Mount Non-compliance & upcoming ICAO/FAA audit?
(05-30-2018, 07:06 AM)kharon Wrote: Statistics – done on the devil’s own abacus.

"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics." (British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli:1878).

[Image: 220px-Benjamin_Disraeli_by_Cornelius_Jab...C_1878.jpg]

Or, as Jean Shepherd said - In God We Trust: All Others Pay Cash.

The table P2 has posted is ‘interesting’ for several reasons – the most glaringly obvious jump off the page of this masterpiece in manipulation; particularly when you consider how the ‘numbers’ were derived; and, by whom…

Australia almost top scores the most ‘registered’ differences list with 4307. Then leads the pack in “Partially implemented or not implemented” with a whopping 2445.

Second in differences filed; top score for not implemented; statistically that places Australia very close to the bottom of the top twenty. It all depends on how you choose to read the numbers and what you want folk to believe.

Toot – believe it if you like – toot.

I know for the Excel purists the following comparison tables compiled by DJ would appear to be ass about but for the purposes of how the figures can be manipulated it will do... Rolleyes  

First the Attach A table unaltered: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...nce-2.xlsx

Now taking the 'net' differences for 'partially implemented or not implemented' showing Australia a distant last out the twenty ICAO signatory States depicted: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...nce-3.xlsx

On my digging for historical references to Australia's NDs to ICAO I came across a very interesting document i.e the 1999 summary report of the ICAO audit of the CASA: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...999_en.pdf

Besides giving an interesting but disturbing juxtaposition comparison on the 20+ year history of CASA, the following was the CASA response to an ICAO recommendation that the regulator should endeavour to reduce the number of NDs related to the SARPs CASA was responsible for:
Quote:3.2.2.1 With respect to the recommendation on reducing the number of differences with ICAO SARPs, CASA will, as necessary, consult with the industry on whether or not a difference should be notified or rectified. It will also complete the programme of rewriting the CARs and monitor changes in ICAO SARPs to ensure future conformance. CASA already started consideration of those departures from SARPs which should be the subject of a notified difference and the target date for notification was 1 January 2000. CASA further indicates that it will develop programmes for monitoring future changes to SARPs to ensure that Australia remains compliant.
     
Again that weasel worded confection has got Dr A's pugmarks written all over it... Dodgy

MTF...P2  Cool
Reply
IF you wake at midnight, and hear a horse's feet,

Perhaps it is time Aleck resigned in order to spend more time with his few remaining marbles. This lunacy, not to mention the expense of seeming to be compliant with the ICAO SARPS etc. must come to an end. The minister needs to take a long, serious look at the huge amounts of money pumped into feeding the deception that Australia is a good, compliant aviation citizen; IMO it is not. The breath taking audacity, monumental arrogance and deliberate manipulation of ‘system’ are clearly apparent when examined closely.

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Past and present government ministers have been or are quite willing to accept the myth that Australia is compliant and has a very safe rule set; a world leader. This is simply the happy horseshit spoon fed to people who cannot possibly understand, or are disinclined to look closely at the realities. The industry hardly has time to do the research; the incredible loads, both financial and operational, demand so much manpower and money that it precludes a WTD moment, followed by protest.

Another disincentive is the protection of ‘rice-bowls’; operational peace and compliance quiet, balanced on a razors edge. To get operations running ‘smoothly’ is, at the best of times, a Herculean task without starting to dig around the foundations, the base blocks on which operational status is based. Rocking the boat and asking awkward questions is a black hole that few will venture near.

But they should. An operation like Qantas for example could, in a heart beat, put some clever folk to work and research exactly how much the current system costs as opposed to how much it would cost if Australia was truly a model aviation citizen. In compliance cost alone Alan Joyce could improve his bottom line substantially. This has to be better than just grinning and bearing it; going along to get along.

This blatant deception, foisted on an unsuspecting public costs a serious amount of money; the current on going sick farce of regulatory reform costs as much again; the cost to industry of compliance with the massive overburden of ‘compliance’ under the ‘regulations’ is reducing the margin between viable and moribund to anorexic levels.

Take a long hard look at the real data on ICAO compliance – even on a self assessment basis, Australia is a long way behind the modern aviation world and grievously suffering for it. Yet the lunatics running the asylum want gold stars, more money to continue the pantomime and a bonus; on account o’ being good.  Bollocks.  

'If You do as you've been told, 'likely there's a chance,
You'll be give a dainty doll, all the way from France,
With a cap of Valenciennes, and a velvet hood -
A present from the Gentlemen, along 'o being good !

Five and twenty ponies,
Trotting through the dark -
Brandy for the Parson, 'Baccy for the Clerk.
Laces for a lady; letters for a spy,
Watch the wall my darling while the Gentlemen go by!

Selah.
Reply
Dr LLLL (Lying Loyola Legal Lickarse)

K;

“Past and present government ministers have been or are quite willing to accept the myth that Australia is compliant and has a very safe rule set; a world leader. This is simply the happy horseshit spoon fed to people who cannot possibly understand, or are disinclined to look closely at the realities.”


It’s a good old deflection that one. Just because we have not yet experienced a QF and VA tail smouldering inside a smoking crater it makes the masses and the politicians feel safe. Bollocks! We have come close, very close, numerous times, and thank God that Professor Reason’s cheesy holes didn’t perfectly align. But tick tock.

More K;

“An operation like Qantas for example could, in a heart beat, put some clever folk to work and research exactly how much the current system costs as opposed to how much it would cost if Australia was truly a model aviation citizen. In compliance cost alone Alan Joyce could improve his bottom line substantially”.

Indeed they could, probably have, and in the very least they would already know how shiteful the Regs are. However, for political reasons they will never rock the boat, speak publicly about CAsA and our pitiful regulatory environment. Wouldn’t want to risk those Government contracts, subsidised routes and tax breaks hey? Just sayin.....

People like Dr LLLL are in place for a reason. For almost 25 years the bearded used car salesman has massaged his speech with pithy words and gently crafted musings pulled from a university handbook on ‘How To Obsfucate And Deceive By Using Wank Words And Other Robust Initiatives’. It hasn’t fooled everyone. Some of us old sea dogs smelled what the Witchdoctor was cooking before he even poured the ingredients into the cauldron. Tsk Tsk Dr LLLL, we’ve got your number. But the Government embraces muppets like Aleck as he does exactly what they want him to do - paint a picture of a joyous, happy, safe and compliant thriving aviation industry that will benefit from even more onerous regulations and an atmosphere of mistrust where all of us are criminals who just haven’t been caught yet.....

