MH370 - time to think of it as a criminal act

'K', I'm thinking that 'Eczema' could in fact be that Coprophagia loving beard on/beard off buffoon, Beaker? Or a Beaker doppelgänger like Lookyloo?

Beaker has much more time on his hands these days as he has been shoved in the back room of some shitty department with just a calculator and an abacus!
Reply

Over on Jeff Wise net, a contributor who goes by the title "S25" has conducted his own analysis of the ISAT BTO/BFO data.

He has proposed an interesting explanation of how it ties in to the Acoustic Signals recorded by the Curtin University Hydrophones, and defines a new search location, which is slightly north-east of the existing ATSB search area.

His post is as follows:

S25
Posted September 12, 2016 at 9:29 PM
To All:
There has been much speculation pertaining to routes which satisfy the BTO/BFO data that may exist East of the current search area. The answer is yes they do exist and do satisfy the BTO/BFO data better than any routes to the current search area. There are at least two routes, which I have identified as the East and West Routes, which have zero BTO error and with average BFO errors of minus 0.11 Hz and minus 0.23 Hz respectively. The basic corridors for these routes were first presented to the ATSB in August 2014. The updated routes were presented to the ATSB in March 2015. The refined routes were presented to the ATSB in March 2016 with all the route timing points, BTO and BFO calculations using two different computation techniques, an Excel spreadsheet showing fuel use minute by minute, an Excel spreadsheet correlating Indicated Airspeed (KIAS); Calibrated Airspeed (KCAS); True Airspeed (KTAS); and Mach Number for zero to 41000 feet altitude with standard and non-standard true-air-temperatures, along with the images of the route segments drawn in Google Earth from takeoff to the Virtual Waypoint locations.
I can only present a very abbreviated impression of the two routes since the full data package has about 60 documents involving computations, tabular data, images and explanatory discussions. The two proposed routes are common from the 17:07:19 position (5.413N, 102.867E) through to the ISBIX waypoint at 0.366N, 93.671E. The West Route crossing time at the ISBIX position is approximately 20:11:00 while the East Route crossing time is approximately 20:12:00. The East Route uses two airspeeds of Mach 0.84/484 KTAS and Mach 0.80/461 KTAS. The West Route uses two airspeeds also, however, they are Mach 0.84/484 KTAS and Mach 0.81/467 KTAS. The two proposed routes follow their individual great circle routes after crossing ISBIX and diverge from each other about 37 nautical miles at the 7th Arc. Google Earth detailed images effectively display the interesting circuitous route that the aircraft was most likely directed to fly between the 18:25 position and the 19:41 BTO/BFO position south of BEDAX. These routes have probably been discounted by the ATSB because they require seven inputs into the flight management system/autopilot thereby negating any “Ghost Flight” scenario.
In early August Richard Godfrey presented a document on the Duncan Steel website entitled ‘Hydrophone Data and MH370’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/date/2016/08/08). The sound data identified as Signal Group A had been captured over a 21 second period at the Cape Leeuwin Hydrophone array located at 34.892°S, 114.153°E and described in Richard Godfrey’s presentation.
It was an independent data source which needed to be integrated with potential MH370 route data. Correlating the data sets was quite interesting since the East and West Route impact points correlated in both position and timing with Richard Godfrey’s discussion impact items #3 and #1 respectively. My analysis and correlation results were presented to the ATSB in early August 2016.
The potential East Route Impact at 00:21:07 UTC at -31.47S, 96.93E correlated with the impact data #3 at 1649km/278.5º from the Cape Leeuwin hydrophone array as addressed in the Discussion portion of Richard Geoffrey’s presentation.
The potential West Route Impact at 00:20:50 UTC at -31.96S, 96.47E correlated with impact data #1 at 1674km/276.25º from the Cape Leeuwin hydrophone array as addressed in the Discussion portion of Richard Godfrey’s presentation. According to Richard from the time delays between the sound arriving at each element of the array (3 elements) it is possible to roughly determine the direction of arrival of the signal to within about 0.75°. The West Route impact data at 276.25º is within the 1.5º nominal cone of reception for impact data #1 observed at the hydrophone array while the East Route impact data at 278.5º is 2.25º outside the cone of reception. This may give extra weight to the West Route impact area if the precision of the cone of reception is held to 1.5º.
The East Route is on a great circle route from the ISBIX Waypoint to Virtual Waypoint S50, E100 or to a secondary Virtual Waypoint S32, E097. These two great circle routes do not deviate more than 1500 feet from each other. The S50, E100 waypoint would most likely have been the waypoint entered in the Flight Management System if the East Route was flown. They are identified as Virtual Waypoints because they are not reachable with the onboard fuel.
The West Route is on a great circle route from the ISBIX Waypoint to Virtual Waypoint S50, E099 or to a secondary Virtual Waypoint S37, E097. These two great circle routes do not deviate more than 3 nautical miles from each other at their furthest excursion. The S50, E099 waypoint would most likely have been the waypoint entered in the Flight Management System if the West Route was flown.
Only one set or neither set of the hydrophone data may be valid. Also, only one or neither of the two routes were flown even though each route fits the given data very well. However, since these are the only two sources of independent data that we have to correlate, consequently, we need to accept the data as being valid, until proven otherwise.
There is another interesting aspect to this potential solution. In March 2016 Duncan Steel presented on his website two related articles entitled ‘Some Comments on the Missing (or Missed) Floating Debris Field from MH370’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/date/2016/03/15) and ‘RNZAF photographs of the sea surface in the MH370 search area in the southern Indian Ocean’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/2261).
A series of photos depicting debris had been taken from RNZAF aircrafts on 28 and 29 march 2014. These photos were taken in the area of -32.5S and 97.8E which happens to be about 140 kilometers southeast of the two proposed impact points on the East and West Routes. This is another aspect of attempting to integrate two types of independent data to establish potential timing and spatial correlations for the two events. Hopefully, someone has the wind and current data for the 8 March to 29 March 2014 time period to verify if these may be valid event correlations and associations.
This discussion may motivate other investigators to search for new data integration/fusion opportunities. It should provide a new dimension to be considered in the drift analysis and newly acquired barnacle enigma. Extensive analyses during the past two years have lead me to the conclusion that the Inmarsat data is of the best quality that could be collected and provided. We need to use it well.
PostScript: There is no way that MH370 could have flown either of these routes if there had been any kind of fire on board.


