By the book:
Followed by bell, candle and requiem.
“In June 2017, CASA published TMI – etc.
“4 km west of Renmark Airport, South Australia on 30 May 2017.”
Perhaps the Ross Air fatal crash was not inevitable; but as a sporting man, you'd have to place it at short odds. Much now depends on how wide the scope of the Coroners inquest reaches and how deep the investigation is allowed to go. On the surface, supported by the ATSB report and backed by CASA – it seems pretty well cut and dried. But is it?
When you strip all the words back to basics, you are left with some fundamental flaws, which I believe must be addressed. In primus the flight was scheduled to test the ability of one pilot to asses the competency of another. This exercise to be conducted under the CASA approved system for the checking and training of pilots. Part of this was assessment of the pilot flying to manage emergency procedures, such as an engine failure.
What is a check pilot looking for during this exercise? The first and probably the most important is 'control' – the aircraft is bound, by nature and design, to behave in a certain, predictable manner. The corrections are well known and, essentially the same for all multi engine aircraft. Next comes 'recognition' - what's gone wrong and what's to to be done. For this there are 'drills' which a pilot must know and execute from memory. What to do next? Once again we meet 'routine' behaviour; for most situations there is a basic 'escape' plan which must be executed. So, engine fails after take off; control, execute drill, and follow escape path, gain a safe height and decide what to do next. The candidate manages all of this, check pilot signs off and its all over for a while. Straight forward, routine day at the office. Provided it is all done by the book. But was the Ross-Air event done strictly 'by the book'?
It depends on which book you read. Certainly the check flight was not conducted by the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM), which legally supports a much higher minimum height for the exercise. At the end of every argument, if the AFM states X and you do Y then the operation is technically illegal. The flight was operated outside of the Ross Air, CASA approved system, which mandated a height lower than the AFM required but much higher than that at which the event occurred at. To prove what?
There are several, safe scenario which can be used to establish that the pilot under check can perform the required drills. There is no need, in this class of aircraft (FAR 23) for a demonstration of an engine out continued take off. Once that notion is dismissed , it becomes a matter of executing the drill at a safe height at a safe speed.
I couldn't begin to count the number of EFATO and OEI drills done on a daily basis across the country – but it is a substantial number. All quite safely managed by junior pilots, in low performance aircraft obtaining their first multi engine rating. Countless pilots routinely demonstrating their ability to manage both airframe and drill during simulated failures, under instrument conditions. It is part and parcel of everyday flight operations. Provided the flight manual 'script' and basic safety precautions are followed there is only a slightly elevated risk, for a very short period of time.
The Ross Air – CASA approved – manual stated a height which was considered 'safe' for the demonstration of the EFATO drill. The aim to establish that at a critical speed and configuration the pilot could manage the aircraft with defined parameters.
So why was the exercise conducted outside of both the AFM and CASA approved systems?
And why did CASA feel the need to draft the TMI?
I'm with P2 on this one – too many parallels with Pel-Air; too many cosy chats and far too many outside influences being brought to bear. The “Make it Happen” philosophy espoused and force fed certainly did it's job. Aye, it happened all right...........
Toot – toot.
Followed by bell, candle and requiem.
“In June 2017, CASA published TMI – etc.
“4 km west of Renmark Airport, South Australia on 30 May 2017.”
Perhaps the Ross Air fatal crash was not inevitable; but as a sporting man, you'd have to place it at short odds. Much now depends on how wide the scope of the Coroners inquest reaches and how deep the investigation is allowed to go. On the surface, supported by the ATSB report and backed by CASA – it seems pretty well cut and dried. But is it?
When you strip all the words back to basics, you are left with some fundamental flaws, which I believe must be addressed. In primus the flight was scheduled to test the ability of one pilot to asses the competency of another. This exercise to be conducted under the CASA approved system for the checking and training of pilots. Part of this was assessment of the pilot flying to manage emergency procedures, such as an engine failure.
What is a check pilot looking for during this exercise? The first and probably the most important is 'control' – the aircraft is bound, by nature and design, to behave in a certain, predictable manner. The corrections are well known and, essentially the same for all multi engine aircraft. Next comes 'recognition' - what's gone wrong and what's to to be done. For this there are 'drills' which a pilot must know and execute from memory. What to do next? Once again we meet 'routine' behaviour; for most situations there is a basic 'escape' plan which must be executed. So, engine fails after take off; control, execute drill, and follow escape path, gain a safe height and decide what to do next. The candidate manages all of this, check pilot signs off and its all over for a while. Straight forward, routine day at the office. Provided it is all done by the book. But was the Ross-Air event done strictly 'by the book'?
It depends on which book you read. Certainly the check flight was not conducted by the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM), which legally supports a much higher minimum height for the exercise. At the end of every argument, if the AFM states X and you do Y then the operation is technically illegal. The flight was operated outside of the Ross Air, CASA approved system, which mandated a height lower than the AFM required but much higher than that at which the event occurred at. To prove what?
There are several, safe scenario which can be used to establish that the pilot under check can perform the required drills. There is no need, in this class of aircraft (FAR 23) for a demonstration of an engine out continued take off. Once that notion is dismissed , it becomes a matter of executing the drill at a safe height at a safe speed.
I couldn't begin to count the number of EFATO and OEI drills done on a daily basis across the country – but it is a substantial number. All quite safely managed by junior pilots, in low performance aircraft obtaining their first multi engine rating. Countless pilots routinely demonstrating their ability to manage both airframe and drill during simulated failures, under instrument conditions. It is part and parcel of everyday flight operations. Provided the flight manual 'script' and basic safety precautions are followed there is only a slightly elevated risk, for a very short period of time.
The Ross Air – CASA approved – manual stated a height which was considered 'safe' for the demonstration of the EFATO drill. The aim to establish that at a critical speed and configuration the pilot could manage the aircraft with defined parameters.
So why was the exercise conducted outside of both the AFM and CASA approved systems?
And why did CASA feel the need to draft the TMI?
I'm with P2 on this one – too many parallels with Pel-Air; too many cosy chats and far too many outside influences being brought to bear. The “Make it Happen” philosophy espoused and force fed certainly did it's job. Aye, it happened all right...........
Toot – toot.