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Times up for Pel_air MkII
One lone comment-

"Oh! What A Tangled Web We Weave When First We Practice To Deceive" - Marmion – Walter Scott.

MTF - Oh yes!
(06-10-2017, 10:33 AM)Peetwo Wrote: D-D-D-D-D-Darren?? - Your shout mate!

Quote:[Image: 96c237e3a4545d3c35d0c37b06f5de0a.jpg]

Reference: The raiders of the shrinking ATP trough.. [Image: dodgy.gif]

Perhaps this should really be a task for the Senate Estimates crew but at post #50 from the Comardy HR thread "K" asks some very interesting QON of 6D and the government that begins with trying to calculate the total cost to ATPs of the PelAir cover-up saga:

Quote:...Take the work of the inestimable Senate RRAT committee as an example. Gods alone know the total cost of the Pel-Air debacle (CASA and ATSB have NFI). Think about it- holistically; from splashdown to this day. Just for fun, let’s have a wee keek at the big ticket items on the bill.

Man hours for search and rescue.
ATSB on site investigation.
Vic police on site.
ATSB initial report –
CASA parallel investigation
Time to provide the ‘final’ report.
Legal cost of actions against James.
Man hours taken to reach Senate inquiry stage.
Cost of the extensive Senate inquiry – (not just Senators, but the whole operation).
Cost of salvage II and CVR analysis.
Cost of producing the Senate recommendations.
Cost of consultation before Truss ordered the ASRR.
Cost of the ASRR.
Cost of the Canadian 'peer' review.
Cost of report #2.

The above is not an extensive list; when you begin to break it down into component costs; the numbers, even on conservative ‘guesstimates’ very quickly become very scary.

The Australian people; knowingly or not, directly or indirectly, have invested, through third party proxy, without their express approval, in blind faith; a very significant sum in the Pel-Air ‘investigation’. To keep that investment viable; several millions more have been invested in a Canadian peer review and countless man hours expended in the ‘review’.

Carmody is, clearly, the ministerial choice as the new boss CASA; he is most certainly not the industry’s first choice. We may then safely assume he speaks with the ministers voice and is going to provide us with only departmentally vetted ministerial answers to our questions, strictly in the interests of ministerial protection...
Surely somewhere in the back offices of M&M's department there has to be some lowly bean counter who'd be able to put their hands on a file(s) containing such trivial expenses related to the Pelair cover-up... Huh  

However according to a rejected FOI request from Kaz Casey, such a compilation of tedious expenses does not exist:

Quote:[Image: KC-1.jpg]
[Image: KC-2.jpg]

Nor does it appear there has been any evidence of government concern for the considerable expenditure blowout and wasted resources on a prolonged (nearly 8 year) joint government agency ass covering exercise... Dodgy

PelAir re-re update - Rolleyes

Would of missed this if I hadn't of been looking... Confused

Via the PelAir re-re-investigation webpage:
Quote:Updated: 26 June 2017
The ATSB has released its confidential draft investigation report (AO-2009-072) into the reopened investigation of the 2009 ditching of a Westwind 1124A near Norfolk Island to Directly Involved Parties on Friday 23 June 2017. Directly Involved Parties (DIPs) are those individuals or organisations that were directly involved in the accident or who may have influenced the circumstances that led to the accident and/or whose reputations are likely to be affected following the release of the final investigation report.

The DIP procedure is an important process, consistent with International Civil Aviation Organization standards and recommended practices, which provides an opportunity for natural justice for DIPs, and also serves to ensure factual accuracy of the report. The draft report has been released under s26 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003, which includes significant protections to ensure confidentiality. Under Section 26, the report may only be copied and disclosed prior to its public release for the purpose of taking safety action or providing comment to the ATSB.  Disclosure of this report in any other circumstance prior to its public release date may constitute a criminal offence.

DIPs have been given until 31 July 2017 to provide the ATSB with any comments on the draft report, including factual information in support of any changes that may be sought.

Given the complexity and size of the draft report, which is over 500 pages long, - Blush UDB! - it is possible that DIPs may seek an extension beyond that period. Once the DIP period has closed and the extent of comments and the likely time needed to give them appropriate consideration is known, the ATSB will be better placed to advise a likely release date for the final report.

MTF...P2 Cool

Ps Shirley there must be some 'in the know' bean counter out there that could give us a rough Estimate on the total cost to date of the PelAir re-re-duck-up - anyone??
P2: PS. Shirley, there must be some 'in the know' bean counter out there that could give us a rough Estimate on the total cost to date of the Pel-Air re-re-duck-up - anyone?

Bloody good question.

I don’t know what ‘we’ pay a Senator or, if there is an additional cost to the public purse for having them ‘sit’ on committee. The same can be said for the secretariat, the ATSB and CASA officials – witnesses are voluntary. The cost of Mrdak – per hour – or per diem; if you like and the ‘other troops, hanging about away from work to attend a ‘hearing’ is not too hard a number to get close to – man hours – by hourly rate will get you close. That children is just to manage a rough guess at the cost of the Senate Inquiry; stand alone alone.  

When you start breaking it down into component parts – it becomes a really big number; before the cost of ministerial hours, the Forsyth panel, the TSBC peer review and the ‘other’ elements are included. This before the cost of the re-re – rewrite and ‘re-view’.

FWIW; the BRB are running a competition to see who can justify the number they entered onto the beer mat estimates, made at the last indaba. I have to say the spreadsheet software has been running hot for a while now. The final ‘cost’ per page of this 500 page redraft is starting to look like a big number. I’ll keep you posted as things progress; but, on present indications, considering the state of the economy – lets say that on a cost per page basis; no one at CASA or ATSB who was involved should be paid for about two years.

PAIN associates competing need to have their final ‘estimates’ in before Manning let’s this thing go public – we have a final estimate for the final report which will not quantify any work done on ‘demanded’ changes to the draft. Why? Well that ain’t going to happen. The Terms of Reference for the competition can be found in the AP (PAIN) library. Closest wins the Tim Tam.

Toot – that’s all – toot.
Karma comes back to visit Herr McComic - Big Grin

Although the following Island Sun article has one glaringly obvious factual error - Nine people lost their lives in the crash. - it is fascinating how Karma may come home to roost on McComic's future career aspirations... Confused  

By Alfred Sasako | June 9, 2016

[Image: airlines-900x450.jpg]SOLOMON AIRLINES has a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO), but John McCormick’s appointment could be short-lived.

It is believed the Board of Solomon Airlines decided on the appointment on 01 June (Wednesday last week). It subsequently recommended the appointment to the Minister of Finance and Treasury, Hon Snyder Rini, who has reportedly endorsed the appointment.

It is understood Mr McCormick has been offered a contract. Mr McCormick was Australia’s Civil Aviation and Safety Authority’s (CASA) Director of Aviation Safety.

But the appointment could be short-lived because of Mr McCormick’s past.

According to published report, McCormick withheld crucial information about the crash of a Pel-Air plane near Norfolk Island. Nine people lost their lives in the crash.

In a Senate Committee investigation, “far more serious issues were raised about McCormick’s conduct and actions in withholding from the Australian Transport and Safety Board (ATSB) a document of material importance when it was making its supposedly independent inquiry in the Pel-Air crash near Norfolk Island in 2009.”