The full details of his theory are contained in 6 files (4 PDF and 2 Excel Spreadsheets), which are available for download from:
https://www.mediafire.com/folder/w5h5xpz6rt5e8/S25

Below are half size renditions of the last 5 (of thirty) images from the main file, of the new "S25" search area.


[Image: attachment.php?aid=197]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=198]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=199]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=200]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=201]





.jpg Yellow-461 and Aqua-467 Routes-2_page_0026_half.jpg Size: 447.83 KB  Downloads: 204
.jpg Yellow-461 and Aqua-467 Routes-2_page_0027_half.jpg Size: 401.89 KB  Downloads: 203
.jpg Yellow-461 and Aqua-467 Routes-2_page_0028_half.jpg Size: 428.67 KB  Downloads: 203
.jpg Yellow-461 and Aqua-467 Routes-2_page_0029_half.jpg Size: 418.25 KB  Downloads: 204
.jpg Yellow-461 and Aqua-467 Routes-2_page_0030_half.jpg Size: 311.2 KB  Downloads: 202
Reply

Now, just this morning, "S25" sent a new e-mail, as follows:

Ventus45

I have five documents to send, however, I will have to do it in three installments because they add up to over 12 Megabytes. In fact one graphics is over six Megabytes which I am hoping will be OK.

I hope you do not mind my sharing with you some thought provoking material for you to wake up to.

The first attachment are extracts from the 26 June 2014 ATSB Report “MH370 – Definition of Underwater Search Areas”.  
http://www.mediafire.com/download/dk6a11...tracts.pdf

The PDF extracts are pages 25 to 29 and page 42 of that report.  As depicted in the extracted pages starting from locations on the 1941 BTO arc, using various search assumptions, the paths with the highest correlation for Analyses A, B, and C all center on 97.5 degrees East Longitude.  Figure 27, which is based on BFOs with 5 Hz tolerance and fixed frequency bias, also centers on 97.5E.  Consequently, the priority (Orange) search area depicted in Figure 37 uses a similar 97.5E centroid.  However, when the ATSB Strategic Search Working Group was repeatedly  asked what happened during the period from 18:25 to 19:41 no one had a logical answer.  That is why 19:41 was selected as the initial analysis starting point.



Consequently, when the 8 October 2014 “MH370 Flight Path Update” was released it contained the following Summary:

“Following the release of the June report,  MH370 – Definition of Underwater Search Areas, further refinement of the satellite communications (SATCOM) data and analysis has been ongoing.  A combination of a better understanding of the ground initiated telephone call messages and a refined SATCOM system model both indicate that an area further south on the 7th arc search should be prioritized.  Although of reasonably high confidence, and relatively large, this area does not contain all the possible derived paths.  This area is intended to be the focus of activities for the initial deployment of the underwater search assets.