TICK TICK
Reply
Three decades of Australia taking the piss out of ICAODodgy

Extracts from the 1999 ICAO audit of CASA: 

Quote:3.2.1.2 The Act empowers CASA to effectively discharge its duties and responsibilities. It also

provides CASA with an investigative power and the authority to develop aviation safety standards and to issue permissions and air operator certificates (AOCs) . However, CASA does not have direct regulatory powers. The power for making regulations is held by the Governor General (essentially the Executive Government) in accordance with Article 98 of the Act which also requires that regulations be made for “the purpose of carrying out and giving effect to the provisions of the Chicago Convention relating to safety”. The rationale for giving the regulatory power to the Governor General is that regulations are delegated legislation in respect of which there must be ministerial responsibility and parliamentary oversight. CASA is a regulator,  not a law-maker, and this is an important distinction in the Australian system of government. The Act (Article 1) also requires that CASA “...performs its functions in a manner consistent with the obligations of Australia under the Chicago Convention”


3.2.1.3 The civil aviation regulations of Australia are in the process of a major review and are grouped in two different sets. The first set — Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 (CARs 1998) — were adopted in 1998 as the first instalment of a major revision of the Australian regulations system which will be organized along the lines of the United States’ Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) system. It includes Parts 21 to 35 (Airworthiness). The other regulations are contained in the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CARs 1988). A timetable indicates that the progressive transfer to the new system will be completed by 2003...


...3.2.2.1 With respect to the recommendation on reducing the number of differences with ICAO SARPs, CASA will, as necessary, consult with the industry on whether or not a difference should be notified or rectified. It will also complete the programme of rewriting the CARs and monitor changes in ICAO SARPs to ensure future conformance. CASA already started consideration of those departures from SARPs which should be the subject of a notified difference and the target date for notification was 1 January 2000. CASA further indicates that it will develop programmes for monitoring future changes to SARPs to ensure that Australia remains compliant.



5. ICAO SARPs NOT IMPLEMENTED

Several differences existing between ICAO Annexes 1, 6 and 8 and the Australian regulations were identified and remained not implemented by the time this report was prepared. On the basis of Article 17 of the MOU signed between Australia and ICAO, the differences contained in the Attachment to this report will be forwarded to the appropriate Sections of the Air Navigation Bureau for inclusion in the Supplements to the respective Annexes.

Extracts from the 2004 ICAO audit of the ATSB:

Quote:5.1.3 Status of implementation and differences to Annex 13


5.1.3.1 In practice, the ATSB is provided amendments to Annex 13 and other relevant ICAO documentation from the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS).
The Deputy 
Director Aviation Safety Investigation reviews the amendments and advises the DOTARS if differences to Annex 13 exist. Australia has notified differences to ICAO in respect of Annex 13. However, while section 17 of the TSI Act automatically endorses any amendments to ICAO SARPs and gives them the force of Australian law, the ATSB has not yet formalized its process for reviewing the SARPs and identifying its differences (Appendix 1-1 refers).

5.1.3.2 In respect of the difference filed by Australia against paragraph 5.1, the audit team
recalled that paragraph 5.1 is a fundamental paragraph in Annex 13, placing an obligation on the State of Occurrence to institute an investigation into the circumstances of an accident and to be responsible for the conduct of the investigation, with the objective of the prevention of (future) accidents and incidents (paragraph 3.1 of Annex 13). The accident investigation agencies in some other major aviation States, facing similar workload increases and budgetary decreases as ATSB, have elected to investigate all
accidents in accordance with Annex 13, with the proviso that the investigation is continued to a point that it is evident that no further safety enhancements can be achieved. A decrease in workload is thus achieved by (severely) limiting the scope of the investigation of some (smaller) accidents as well as the size and format of the report.

5.1.3.3 Australia had filed a difference to paragraph 5.4 a) in respect of “gathering, recording and analysing all available information”. The ATSB commented that there were limited resources resulting in a prioritization depending on the likely safety value of the investigation.

5.1.3.4 The difference filed by Australia against paragraph 5.6 concerned the control of the
bodies of the fatally injured flight crew and passengers which rested with the coronial authorities. The ICAO audit team recalled that the intent of paragraph 5.6 was to deal with the access and control by the investigator-in-charge of the wreckage and flight records and documentation. The handling and the autopsies of the bodies was dealt with in paragraph 5.9 which addressed “the State” (not the investigatorin-charge) to reflect the fact that the primary control of the handling of the bodies and the autopsies was the responsibility of other national authorities (usually coronial and police authorities).

5.1.3.5 Regarding paragraph 5.25, Australia had filed a difference reserving the right to remove a participant from an investigation if such a participant contravened the agreed conditions of participation.

The audit team recalled that the spirit of Annex 13 was full cooperation between the States and the participants involved, and full adherence to Annex 13. Hence, Annex 13 did not deal with situations that might result from non-adherence to Annex 13 and it should not be necessary to file differences for such eventualities. The audit team noted that Note 1 to paragraph 5.25 appeared to cover the situation envisaged by Australia. Regarding the envisaged situation, the audit team further noted that subject to a consultation with the State that appointed an accredited representative or an adviser, that State could be
expected to replace or withdraw its appointed representative/adviser. In such a case, the State of Occurrence would not have a need to “remove” a participant from an investigation.

5.1.3.6 The difference filed by Australia against paragraphs 7.1 and 7.5 regarding Preliminary Reports and Data Reports to be sent to the ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) system introduced certain limitations to the reporting by Australia. The ICAO audit team reiterated that the ICAO ADREP system had been established by the 1974 ICAO Accident Investigation and Prevention Divisional Meeting. The States participating in the meeting considered it essential that a world accident data system be established and that ICAO be the custodian of the system. The States undertook to report their accidents to the system. The original ADREP system was developed in 1975 by an expert made available to ICAO by Australia. The requirements for States to report to the ADREP system are contained in Chapter 7 of Annex 13. The data in the ADREP system was essential in developing the world accident statistics, determining safety indicators for aviation, analysing causal factors in accidents and in determining and prioritizing safety initiatives.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSED BY THE ATSB:

Section 17 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 requires the ATSB to exercise powers in a manner consistent with Annex 13 (identified by Regulation) in the latest form that the Annex is in force. This means that there is no need to take separate action to ensure amendments to Annex 13 are reflected in Australian legislation – it happens automatically.

However, the ATSB has revised the Safety Investigation Policy and Procedures Manual to include a procedure to formally review amendments to SARPs against the TSI Act, regulations, policies, procedures and resource capability of the bureau, and to list and notify any differences to ICAO.

The ATSB has forwarded a notification to ICAO, through the Australian Council Representative, that Australia is removing differences filed against Annex 13 paragraphs 5.6 and 5.25. This action was taken as a result of the ICAO Audit Team noting that the intent of paragraph 5.6 and the spirit of Annex 13 in relation to paragraph
5.25 were being met by Australia.

Extracts from the 2008 ICAO audit of the Civil Aviation System of Australia:

Quote:
AUDIT FINDING LEG/01


Australia has established procedures for the amendment of its regulations and for the identification and notification to ICAO of differences existing between the ICAO SARPs and PANS on one hand and Australia’s regulations in its newly approved Regulatory Development Management Manual on the other hand. However, these procedures do not address adopted regulations and have not fully kept the national regulations in pace with ICAO Annex amendments, in particular in the areas of personnel licensing, airworthiness and aircraft operations. In addition, not all differences to ICAO SARPs have been notified to ICAO. Furthermore, the list of differences to ICAO SARPs as published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) Australia has not been updated since 9 June 2005.