But the Senate Committee subsequently discovered the document under its own investigations. The crucial document “suppressed by CASA … was a review of its actions in relation to the Pel-Air crash that was ordered by McCormick.”

“In that ‘Chambers review’ CASA’s incompetence and lack of oversight in relation to Pel-Air was exposed, yet hidden from the notice of the Australian Transport and Safety Board (ATSB) contrary to the provisions of the Transport Safety Investigations Act, raising the question, as yet unanswered, as to whether McCormick had committed an offence under the Act.

“In testimony before the Senate Committee when he was confronted with the document, McCormick both admits and apologises for his action,” the report said.

McCormick reportedly resigned as a result of his role in the botched investigation.

“The Chambers review document makes the point that had CASA done its job properly the Pel-Air crash might never have occurred. The suppression of that document, and the shabby quality of the ATSB report into the crash, has raised doubts as to the integrity and professionalism and direction of the ATSB, with the Senate Committee detailing what they considered the unsatisfactory testimony given to it by the ATSB chief commissioner Martin Dolan,” the report said.

It is understood that the Board may have ignored advice it was given on the process of appointing a new CEO. It is also understood that the Civil Aviation Authority of Solomon Islands has written to the Board, opposing McCormick’s appointment because of his past.

When contacted last night, incumbent CEO Ron Sumsum said the appointment of a new CEO for the Airlines is a matter for the Board.

“I have made it clear to the Board as far back as last year that I am leaving anyway. Who the Board appoints is its business but I would like to see that Solomon Airlines is left in a clean hand when I leave,” Capt. Sumsum said.

Meanwhile Solomon Airlines has lifted the stand down of its operations. Its first international flight to Brisbane left last night. comment - Rolleyes

MTF...P2 Tongue
"Out, damned spot!"

Revisiting the PelAir cover-up timeline of embuggerance and courtesy the AP blog - remember this?

Quote:A little more meā maximā culpā.
15 Feb

It’s been noted with interest that the much admired and respected Ms. Nancy Graham Director of the ICAO Air Navigation Safety has become a leading light in her advocacy for fairness to those left behind, awaiting news of MH 370.  Like many reasonable folk, she expresses concern that the spirit and intent of both the MC99 and now dated Warsaw convention are being disturbed by the wide spread use of ‘extreme’ legal interpretation.
PAIN understands Ms. Graham is to meet the MH 370 families to discuss the battles ahead and to try and ensure that the desperately needed speedy resolution is forthcoming; in the hope that the trauma may be reduced as much as humanly possible.  Ms. Graham has made an appeal to the UN for unity and compassion; what a lovely thought in this day and age.

It is passing strange though that apparently ICAO have no knowledge of the Pel-Air ditching, the Senate inquiry, the Rev Forsyth’s independent review, or the TSBC peer review.   Perhaps when she meets the McComic at a cocktail party, she may ask why two serious, controversial, fatal accident were not reported to ICAO.  Neither the fatal Canley Vale accident (VH-PGW) nor the nearly fatal Norfolk Island ditching (VH-NGA) appear in the accidents listed – see research links below.  For if this apparent double omission is proven accurate, it will go a long way toward explaining some of the unbelievable actions of the Australian safety agencies.  There’ll be hell to pay if the duck up of the cover up went as far as fooling ICAO; the Senate is one thing, ICAO funded by the USA is quite another.  Can’t wait to see Merdek deal with that hot little potato; Heff will go nuts.
It is also passing strange that McComic’s #1 willing accomplice (Wodger) was in control of the CASA end of both accident investigations; and, that both the ATSB reports were met by howls of outrage and cries derision, which bounced off Doolaly Dolittle like water, off the proverbial ducks back.

What we do know – Ms. Graham was genuinely intrigued by the previously unknown story of Karen Casey and the survivors of the NLK ditching; the long stretch of a 1929 law being used to delay, bully and confound the compensation claims for the survivors.  Ms. Graham will investigate the tale further as she simply cannot understand why this incredible story was unknown to her.

What we suspect – Vardy from the TSBC may get a WTF call; the McComic pug marks on the episode will be looked at; and, with any luck at all, the Uriah Heep of accident investigation may end up with just a few more questions to answer.

I find it most refreshing that someone like the inestimable Ms. Nancy Graham would take the time, find the humanity and compassion to take a call from Karen, spend time discussing the event and agree to do a little digging.  It’s not how the world should be though, is it? – if the ATSB had done the right thing, if the CASA had done the right thing, there would be no need for the ICAO top brass to become involved.  Shame on a once proud nation, top marks to Ms. Graham.


Toot toot..

Unfortunately, like many PelAir lines of investigation, the Nancy Graham promised inquisition came to nought, zilch, nada - Dodgy

To be fair, Nancy Graham's tenure at ICAO came to an end not long after she became aware that there was no ICAO record of the ditching of VH-NGA.

In a passing strange coincidence, I just so happened to be reviewing the ATSB FOI disclosure log and I noted that there was a new entry:
Quote:Disclosure log number:     FOI 16-17(24)
Date information listed:     31 May 2017

Summary of FOI request:  All documents relating to an aviation accident which occurred near the Barwon Highway, Callandoon, Queensland on 28 December 2016.
Description of information released under the disclosure log (full or part):
The documents were released to the applicant in part.  Exemption provisions applied: s47F(1) and s47E(d) of the FOI Act.

FOI 16-17(24) Disclosure docs.pdf [Image: dl_acrobat.gif]
The following is a copy of the last page (Document 4) from the above PDF link:
Quote:[Image: ICAO-Notification.jpg]

This would appear to be a standard serious incident/accident ICAO notification form. This begs the question that Shirley one of these must exist for the formal notification of the VH-NGA Norfolk Island ditching to ICAO - Shirley? Or Nancy? Big Grin  

Anyway perhaps some DIP might consider an FOI request for a copy of the VH-NGA ICAO notification form. This would at least establish whether the 'no notification' cock-up was merely lost in the mail; or lost in translation internally with ICAO; or something much more sinister like perhaps M&M, McComic, Beaker & Russell had a strong desire to keep quiet (i.e. cover-up) the gory details surrounding the VH-NGA ditching... Huh

MTF? Definitely...P2 Cool

Ps -.. --- - ... /.- -. -../ -.. .- ... .... . ...
You have the right to remain silent. However;

"He who asks a question is a fool for five minutes; he who does not ask a question remains a fool forever." (Anon Chinese proverb).

I can stand being thought a fool for five minutes. My question is a simple one; why? Why did our two major safety agencies go to such extraordinary lengths? There had to be some powerful reasons. You don’t try to bamboozle a Senate Committee without good cause – well; not unless the real reason is to mask a greater crime.

The period leading up to the ditching off Norfolk Island is an interesting one; and coincidentally many of the players involved had fingers in some pretty influential pies and their eyes on some plum jobs. Then there was the PASO power struggle – Oz v The Kiwi’s for dominance in the South Pacific region; that was not a win for those who’s names and future prospects, not to mention funding, depended. Then there were some pretty hefty contracts at risk, investors to protect and reputations – all on the line.