Additionally, work is continuing with ongoing examination and analysis of the SATCOM data and end-of-flight scenarios or simulations which may affect the dimensions or flight path probabilities within the search area.  The ongoing refinement may result in changes to search asset deployment.”

Such was born the FINAL MAJOR TURN (FMT) and all of its consequences.  The Independent Group did not help matters by their incessant championing of the FMT and the “Ghost Flight”.

A further  statement in the report is as follows:  “This update presents recent results from analysis of SATCOM data and information from unanswered ground-to-air telephone call 17 minutes after the last radar information.  The update provides a key input to the ATSB’s planning and direction of current underwater search activities to locate MH370 in the Southern Indian Ocean.  This update should be read in conjunction with the June report.”

During 2014 a very good analyst named YAP, Fook Fah, an Assistant Professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, did some outstanding work and produced what I still consider to be the best BTO/BFO calculator, which I still use to verify my own methodology results.  I think he became disillusioned with all of the illogical theories posted on the Duncan Steel site and after that the Jeffrey Wise blog.

http://www.ntu.edu.sg/home/mffyap/web/index.htm

http://www.ntu.edu.sg/home/mffyap/web/research.htm

http://www.ntu.edu.sg/Pages/home.aspx

The only other publication subsequent to 2014 by Professor YAP, that I am aware of, was on the Duncan Steel website on 14 April 2016.  The document is titled “Consideration of a Controlled Ditch Scenario for MH370”.  It is a good read even though it pertains to the current ATSB search area.

http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/date/2016/04

I am attaching Version 1 of Professor YAP’s calculator which he released on 9 August 2014.  
http://www.mediafire.com/download/w9uizq...g2014.xlsx
He created a path from 18:25 to 19:41 which used true courses and ground speeds that were improbable.  However, his 19:41 position on the BTO arc was quite good.  From the 19:41 point he used small true course changes along with a constant 457.5 knot ground speed to navigate southeast down to the 7th arc at 00:19:00.  His position at the 7th arc was -31.4467S, 96.9044E.  Remarkably, this position is only about 4 nautical miles from the position I arrived at on my Yellow Route in March 2015 (-31.381, 96.917)!!!  What is surprising is that we each approached the problem using entirely different methodologies and techniques.

The final set of attachments are intriguing.  
One is of the ATSB’s 27 October 2014 Progressive Bathymetric Survey Map.  
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5168463/Pr...ct2014.jpg
The second attachment is the ATSB’s 29 October 2014 Progressive Bathymetric Survey Map.  
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5169605/pr...ct2014.jpg

You will notice in the 27 October 2014 map that there is the start of a cutout near the Broken Ridge Trench.  However, in the 29 October 2014 map the cutout is fully shown with a surveyed block extending southeast of the cutout.  I asked the SSWG if this surveyed block was real or just an artifact.  I never did get an answer.  

Now here is the interesting part that is presented in the final attachment.  

[Image: attachment.php?aid=202]

The Yellow Route 7th arc terminal point (black square) was the initial point used to extend the track 85 nautical mile to represent a terminal glide from 26,000 feet.  The surface wind was from the south (184/15) so the aircraft would have travelled nearly due south to take advantage of the 15 knot surface headwind in the ditching maneuver.  The headwind slows the groundspeed of the aircraft by a near equal amount.  There is also a ground effect which allows  a further slowing down by creating a cushion of air which delays a stall.  Impact is equal to mass times velocity, therefore, every foot-per-second that can be reduced in the collision does matter.  Notice that the 85 nautical glide point (black dot) plots inside the offset block.  

Is it a coincidence or for real??  

If the offset is real then it begs the question ‘what were they surveying in the trench??’.  The Trench is 17,000 feet deep at that point!!

Warm Regards,
S25


Added by V45:
And why was there an additional "east west scan" between October and December 2014?

[Image: attachment.php?aid=203]



.jpg Glide Point-Annotated.jpg Size: 255.66 KB  Downloads: 198
.jpg S25-additional-scan.jpg Size: 380.76 KB  Downloads: 184
Reply

MH370: Test Results On Four Pieces Of Debris To Be Known In 3 Months - Liow

http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v8/ge/new...id=1283498
Reply

The answer, is in the stars, CANOPUS.


[Image: attachment.php?aid=204]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=205]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=206]


.jpg Canopus-Setting.JPG Size: 188.22 KB  Downloads: 167
.jpg MH-370-1-Star-Chart-Cropped-90.jpg Size: 433.02 KB  Downloads: 164
.jpg MH-370-1--Dawn-Cropped-90.jpg Size: 412.11 KB  Downloads: 167
Reply

The "significance" of Point 4 in "mission planning".