A new Australian policy and associated procedures for identifying and notifying ICAO of differences to standards and those recommended practices has been developed. The policy includes notification of a difference to those recommended practices which we consider integral to the implementation of a standard.


Once adopted, the new policy will be used to complete a thorough review of Australia’s
differences. All differences to standards and significant recommended practices will then be
notified to ICAO in a single document. 

Note: The policy also includes a regular review of differences followed by any required notification to ICAO, to be coordinated by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (Department of Infrastructure).

Infrastructure By 31 October 2008





Following the notification of all differences to ICAO, Australia will update its AIP to reflect all notified differences and those relating to PANS. - Airservices Australia - By 30 November 2008





Each relevant agency will also develop, document and implement a process for critically assessing proposed amendments to the SARPs to support the differences policy and procedures. These processes will ensure that amendments are adopted as appropriate, or a difference is notified, in a timely manner. - CASA, Airservices Australia, ATSB, BOM, AMSA - By 31 January 2009

Now let's fast forward to the here and now, first of all we had the exchange between the ICAO permanent rep Sam Lucas and Kaz Casey who AP supported with this: ref - Obfuscation of ICAO - A how to?

Quote:"...In general, it must be stated that the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has an unique approach to ICAO compliance, with record number of ‘notified differences’..."

Further to the embarrassing - [Image: blush.gif] - number of Australian notified differences to the ICAO SARPs it is worth referring again to my previous post and the DoIRD submission to the Parliamentary JSCOT inquiry into the Serbia/Vanuatu Airservices agreements/treaties: Post #8

And again referring to that table for the JSCOT inquiry:
 
Quote:Coming back to that 'categories of differences' table:
[Image: Untitled_Clipping_090416_105822_PM.jpg]
My hope is that due to Senator Fawcett's questioning and in collating that data for the sup submission, the Department may have suddenly come to the realisation that Australia is far from being anywhere near adhering to the spirit and intent of most of the ICAO SARPs.

It is worth noting that of the listed 10,696 notified differences from the three countries, 4024 were from Australia, this is a disturbing 38% of the total. But what is more disturbing is the figure in the 'Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented' category (in other words the 'up yours' category... [Image: dodgy.gif]), which was an UDB 2078, compared to 41 Serbia & 9 Vanuatu... [Image: confused.gif]

4024 notified differences for Australia?? Recently I had collated from the 2015 AIP GEN 1.7 SUP that notified differences had grown to a total of 3116. However in actual fact between the 2011 SUP the figure had grown to 4024 but due to the loose ICAO arrangement of only listing NDs every 3 years this was missed. So from my approximate estimate from 2011 to 2014 the NDs had grown by 2500.

This means that in actual fact in the period between 10 February 2014 till November 2015 the Department has managed to reduce the notified differences by 908.

Still got a long way to go but perhaps this highlights more than anything else the impact that the Senator Fawcett inquisition had way back on the 10 February 2014... [Image: wink.gif]


What followed then was Sam Lucas handballed to the Dept minion Lachie which led to my still unreplied - Dear Lachie correspondence?? However since that JSCOT inquiry I was under the (unfortunately false) impression that after 30 years of obfuscating the Dept, Iron Ring and agency minions were endeavouring to reduce the total number of notified differences. However after the tabling at the last Budget Estimates - ref: Barry O, Mr McFixit and the ICAO snowjob  - evidence would appear to be the opposite (see attach A table above). -  Dodgy

Which finally brings me to this passage of Hansard from the Cloncurry Senate (Air routes) inquiry public hearing - Reference Senate Estimates: Winton/Cloncurry Hansard; & tabled docs.

Quote:ACTING CHAIR: This committee's bailiwick is to do with aviation. We are very alive to the issues around CASA, less so around the ATSB. Let's not flinch: they're not CASA's regulations; they're the government's regulations that are often recommended by CASA. We're aware of the current impacts on general aviation with new CASA regulations, the shortage of pilots and the maintenance issue with licensed aircraft maintenance engineers and the like. We as a committee have called for some figures—and I don't know if Ms Redden is in a position to update us. We want to look at comparisons with international standards. The FAA has done an audit on CASA in Australia. I understand it's going to be interesting reading. They're resisting publication of that at the moment. We're trying to muddle our way through getting that out into the open. So we're very alive, to the point where we have contemplated out loud whether we will hold an inquiry such as this into this regulatory environment—not just the operation of CASA but by extension the impact that that is having on general aviation.

We conducted an audit of the OneSKY program. You might be familiar with that, where we are changing the platform for air traffic control. That absorbed quite an amount of this committee's energy for about 18 months. But I suspect there's nothing new you can tell us about CASA—their popularity or otherwise—and about what people see as arrogance and sometimes an abuse of power. With the ATSB there is not so much. They're in a quite respected cycle of their lives. We are alive to it all. We are contemplating week by week as to whether we'll have an inquiry. If it gets to a point where this evidence that we've called for shows us that it's critical, we'll conduct an inquiry like this and may find ourselves back in Cloncurry—or Mount Isa next time, probably—to hear evidence of its impact, particularly on rural aviation...
So after the evidence of nearly 3 decades (see above) of taking the 'Mickey Bliss' on compliance and relative harmonisation with the ICAO SARPs: 
QON - why is the committee whose 'bailiwick is to do with aviation' not holding the aviation safety bureaucracy to account? And how can the Iron Ring resist publication of the ICAO audit report? Finally why isn't a certain independent Senator requesting a copy of that report, either via the FOI or Senate order?

P2 comment: And if people are under the misbleief that under the new CMA USOAP system that an ICAO audit no longer requires a proper summary audit report think again- refer to this ICAO powerpoint presentation link: 

From pg 9: 

 Phase 3 ― Validation and Report Production (Post-audit/ICVM) • ICAO forwards draft audit report to State. • State submits comments and Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). • Comments are incorporated into final audit report. • Final audit report is published on USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF): http://www.icao.int/usoap.   

And pg 27-28:

IV. Timeline of Validation and Report Production Phase (Post Audit/ICVM)

[Image: USOAP-1.jpg]


And if the Dept et.al are still waiting for the final report, the question will be - what the hell is the delay??  Dodgy


MTF...P2 

P7's two bob - Bloody good work P2 - first class. Perhaps we can get the issue raised by Mike Smith at the Wagga pow-wow. Have a choc frog mate...My shout next time around..

Cool
Reply
Three decades of Australia taking the piss out of ICAO - Part II

P7 said: "...Perhaps we can get the issue raised by Mike Smith at the Wagga pow-wow. Have a choc frog mate...My shout next time around..."

Bloody good idea Ol'Tom, after all (according to the MS CV) there is no more informed independent Aussie ex-pat that knows the inner workings of FAA's IASA program than Mike Smith... Rolleyes

Quote from AvMassi promo for MS: ref - http://www.avmassi.com/about-us/our-team...smith.html

Quote:...Since leaving the Australian Civil Service, Mike has been engaged as a senior consultant by airlines and aviation regulators around the world, predominantly advising clients in the areas of regulatory reform, ICAO USOAP and FAA IASA compliance and the introduction of Safety Management Systems and risk based oversight principles into their organizations. Recent clients include the World Bank and the civil aviation administrations of Singapore, the UAE, Nigeria and Bahrain. Mike led the World Bank funded program that gained IASA category one status for Nigeria in 2010, allowing that country’s airlines to operate to the USA. Nigeria remains one of only six African nations to hold that status...