No doubt Manning has conducted a surgical, proper analysis of the incident; within the terms and conditions required of ATSB. – The final report will (must) most certainly present ‘just the facts’; but only those related directly to the incident. While this is reasonable, fair and proper; it will not answer the questions of many. We know, essentially, the what’s and why fore’s, we have an inkling that the CASA oversight and audit process was ‘over easy’, we know the system was slack and lip service only was paid to the Safety Management System and pilot ‘education’. We even know that the Sydney CASA ‘approved’ by acceptance, the operation as it stood. Manning’s report will, no doubt, reflect this, with all the trimmings. All well and good and, by the way, it is what the ATSB should have done many years and millions of ago.

But will the report get to the ‘nitty-gritty’?  Probably not, but it will deflect attention from the underlying motives for the misdirection and obfuscation. There was much in the way of money, power, kudos and future prospects in the pot – all to play for while the ICAO were sniffing about.

Indeed, history is nothing more than a tableau of crimes and misfortunes. Voltaire.

Aye well, I can’t see either the Muppet or Puppet seeking answers to the deep questions; they can’t even show any interest telling the nation how much this little exercise has cost; which, when you think about it, ain’t any surprise at all. At least the phone call to Karma is a free call – 1300 – BITCH.

Toot – toot.
PASO, dots, dashes & an unfortunate ditching- Rolleyes  

Quote:The period leading up to the ditching off Norfolk Island is an interesting one; and coincidentally many of the players involved had fingers in some pretty influential pies and their eyes on some plum jobs. Then there was the PASO power struggle – Oz v The Kiwi’s for dominance in the South Pacific region; that was not a win for those who’s names and future prospects, not to mention funding, depended. Then there were some pretty hefty contracts at risk, investors to protect and reputations – all on the line.

Funny that you should mention the Pacific Aviation Safety Office "K" because apparently one of the PASO member ( Island nations is currently visiting in Can'tberra.

Here's Hoody forever up for a photo opportunity... Shy

Quote:ATSB welcomes delegation of aviation experts from the Republic of Kiribati
A delegation of aviation experts from the Republic of Kiribati visited the ATSB on Tuesday, 27 June to discuss possible ways to work cooperatively in matters of aviation safety investigation.
[Image: republic-of-kiribati.jpg]
Chief Commissioner Greg Hood and the Honourable Willie Tokataake, Minister for Information, Communication, Transport and Tourism Development

The members of the delegation were the Honourable Willie Tokataake, Minister for Information, Communication, Transport and Tourism Development, Permanent Secretary Dr Teatao Tiira, the Director of Civil Aviation Ms Aako Teikake, the CEO of Air Kiribati Limited, Mr Tarataake Teanaki, and Aviation Advisor Mr Mike Gahan.

The delegates met with ATSB Chief Commissioner Greg Hood, ATSB investigators, and toured the ATSB Technical Analysis labs.

Greg Hood said the Republic of Kiribati’s position in the South-West Pacific renders it especially important to Australia for consultation and collaboration in aviation safety.
“This has been an excellent opportunity to build stronger ties with our neighbours in the Pacific and continue to improve aviation safety in the region,” he said.

 [Image: delegationgroup.jpg?width=670&height=392.5645994832041] 

 Apparently ICAO are still very reliant on M&M and his minions to provide top-cover aviation safety mentoring for the Pacific island nations.

Extract from Pg 17 of the 2014 ICAO Safety Report:


Five Australian government agencies are involved in
programmes of co-operation and assistance with States
in the Asia Pacific region, in particular with Indonesia and
Papua New Guinea. These agencies are the Department of
Infrastructure and Regional Development, the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau,
Airservices Australia and the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority. The co-operation and assistance programmes
enhance regional aviation safety through training, mentoring,
and capacity building activities. Australia actively supports
the Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO), a cooperative
regional safety oversight organization created to assist its
Member States in meeting international obligations. As a
non-voting member on the PASO Council, Australia is
providing support and practical assistance to the Organization.
And going back further in time to the McComic years, here is some extracts from a past CASA external engagement webpage (note the dates):
Quote:Regional Aviation Safety Forum

The Regional Aviation Safety Forum brings together a cross-section of people and organisations that have a direct interest in aviation operations in regional Australia. The forum provides feedback to CASA, allows industry to bring forward concerns and issues, and allows CASA to explain its policies and actions. Members have advised CASA that participation in the forum is a valuable means of exchanging information on aviation safety issues of mutual interest.

The forum is chaired by the Director of Aviation Safety, and membership is drawn from operators and associations with an interest in regional operations. It met twice in 2011–12, on 7 October 2011 and 30 March 2012, in Canberra.

Regional Aviation Safety Group – Asia and Pacific Regions

The inaugural meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Asia and Pacific Regions (RASG–APAC) was held concurrently with the Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference in New Caledonia, from 10 to 11 October 2011. CASA’s Director of Aviation Safety was unanimously elected as the Chairperson of the RASG–APAC.

The RASG–APAC is tasked with developing and implementing a work program that supports a regional performance framework for the management of safety on the basis of ICAO’s Global Aviation Safety Plan and the Global Aviation Safety Roadmap. The reports of RASG–APAC meetings will be reviewed by the ICAO Air Navigation Commission on a regular basis and by the ICAO Council as necessary.

The next meeting of the group will be held concurrently with the next annual meeting of the Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference. The Asia–Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Team (APRAST) is a subgroup of the RASG–APAC. The first meeting of the APRAST was held at the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office in Thailand from 20 to 24 February 2012, and was attended by the Director of Aviation Safety and other CASA delegates. APRAST’s key objective is to make recommendations to the RASG–APAC on interventions which will reduce aviation risks. It includes representatives of appropriate regulatory agencies as well as representatives of industry and other organisations.

MTF? Probably...P2 Tongue
PASO, dots, dashes & an unfortunate ditching - Part II

From the Iron Bar list of achievements and connections to PASO:
Quote:A list of the more notable assignments Iron Bar has completed in the Pacific region in the past few years include:
  • Advisor to the Timor-Leste Government and Director of Civil Aviation Division as an aviation regulations specialist to the Asia Development Bank (ADB) funded Infrastructure Technical Assistance (ITA) Project and assisted preparation for the ICAO USOAP audit in 2010.
  • Member of the Legal and Technical Review team of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) funded Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO) project across all eight island PASO Treaty member nations including: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Cook Islands, Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu.
  • Specialist aviation advisor to the Board of the Civil Aviation Authority of the Republic of South Africa to develop their two year Corporate Strategic Plan.
  • Developed technical training manuals for the Australian Commonwealth Government funded AusAID program for safety regulators in Flight Operations and Airworthiness technical inspectors with the Pacific Aviation Safety Office in Port Vila, Vanuatu.
  • Represented the Qantas Airways CEO on the Federal Government’s Aviation Regulation Review Taskforce.
  • Drafted the enabling legislation for the establishment of an Airports Authority for the Kingdom of Tonga as part of the World Bank sponsored Pacific Aviation Investment Program
  • Development of the Aviation White Paper for the Papua New Guinea Civil Aviation Safety Authority – Flight Plan to Sustainability
  • Provision of ongoing specialist aviation legal and technical expertise as a member of the Federal Government Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).
  • Undertaken safety reviews, audits and consultancy throughout the Asia-Pacific Region including Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Myanmar, Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati, Hong Kong, Singapore, Jordan, Malaysia, The Philippines, United States, United Kingdom, Turkey, South Africa and New Caledonia.

On the subject of the still missing ICAO notification (ref: A little more meā maximā culpā.) of the VH-NGA ditching, apparently the ATSB are still looking but at this point in time it is not looking promising (at either end... Dodgy ). 