[Image: attachment.php?aid=207]


.jpg Point4-Significance50.jpg Size: 315.47 KB  Downloads: 140
Reply

A little more information.

[Image: attachment.php?aid=208]

.jpg A_little_more_information.JPG Size: 178.98 KB  Downloads: 130
Reply

I will feed you just a little of my thinking at this point.

As a "mission planner", who has planned a "vanishing" in the SIO, the planner would have needed a simple, foolproof, "backup navigation plan", to use in the event that the aircraft's navigation systems were, or became "unserviceable".

Anyone planning such an operation (must be a "Navigator" at heart - and I am) would know full well the magnetic variations in the Indian Ocean, and would quickly conclude that relying on the magnetic compass (if all else failed)) would be inviting disaster.

The only "reliable and external to the aircraft" navigation information available, is the stars.

Canopus is the obvious answer.

The plan entails simply heading directly for Canopus as you fly south.

Starting from IGARI, this gives an initial south westerly course, which gradually curves towards south.

Refer back to Table 1 in Post # 245
By the time of crossing the equator, the true heading is 217.
By the time of reaching 20 South, the the true heading is 212.
Follow the table from there, you should get the idea.

Now, the significance of this is that it is easy to plot the resultant ground track (in no wind conditions for the moment) if you know:-
(a) the time of crossing the equator,
(b) the actual longitude of crossing the equator, and
© the ground speed.

What complicates matters is determining the ground speed made good, given cruise altitude, Mach, TAS, and of course, the winds encountered.

However, what my analysis has shown so far (I will not put up the plots yet) clearly indicates, that the aircraft would have flown further west/south-westerly, than the BTO's "as published by Malaysia" allow.

This is significant.

Let's go back to square one.

The whole question of the ISAT data as published by Malaysia has been done to death, and the consensus of "the experts" is that the BTO's are "solid". They "argue" over the BFO's, seemingly incessantly.

I disagree with the experts. I have a different view.

Think outside the square for a minute.

If you were Malaysia, and you "DID NOT WANT THE AIRCRAFT FOUND", the easiest, simplest, and safest thing to do, would be to "tamper with the BTO's", not the BFO's.

Furthermore, it is significant, that in ALL the press conferences given by Inmarsat, and in ALL the public presentations given by them, they have "steadfastly refused" to release "their actual data", and have always said "we gave all the information to the <quote> Investaigation </unquote>. The interview where Paul Sladen put the acid word on them was "telling", in my view.

Even in their "Journal of Navigation" paper, they used, and were VERY careful to "reference" all data used in the paper, from the Malaysian and ATSB publications. How quaint. What serious researcher uses second hand sources of "their own data" for "their own paper" ?

Furthermore, one must ask the question, why would a bunch of engineers, communications engineers, publish such a paper in the journal of the Navigation society in the first place, rather than their own professional societies and their journals ?

Were Inmarsat trying to protect their own credibility ?

Were they trying to give us a "clue", that what had been published by Malaysia, in that "much delayed", and "highly redacted", and "copy protected" PDF File, might not be, 100% "ridgi-dige" ?
(Ref: https://www.docdownload.com.au/australia...erms-abuse)

I will leave it there for now.
Reply

Expanded Table 1

[Image: attachment.php?aid=209]

.gif Canopus-Setting.gif Size: 466.01 KB  Downloads: 111
Reply

Z's computer.

A "Mission Planner's Perspective".

The significance of the two SIO coordinates on Z's computer, close together, (near 45 South 104 East), one at FL380 and the other at 4,000 feet, is quite obvious to any Navigator.


[Image: attachment.php?aid=210]


Z was testing arriving at 45 South 104 East, just before the first light of dawn at cruise altitude, but with the sea below still in total darkness, then conducting a circling descent, to search for the lights of any ships if present, on the shortest day of the year, in the southern hemisphere, ie, the winter solstice, June 23.

The relevant Astronomical Data is as follows.

At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:00:00 UTC, we have:-
It is pre-dawn, in the beginning of Twilight.
The Sun is still below the horizon to the east-north - east (Az/Alt: +64°08'58"/-7°28'16")
Canopus is still fully visible to the south east (Az/Alt: +129°36'57"/+39°02'24")

Ten minutes later:-
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:10:00 UTC, we have:-
It is still pre-dawn, but Twilight is rapidly lightening to the east.
The Sun is still below the horizon (Az/Alt: +62°28'29"/-5°53'31")
The sky is rapidly lightening to the east.
Canopus is still just visible to the south east (Az/Alt: +128°46'24"/+40°24'01")  

Ten minutes later:-
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:20:00 UTC, we have:-
It is still pre-dawn, but in the end of Twilight.
The Sun is now only just below the horizon (Az/Alt: +60°46'56"/-4°20'12")
But the sky is rapidly lightening to the east.
Canopus is still to the south east (Az/Alt: +127°57'37"/+41°47'24") but is no longer visible.