I have no doubt that MS will have a passing interest in some of the seriously deluded and disconnected correspondence recently tabled with the Senate RRAT committee in Estimates hearings from the Dept.

For example from the Secretary to the Dept:


  [Image: ICAO-ND-2.jpg]

And tabled from - the latest - Mr McFixit at Budget Estimates:


[Image: ICAO-ND-1.jpg]


So according to Lachie  ... 

Quote:..Australia was assessed in October 2017 by ICAO auditors and while the results are yet to be made public it places Australia in the top 10 States for safety oversight compliance... 

...and the Dept Secretary (see above) the results, which presumably means the report, were due to be published (February 2018) publicly by now. These results/report are important as they will go to the veracity of the Carmody/Dept Secretary/Mr Mc'Fixit/Lachie proclamations of all's good in Dodge City -  Undecided       

This brings me to an historical reference blog - posthumously from Ben Sandilands  Angel - which is still unfortunately very relevant to our international involvement with ICAO and our regional aviation member states - Confused : reference Herbert D Ray submission #47 to the Forsyth (ASRR) review.

Quote:US rehabilitates Israeli air safety, a lesson for Australia

Ben Sandilands | Nov 02, 2012 8:05AM | EMAIL | PRINT

The US Federal Aviation Agency’s rehabilitation of Israel as a Level 1 state in relation to air safety ought to be read as the clearest of warnings to Australia to get its act together without delay.

If Australia is busted down to Level 2, which on the evidence, it should be, the consequences include the prohibition under US law of code shares between Australian flag carriers and those of America.

The managements of Qantas and Virgin Australia need to carefully consider what losing their respective code share deals with American Airlines and Delta would mean, and ask whether the craven acceptance of the dismal state of affairs in CASA, the ATSB and AirServices Australia is worth the damage such a downgrade would inflict on their shareholders, employees and commercial reputations.

When Israel flouted its responsibilities and was busted for almost four years, it failed to lobby its way out of trouble, which was quite surprising. But as Wikileaks showed earlier this year, when Australia provisionally failed the necessary audits to retain Level 1 status, our lobbying efforts saved the day.

Since then matters if judged by recent events, have gone backwards in CASA, the ATSB and AirServices Australia, and the risk of a safety downgrade and all of its commercial consequences should be treated (as it may already be in high places) as being severe and imminent.

This is the FAA statement concerning Israel, released overnight:

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today announced that Israel complies with international safety standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based on the results of an October FAA review of Israel’s civil aviation authority.

Israel is now upgraded to Category 1 from the Category 2 safety rating the country received from the FAA in December 2008. Israel’s civil aviation authority worked with the FAA on an action plan so that its safety oversight system fully complies with ICAO’s standards and practices.

A Category 1 rating means the country’s civil aviation authority complies with ICAO standards. A Category 2 rating means a country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with minimum international standards, or that its civil aviation authority – equivalent to the FAA for aviation safety matters – is deficient in one or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record keeping or inspection procedures

With the International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Category 1 rating, Israeli air carriers can add flights and service to the United States and carry the code of U.S. carriers. With the Category 2 rating, Israeli air carriers were allowed to maintain existing service to the United States, but could not establish new services

As part of the FAA’s IASA program, the agency assesses the civil aviation authorities of all countries with air carriers that operate or have applied to fly to the United States and makes that information available to the public.

The assessments determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are meeting ICAO safety standards, not FAA regulations

In order to maintain a Category 1 rating, countries with air carriers that fly to the United States must adhere to the safety standards of ICAO, the United Nations’ technical agency for aviation that establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

This is the situation in Australia, in terse form:

CASA is accused in multiple places, including under parliamentary privilege before the Senate, of conspiring with the ATSB, to withhold vital safety information contrary to the provisions of the Transport Safety Information Act of 2003 in order to protect the reputation of operator Pel-Air in relation to the ditching of one of Westwind jets off Norfolk Island in 2009, in the final report into the crash published by the ATSB on 30 August.

The ATSB has admitted that the report is not one it can be proud of, through its chief commissioner Martin Dolan, and the general manager, air safety investigations, Ian Sangston, deposed that he didn’t even know what safety questions had been asked of the survivors, but signed off on a report that did not even say whether the safety equipment on the jet worked. (It didn’t.)





AirServices Australia has recently lost at least two airliners in Australian controlled airspace, and in the case of the Virgin Australia 737 that it lost track of for most of the way between Sydney and Brisbane, lied about to the media, and has not addressed evidence that the notification of the incident to the ATSB was so inaccurate in the first instance that it had to be amended after the fact.

There are many more areas of administrative and competency failures, as regular readers of Plane Talking would be aware.

The damage the situation in CASA, the ATSB and AirServices Australia can do to life, property and the economic interests of this country are considerable. They are conveniently ignored in the general media and public life. The inconvenience that will arise without determined and urgent corrective action cannot be understated.

Coming back to the Herbert D Ray submission, although somewhat disjointed it provides an historical insight into the 30+ year disconnection between the metamorphosis of the big 'R' regulator from the real world of aviation safety and international aviation regulation harmonisation.

Extract from HD Ray submission:

Dear Sir,

The purpose of this submission is to respectfully draw the attention of the ‘Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport (the Committee) to the effects of the ‘Clipping our Wings’ submission questioning the government ‘Where in all the World is our International Civil Aviation law- ?’

This complimentary submission argues a vital consequence of not ‘safety regulating’ compliant with the requirements contained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation which establishes delinquent operational matters and consequences attributed to by the airworthiness matters and consequences as regulated by FAR sterile national law standards and practices not recognized by FAR harmonized international civil aviation law and that laws standards and practices.

Our FAR sterile National Civil Aviation laws do not provide an equivalent ‘internationally acceptable standard of safety’ for persons traveling in VH aircraft transiting in national and international airspace as is afforded those persons traveling in aircraft registered in up to 870+ compliant ICAO Treaty States that are safety regulated compliant with the requirements of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and that Convention’s safety standards and practices.

Our National Civil Aviation regulations have never been audited by an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Program (USOP) audit team as being classed as other than a ‘Non compliant ICAO Treaty State’

The US should ‘rehabilitate’ CASA’

The attached article “US rehabilitate Israeli air safety, a lesson for Australia” CASA was identified in a “Wikileaks document which showed late last year, that
Australia provisionally failed the necessary audits to retain Level 1 status, our lobbying efforts saved the day.”

Our national civil aviation laws have been consistently audited by the ICAO USOP teams as Australia being a non compliant ICAO Treaty State which by default qualifies our air carriers as FAA category 2 operators.