However a quick reference to pg 33 of the 1st ICAO APAC Annual Safety Report would appear to support the theory that ICAO were never notified:
Quote:[Image: VH-NGA.jpg]

Still waiting for formal verification but in the meantime for perhaps another very good reason  for the non-notification of the ditching and the subsequent subterfuge of the ATSB investigation, please refer to the following WikiLeaks cable link:

In particular note the date in bold red - Confused   
Quote:Canonical ID: 09CANBERRA1081_a


From: Australia Canberra

To: Australia Melbourne, Australia Perth, Australia Sydney,

Department of Commerce, Secretary of State, White House

Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Previous Handling Restrictions: -- Not Assigned --

Archive Status: -- Not Assigned --

Type: TE


Reference(s): -- N/A or Blank --

Executive Order (E.O.): -- Not Assigned --

Markings: -- Not Assigned --

Enclosure: -- Not Assigned --

Concepts: -- Not Assigned --

TAGS: Australia [AS]

Economic Affairs--Aeronautics and Aviation; Civil Aviation [EAIR]

Office: -- N/A or Blank --

Document Character Count: 4046

Date: 2009 December 7, 05:33 (Monday)

1. (C/NF) Summary: The FAA team concluded their audit

(reftels) and gave a brief assessment of preliminary

findings. While the team recognized improvements on previous

shortcomings and commended many areas, a few

problems remain. Australian officials seem committed to

overcoming the shortcomings before a second and final FAA

visit within the next three months, but the possibility of a

category downgrade does exist and is being taken

seriously. The team outlined the sequence of events going

forward and agreed to work closely with Embassy Canberra.

End Summary.



3. (C/NF) While the team recognized improvements on previous

shortcomings and commended many areas, there

remain a few shortcomings, principally a shortage of

properly-trained inspectors and excessive delegation of

regulatory functions to carriers.

Approximate Timeline:


4. (C/NF) Based on our conversations with FAA team members,

following is a rough sequence of events going forward:

-- Two weeks: Informal letter FAA team to CASA (through

State/Embassy Canberra) delineating specific areas from

their assessment that need to be addressed. This is meant to

aid CASA to swiftly focus efforts on overcoming


-- 30 days: Formal State front-channel cable with official

report of the week-long assessment, constituting official

notification from FAA to CASA under ICAO. According to the

FAA team, this cable will most likely state that Australia

does not/not comply with ICAO standards and indicate that, if

the problems are not remedied, it would be downgraded to

Category 2. The cable will also request further

consultations, which would include a second visit to

Australia within 65 days after the first visit.

-- 65-90 days: Second visit to Australia, probably by the

end of February 2010, by a smaller team. This would be a

shorter verification trip which would determine whether or

not to recommend a downgrade to Category 2.

-- Mid-March 2010: Approximate timeframe when FAA would

publish official notice of a Category 2 downgrade, in the

event this were to happen.

Preventing Worst-Case Scenario


5. (C/NF) A downgrade to Category 2 would be the worst-case

scenario, which would entail measures such as

freezing Australia-U.S. flight operations to current levels

and terminating code-sharing arrangements, such as the one

between Qantas and American Airlines. CASA officials are not

taking this possibility lightly and seem committed to

resolve the shortcomings in order to avoid a downgrade.

6. (C/NF) Comment: FAA team members were extremely satisfied

with CASA officials' openness and eagerness to

make constructive improvements based on the assessment. FAA

Qmake constructive improvements based on the assessment. FAA

and CASA clearly have a good working relationship and

we will monitor progress toward maintaining Category 1

status. We will also monitor that CASA's efforts enjoy

adequate support at the ministerial level as well as from

CANBERRA 00001081 002 OF 002

Australia's commercial airlines.

Just saying... Rolleyes

MTF...P2 Cool
PASO, dots, dashes & an unfortunate ditching - Part III

In the process of following up on the missing ICAO occurrence notification for VH-NGA, I remembered that this wasn't an isolated aberration... Confused

This notification glitch apparently also occurred for the tragic fatal accident at Canley Vale involving Mojave VH-PGW: Collision with terrain - Piper PA-31P-350, VH-PGW, 6 km NW of Bankstown Airport, NSW, 15 June 2010
Quote:What happened

At about 0806 Eastern Standard Time on 15 June 2010 a Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave aircraft, registered VH-PGW, with a pilot and a flight nurse on board, collided with terrain in a suburban area about 6 km north-west of Bankstown Airport, New South Wales. At the time of the accident, the pilot was attempting to return to Bankstown following a reported in-flight engine shutdown. Both occupants were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by the impact forces and an intense post-impact fire.

What the ATSB found

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) found that following the shut down of the right engine, the aircraft’s airspeed and rate of descent were not optimised for one engine inoperative flight. In addition, spectral analysis indicated it was unlikely that the left engine was being operated at maximum continuous power as the aircraft descended.

As a result, the aircraft descended to a low altitude over a suburban area and the pilot was then unable to maintain level flight, which led to the collision with terrain.

Examination of the engines, propellers and governors and other aircraft components found no evidence of any pre-impact faults. However, the engine surging identified by the spectral analysis of radio transmissions during the flight was consistent with uneven fuel distribution to the cylinders.

What has been done as a result

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has started a project to amend advisory material relating to multi-engine aircraft training and operations to include guidance information about engine problems encountered during the climb and cruise phases of flight. This amended guidance material will include information about aircraft handling, engine management, and decision making during these phases of flight.

Safety message

This accident reinforces the importance when flying twin-engine aircraft with one engine shutdown that the optimal speed be selected, along with maximum continuous power on the operative engine, and that the aircraft’s performance should be verified prior to conducting a descent. Pilots should also use the appropriate PAN or MAYDAY phraseology when advising air traffic control of non-normal or emergency situations.
Here is the ICAO iStar database page that should have the entry for VH-PGW:
[Image: VH-PGW.jpg]
Although one flight was an international operation and the other was domestic, it is passing strange how VH-NGA and VH-PGW were both air ambulance operations, operated under the same regulatory 'Aerial Work' classification, with both AOCs oversighted by the former CASA Bankstown regional office... Huh  

And both ICAO notifications were lost in the mail or in translation? - Yeah right... Dodgy

It should also be noted that when Nancy Graham could not find the details of VH-NGA on the iSTAR database back in 2015, this would also indicate that at that time there was no Preliminary or Final Report filed under the ICAO ADREP/ECCAIRS system.

On ADREP and the ECCAIRS PC application tool, it is worth noting the following finding and recommendation from the 2004 ATSB ICAO audit report:
Quote: ADREP reporting The procedures in place for the ATSB to report to the ICAO ADREP system, contained in the ATSB Notifications Procedures Manual (Section 8 – ADREP Reporting), meet the international reporting requirements of Annex 13, Chapter 7. In practice, the ATSB has been reporting accidents and investigated incidents to the ICAO ADREP system as a result of a discussion between ATSB personnel and the ICAO ADREP system administrator some 18 months before this audit. The ICAO audit team was informed that no feedback had been received from ICAO as to the status and format of the reported data. According to the ICAO ADREP system administrator, the data received from Australia constituted ADREP Preliminary Reports and no ADREP Data Reports had been received in the last few years. It is worthy to note that there was some confusion prior to the audit between the ATSB and the ICAO Secretariat, which meant that the ATSB was unaware of the ADREP reporting problems. Since the ATSB is in the process of acquiring a new accident and incident data reporting system, it is recommended that the new database system be ADREP-ECCAIRS compatible in order to facilitate ADREP reporting and an international exchange of accident and incident data. It is envisaged that the ATSB may transfer accident data from its old system to the new system in due course, thus also facilitating the reporting to ADREP of older accident records in an ADREP-ECCAIRS taxonomy format. It is also recommended that further discussions take place between the ATSB database system personnel and the ICAO ADREP system administrator in order to facilitate the reporting to the ADREP using the ATSB existing system before the new ATSB system becomes operational (Appendix 5-1 refers).