Ten minutes later:-
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:30:00 UTC, we have:-
It is still pre-dawn, but in the end of Twilight.
The Sun is now only just below the horizon (Az/Alt: +59°04'12"/-2°48'26")
But the sky is rapidly lightening to the east.
Canopus is still only just visible to the south east (Az/Alt: +127°10'40"/+43°11'42")

Ten minutes later:-
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:40:00 UTC, we have:-
It is now effectively dawn.
The Sun is effectively on the horizon (Az/Alt: +57°20'09"/-1°18'17")
Canopus (the last star visible) has now disappeared to the south east (Az/Alt: +127°10'40"/+43°11'42")

From a "Mission Planning Perspective", the significance of all this is as follows.

FIRST:
The "shortest day of the year" is also the "longest night" of the year.  The "longest night" give the maximum amount of time to fly south - in the dark. It also puts sunrise at the surface (the surface TERMINATOR) the furthest east of any day of the year (for any given southern latitude). For planning purposes, 00:00 UTC is the obvious choice.


SECOND:
The position itself (45S 104E) is a significant choice, in that it satisfies all the requirements of a "vanishing", for EITHER a "crash" (with lots of floating debris), or a "ditch" (with little if any floating debris).
(a) Stealth:-
This position is remote, and well outside all normal shipping routes. The possibility of "discovery" by "fishing fleets" exists, but is unlikely. The possibly of discovery by Naval shipping is even more unlikely, and any other shipping, whether Research vessels or yachts, is so minute as to be safely ignored.
(B) Debris:-
At this latitude, any debris would pass well south of Australia, in the Circumpolar Current, and would be unlikely to wash up on any inhabited shore anywhere in the southern hemisphere, for a very long time, probably years.

THIRD:
To reach this position, in no wind conditions, from a "start point" (the FMT) north-west of Ache , (let's assume at ANOKO), and thence to track around Indonesian Radar to BEDAX, and then to set off for "top of descent" at 45S 104E, travelling at 480 Knots Ground Speed, it would take 6 hours and 33 minutes (for a total distance of 3,174 nautical miles from ANOKO).
If the intended time of "top of descent" was "just prior to dawn at altitude" (to allow time for descent for a "ditch at dawn"), you would want to reach "top of descent" no later than 00:30 UTC.  Thus, the FMT at ANOKO would need to be no later than 18:00 UTC.  To reach ANOKO from KLIA (on a "planning flight" to Europe) would take an additional 1 hour 10 minutes, so "departure time" of that flight would have to be no later than 16:50 UTC, preferably a little earlier (to allow for "delays"), thus, a flight with a "scheduled departure" around 16:30 UTC would be ideal, from a "planning perspective".

MH-370 met the "departure criteria".




<Begin SIDEBAR NOTES 1>

At this point in the discussion, I will add one "significant observation", and it is this.

(a) In "the plan", you will note that when flying south from BEDAX, the path crosses AIRWAY L774. The crossing point is at way point UPROB, 268 nautical miles south of BEDAX (time interval at 480 knots ground speed is 34 minutes) .

(b) At 480 knots ground speed, The time interval from ANOKO to UPROB is 48 minutes, so the "planned time" at UPROB is 18:48UTC.  Remember this place and time, because it is PIVOTAL to "finding" MH-370.  You heard it here FIRST.  

© The actual "cruise time and distance" onward from UPROB to "top of descent" at 45S 104E at 00:30 UTC is 5 hours 46 minutes (00:34 UTC actually - only 4 minutes difference) and 2,794 nautical miles (which, incidentally, also puts the abandoned "EMU FIELD" (YEMJ), the 5'500 foot dry lake strip, at the old Nuclear Test Site, in North West South Australia, just within range).

(d) From a "planning perspective" therefore, UPROB is the "Rally Point", the "Initial Point", the "Pivot Point", for ANY flight into the SIO, for ANY day of the year, to reach "sunrise at Top Of Descent" for a "ditch at dawn".

(e) Consequently, the "radius" of 2,794 nautical miles from UPROB give the locus of "reachable tops of descent" at 00:30 UTC (which, incidentely, crosses the 7th Arc at 42 deg 37.67 minutes South 75 degrees 57.167 minutes East) assuming that this "any other flight" has the same (or more) fuel.