“A Category 2 rating means a country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with minimum international standards, or that its civil aviation authority – equivalent to the FAA for aviation safety matters – is deficient in one or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record keeping or inspection procedures”

Maintaining the ICAO USOP audit findings as a ‘non compliant ICAO Treaty State and an FAA category 2 ‘safety regulator’ means our safety regulation laws are not compliant with the minimum international standards for the certification of aerospace products, which the submission ‘Clipping our Wings’ described, including a lack of technical expertise, trained personnel and inspection procedures, all elements mirrored by the FAA to qualify Israeli air carriers as ‘category 2’ operators.

Our national civil aviation laws are ICAO USOP audited and are in principle found to be not compliant with the requirements of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
CASA as a ‘safety regulator’ does not provide an equivalent ‘level of safety’ for persons traveling in VH aircraft transiting in national and international airspace as is afforded those persons traveling in aircraft safety regulated compliant with the requirements of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and that Conventions FAR harmonized safety standards and practices.

An FAA category 2 rating on our national air carriers both RPT and GA will have a devastating economic effect on the entire VH aerospace industry, as GA operator’s contract in foreign States and must maintain the diplomatically engineered FAA category 1 level to operate in compliant ICAO Treaty States airspace.

We are operating in foreign airspace as ICAO/FAA category 1 operators, hinged on ‘diplomatic camerade’ and this will surely ‘unhinge’.

The 1999 ICAO USOP audit ‘findings’ noted ‘ that an MOU had been signed between Australia and ICAO to resolve a raft of primary and civil aviation legislation delinquencies and CASA should review the requirements contained in its Regulation and Orders to ensure full conformance with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) contained in Annexes 1, 6 and 8.

The 1996 USOP audit findings also noted that in June 1996, the Regulatory Framework Program (RFP) office of CASA(as directed by the Program Advisory Panel) commenced a Government endorsed review and revision of the Australian aviation safety requirements currently contained in the Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs) and the Civil Aviation Orders (CAOs). The proposed new legislation is to be called the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASRs).

The ‘findings noted that “the future CASR Parts will ensure, ensure Australian regulations FAR harmonize with international standards and practices?

The ICAO USOP audit teams consistently ‘find’ Australian regulations do not FAR harmonize with international standards and practices and neither does the FAA ‘find’ a VH TC’d aircraft is returned to service compliant with FAA design standard law, and those laws instructions and orders that constitutes ICAO USOP ‘international standards and practices !

In 2004 CEO Bruce Byron’s unauthorized withdrawal of the Program Advisory Panel CASR /FAR sequenced Part 43/66/145 and 147 maintenance, licensing and training rules compliant with our ICAO USOP MOU and our treaty pledge and Article 37 of the Convention rules and those rules replacement with the FAR sterile CAR 1988 Part 1 and CASR Part 42/66/145 and 147 maintenance, licensing and training rules, are not compliant with our ICAO Treaty pledge nor are they Article 37 of the Convention compliant or correlated with international civil aviation laws and that laws standards and recommended practices.

If our civil aviation airworthiness laws are not article 37 compliant with the ICAO treaty States regulated compliant with the requirements of the Convention on International

Civil Aviations simply put we will never be classed as a ‘Compliant ICAO Treaty State’
Subsequent ICAO USOP audits have maintained Australia as a ‘non compliant ICAO Treaty State exacerbated by CASA being established as serially dishonoring promises to regulate to international ICAO USOP ‘Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP’s) and reneged on the 1999 promise ICAO USOP audit promise” “the future CASR Parts will ensure, ensure Australian regulations FAR harmonize with international standards and practices.

The ‘Summary ‘ duplicates the same ‘resolutions’ as ‘Clipping our Wings’ but maybe should include ‘The US should ‘rehabilitate’ CASA’ -to maintain a ICAO/FAA category 1 rating.?
The ICAO USOP audits findings display similar CASA non compliances with USOP SARP’s etc as the level 2’d Israeli air carriers!

Summary

We believe that it is a responsibility of ‘the Committee’ to ensure ‘Constitutional’ matters that vest a power to the parliament to promulgate legislation must be seen to make laws that are appropriate to meet those Constitutional obligations and responsibilities as pledged as an ‘ICAO Treaty State’

The government has entrusted a ‘rulemaking power to CASA who have serially dishonored Treaties, MOU’s, Charters and Pledges, made to the ICAO USOP audit teams to harmonize to airworthiness international standards, by taking the questionable privilege of submitting national airworthiness legislation to our parliament that is in conflict with the terms and conditions of matters our government has contracted to uphold as a Constitutional Section 51 (XXIX) ‘External Affairs’ instrument to be a compliant ICAO Treaty State regulated to FAR harmonized International Civil Aviation law.

The withdrawing of the PAP harmonized CASR/FAR Part 43/66/145/147 universal rules and the ‘putting‘ of national airworthiness legislation that is in conflict with the ICAO Treaty and absolves CASA of its international ‘safety oversight regulator ‘ responsibilities can be argued as being ‘unconstitutional law’.

The options the government should consider in resolving the ‘matter’ of CASA’s airworthiness ‘safety oversight’ management that jeopardizes ‘Safer Skies for All’ includes:

First and foremost

- Separating CASA’s ‘rule making power’ and resume the Program Advisory Panel of Industry experts. CASA can’t be trusted!
- Sack the CASA board and replace it with a ‘non partisan’ board with the ‘best interests’ of the nation at heart! –We don’t want any more ‘sword falling’ invitations for FAR harmonizing CEO’s!
- Revoking 1988 CARS and CAR 42/CASR Part 42 and Part 145 as the CAR 1988 PART 1 (2) dysfunctional behavior creating illegal CASA approved maintenance instructions permeates through CASR Part 42 and Part 145 and cannot positively contribute to ‘safer skies for all’
- Revoking the CASR Part 66 and Part 147 as these rules do not harmonize with the standards and values of either the **FAA or EASA rules.
- Australia should either resurrect the PAP FAR harmonized CASR 43/66/145/147 rules or adopt the NZCAA internationally recognized rules expanding the significant ANZA mutual operational agreement to include the NZCAA maintenance and personnel rules which are seen as the most cost efficient resolution to CASA’s perpetual and costly development of misaligned rules.
- The possibility of presenting the ANZA mutual operational agreement, and expanding the agreement to include maintenance and personnel as the SW Pacific Aviation Safety Agency (SWPASA) would be in line with our joint Trans Tasman Trade agreement principles should be held in view.
- Adapting the NZCAA rules ‘would be more cost effective than harmonizing CASA’s present costly and dysfunctional EASA agenda CAR 1988 and CASR 42/66/145/147 national rules with the EASA system and its guidance material , which favors the ‘big end of town’ at the expense of the ‘little end of town’.
- The transitioning of AME’s who may still hold ICAO Annex 1 license(Diamonds), to the NZCAR 66 AME license is preferable to transitioning to CASR 66 licenses as these are not ICAO Annex 1 rated. (Lemons)
- To overcome CASA’s skill resources dilemma CASA should contract industry IoA holders that specialize in design conformity inspections for C of A issues, and experienced LAME’s (retired) qualified to carry out this RTS function on CASA’s behalf until those LAME/ AWI’s in CASA’s employ receive re currency training. The ADF AW staff will need to obtain AME licenses and civil experience
or
- The government give consideration to extending the MRO industry’s present ‘self regulatory ‘ role to act as a ‘maintenance and AME licensing ‘safety oversight program regulator’ to administer the FAR harmonized ‘maintenance and AME licensing rules on behalf of the government supported by a resurrected ‘Program Advisory Panel’
- As noted adopting the NZCARS is popular with other NAA’s – and is the most cost effective solution to CASA’s skill based AW rules dilemma.
- Having FAR harmonized maintenance and AME personnel rules will see a pleasant change with the ICAO USOP audits finding Australia a ‘compliant ICAO Treaty State’ instead of findings to date of being a ‘non compliant ICAO Treaty State’ and our CAR form 1 ARCs being rated on a par with an **FAA 8130-3 ARC the global airworthiness certification standard

 It will be a pleasant change from being internationally recognized as a ‘lemon’!

