Wolf! – Wolf! – Bollocks.
I don’t believe stories like the one above ‘help’. For starters there is nothing whatsoever ‘hair raising' about an instrument approach to ‘Cambridge’ – provided the pilot has self briefed, considered what is required and has ‘set-up’ early for the approach. The very idea of ‘scrabbling’ about trying to locate a ‘chart’ is risible; the dramatic “186 Approach” is a nonsense. The approach to any point is set up like a wagon wheel; the airport (or destination navigation beacon) at the centre – the aircraft on one of the ‘spokes’ leading to that hub. It is a simple matter to determine which ‘spoke’ you are on. For that spoke, to avoid hitting the obstacles below, there are an established series of ‘step-heights’ below which you may not descend – until you reach the next; e.g. @ 10 miles you may descend to not below 3600 feet until you are at 7 miles, where you may descend to 2220 feet etc. Routine, daily exercise, safe as houses. Then there is the ‘drama’ of ‘ice’; well ice on an airframe during descent, through cloud is again, fairly routine. Unless the aircraft is equipped with anti or ‘de-ice’ equipment, you have no business deliberately operating in a ‘known’ icing environment; it is bloody risky. Any more ice on a non equipped aircraft than you would put in a rum and coke is too much. One may assume the Smith aircraft was suitably equipped; so why the fuss? Tassy pilots have been successfully executing the approaches to Hobart for donkeys years; nothing has changed too much, simply because the topography and the weather have not changed.
There is no need for this type of overstated high drama; there are problems enough without the total lack of credibility in one part of the tale detracting from the real, valid points which get lost in the ‘derring-do’. For example; there is little ‘ambiguous’ in any ATC ‘clearance’ yet the impression is left here that Smith – ‘covered in ice’; in ‘severe turbulence’, deep in the belly of an evil cloud was given a whimsical; ambiguous clearance and left to his own devices. This is neither true of nor fair to the ATCO – that aside for the moment (I digress).
The real story is the ADS-B system; or the lack thereof. ATCO not trained, tested and qualified to use a very expensive, controversial system is not, of its self ‘dangerous’; but, as the story tells; they ain’t qualified – so they don’t use it. This, stand alone points directly at the truly dreadful state the ASA is in, it highlights the unseen additional stress and strain on the ATCO and speaks volumes on the total disorganization within the hugely expensive, loss making monopoly the ASA is. It is truly disgraceful that the ADS-B system is ‘running’ but ASA cannot fully exploit the efficiency benefits the system ‘could’ provide.
Smith – “Mr Smith told the minister that if nothing changed, there would be a serious accident and it would take a royal commission to bring about better safety.”
Bollocks; counterproductive, emotive Bollocks. There is a great waste of time, public money and operating costs; it is a massive haemorrhage of resources and money – all trackable back to the large, shiny, expensive offices of a handful of ASA management types. Dick is wasting credibility and opportunity barking up the wrong tree; the Senate committee is not. The RRAT is reading the audits, analysing the programs and asking, quite correctly, WTF have you been playing at? A hundred million dollars a year monopoly, going broke, beggars belief; retrenching, not training ATCO, bringing in consultants to do the in house work payed by industry, that and taking long lunches and cozy weekend get a ways needs to be examined; in detail.
There is a story there; plenty of drama, gross waste, highly conflicted interests. For ducks sake, lets just forget about one piddling overstated tall tale and concentrate on where the money has gone and why, despite paying – handsomely – for an improved, more efficient system Australia still has not got one.
There; I feel much better now.
Toot toot.
I don’t believe stories like the one above ‘help’. For starters there is nothing whatsoever ‘hair raising' about an instrument approach to ‘Cambridge’ – provided the pilot has self briefed, considered what is required and has ‘set-up’ early for the approach. The very idea of ‘scrabbling’ about trying to locate a ‘chart’ is risible; the dramatic “186 Approach” is a nonsense. The approach to any point is set up like a wagon wheel; the airport (or destination navigation beacon) at the centre – the aircraft on one of the ‘spokes’ leading to that hub. It is a simple matter to determine which ‘spoke’ you are on. For that spoke, to avoid hitting the obstacles below, there are an established series of ‘step-heights’ below which you may not descend – until you reach the next; e.g. @ 10 miles you may descend to not below 3600 feet until you are at 7 miles, where you may descend to 2220 feet etc. Routine, daily exercise, safe as houses. Then there is the ‘drama’ of ‘ice’; well ice on an airframe during descent, through cloud is again, fairly routine. Unless the aircraft is equipped with anti or ‘de-ice’ equipment, you have no business deliberately operating in a ‘known’ icing environment; it is bloody risky. Any more ice on a non equipped aircraft than you would put in a rum and coke is too much. One may assume the Smith aircraft was suitably equipped; so why the fuss? Tassy pilots have been successfully executing the approaches to Hobart for donkeys years; nothing has changed too much, simply because the topography and the weather have not changed.
There is no need for this type of overstated high drama; there are problems enough without the total lack of credibility in one part of the tale detracting from the real, valid points which get lost in the ‘derring-do’. For example; there is little ‘ambiguous’ in any ATC ‘clearance’ yet the impression is left here that Smith – ‘covered in ice’; in ‘severe turbulence’, deep in the belly of an evil cloud was given a whimsical; ambiguous clearance and left to his own devices. This is neither true of nor fair to the ATCO – that aside for the moment (I digress).
The real story is the ADS-B system; or the lack thereof. ATCO not trained, tested and qualified to use a very expensive, controversial system is not, of its self ‘dangerous’; but, as the story tells; they ain’t qualified – so they don’t use it. This, stand alone points directly at the truly dreadful state the ASA is in, it highlights the unseen additional stress and strain on the ATCO and speaks volumes on the total disorganization within the hugely expensive, loss making monopoly the ASA is. It is truly disgraceful that the ADS-B system is ‘running’ but ASA cannot fully exploit the efficiency benefits the system ‘could’ provide.
Smith – “Mr Smith told the minister that if nothing changed, there would be a serious accident and it would take a royal commission to bring about better safety.”
Bollocks; counterproductive, emotive Bollocks. There is a great waste of time, public money and operating costs; it is a massive haemorrhage of resources and money – all trackable back to the large, shiny, expensive offices of a handful of ASA management types. Dick is wasting credibility and opportunity barking up the wrong tree; the Senate committee is not. The RRAT is reading the audits, analysing the programs and asking, quite correctly, WTF have you been playing at? A hundred million dollars a year monopoly, going broke, beggars belief; retrenching, not training ATCO, bringing in consultants to do the in house work payed by industry, that and taking long lunches and cozy weekend get a ways needs to be examined; in detail.
There is a story there; plenty of drama, gross waste, highly conflicted interests. For ducks sake, lets just forget about one piddling overstated tall tale and concentrate on where the money has gone and why, despite paying – handsomely – for an improved, more efficient system Australia still has not got one.
There; I feel much better now.
Toot toot.