(f) Note also, that this position and time is still "in the dark" on the morning of the 8th March 2014.

(g) We know that MH-370 did not have as much fuel as the "European Planning Flight". We know that it's fuel was "effectively" exhausted around 00:10 UTC (approximately), giving an actual "cruise endurance" past UPROB of (18:48 to 00:20) of about 5 hours 32 minutes. At 480 knots ground speed this gives a "radius of action" for MH370 of 2,656 nautical miles from UPROB. This gives a maximum possible intercept of the 7th Arc at 41 degrees 21.94 minutes south 80 degrees 12.83 minutes East, which is about 370 Nautical Miles south west of the current search focus.

(h) Again, it is significant to note, that this position and time is still "in the dark" on the morning of the 8th March 2014, at 00:10 UTC.

(i) It is also significant to note, that CANOPUS is still above the horizon at this time and location
<End Sidebar Notes 1>


So, what is the significance of "UPROB" - you ask ?
The answer is simple, and has stunning implications.




<Begin SIDEBAR NOTES 2>

Every "Mission Planner" has a "Plan B".

Z planned his vanishing well, and he did have a "Plan B".

Plan A - was the "vanishing" off the "North Western European Flight" with the "Northern FMT" at ANOKO.

Plan B - was the "vanishing" off the "North Eastern Beijing Flight" with the "Southern FMT" at UPROB.

As stated above, UPROB is the "key".

In the case of the "North Eastern Beijing Flight", ie, MH-370, the critical requirement is to be able to reach UPROB by 18:48 UTC.

The only way MH-370 can reach UPROB by 18:48 UTC, is for it to track virtually direct from IGARI to UPROB.

Departing KLIA at 16:42, turning IGARI at 17:20, passing abeam Penang at 17:52, and thence picking up Airway G468 at GUNIP, then GOTLA then overflying MEDAN onto Airway L774 to MERIM and thence to UPROB.

The arrival time at UPROB would have been 18:48 UTC approximately, "AS PLANNED - in Plan A".  

But, the ISAT data tells us that the FMT was at 18:38 UTC.  

Z wanted "a little insurance".  He knew that his fuel was "mission critical" in terms of both endurance and range. So he decided to "turn early", ten minutes early, with a view to "saving" some track miles to his TOP of Descent Point, but more significantly, he had to consider, that if he encountered unexpectedly strong westerly winds, he would burn more fuel getting south, and thus would fall a bit short on his final latitude, and if his ground speed was reduced by ten knots or more, over 5 hours, he would slightly north and east of his "planned TOD. Turning ten minutes early moves the longitude of sunrise east by 2.5 degrees of longitude (Earth's rotation is 15 degrees per hour - thus 10 minutes = 2.5 degrees). Thus, he builds in an additional "safety margin", for "remaining in the dark" all the way. Depending on the winds encountered, he can adjust his track in the final hour or so of cruise, to refine his TOD position more accurately.

So he turned SW at 18:38 UTC, 80 miles short of UPROB, very near to position 01:40.04N 095:42.43E.

Thus, the north-west flight up the Malacca Straight is an "INVENTION". It never happened.  QED.

This means that the "Southern FMT" is the "TRUE FMT", and thus, the final resting place of MH-370 is a long way south west on the 7th Arc than the DSTG's (and others) analysis from the "Northern FMT" suggests.

It is of interest to note, that the Malaysians have, from the earliest days of ISAT data analysis, done everything seemingly (and unseemingly) possible, to "drive the search north east", AWAY from the INITIAL US NTSB TWIN TRACKS (which do put the terminal point well to the south west on the 7th Arc from the DSTG's (and others) analysis from the "Northern FMT").  

Indeed, if the examination of Z's computer by the Malaysians in the first few days, revealed the data in the table at the head of this post, at that time, it is more than probable, that the very "creation" of the Malacca Strait flight path (the famous Lido slide) was done deliberately with a view, to be able to  "subsequently" convince the world, that that is what actually happened, when it clearly did not.  That "subsequently", was the leaking of the table, more than two years later.  Such action speaks of deliberate "management" of the search criteria, with only one possible reason, to ensure that the aircraft is never found.

<End Sidebar Notes 2>

I will therefore ignore the ATSB/DSTG position, since they are based on the Northern FMT, and they are politically welded to it.

I will however ask the IG, their technical associates, and any other "interested others", to restart their analysis, with a "clean sheet of paper", ( clean spreadsheets ! ) from my "Southern FMT" (01:40.04N 095:42.43E) and see what they come up with.

