[Peetwo]

Posting for “K” today – who is under orders - ‘be there’- or else.

SR continuum.

‘Procedural separation’ (Class E ala Dick) was a topic at a recent BRB indaba.  Thought the BRB vote may be of some interest.

The need for 24/7 blanket coverage was dismissed as not required – 100% against.  The need for a system which could be ‘on –standby’ when ‘alternates’ where required and ATC was aware of more than three aircraft scheduled to arrive within ‘alternate’ buffer periods found much support; 78% thought it ‘sound’, a further 14% thought it should be made to happen.  That naturally led to some debate.  I will try to summarise:-

The weather across the inland is for the most part benign and traffic sparse; the chances of multiple arrivals, within a narrow time frame, in IMC are slim.  There are the exceptions but in the main, ATC would not be frequently called upon to take a hand.

Along the coastal areas and over the hills, the weather can be fickle and occasionally brutal, the OCTA airports do carry a fair bit of traffic and two or three aircraft arriving within a narrow time band is probable – but not high frequency.  A busy period where the RPT is scheduled, a charter or two due about the same time – perhaps a trainer in the circuit; in reasonable weather it is not a problem – except for extended circuits or even a short hold to allow safe separation.  Inefficient? sure, and operationally costly but not a situation for risk mitigation – in the form of positive separation by ATC.  Unless the required triggers are in place; weather at alternate minima; more than two IFR aircraft scheduled within 30 minutes of each other, i.e. within the time needed for an approach – missed approach and sort out.  Close proximity aircraft in this situation are at a higher risk level – (A) misses out and decides to head to the alternate, (B) now aware of the weather decides not to mess about and also decides to divert; depending on height, position, speed and selected alternate; without good communication, there is a chance the two could get fairly close, particularly when the same alternate is used and track height needs to be changed; this is routinely resolved by flight crew, but add a third or fourth aircraft and the risk matrix alters.    

When we look at the Hotham event – YHOT can be ignored 364 out of 365 days a year; there simply is not a traffic problem – but when an event which requires multiple arrivals and departures within a close time frame is flagged and the weather demands an alternate, even with the most meticulous planning things can and do go wrong – in fact, you could bet money on Murphy to win the race.  

So, solutions.  Given the triggers present on that day, would it have been feasible for ATC to provide a watching brief and ‘positive control’ – as the traffic piled up behind the lowest aircraft.  Stack ‘em and release ‘em when the way was clear?  They can do that, standing on their heads, they could also ask the question ‘intentions?’  On the other hand, good communication from the aircraft having difficulties would have assisted in the short term; but a helping hand from someone who had the whole picture would have been of great value.

If we put aside the costing, liability, rules and an inflexible, hidebound, draconian ATC ‘responsibility’ system; how good would it be to have a friendly voice chiming in “ABC – instrument approaches in progress, hold at 10 thousand expect 15 minute delay.  “DEF -*-*-*-*-“.  Is it worth all the trouble for a couple of hours a year?, probably not.  Except for 300 small feet – not even 92 meters, which separated two aircraft with a closing speed of about 500 kph.  Allowing for maximum tolerable instrument error, and within tolerance flying +100 for the lower aircraft; they could have been a bit further apart or, much closer.  Either way, it’s only the difference between two or three heartbeats.  

Risk analysis puts the percentile chance of a reoccurrence off the chart; but, can it be allowed to happen a second time?  It’s the same thing as the Mildura fiasco, infinitesimal chances of those holes lining up – but they did; more chance of winning the lottery, but people do.  

Aye, ‘tis a puzzle.  No blame on ATC, nor the system, which whilst not efficient, performs design function and separates aircraft.  The pilots and actions could stand some scrutiny, but that would, without all the facts, be subjective.  I guess we just got lucky – one more time.

Just a Sunday twiddle – food for thought if you will.  

Toot – I’ll be there directly dear – toot.

Good twiddle "K" and if you spoke to any number of ATCOs probably very doable, however there is a major roadblock and it emanates very much from bureaucratic paranoia of admitted liability, coupled with government ignorance/naivety/deniablity of aviation safety matters - also called the 'mystique of aviation safety'.

The classic example is more than adequately highlighted in the TASWAM case - post above & quotes below - where the system designer believed their system was capable for procedural separation to the ground but government (i.e. CASA) never intended to certify the system to do this - UFB (reference Sir A correspondence bottom of the page)        

Raiders of the lost trough - Part II

While we were analysing & dissecting all the juicy moments from the Senate Estimates hearing the Secretariat was quietly getting on with business and updating the ROTLT (ASA performance inquiry) webpage with some additional info/AQON etc.

First there was an additional, very informative submission from a Mr Robert Hamilton- see here. His background, much like Mr Bennett, does IMO classify him as an 'expert witness' infinitely qualified to comment. Mr Hamilton's concerns:

MY CONCERNS

I make this submission because I am concerned:

• That too many recent comments about Airservices, air traffic control and air traffic controllers appear misinformed, uninformed, inappropriate and at times

misleading-I seek to provide history and context to the comments and correct the public record where appropriate and to the extent that I can.

• That Airservices has not accurately provided to the aviation industry and the Australian taxpayer specific details about how ADS-B will be used in Australian airspace, whether it will benefit Australian aviation and what the costs and benefits will be-I seek to ensure, to the extent that I can, that Australia recognises and maximises the benefits obtainable from introducing at significant expense a 4th generation air traffic services system.

• About the risk to air safety when history is disregarded in favour of short term narrow objectives-I seek to provide an accurate history of radar in Tasmania and show how public funds were easily spent for no public benefit.