Unfortunately for H.D.Ray et.al it would appear that our committee has been lost to the self-interested political survival of a totally disconnected National party... Confused

This was the observed attitude (former Senator Edwards) of the committee then (i.e prior to O'Obfuscation):





 Compare that to this recent totally 'soft cock' performance from the Senate RRAT committee headed up by a QLD LNP powerbroker:





&..






No comment required me'thinks... Dodgy


MTF...P2  Cool
Reply
Dear Lachie - Part II

Via PAIN_Net email chain:

Quote:Dear Lachlan,

I note that my (24/02/2018) email reply to you was neither acknowledged or responded to. In case this was due to being lost in the cyber-sphere; or caught up in Departmental spam/security filters etc. I again forward that email (with questions) for your reference.
Quote from your original correspondence:

Quote:Australia was assessed in October 2017 by ICAO auditors and while the results are yet to be made public it places Australia in the top 10 States for safety oversight compliance. 

Plus from correspondence from the Dept Secretary to the Senate RRAT Legislative Committee at additional budget Estimates: https://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates....pdf?la=en
 
Quote:[Image: ICAO-ND-2.jpg]

Following on from my previous reply email (below), please note the following Senate RRAT Committee Hansard from a References inquiry ( see: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus...lAirRoutes ) public hearing held at Cloncurry, QLD on the 12 April 2018:

Quote:...ACTING CHAIR: This committee's bailiwick is to do with aviation. We are very alive to the issues around CASA, less so around the ATSB. Let's not flinch: they're not CASA's regulations; they're the government's regulations that are often recommended by CASA. We're aware of the current impacts on general aviation with new CASA regulations, the shortage of pilots and the maintenance issue with licensed aircraft maintenance engineers and the like. We as a committee have called for some figures—and I don't know if Ms Redden is in a position to update us. We want to look at comparisons with international standards. The FAA has done an audit on CASA in Australia. I understand it's going to be interesting reading. They're resisting publication of that at the moment. We're trying to muddle our way through getting that out into the open. So we're very alive, to the point where we have contemplated out loud whether we will hold an inquiry such as this into this regulatory environment—not just the operation of CASA but by extension the impact that that is having on general aviation...

Next there is a reference from a recent Aunty Pru forum post relevant to the PAIN Net inquiries: ref - http://www.auntypru.com/forum/showthread...29#pid8829


Quote: And if people are under the misbelief that under the new CMA USOAP system that an ICAO audit no longer requires a proper summary audit report think again- refer to this ICAO powerpoint presentation link: 

From pg 9: 

 Phase 3 ― Validation and Report Production (Post-audit/ICVM) • ICAO forwards draft audit report to State. • State submits comments and Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). • Comments are incorporated into final audit report. • Final audit report is published on USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF): http://www.icao.int/usoap.   

And pg 27-28:

IV. Timeline of Validation and Report Production Phase (Post Audit/ICVM)


[Image: USOAP-1.jpg]

Q/ The above would suggest that (a) there should now be an ICAO audit report available; and (b) that it is the intent of the Dept and the Government to make that audit report publicly available. Yet, unlike previous ICAO reports, a search of the Dept website would appear to indicate that report is still not publicly available. Could we please get an indication from the Dept when this report will become publicly available? 

Q/ Also from the Hansard extract (in bold), I am almost certain that the Acting Chair meant to say that ICAO had conducted an audit of CASA, the Department and the other aviation safety related agencies (ATSB, Airservices, AMSA etc.) and not the FAA. However in case the FAA has conducted an IASA audit of CASA, would it also be possible to get a published link for a copy of that report as well? 


Regards,

And Lachie's reply:
Quote:Dear P2,
 
Thank you for your correspondence.  In response to the first of your two questions, Australia has received the final report from ICAO regarding our assessment in October 2017.  It is not our understanding that the previous ICAO audit report was made public, however we are happy to share the current report.  The Department is currently identifying the appropriate part of our website and should have it online shortly, and we will let you know when it is live.
 
Regarding the issue of a possible audit by the FAA, I cannot speak for the Acting Chair, but I can confirm that there has not been a recent FAA International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) of CASA in recent years.  By way of background, while the FAA publishes IASA category ratings on their website, they do not publish or provide copies of assessment findings to third parties. 
 
Regards,

And my response:

Quote:Dear Lachlan,

Thank you for your prompt response and I look forward to reviewing the 2017 ICAO report when published on the Department website.

For your information please go to the following links for copies of the 2008 ICAO audit report, the 2004 ATSB ICAO audit report and the 1999 CASA ICAO audit report:

https://amroba.org.au/wp-content/uploads...rt2008.pdf

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2004/icao_audit/

https://cfapp.icao.int/fsix/AuditReps/in...999_en.pdf

Not so sure about the 2008 audit report but I believe the 2004 and 1999 reports were once available on the Dept website.

Finally, thank you very much for confirming that the FAA IASA have not conducted a recent audit of CASA.

Reference links for information related to the 2009 FAA IASA audit report of the CASA: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf & http://wikileaks.redfoxcenter.org/cable/...A1040.html

PAIN has confirmed, with a recent rejection of a FOI request for the November/December 2009 FAA IASA audit report, that the FAA are not in the habit of publishing their audit assessment findings to 3rd party stakeholders.

However given the passage of time and the significant industry financial contribution ( fuel levy - $89.9 million?) that was levied from industry to help rectify the deficiencies from that report; PAIN associates would still like to request from the Department (informally or formally through the FOI Act) copies of that report and relevant correspondence associated with the conduct of the FAA IASA audit. Therefore if you could facilitate that request, or provide contact details for your FOI office to process a formal FOI request, it would be greatly appreciated.

Kind regards,

MTF...P2  Cool
Reply
Lachie (finally) comes through - nearly?  Dodgy

Finally Lachie has come through with his promise for the Dept to provide a copy of the 2017 ICAO audit report - see: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...t_full.pdf

However it would appear the report is still yet to receive a proper CAP ( https://soa.icao.int/usoap/USOAP%20Docum...02017..pdf ) for the State to address the identified deficiencies:

Quote:APP 1 - 2

ICVM Final Report — Australia March 2018 Analysis

Considering the overall results outlined in Figures 1 and 2, the information below has been developed to assist the State in prioritizing its remedial actions.