All for now.

.jpg SIO-coordinates.jpg Size: 44.21 KB  Downloads: 102
Reply

Readers of Jeff Wise's comments section may have noticed my absence of late. I can report that it is not for lack of trying: I've attempted to reply amicably to three people who addressed me directly, but Jeff has been redacting them.

I won't comment on the cause of this new friction - I have no desire to say anything bad about Jeff, or how he runs his forum. I just wanted you to know that I am trying my best to get back in his good books, without sacrificing my principles (go where the evidence leads, seek truth fearlessly, and hold our leaders to full account).
Reply

Brock, most of us here are also either avid followers of and/or occasional posters on Jeff's blog. If you have had posts replying to people "redacted or censored", why not post them here ?
Reply

Ventus: sure thing. Here's my latest - a reply to "Sajid UK" re: his Sept 29, 9:27AM comment to me, stating that he preferred "secrets and obfuscation" to a potentially destabilizing truth:

"@Sajid: thanks for the kind words.  I enjoy your contributions as well.  But on the narrow point you emphasize: I disagree strenuously.  I do NOT prefer a soothing lie over a disturbing truth.  Lies do more damage when left to fester under the skin than they do if lanced.  And the precedent your philosophy sets is, to me, a very dangerous one: if we stop sniffing around whenever our leaders say "state secrets!", what will stop them from using that excuse whenever they want?  To what degree of incompetence, corruption, and outright evil are we prepared to turn a blind eye, in order to ensure our leaders have plenty of space to park all their "noble" lies?

Believe me: I'm absolutely sure you just want what's best for all involved.  But believe me: so do I."
Reply

Brock said;

"I just wanted you to know that I am trying my best to get back in his good books, without sacrificing my principles (go where the evidence leads, seek truth fearlessly, and hold our leaders to full account)"

You've come to the right place at AP Brock. Robust discussion is encouraged, free speech promulgated (although even the bad GD is censored on rare occasions by other Mods), where the Guv'mint isn't protected by its spin doctors, media department or minions.

Whatever you can't say over there you can say over here mate.

Cheers
Reply

GD, with respect and affection. No, he cannot.

Out of courtesy to GD I shall explain; once. I will let the BM post slide by this once. But not again. We are not interested in the Pprune style of personal slanging match. BM’s post is a ‘personal’ debate between two parties; both playing the man; not the ball. Once it gets personal on AP I will knock the posts out.  We do not want, nor need this sort of crap on this forum. It is not acceptable.  If there is a ball to play – then let’s have at it. Play the man – red card; no hesitation, no regrets.


While I’m at it the ‘Wise’ blog is not widely read or respected  by the AP, it is certainly not supported and the trite, petty, pointless bickering’s have neither merit, nor intrinsic value, Not as far as most here are concerned.

So; two choices – no options for McEwan.  Comment on topic and be aware that nobody here gives a toss what Mr Sajid UK has to say, about Brock; or vice versa;  - particularly through Mr Wise.

End of – Full stop.
Reply

Over on JeffWise, Oleksandr said (at October 6, 2016 at 9:30 AM)

" I have abandoned further detailed studies and refinements of the magnetic modes because it was noted that such modes do not exist on B777."

My "copper mate's" take on that type of "closing off a "line of enquiry"" is this.

From a "detective's" point of view, it is a "dangerous assumption" to rule any "criminal methodology" out, simply on the basis of it not being "obviously" possible.

In this case, just because an autopilot "mode" does not exist on the B-777, does not mean that it was not "deliberately piloted" in "effectively" the same, or "very similar" way.

I can think of two scenarios, for "deliberate action" by a "live perpetrator", that anyone with even "basic" knowledge could use. The perpetrator does not have to be a B-777 rated pilot. Both are simple, and in keeping with KISS principles.

Scenario One = "Some chosen = Desired, "Magnetic HEADING".
Methodology: = Simply put autopilot in LNAV, and simply adjust the heading select knob every now and again, against the magnetic compass on the windscreen center post. So long as he (or she) regularly adjusts (say at ten or fifteen minute intervals) the heading select knob, to keep the magnetic compass reading what he (or she) wants, their "objective" is achieved.

Scenario Two = "Some chosen = Desired, "CELESTIAL OBJECT".
Methodology: = Simply put autopilot in LNAV, and simply adjust the heading select knob every now and again, to keep the aircraft "HEADING" straight at that chosen "Celestial Object", every ten or fifteen minutes, as above.