There was some confusion prior to the audit between the ATSB and the ICAO secretariat which meant that the ATSB was not aware of the ADREP reporting problems. The ATSB is currently investigating the feasibility of incorporating an ECCAIRS compatible ADREP into the new accident/incident database. However, a determination is still several months away. As a result of the audit, the ATSB has obtained a copy of the latest ADREP (Form D) and is seeking to create a template that will capture the necessary data applicable.

The ATSB is committed to fully meet the ICAO obligation in both the short and longer terms.


The use of ECCAIRS was considered as an option for the occurrence database module of the ATSB's newly developed Safety Investigation Information Management System. Given that most of the aviation data collected by the ATSB is high-volume, low-detail data, the complexity of the ECCAIRS taxonomy was not considered appropriate. A bespoke taxonomy for safety events and safety factors was developed by the ATSB which better suits its needs, particularly for the purposes of safety research and for the application of its investigation safety analysis methodology. However, a mapping exercise was carried out to ensure that there was comparability between the ATSB and ECCAIRS taxonomies. For the purposes of notification, preliminary and final ADREP data reports, the ATSB continues to provide this information in the ECCAIRS format, including the use of the ECCAIRS taxonomies.

STATUS: Completed
According to the status this recommendation was fully actioned, couple that with a review of the ICAO 2008 audit report, would appear to indicate that the ATSB disconnection with the ICAO ADREP system had been resolved.

However it is of interest that with the introduction of the ECCAIRS PC application tool, the issue of compatibility with the ADREP/ECCAIRS taxonomy was a common problem with some individual signatory States.

But the issue was identified and proactively addressed by the ICAO (IAG) Secretariat at the ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND PREVENTION (AIG) DIVISIONAL MEETING 2008 (Reference PDF PG 65-67):

4.1.1 The meeting considered ways for improving the collection, exchange and representation of safety data.


4.2.1 The meeting agreed with the following proposals, which foster the better management and representation of safety data.

a) to urge States to adopt an ADREP compatible taxonomy as an aviation occurrence taxonomy;

b) to encourage the dissemination of ECCAIRS in the ICAO Contracting States which

do not have their own ADREP compatible occurrence database;

c) to encourage the facilitation of data-exchange between the existing ADREP compatible databases;

d) to recommend establishing a means to facilitate a periodical revision of the ADREP taxonomy; and

e) to recommend that States use ADREP/ECCAIRS or a compatible system to collect, analyse and share safety data.

4.2.2 The meeting was informed that an ADREP compatible software that had been developed by the European Union, namely the European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting System (ECCAIRS), was available to all States.

4.2.3 The meeting raised several issues with respect to the implementation of the proposals.

These included: legacy systems, availability of ADREP compatible systems in all official languages of the Organization, and resource and training requirements.

4.2.4 The Secretariat informed the meeting that it will consider these and other issues when implementing the recommendations of the Meeting under this item.


4.3.1 The meeting agreed with a proposal to recommend that States have publications on safety data accompanied by a clear description of, or reference to, the data sampled and parameters used...
Therefore 'lost in translation' or 'lost in the mail' as an excuse for no notification, no preliminary or final reports, of either the VH-NGA or VH-PGW occurrences, would IMO seem highly implausible... Rolleyes

MTF...P2 Cool

Ps From that AIG08 report:


4.1 The Secretary of the meeting was Mr. M. Costa, Chief, Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) Section. The Deputy Secretaries were Mr. T. Thormodsson, Technical Officer (AIG), Mr. A. de Kock, Technical Officer (AIG).

&..from Mount NCN thread:

Quote:Thor ToR & ICAO & IATA reoccurring theme -  [Image: rolleyes.gif]

(04-11-2017, 09:23 PM)Peetwo Wrote: Wrote:
Quote: Wrote:Safety boost from Thor’s ICAO audit

Thor Thormodsson has spent the past eight years travelling the world undertaking safety oversight audits for the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

[Image: thor_icao.jpg]
Now there's a bloke that should be able to access the necessary paperwork - Shy
Red Rag Post:-

P2 – “Although one flight was an international operation and the other was domestic, it is passing strange how VH-NGA and VH-PGW were both air ambulance operations, operated under the same regulatory 'Aerial Work' classification, with both AOCs oversighted by the former CASA Bankstown regional office...

If ever anyone wanted to seriously investigate the abomination that is CASA; the details of the two cases mentioned by P2, would 'rock 'em and shock 'em'. I (and many others) have always believed that a Royal Commission or Judicial inquiry (despite the difficulty in raising one) into both events would be in the national interest. The actions taken by CASA officers were (IMO) highly improper, legally unsafe, criminally negligent and detrimental to air safety. That, is not ‘hot-air’ – the proof is all there, albeit neatly buried. It is also germane to remember that Hood was the CASA decision maker and his signature is on almost every document used by CASA to enforce their actions, is now running our safety investigation bureau.

The serious examiner would need some of the ‘detail’ elaborated before beginning. Should ICAO ever take an interest the layers of deception would need to be peeled away. P2’s brief introduction (above) is one breadcrumb along a path which ICAO could follow; but even that simple paragraph is deceptive.

“[one] flight was an international operation and the other was domestic”. True.

“[passing] strange how VH-NGA and VH-PGW were both air ambulance operations”. False. Both were operating a commercial ‘patient transfer’ service on behalf of medical insurance companies.

“[operated] under the same regulatory 'Aerial Work' classification”. True. This, stand alone, is worthy of investigation. The Australian rules allow what is clearly a ‘commercial’ operation to be operated in the ‘Aerial Work’ category – it is almost legally unique. The FAA would not allow it.

“[with] both AOCs oversighted by the former CASA Bankstown regional office.” True.

And, this where it gets ‘weird’. A short explanation, to clarify is required here, so bear with me.  VH-PGW was operating under the ‘Skymaster’ Air Operators Certificate (AOC). The company was part of a ‘group’ of companies sharing an administrative, executive and operational management system and shared an operating base facility with a sister company Airtex Aviation. Each company had an independent Chief pilot and separate operations manual suite. From here, the paths diverged – radically. Airtex conducted ‘patient transport’ under the rules governing ‘Charter’ (commercial) operations; Skymaster did not. Airtex insisted that essential crew members (flight nurses) held certification under CAO 2.011 (emergency, evacuation, ditching etc.): Skymaster did not. Airtex was a leading participant in the group ‘Safety Management System’ (SMS) being developed; Skymaster simply refused to participate. I won’t go on, but you can see the pattern developing there. This culminated in two separate advisories to the CASA and company management, from senior Airtex pilots warning that unless the training and operational standards were improved, immediately, then a serious accident was inevitable. Management took what action they could on notification. CASA brought the report back to the senior pilots; told them to mind their own business and remove the report from the SMS data base.

