[Peetwo]

Scrambled dots & Angel Flight smokescreens - cont/-

Ref:

Hood – Should, Could and did not. Why?????????

O’Sofullofit; fails, utterly (as usual) by stepping around the glaring, basic issues. Perhaps he should take a slightly broader view, in particular, the complete disregard CASA have continually demonstrated in relation the ‘safety recommendations’ offered by ATSB. It is quite a history and those who are not totally across the subject matter should spend a little time getting familiar. I know P2 is delving deeply into various matters in an attempt to discern why CASA have thrown up a huge smoke screen, using AF as their whipping boy to excuse their past dismissal of ATSB (pre Hood) and Coroner recommendations as suggestions only. Despite O’Sofullofit’ continual, fatuous, repetitive claims to ‘understanding’ , experience and being full bottle on ‘investigations’ I say he needs to STDU and do his homework, rather than keep telling us what a whizz-bang safety guru he is. He ain’t – he’s either a very naughty boy; or, we need to question his ‘motivation’...(sic)...

...The AF debacle is a smoke screen; Essendon was an important event; Ross Air was an important event; the Braz was an important event; the Coal Loader event at Newcastle was an important event; the Virgin / Qantas episode was an important event; the ATR was an important event; the Swan river crash was an important event – must I go on? WTD are we wasting time, money and effort on here; Angel Flight deaths? It’s a total Bollocks. Safety as ‘we’ (the industry) have understood it – operationally – is going to Hell in a hand cart – CASA is driving – Hood is pushing and the Devil is working the whip. Will someone , anyone please put the brakes on this lunacy.

Something in Denmark stinks to the high heavens... 

Referencing pages 3 to 4 and 13 to 15 of the P7 SR document link above:

1) CFIW: East of Cape Hillsborough, QLD, Bell 407, VH-HTD; 17 October 2003. Report - R20050002. Issue date 14 March 2005. http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24411/aair2...82_001.pdf
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/reco...50002.aspx

As a result of the investigation, safety recommendations were issued to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority recommending: a review of the night VFR requirements, an assessment of the benefits of additional flight equipment for helicopters operating under night VFR and a review of the operator classification and/or minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS operations.

ATSB Safety Recommendation. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review it's operators classification and/or it's minimum safety standards required for helicopter Emergency Medical Services operations. This review should consider increasing; (1) the minimum pilot qualifications, experience and recency requirements, (2) operational procedures and (3) minimum equipment for conduct of such operations at night.  

Ref: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/rec...r20030213/

Further correspondence

Date issued: 27 January 2005
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response status: Closed - Not Accepted

Response text:
CASA expressed concern that the report appeared to attribute the cause of the accident to night VFR regulations rather than the shortcomings in recruitment, induction and training.

Moreover, CASA was troubled by the emphasis placed by ATSB on the need for specifying minimum ambient lighting requirements for night VFR operations. Reliance on ambient lighting at night rather than instruments for attitude reference is potentially hazardous due to the high risk of pilot disorientation.

CASA strongly believes that the requirements specified in Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 40.2.2 are adequate for night VFR operations. It is the responsibility of the operators to ensure that pilots meet the requirements specified for rating issue, especially those related to instrument flying. Therefore, CASA does not believe that a review of these requirements is necessary given that Australia already has the most comprehensive night VFR pilot qualification.

---

&..

5) En-route Engine(s) Failure (Fuel starvation): Newman Airport, WA; Cessna 310R, VH- HCP; 26 January 2001.
Safety Recommendations – (1) R20020205,(2) R20020193, (3) R20020194, (4)R20010195. Issue Date: (1)(2)(3) 23 October 2002, (4) 07 September 2001.