In either scenario, "precisely where" the aircraft ends up (in terms of Lat / Lon) may not actually matter to the perpetrator. It may have been both "sufficient" and "necessary" that the final "region" of the crash is only in a "ballpark" area, and NOT at a location that could be "deduced" or "determined" by the official investigation, or US !!

After all, there is a BIG difference between "disappearing", but using a method that could later be "worked out", and thus leading to the eventual 'finding' of the aircraft, and "vanishing", in a way that is "unsolvable", so as to ENSURE that the aircraft is never found.

I go with the later "vanishing" objective, ENSURING, that the aircraft is never found.

My theory is Scenario Two.

My "Celestial Object" of "choice", is "CANOPUS", as I have stated before.
Reply

Malaysia re-elected to the ICAO Council

http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/20...reelected/

Looks like Malaysia has been rewarded for the magnificent job they are doing in 'leading' the MH370 investigation. Perhaps they will receive some training in Annexe 13 while they are visiting Montreal? They need it....

"K" - Good catch GD. WTF are they drinking over there? 
Reply

Canopus is an interesting "Limit Case".

The track below is for no-wind 480 Knots Ground Speed, and represents the most south westerly track possible if "steering by Canopus", determined by the limiting requirement that Canopus must always be on - or above the horizon, to be seen. The minimum elevation is "mid flight", around 21:30 Utc,  as shown in the right most column below.

The terminus is 37 South 69.75 East.

I would be interested to see what Mike Chillit's "drifters" do if starting from that position.

Dropbax - Canopus-1.pdf


[Image: attachment.php?aid=212]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=211]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=213]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=214]

[Image: attachment.php?aid=215]


Reply

For Joe,

Update of the 2,794 Nautical Mile Cruise Range Limit from UPROB for TOD, compared to the end of the "Head for Canopus" Track.

[Image: attachment.php?aid=216]

As you can see, the distance from the center of the DSTG's PDF (based on the "Northern FMT near Ache) to the Range Limit based on my "Southern FMT" near UPROB, is about 630 Nautical Miles, further south west, along the arc.

I think the search should be extended to cover this area, because I am convinced that the "Northern FMT" is WRONG, and my "Southern FMT" is CORRECT.

I think that the DSTG should re-do their calculations from my Southern FMT, and produce a new PDF based on that analysis.

Alas, I can't see the ATSB commissioning / funding that, even though it would be a trivial exercise to just change the necessary inputs to their "already developed" computer models, and just let the thing "run overnight". There should be a new PDF map on the printer when they come in for work in the morning.

Too simple. So, obviously, they will not do it.


.jpg For Joe.jpg Size: 446.27 KB  Downloads: 159
Reply

Is there some serendipity in the air today ?

Dr Neils R. Tas has just published an ADDENDUM to his original paper, available from the link here.
http://www.science4u.org/startpagina.html

In it, he makes two fundamental points.  Points that I have been arguing and "banging heads" over with people for ages.  FINALLY, and thankfully, someone with some "professional standing", has at last acknowledged the significance of these issues.

Point 1
<QUOTE_1 (PAGE_1)>
The main assumption made in [1] as well as in this document are:
‐ The Inmarsat data [2] originates from 9M‐MRO and the satellite communication equipment was operating as normal and known from previous flights, perhaps except for a few short periods just after the log‐on initiations.
‐ It is not certain that the military (primary) radar data relates to 9M‐MRO. Therefore, its use should be avoided in flight path analysis.
<end QUOTE_1>

Point 2
<QUOTE_2 (PAGE_8)>
Section 3: Possible flight paths before 19:41 UTC
By ignoring the radar data, we are currently left with no information on the location of MH370 between 17:22 UTC and 18:25 UTC, and only sparse and limited information from 18:25 UTC onwards based on the satellite communication meta‐data. The range of possible18:25 UTC positions can be limited based on an estimate of the maximum groundspeed (assumed to be 520 knots) and the last known 17:22 UTC position (assumed to be IGARI). A simple calculation shows a northern limit of N10.8 degrees on the 18:25:27 "ping ring" and a southern limit of N1.4 degrees on the same ping ring (10 km altitude).
<end QUOTE_2>

These two fundamental issues have to be acknowledged by the wider "search community", and thrashed out, if we are to ever find MH-370. The "radar" has totally BIASED all thinking to this point.  This BIAS must be removed.

Now, will the ATSB / DSTG finally pull their heads out of the Malaysian "radar quick-sand come quagmire", and do what I asked ages ago, and repeated only 3 hours ago ?

LOOK AT MY SOUTHERN FMT !!

Foley, Please, ,,,,, pretty please.
Reply




Users browsing this thread: 4 Guest(s)