The parallels between the Skymaster operation and Pel-Air are strikingly similar; the results almost identical. The response from CASA beggars belief; although the empirical of it is freely available. In short: the Pel-Air audit was quick, easy and ‘helpful’ as was the Skymaster mini audit. The only company penalised, to the maximum extent was Airtex. The actions of the Bankstown FOI, ordered by Chambers, backed by McCormack, supported by Hood defied the law, the constitution, logic and honesty – even under oath. All there, matter of AAT record; the Pel-Air debacle supported by Hansard.

No apology offered for the introduction; if we are to examine the breadcrumb trail laid by P2; then it is vital we understand the ‘deeper’ background. Many believe, as do I, that not only was the Senate inquiry into the Pel-Air accident deceived, but so was ICAO, the minister and  Australian people.

Manning has drafted a concise report which covers in some detail the ‘technicalities’ of the Pel-Air event; a model which should have been provided many years and millions of dollars ago. Whilst the report may cover off the detail and provide a guide to managing future accident reports it, quite rightly, steps around the machinations surrounding the event.

It is not within Capt. Manning’s remit to examine, in depth, the vast differences between the CASA actions during the time period; nor is it for him to point out to ICAO why there are reporting anomalies. The soft ride and tender care Pel-Air received in comparison to the crucifixion doled out to Airtex is not within his ambit. He has simply done ‘the right thing’ and analysed ‘the accident’. Thank you Sir; that’s the accident explained at least.

Which leaves us with what: ICAO, Senate committee, minister and the public deceived, the government out of pocket a sizeable sum, the Senate committee frustrated, industry still suffering under the same regime and those responsible still employed.

I say this: until the abominations, aberrations and atrocities committed during the McCormack era are addressed – in full – then any and all money spent in pursuit of aviation regulatory reform is wasted; any chance of true reconciliation is lost; no future minister can hope for credibility and a fine industry will be left floundering, terrified in the full knowledge of just what CASA can and regularly do get away with, under cover – in the name of air safety.  

Wish list: David Fawcett Junior Minister; a real reform director; the NZ rules (FAA if you like) and an open ICAO inquiry into CASA actions over the last seven years; then legislation made to ensure that any future antics, of the type displayed during that period can never, not ever, be inflicted on a honest industry, trying to make ends meet.

Sorry for the drift P2 – but if we are to follow the breadcrumbs into the dark woods, then we need a little candle light, just for clarity, so we may find our way.

Dots, dashes & ICAO ADREP aberrations -  Confused

To begin a quick trip down memory lane... Rolleyes

Reference O&O post #1.

From the Feb 2015 PT post: Did Australia mislead ICAO over the Pel-Air crash? 

Quote:...and is understood to be likely to become an early focus of the same Senate committee that exposed the truth about the original CASA cover up of the deficiencies in Pel-Air’s Westwind jet operations at the time of the 2009 ditching near Norfolk Island.

Ministerial spokesperson responds:
Quote:The ATSB advises that it did report the Pel-Air accident off Norfolk Island to ICAO, which is confirmed through a check of the iSTARS database.

The accident did not appear in the Annual Safety Report Asia Pacific Region (2002-2011) because the report is limited to scheduled commercial operations above 5,700kg. The Pel-Air accident off Norfolk Island was not a scheduled commercial operation so it was excluded from the report.

This statement doesn’t address all of the issues in the post.

It specifically ignores the other instance of ATSB amnesia in its ten year review of fiuel management accidents and incidents, which included events involving non scheduled services by aircraft smaller than the Westwind that was ditched off Norfolk Island.
A complete response to the post continues to be sought from the Minister.

The statement from the ministerial minion I call total and utter bollocks, the miniscule (Truss in this case) has again been fed a line that doesn't match the factual evidence.

Here is an entry from that same iSTAR database extract, totally unrelated to VH-NGA, summarised in an ASN occurrence report:
Quote:ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 123055
Last updated: 13 July 2017
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information. If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.

Date: 20-JAN-2010
[Image: C56X.gif]
Cessna 560XLS Citation Excel
NetJets Europe
C/n / msn:
Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Airplane damage:
Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (EHAM) - [Image: PH.gif]   Netherlands
Departure airport:
Rotterdam Airport (EHRD)
Destination airport:
Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (EHAM)
While landing on Runway 06 at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport the crew attempted to stop the aircraft at the end of the runway. When the first officer commenced braking this however had little effect.

The first officer subsequently activated the emergency brake system, at which point the aircraft exited the runway to the right. The aircraft finally came to a halt on Runway 18L-36R, which is located at the end of Runway 06. The two occupants sustained no injuries however the aircraft was severely damaged.


[Image: _4df7a474c3a1cCS-DXR.jpg]
Photo: © Dutch Safetyboard
A Cessna 560XL has a 9 pax seating capacity and would not be my first choice for a low capacity RPT operation, not to mention the report states "..Ferry/positioning.."  

Which, unless things have changed, does not meet the definition of a scheduled commercial operation. 

Still trying to track down what historical and present entries are actually listed on the iSTAR database for VH-NGA and VH-PGW. However as the ICAO ADREP system is now inter connected via the ECCAIRS IT application tool it is now possible to access a worldwide AAI final report archive. Here is a link for that archive:

Doing a search through the 'query' TAB I was able to locate the following entry for VH-NGA:
Quote:Reporting form type: Other (Preliminary Report)
Report identification: AO-2009-072

What this obviously means is that the ATSB (as per the minion statement in the PT article extract) did report to ICAO the ditching occurrence of VH-NGA and subsequently filed the preliminary report. However the question is did this happen in the required (Annex 13) chronological order? And if it was done as per the Annex 13 book, where is the copy/record of the original AO-2009-072 Final Report?

This brings me to VH-PGW - there is no entry that I can find that would indicate that ICAO have been notified; or have had filed either a preliminary or final report on the fatal accident, near Canley vale Sydney NSW, of VH-PGW - can someone please explain??

MTF...P2 Cool
When the dust settles –

As it always does after every major accident event life will return to normal in Sleepy Hollow. I defy anyone to refute that statement; you have a classic example in the MH 370 story. Despite all the hullabaloo, media hysterics, academic posturing, concerned government faces and money thrown into ‘inquiry’; the dust settles and tranquillity returns; until the next event. And that, boys and girls, is for a major international mystery; the disappearance of an international heavy jet, claiming hundreds of lives.

Australia has a great track record on dust settling; the pattern is easily defined. Even after a travesty such as Pel-Air the only difference was a step or two backwards, shuffle a deck chair or two, redo the report allow a little time to slip by and poof; there you are, dust free. Magic.

I happen to know where P2 is digging about; as a willing accomplice to the research. It is an interesting investigation, triggered by a very simple question; “why”? asked in relation to both CASA and ATSB behaviour during the Pel-Air and Skymaster events.

You must start at the very end and carefully work backwards to the beginning if you are to reach the undeniable, inescapable conclusion. To do this one must have a very clear picture of what each accident was – of itself.