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24547/aair2...48_001.pdf
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/reco...20205.aspx http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/reco...20193.aspx http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/reco...10195.aspx

NB. This SR was originally promulgated by the ATSB in response to:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inve...03130.aspx

As a result of the investigation, safety recommendations were issued to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority:

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review the provisions for planning a fixed fuel reserve and determine if this fuel should be contained in the fuel tanks that are to be used during the approach and landing.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review the general operational requirements, training requirements, flight planning requirements and guidance material provided to pilots conducting VFR operations in dark night conditions

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review the required qualifications and/or competencies for chief pilots, with particular reference to management and system safety issues.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority consider proposing an increase in the operations' classification, and/or the minimum safety standards required, for organisations that transport their own employees and similar personnel (for example contractors, personnel from related organisations, or prisoners, but not fare-paying passengers) on a regular basis. This recommendation applies to all such operations, regardless of the take-off weight of the aircraft involved. 

Further correspondence

Date issued: 13 December 2002
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response status: Monitor

Response text:
CASA acknowledges the intent of this Recommendation. As part of the proposed CASR Part 61, CASA is developing the requirements for night VFR ratings which will be based on the existing Civil Aviation Order CAO 40.2.2. In addition, a draft competency standard for night visual flight operations has been developed for inclusion in the proposed CASR Part 61 Manual of Standards. CASA plans to publish a Notice of Proposed Rule Making in relation to this matter in March 2003.

 
"K" said: "..All of which paints a pretty grim picture; we could live with ineptitude; but foisting lies, damn and statistics on a Senate Committee is a chancy strategy. Mind you, stepping around Senate recommendations is considered a relaxation therapy session following the stress of morning tea..."

For instance in regards to the now infamous but shelfwared Senate Inquiry into Aviation Accidents and Investigations, the matter of addressing ATSB SR in a proactive, transparent and timely manner was the subject of recommendations 17 to 21 of the PelAir cover-up report...

Links for PelAir cover-up Senate Inquiry:

• Report
  
  
• Government Response
  

Recommendation 17
9.18      The committee recommends that the ATSB prepare and release publicly a list of all its identified safety issues and the actions which are being taken or have been taken to address them. The ATSB should indicate its progress in monitoring the actions every 6 months and report every 12 months to Parliament.

Recommendation 18
9.40      The committee recommends that where a safety action has not been completed before a report being issued that a recommendation should be made. If it has been completed the report should include details of the action, who was involved and how it was resolved.

Recommendation 19
9.42      The committee recommends that the ATSB review its process to track the implementation of recommendations or safety actions to ensure it is an effective closed loop system. This should be made public, and provided to the Senate Regional and Rural Affairs and Transport Committee prior to each Budget Estimates.

Recommendation 20
9.44      The committee recommends that where the consideration and implementation of an ATSB recommendation may be protracted, the requirement for regular updates (for example 6 monthly) should be included in the TSI Act.

Recommendation 21
9.45      The committee recommends that the government consider setting a time limit for agencies to implement or reject recommendations, beyond which ministerial oversight is required where the agencies concerned must report to the minister why the recommendation has not been implemented or that, with ministerial approval, it has been formally rejected.

The (Coalition) Government response to R21, IMO adequately highlights why it is that Carmody and the Iron Ring cadre feel totally secure in thumbing their noses at any recommendations issued by Govt (Forsyth report), Senate (too numerous to mention) and indeed the ATSB:

    
No further comment required except to draw your attention from (about) this post off the 'Closing the safety loop' thread: Beyond Reason - & the pale?? 

&/or this Google image search link: see HERE.

Senator FAWCETT: Mr Mrdak, as secretary of the relevant department, how would you propose to engage with the coroners to make sure that we, as a nation, close this loophole to make our air environment safer?
Mr Mrdak : I think Mr Dolan has indicated the relationship with coroners is on a much better footing than it has been ever before. I think the work of the ATSB has led that. I think it then becomes a matter of addressing the relationship between the safety regulators and security regulators, as necessary, with the coroners. It is probably one I would take on notice and give a bit of thought to, if you do not mind.
Senator FAWCETT: You do not accept that your department and you, as secretary, have a duty of care and an oversight to make sure that two agencies who work for you do actually complement their activities for the outcome that benefits the aviation community?
Mr Mrdak : We certainly do ensure that agencies are working together. That is certainly occurring. You have asked me the more detailed question about coroners and relationships with the agencies. I will have a bit of a think about that, if that is okay.
Senator FAWCETT: Thank you.

MTF...P2