High Priorities:

LEG:

1) Review the processes, procedures and/or arrangements in place to ensure that all relevant State safety oversight and investigation authorities (particularly with respect to Annexes 3, 12 and 13 to the Chicago Convention) are involved, in a coordinated manner, in the processing of adopted Annex amendments, with a view to:

a) identifying all differences between the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
and the State’s regulations and practices; and
b) determining any need to amend the State’s legislation.

2) Ensure a timely and consistent update of national regulations whenever amendments to
Annexes 1, 6 and 18 are received.

3) Ensure a consistent, thorough and documented review of the State’s enabling
airworthiness-related regulations and national standards subsequent to an Annex amendment or an amendment by the originating State/organization, if applicable, to decide on the next course of action.


4) Establish requirements regarding the documents to be carried on board, to include the journey logbook.

5) Establish requirements, based on scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience, for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations applicable for cabin crew.

6) Establish requirements for human factors principles to be observed in the design and application of maintenance programmes.


7) Amend the State’s legislation to require the re-opening of an investigation if new and significant evidence becomes available.

ORG:

1) Include all required training in the training programmes established for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)’s airworthiness inspectors and engineers, and ensure the effective
implementation of such training, in particular during the on-the-job training (OJT).


2) Finalize the recruitment and training of additional investigators to ensure that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) can meet its national and international obligations with respect to aircraft accident and incident investigations.

PEL:

None.

APP 1 - 3

High Priorities: (cont.)

OPS:

1) Establish and implement procedures to ensure that air operators develop instructions to preserve flight recorders to the extent possible, in the event that the aeroplane becomes involved in an accident or incident and to keep flight recorders and associated records in safe custody pending their disposition.

2) Establish a system to ensure that air operators implement and maintain requirements, in the operations manual, to establish flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations for cabin crew.

3) Establish a system to ensure full compliance of air operator certificate (AOC) associated
operations specifications with the elements and the format/layout outlined in the relevant
provisions of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

4) Establish and implement a system to ensure that procedures for the approval of operations specifications are fully defined and implemented.

5) With respect to the transport of dangerous goods by air, ensure that procedures for the
surveillance of authorized or non-authorized air operators, national and foreign operators are fully defined and implemented, and include regular and random inspections.

AIR:

Airworthiness Inspection:

1) Establish and implement procedures for the approval of leases among commercial air transport operators.

2) Review procedures/guidance for adequacy and, where possible, use standardized terminology to minimize misinterpretation.

Design Certification and Production:

None.

AIG:

Fully implement the ATSB’s action plan to ensure that all accident and incident investigation reports are completed within the established timelines.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

1) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements on Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) at aerodromes.

2) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements for the provision of rescue and firefighting (RFF) services at aerodromes, which take into account the aerodrome location and the surrounding terrain.

APP 1 - 4

Other Priorities:

LEG:

1) Amend the State’s primary aviation legislation to include explicit provisions to recognize as valid personnel licences, certificates of airworthiness and radio station licences issued/renewed by the State of the Operator under an Article 83 bis agreement between two third-party States.

2) Ensure that the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) contains all significant differences, not only with the SARPs, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)-OPS and PANS-ATM, but also with all other PANS and the Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS).

ORG:

Ensure that aerodrome inspectors are provided with training related to the regulation, acceptance and surveillance of the safety management system (SMS) which is customized to suit to specificities of aerodromes.

PEL:

None.

OPS:

None.

Airworthiness Inspection:

Clarify the procedures, including associated flowcharts, which describe the granting of the noise certificate.

Design Certification and Production:

1) Review the documentation published on CASA’s intranet to ensure that obsolete documents (in particular AEB Form 002) are not available to staff, in order to minimize inadvertent use.

2) Enhance the control of existing forms and checklists by including revision/issue control reference in addition to date of revision.

AIG:

None.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

MTF...P2  Cool

Ps Compliments to Dr Jane and the RRAT Committee Secretariat for their tireless efforts in ensuring the Dept kept their word on making public the 2017 ICAO audit report. 

Pps All we need now is the CAP -  Rolleyes
Reply
(08-13-2018, 09:56 PM)Peetwo Wrote: Lachie (finally) comes through - nearly?  Dodgy

Finally Lachie has come through with his promise for the Dept to provide a copy of the 2017 ICAO audit report - see: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...t_full.pdf

And from the Dept website:

Quote:Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program
Listen to this page
A A A

The first stage of the program, launched in 1996, was voluntary. Its initial success led the 31st Session of the ICAO Assembly (October 1998) to endorse an enhanced program and provide the necessary funding. The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) commenced on 1 January 1999, replacing the voluntary program. The basis of the ICAO audit was the degree to which the States complied with safety related Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and associated procedures laid down in three of the eighteen Annexes to the Chicago Convention: Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing), Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft) and Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft). It was envisaged that ICAO would audit other annexes in future programs. Australia's first audit under this system took place 9–20 August 1999.

The 35th Session of the ICAO Assembly considered the proposal of the Council for the continuation and expansion of USOAP in 2005, and resolved that USOAP be expanded to cover the safety-related provisions in all safety-related Annexes (all Annexes with the exception of Annex 9 Facilitation and Annex 17 Security) and also to implement a comprehensive systems approach (CSA) for the conduct of safety oversight audits. The six-year cycle of USOAP CSA concluded at the end of 2010. In September 2007, the 36th Session of the Assembly directed the Council to examine different options for the continuation of the USOAP beyond 2010, including the feasibility of applying a new approach based on the concept of continuous monitoring.

The 37th Session of the Assembly agreed the best and most cost-effective option was the implementation of a continuous monitoring approach (CMA) and directed the Secretary-General of ICAO to begin to develop the methodology and tools required to implement a CMA, including the necessary detailed guidance to States. It also directed the Secretary-General of ICAO to provide a transition period to the CMA, in order to allow States and ICAO to gradually implement the different elements of the new approach. CMA came into effect 1 January 2013.
Under the USOAP CMA, Australia's most recent assessment was through an ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission (ICVM), which occurred 9–13 October 2017.
  • Final Report Of The ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission In Australia PDF: 593 KB [Image: readspeaker_listen_icon.gif]


However it would appear the report is still yet to receive a proper CAP ( https://soa.icao.int/usoap/USOAP%20Docum...02017..pdf ) for the State to address the identified deficiencies:

Quote:APP 1 - 2

ICVM Final Report — Australia March 2018 Analysis

Considering the overall results outlined in Figures 1 and 2, the information below has been developed to assist the State in prioritizing its remedial actions.

High Priorities:

LEG:

1) Review the processes, procedures and/or arrangements in place to ensure that all relevant State safety oversight and investigation authorities (particularly with respect to Annexes 3, 12 and 13 to the Chicago Convention) are involved, in a coordinated manner, in the processing of adopted Annex amendments, with a view to:

a) identifying all differences between the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
and the State’s regulations and practices; and
b) determining any need to amend the State’s legislation.