VH- NGA was essentially a ‘simple’ accident investigation – the aircraft ran out of fuel, luck and weather at the same time.  The why and the how of that occurring are simple enough to fathom.  Yet it became the subject of a Senate inquiry and much more. Manning has done a splendid job, 500 odd pages worth of ‘splendid’ dust settling. The accident explained in full but completely avoiding the radical issues – like why was there a need to have anything more than a routine investigation in the first place? Why would both ATSB and CASA take such horrendous risks during the Senate inquiry? What was so important that it needed the treatment and money it got? Why?

VH-PGW was, in the way of an accident investigation, a much more complex affair; yet it was passed off with only a cursory examination; the report a neatly scripted ‘nothing to see here’ offering which, standing alone was operationally risible. The aftermath almost unbelievable; when senior counsel walk away, confounded, stating utter disbelief – you have to start wondering – why? Yet the Canley Vale dust was settled so quickly, it seems as though it never happened.

The distortion and discrepancies in both events raise many significant questions. The deep research into the background of these stories seeks the motivation for what many believe is not so much a cover up as a desperate bid to keep Australia’s ICAO ranking, while the power struggle for dominance in the South Pacific region was raging. There was much at stake and the Kiwi’s were stealing the march; much kudos, credit, power and position to play for in that game (did I mention money).

The daisy chain of supporting evidence is growing longer by the day; this is a tale of the ambitious search for individual power glory, supported by a government who could not allow the nations international ranking to be downgraded.

There is enough in the pile now for a writer of fiction to develop a ripping good yarn from. We are not interested in fiction – ‘just the facts Ma’am; just the facts.

More to follow? Indeed there is, probably about the same time as ATSB release the Pel-Air report. Will it make any difference ? I doubt it, but our consciences will be clear.

Toot – (we having fun yet P2?) – toot.
Dots, dashes & ICAO ADREP aberrations - Part II

Other than the missing (original) final report for VH-NGA and the worse no record at all for VH-PGW, - I have discovered further (yet to be explained) aberrations with the Australian relay of required Annex 13 AAI reports to the ICAO ADREP/ECCAIRS. 

The biggest aberration that I have discovered so far is there is no preliminary or final report for the Mildura fog duck-up... Undecided

An occurrence that, except for the skill of the Flight crew, had the potential to be the worst aviation disaster in the history of Australian aviation. An occurrence that the lessons learnt would surely have worldwide industry relevance for mitigating any potential reoccurrences.

However maybe it isn't relevant to the rest of the world and with the exception of pilot error; or operator stupidity; or poor regulatory oversight..etc;  they have already learnt that lesson and taken proactive steps to mitigate min fuel related occurrences.

Reference from Planetalking, via the Search 4 IP post #185:    
Quote:James Nixon
July 11, 2017 at 3:23 pm

I call it “the cleanest third world country in the world”.

After 31 years in the industry I am still amazed that an Australian A380 can fly from Dubai to Sydney and not have to carry an Alternate because of a CASA “Grandfather Clause”.

This saves them carrying 20 tonnes of fuel every day compared to international airlines, and has resulted at least one declaration of emergency so they could land below minima. That flight didn’t even have enough fuel to divert to Canberra.

Twice inbound Australian international flights have had to declare emergencies when arriving at Perth after unforecast weather materialised. One flight, from Singapore, Pilots even discussed ditching until a paxing Captain convinced them otherwise.

Despite being called (behind their backs) “AUSTR-ONAUTS” for their pedantic ways, Australian pilots routinely set off to destinations in Australia without carrying enough fuel to reach an alternate airport, carrying only enough to cover and INTER or TEMPO for bad weather.

But they don’t get it. It’s not only weather that can cause troubles. The better the weather, the more light planes out and about.

One day, before flying from Alice Springs to Darwin, a Flight Engineer and I had to work really hard to convince a new Captain to carry enough fuel to get to Katherine if anything went wrong. He was terrified he would “be called in the office” for carrying extra fuel.

We arrived in Darwin, on short final for 11, to see a Cessna 210 brake off a wheel and spin on the runway in front of us. Going around from fifty feet, we had only seven minutes of fuel before we were committed to fly to Katherine.

Thankfully, the Cessna pilot dragged his wreck off onto the cross runway, the men in the little yellow car removed the wheel; and our passengers reached their destination.

Had my Captain taken his planned fuel, and had the Cessna suffered a more debilitating arrival; we would have had to land over the wreckage on whatever runway remained.

Fog is the enemy in Australia, a country that talks big about air safety, but only has two Cat 3B runways. When you fly into third world countries that have better facilities you wonder: “So does that make my country, Australia, the 4th, or 5th, world?”

Pilots: if they don’t give you a Lo Vis licence and Cat 3B runways, cover your backside with fuel to go somewhere else. Not 200 kgs on every flight “for Mum” (200 kgs gets you no-where and is not going to help your Mum); but enough for a realistic alternate.

And if they want to call you in the office for it, great. Get them to put it in writing. Take pics of every document, then contact Ben Sandilands or me.

We’ll make you famous for sticking-up for your passengers.
As Don Kendell once told me: “I haven’t spent 20 years building my company so you can turn a Metro into a rotary hoe, 20 miles west of Hamilton. Take The Fuel”.

He was a very wise man.
&.. the PT by-line: "..Somehow the ATSB has done a research report on the Mildura fog crisis of 2013 that doesn't mention the 737s didn't have to carry enough fuel to prevent it happening.."
Which brings me to the 'PING' moment and to where I think - Huh -"K" is heading with his last post.

Reference a CASA project that was begun (August 2009) prior to the VH-NGA inconvenient ditch and was in response to a proposed (at the time) ICAO amendment to Annex 6 Part I. This amendment eventually came into effect on 15 November 2012: Project OS 09/13 - Fuel and Alternate requirements
Quote:..Civil Aviation Regulation 1988 (CAR) 234 states that it is the responsibility of the pilot-in-command and the operator of the aircraft to ensure that a flight does not commence without sufficient fuel being carried to enable the flight to be undertaken safely.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau database has provided evidence that fuel quantity issues are becoming problematic, and therefore it has been decided that action must be taken in order to address the issue specifically to account for sufficient fuel for the continuation of safe flight.

Additionally, amendment 36 to ICAO Annex 6 Part I, International Commercial Air Transport- Aeroplanes, has specific changes relating to fuel planning, in flight fuel management, selection of alternate aerodromes and extended diversion time operations (EDTO). This ICAO amendment also specifically addresses fuel and operational requirements for flights to Isolated Aerodromes.

Implementation of the ICAO amendment, either in part or in its entirety, will require CASA to identify those parts that may not be applicable to operations within the Australian aviation operating environment.

...While this project will focus specifically on passenger-carrying commercial flights the project will also be reviewing fuel requirements generally. The project will be conducted in four phases. The first three phases will involve amendments to the relevant Civil Aviation Order (CAO) applicable CAAP 234-1 and CAR 234...

