARPs with the failure of system or; (sic)..deliberate manipulation of accident/incident/safety reporting to ICAO; and the disturbing suspicion that our Annex 13 AAI, the ATSB, is seemingly providing non-transparent, politically correct top cover for the Department, it's agencies and the big end of town Airlines and major operators;...  

Quote:Example: PelAir MKII: ASA Swiss Cheese slices & bunnies 

...and IMO we are heading towards a statistically high probability of an air disaster that could have been avoided if the government, the department and it's aviation safety agencies weren't so busy covering their asses... Dodgy

MTF...P2 Cool  

Ps Q/ Did PT ever get a complete response from former DPM/Minister Truss to this article?

Quote:        
Did Australia mislead ICAO over the Pel-Air crash?

Updated with partial response from Minister Truss. The Pel-Air accident scandal now threatens to undermine Australia’s nomination of the former chief of  CASA, John McCo

Ben Sandilands

Updated with partial response from Minister Truss. The Pel-Air accident scandal now threatens to undermine Australia’s nomination of the former chief of  CASA, John McCormick, as the next secretary general of ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

The core issue is that the Pel-Air ditching in 2009, and the botched accident report produced by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the ATSB, don’t appear to have been filed with ICAO.

This means that ICAO could be seen to be officially unaware of the crash, or the subsequent accident report, contrary to its own ICAO Annex 13, specifically Chapter 7 and Attachment B. The conduct of CASA, under Mr McCormick, in relation to the Pel-Air crash would thus not necessarily arise in ICAO’s deliberations in choosing a new secretary general, the other candidate being from China.

Australia failed in its responsibility to ICAO in not meeting these reporting requirements.
This failure is noticeable in this document, a draft of the Asia/Pacific Annual Safety Report for 2002 to 2011. No reference is made to the Pel-Air ditching.

Yet in the quaint post war terminology employed by ICAO as a United Nations agency, Australia is “the champion for the editing and publishing group.”

But has Australia misled ICAO, or just been an incompetent champion?

If ICAO were to be informed of and curious about the Pel-Air crash, and the quality and integrity of the accident report, it would read the deliberations and testimonies associated with the Australian Senate investigation of the ATSB’s Pel-Air report, which discredited the conduct of both Mr McCormick as director of safety at CASA and Martin Dolan as chief  commissioner of  the ATSB.

It would also, in its diligence, become aware of the somewhat astonishing generosity of  REX, the owner of Pel-Air, to the major political parties of Australia in 2012, in the second half of the year in which the ATSB was in a state of turmoil over the direction of the final report.

A deodorant to counter the stench coming off this sorry, sorry epic, involving the performances of the former responsible transport minister Anthony Albanese, and the current somewhat vague minister, Warren Truss, would also be advised.

Amnesia related to Pel-Air was also apparent in this recently recycled ATSB report into fuel exhaustion accidents.

The current state of play in the Pel-Air saga is that the ATSB, having been found wanting in its procedures by a peer review by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada,  is now reviewing its original defective report with its own appointee!

This additional layer of farce and maladministration might also be of interest to ICAO, and is understood to be likely to become an early focus of the same Senate committee that exposed the truth about the original CASA cover up of the deficiencies in Pel-Air’s Westwind jet operations at the time of the 2009 ditching near Norfolk Island.
Ministerial spokesperson responds:

Quote:The ATSB advises that it did report the Pel-Air accident off Norfolk Island to ICAO, which is confirmed through a check of the iSTARS database.
The accident did not appear in the Annual Safety Report Asia Pacific Region (2002-2011) because the report is limited to scheduled commercial operations above 5,700kg. The Pel-Air accident off Norfolk Island was not a scheduled commercial operation so it was excluded from the report.

This statement doesn’t address all of the issues in the post.

It specifically ignores the other instance of ATSB amnesia in its ten year review of fiuel management accidents and incidents, which included events involving non scheduled services by aircraft smaller than the Westwind that was ditched off Norfolk Island.

A complete response to the post continues to be sought from the Minister.
 
        
Reply


Forum Jump:


Users browsing this thread: 1 Guest(s)