2) Ensure a timely and consistent update of national regulations whenever amendments to
Annexes 1, 6 and 18 are received.

3) Ensure a consistent, thorough and documented review of the State’s enabling
airworthiness-related regulations and national standards subsequent to an Annex amendment or an amendment by the originating State/organization, if applicable, to decide on the next course of action.


4) Establish requirements regarding the documents to be carried on board, to include the journey logbook.

5) Establish requirements, based on scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience, for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations applicable for cabin crew.

6) Establish requirements for human factors principles to be observed in the design and application of maintenance programmes.


7) Amend the State’s legislation to require the re-opening of an investigation if new and significant evidence becomes available.

ORG:

1) Include all required training in the training programmes established for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)’s airworthiness inspectors and engineers, and ensure the effective
implementation of such training, in particular during the on-the-job training (OJT).


2) Finalize the recruitment and training of additional investigators to ensure that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) can meet its national and international obligations with respect to aircraft accident and incident investigations.

PEL:

None.

APP 1 - 3

High Priorities: (cont.)

OPS:

1) Establish and implement procedures to ensure that air operators develop instructions to preserve flight recorders to the extent possible, in the event that the aeroplane becomes involved in an accident or incident and to keep flight recorders and associated records in safe custody pending their disposition.

2) Establish a system to ensure that air operators implement and maintain requirements, in the operations manual, to establish flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations for cabin crew.

3) Establish a system to ensure full compliance of air operator certificate (AOC) associated
operations specifications with the elements and the format/layout outlined in the relevant
provisions of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

4) Establish and implement a system to ensure that procedures for the approval of operations specifications are fully defined and implemented.

5) With respect to the transport of dangerous goods by air, ensure that procedures for the
surveillance of authorized or non-authorized air operators, national and foreign operators are fully defined and implemented, and include regular and random inspections.

AIR:

Airworthiness Inspection:

1) Establish and implement procedures for the approval of leases among commercial air transport operators.

2) Review procedures/guidance for adequacy and, where possible, use standardized terminology to minimize misinterpretation.

Design Certification and Production:

None.

AIG:

Fully implement the ATSB’s action plan to ensure that all accident and incident investigation reports are completed within the established timelines.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

1) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements on Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) at aerodromes.

2) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements for the provision of rescue and firefighting (RFF) services at aerodromes, which take into account the aerodrome location and the surrounding terrain.

APP 1 - 4

Other Priorities:

LEG:

1) Amend the State’s primary aviation legislation to include explicit provisions to recognize as valid personnel licences, certificates of airworthiness and radio station licences issued/renewed by the State of the Operator under an Article 83 bis agreement between two third-party States.

2) Ensure that the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) contains all significant differences, not only with the SARPs, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)-OPS and PANS-ATM, but also with all other PANS and the Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS).

ORG:

Ensure that aerodrome inspectors are provided with training related to the regulation, acceptance and surveillance of the safety management system (SMS) which is customized to suit to specificities of aerodromes.

PEL:

None.

OPS:

None.

Airworthiness Inspection:

Clarify the procedures, including associated flowcharts, which describe the granting of the noise certificate.

Design Certification and Production:

1) Review the documentation published on CASA’s intranet to ensure that obsolete documents (in particular AEB Form 002) are not available to staff, in order to minimize inadvertent use.

2) Enhance the control of existing forms and checklists by including revision/issue control reference in addition to date of revision.

AIG:

None.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

MTF...P2  Cool

Ps Compliments to Dr Jane and the RRAT Committee Secretariat for their tireless efforts in ensuring the Dept kept their word on making public the 2017 ICAO audit report. 

Pps All we need now is the CAP -  Rolleyes
Reply
ICAO flogs Australian oversight.

Severely, with a small, damp lettuce leaf. That’ll fix it all up, quick smart – right?

How about this for a thrashing:-

“Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.”

Wow , tough stuff (not). The many posts on the 'Airports' forum will assist the casual reader in deciding if the punishment fits the crime. Search word - ESSENDON. 

But of course, no one bothers to read, let alone take our safety watchdogs to task; and so, the whole carefully worded confection will slowly find it’s way to the ‘shelf-ware’ section of the basement, to moulder away with all the other embarrassing documents. The time honoured system has never let the minister down. Softly, softly the damning paper work creeps away, while ICAO swans off to new engagements, trusting that the DoIT will make the suggested changes happen, sometime over the next decade or so; no rush….

You have to wonder why this innocuous, bland report has been kept out of the public purview, we did after all pay for it. Then there is the question of the CAN. But, for my money, the stellar performance of the Canberra back line takes the biscuit.

The 'who' authorized the building ‘ball’ goes into the Senate scrum – the Canberra back's get it and the speed at which the ball (and the responsibility) is passed along is truly breathtaking. It seems that no one is 'wholly’ responsible for parking a bloody great big building, full of ‘happy shoppers’ in harms way. The crowd watching begin the traditional chant “No, weren’t us” -  loud and long.......

BOLLOCKS; Mr Genuine Minister needs to pay close attention – the law suites are coming; soon as ATSB gets off it’s beam ends and actually does something that is not window dressing and prevarication. Murky knows who rewrote the ‘definitions’ and who flogged off the airports to developers; him and Beaker, up their eyebrows.

I hope the Yanks crucify ‘em – I’ll even help them. No matter, great audit, really helpful. iCAO ‘on –the-money’.

Toot – toot – one for luck – Toot.
Reply
Of departmental enemas, stammering fools and giant headed monsters

‘K’;

”Murky knows who rewrote the ‘definitions’ and who flogged off the airports to developers; him and Beaker, up their eyebrows”.

Nothing to see here, move along. Beaker is enjoying the fruits of his semi-retirement and his huge superannuation nest egg filled to the bream over the decades by bludging off the taxpayer. Great timing to go and get your PHD. Phew.

Pumpkin Head is enjoying his new $800k role over at Community and Arts after receiving a new plumb role for being loyal to Turdball. Again, great timing for the giant headed former Infuckstructure department head and serial senate spin doctor.

Within hours of the DFO bingle the Fort Fumble shredders had smoke pouring out of them and the bowels of TRIM had received an enema and been emptied to ensure no signed paperwork could or would ever be found that might aportion blame, or heaven forebid, accountability.

As for ICAO, well they will never bite the hand that feeds them. The likes of Rudd, Gillard, Turdball and Stick Insect Bishop have been oiling he UN’s wheels for years with healthy, robust infusions of taxpayer money, and in return receiving AAA status and lavish trips to New York to hobnob with the rich, powerful, lobbyists who will ensure their post political life is well cared for. ICAO is just another branch of the despicable UN who are nothing short of being a bunch of self appointed, conceited, inept fucktards draining countries of their taxpayers money.

Expect justice over the Essendon crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the Pelair ditching? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the Lockhart River crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the MH370 crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice, honesty and transparency in any way, shape or form from any government, political party, bureaucracy or public servant? KEEP EFFING DREAMING

TICK TOCK
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