• About Airservices public image problems-I seek to point out the consequences of Airservices’ inaccurate public statements and inability to respond to irresponsible and ignorant statements too readily provided by so called ‘experts’.

 
Of main interest to most, will be the RH analysis of the ADSB mandate introduction from paragraphs 10-20.

From page 5:

A dream or a plan?
 
11.It seems to me that this is Mr Smith’s question, and it’s a fair one. But permit me to widen its scope and ask: What’s in it for the entire industry, not just general aviation? Mandating a short period for equipment purchase and installation is a first step toward avoiding the issues of the past but it increases the front end costs to the industry. The danger, though, based on past experience, is that the industry will bear high initial costs for benefits that will arrive only slowly and will never be maximised.

12.The industry’s objective now is the same as it was previously: it will have the new equipment and it will want to maximise the benefits that it will bring. And once again, any benefits and the extent of any benefits can only be provided by and known to Airservices, for it is the Australian air traffic system manager and it appears the only organisation that seems to know what the benefits will be for Australian users. But does it?

13.My reading so far suggests that Airservices and CASA demonstrate some knowledge of what ADS-B can do generally, but Airservices has not revealed its capacities or limitations within Australian airspace, how it will be used, what the benefits will be and when any benefits will be realised. Airservices plan, to me, appears more visionary than detailed.

14.Permit me to provide 4 real world examples of my concern. For the last 45 years aircraft departing Sydney for Brisbane have flown a track to West Maitland then Casino then Brisbane, or it seems recently to Casino, then Coolangatta, then Brisbane. Will this new equipment enable pilots to routinely plan and ATC to routinely permit a normal flight track from 5 miles east of Sydney direct to an 8 or 10 mile final approach at Brisbane? If not, then where is the gain to industry?

15.Or, aircraft are landed 3 miles or 2 minutes apart at our major airports. Will this equipment improve on that and the chronic holding delays over Coolangatta? I doubt it and the result-no cost saving. Or, there used to be a separation standard for properly equipped aircraft of 10 miles either side of planned track. Will the new system permit a lesser standard? If not, then no gain to industry. And another example: basic radar separation is 5 miles plus tolerances, or sometimes 3 miles. Can this be bettered? If not, then no gain to industry.

16.Airservices needs to show what changes it intends, not what changes it believes are possible. And then it needs to accurately, reliably and in greater detail cost and report to industry and government on the savings that it intends to deliver and on what time period it intends these savings will occur.  

Airservices Australia's Brisbane tower. (Airservices)

 

Senator XENOPHON: So there has never been a circumstance where Airservices have said, 'We areconcerned about the safety aspects of this', but you have been overruled by government policy?

Sir Angus Houston: Not to my knowledge.

Senator XENOPHON: Could that be taken on notice. I might be surprised if there was.
Mr Harfield: We can take that on notice to find out. But not to my knowledge.

Answer:

In 2007, airspace regulatory function transferred to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA) reinforcing Airservices role as a service provider.

CASA makes the ultimate decision on issues of aviation safety as the responsible regulator.

In addition, Airservices works very closely and effectively with CASA and the Aviation
Policy Group, consisting of key aviation related agencies, to ensure effective inter-agency
coordination on strategic policy issues.

Hmm..beg to differ when you look at the historical context - paragraphs 1-9 - of the RH submission.

Next AQON 11:

Senator XENOPHON: In the case of the Adelaide TCU it has been put to me that the physical presence of the TCU in Adelaide is relevant. Unlike in Canberra and the Gold Coast, Adelaide Tower has no permanent air space, thus the TCU controls aircraft from the surface level up to 24½ thousand feet, and local knowledge is a big factor. Because of time constraints, could you take that assertion on notice and respond to it accordingly?

Mr Harfield: Yes, I can.

Answer:

The physical location of a Terminal Control Unit (TCU) is not relevant to the services provided.

Air traffic control towers predominantly provide visual control services as opposed to TCUs which provide surveillance-based services. The services provided by TCUs are delivered entirely by electronic means (predominantly radar) and are not dependent on controllers visually seeing the aircraft.

A core part of the training and assessment process for air traffic controllers is familiarity with the airspace that they control, including knowledge of relevant geography and local traffic patterns.

Hmm...interesting comments from the Hamilton submission which relate to the Adelaide TCU:

58.Mr Bennett’s expressed local concerns raise a more serious issue, however, and that is the national need for physical security of Airservices sites, high levels of communication system security, operational redundancy and failover.

59.Australia’s air traffic service is of national importance. It not only services air traffic from halfway across the Indian Ocean to halfway to Hawaii and halfway to New Zealand, but it also provides a highly adaptable nationwide surveillance and communications system of military standard operated by highly disciplined and operationally flexible personnel able to rapidly respond to serious and sometimes unusual national crises and local emergencies.

60.Airservices provides a vital national service to Australia that far exceeds ordinary air traffic control, and decisions relating to consolidation of units, protection of facilities, redundancy of service and the need for rapid failover involve issues of national security as well as system security. The extent of proposed consolidation suggests an increasing need for Airservices to particularly emphasise physical security at its Melbourne and Brisbane centres. Brisbane centre is of immediate concern as it seems vulnerable to any determined physical threat.

Finally Sir A had some 'clarification issues' from his appearance at the last hearing :

2. Correspondence from Sir Angus Houston, Chair, Airservices Australia to committee clarifying statements made at 9 September 2015 hearing, received 15 October 2015

MTF...P2