...The amendment to the ICAO Annex 6 standards will be considered, and where appropriate, incorporated into the relevant legislation/advisory publication. In addition it is anticipated that there will be guidance material for operators who can demonstrate a particular level of performance- based compliance. The intent is to provide a bridge from the conventional approach to safety to the contemporary approach that uses process- based methods and Safety Risk Management (SRM) principles...
However before we begin to revisit the TOE (timeline of embuggerance) and attempt to join the dots in sequential order, I did a revisit to the ICAO ADREP/ECCAIRS database because I remembered another HCRPT min fuel occurrence (involving a VH- registered aircraft) that AP covered - ref: O&O #61 or report AO-2012-073. Unfortunately that glossed over 'serious incident' report would appear to be also lost in translation or in the cyber-verse... Confused comment - yet... Undecided

MTF...P2 Cool
Dots, dashes & ICAO ADREP aberrations - Part III Confused

{P2 reminder: Two weeks and counting until the first DIP responses to the 2nd VH-NGA (500+ page) DRAFT Final Report are due - TICK TOCK... Rolleyes }

Dear Australian (trough-feeding) mission to ICAO - Please explain... Huh

In the course of reviewing the ICAO ADREP/ECCAIRS crumb trail to the original VH-NGA (non-)notification, which would appear to be at odds to Annex 13, ch 7, para 7.7...
Quote:Incidents to aircraft over 5 700 kg

7.7 If a State conducts an investigation into an incident to an aircraft of a maximum mass of over 5 700 kg, that State shall send, as soon as is practicable after the investigation, the Incident Data Report to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
....but not at odds with paragraphs 7.3 & 7.4...

7.3 The Preliminary Report shall be submitted to appropriate States and to the International Civil Aviation Organization in one of the working languages of ICAO.


7.4 The Preliminary Report shall be sent by facsimile, e-mail, or airmail within thirty days of the date of the accident unless the Accident/Incident Data Report has been sent by that time. When matters directly affecting safety are involved, it shall be sent as soon as the information is available and by the most suitable and quickest means available.
...I happened to notice some strange anomalies with the ICAO/ECCAIRS version of the original preliminary report - Aus_Isreal_VH-NGA_18Nov2009_prelim.

To begin this copy was created two days after the original prelim report was released for public consumption on the 13th of January 2010. From that PDF it would appear that the original report was modified on 10/11/2015 at 8:13:02 am (click 'file' then click 'properties') by 'author' E.Hargreaves (ATSB REPCON Manager & ICAO co-ordinator).

Now remembering that the ECCAIRS IT application is basically a big version of a SMS incident/accident software program and is therefore supposed to be secure from 1st, 2nd and 3rd party modification/amendment after submission. Therefore the question that must be answered is how is it possible for the official ATSB ICAO co-ordinator to go back into 'modify' the original ICAO prelim report??  

The obvious answer is that the original prelim report copy, intended for ICAO, was not sent; or was intercepted before reaching the ICAO ADREP secretariat responsible for inputting all forwarded notifications and/or AAI reports.

In attempt to track down these anomalies Kaz Casey contacted ICAO directly, who subsequently forwarded her inquiries to the office of the permanent rep of the Australian mission to ICAO.

This the email chain that followed Ziggy's inquiries Wink :

Quote:Subject: ICAO: query to the Australian Mission
Dear Ms Casey
Greetings from Montreal – I received a message from my office manager that you had called the Australian Mission to ICAO yesterday, with a query as to whether the Australian Government had filed its report(s) on the ditching of VH-NGA off Norfolk Island on 18 November 2009 with ICAO in line with the requirements of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.  I understand you were after a quick response, given time pressures on your end, therefore I thought it best to send you an email once I had an answer rather than wait for the timezones to align.
I have spoken with the relevant team in the ICAO Secretariat, who manage the databases of accident information.  They advise me their records indicate that they received the report and that there was no filing action outstanding at this time.
I hope this answers your query.  If not, or if you have any further queries relating to ICAO, please let me know.

Subject: Re: ICAO: query to the Australian Mission

Thank you for your prompt response.
Much appreciated.

Warm Regards,

& then 4 days later... Confused :

Subject: RE: ICAO: query to the Australian Mission
Dear Ms Casey
Subsequent to sending you the advice earlier this week, I received follow up clarification from the team within the Secretariat confirming they had indeed received the preliminary report, but their records do not include having received the final report (they were unsure whether this was because it had not been send to them, or because they had made a mistake on their end in updating their records).
Apologies for the disjointed advice, but I wanted to update with the clarification ICAO provided me.

Hmm...all quite passing strange - Dodgy

Which brings me 'back to the future' with reference to Search 4 IP posts - Passing strange - Part I  & Part II

Now remembering from the previous post CASA project OS 09/13 - Fuel and Alternate requirements...

"..The Australian Transport Safety Bureau database has provided evidence that fuel quantity issues are becoming problematic, and therefore it has been decided that action must be taken in order to address the issue specifically to account for sufficient fuel for the continuation of safe flight.

Additionally, amendment 36 to ICAO Annex 6 Part I, International Commercial Air Transport- Aeroplanes, has specific changes relating to fuel planning, in flight fuel management, selection of alternate aerodromes and extended diversion time operations (EDTO). This ICAO amendment also specifically addresses fuel and operational requirements for flights to Isolated Aerodromes.

Implementation of the ICAO amendment, either in part or in its entirety, will require CASA to identify those parts that may not be applicable to operations within the Australian aviation operating environment..."

Keeping the above in mind, at around about the time that the ATSB VH-NGA prelim report was released, there was a rather large point of disagreement (between CASA and the ATSB) over where the independent transport safety investigator's VH-NGA investigation was heading... Confused

Reference from Senate AAI inquiry: Addinfo1_critical_safety_issue_recieved221012 & 04 CASA_Doc 2_Web

Quote:[Image: CSI-1.jpg][Image: CSI-2.jpg]
I reckon Blind Freddy could join those dots... Rolleyes

MTF...P2 Cool
A beer (or two) with Blind Freddy.

P2 - "I reckon Blind Freddy could join those dots... "

Serious darts practice; big match coming up with a Kiwi crew who are no easy beats. Anyway, Blind Freddy was there along with the rest of the crew and I asked him – “P2 reckons you can join the dots in his latest breadcrumb trail; so, tell all”. “Bloody P2” says Freddie “is, are you well know writing this years ‘brain-teaser’ for the AGM; not fair”. A beat as the new ales arrive – “and anyway, you two are working on the research, so you can’t compete this year” he mumps. Quick as a wink I wade into the morass – “ Never do enter” say’s I – “but I’ll referee it; anyway it’s way to deep for my wooden head'. “But, if the question is posed the way I think it will be, it is a real head scratcher; this time, he’s gone ‘deep’: but, I’ll give you a clue, think about ICAO notifications, ATSB/ASA staff movements and mandatory stuff”

Freddie took his turn; I marked the board and had my throw; then we retired to the corner. “all well and good” say’s he – I caught the cunning glint in his eye and waited – “but the anomalies won’t be the core of the question; it will be on the strange twists and turns of a career change, P2 will want to know the why of the thing: rotten bugger, you watch, it will all centre about EH being appointed and a sudden rush of reports being filed”.

What could I say? Not too much is the answer, there were some mighty strange doings: P2 and I have ploughed our way through it all as best we may; but there is one small knot we cannot undo. I have a feeling that the undoing of that knot will be this years ‘brain teaser’; if it is, the Gordian version was a stroll in the park.

Strange and wonderful are the workings of our safety agencies – very strange indeed. It will interesting to see what associates make of it all; if we ever get to the end of the research. Lots to do.

Blind Freddie winked at me, signalled for more ale, got up to take his shots and proved, once again, why he is an essential member of the BRB front line darts team and nowhere near dopey.

Bring it on P2 – give ‘em the question and turn ‘em loose. Full house BRB and an intriguing question, can’t wait.

Toot toot.

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