[Peetwo]

Unintentional but "K" had some finger trouble and with regret deleted my post off this thread. However beside the UP content my post is reinstated for posterity & discussion on yet another of the myriad of dots & dashes related to the PelAir cover-up scandal, to which I believe one I-ron-Bar is up to his eyeballs in...    

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My turn to raid the UP all boring till I came across the UITA initiated thread - Lockhart River.........10 years on . Despite the honourable intent of starting the thread on the 10th anniversary of the Lockhart River tragedy, I fear that due to a resident parasite troll that the thread will very shortly be closed - why? Well for the record see here...  : 

I-ron-Bar(tsch)

FFS not again. Attention all new generation pilots (neglectfully failing to reply) take heed! This is NOT the way to manage your multi crew aeroplane, or the way to fly an instrument approach. 

Serious doubts about the event? Here's your problem;

From the ATSB report. 

Contributing factors relating to the event and individual actions. 

• The crew commenced the Lockhart River Runway 12 RNAV (GNSS) approach, even though the crew were aware that the copilot did not have the appropriate endorsement and had limited experience to conduct this type of instrument approach.

• The descent speeds, approach speeds and rate of descent were greater than those specified for the aircraft in the Transair Operations Manual. The speeds and rate of descent also exceeded those appropriate for establishing a stabilised approach.

• During the approach, the aircraft descended below the segment minimum safe altitude for the aircraft’s position on the approach.

• The aircraft’s high rate of descent, and the descent below the segment minimum safe altitude, were not detected and/or corrected by the crew before the aircraft collided with terrain.

• The accident was almost certainly the result of controlled flight into terrain.
3.2.2 Contributing factors relating to local conditions

• The crew probably experienced a very high workload during the approach.

• The crew probably lost situational awareness about the aircraft’s position
along the approach.

• The pilot in command had a previous history of conducting RNAV (GNSS) approaches with crew without appropriate endorsements, and operating the aircraft at speeds higher than those specified in the Transair Operations Manual.

Desperately sad for all involved. So why not just leave it rest.

 
UITA

The whole story please 

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Maybe a quote from the Coroners report is worthwhile, which doesn't seem to match your take*ronbar**:

.........associated with applications by air operators to vary their AOC to add new routes. Such applications required CASA field officers to apply the guidelines and provisions of a particular manual of air operator’s certification. In the case of Transair this involved considering the operator’s request, in 2001, to add Bamaga as its first mainland Australia regular public transport route (from Cairns), and subsequently in 2004 to seek the addition of Lockhart River.

In neither case did CASA require the operator to conduct a comprehensive or structured risk assessment of the proposed change. In particular, no such assessment was required in relation to Transair’s operating procedures, pilot experience or level of training, the rostering practices of Transair in relation to pilots who would be flying the routes involved and the pilot resources available to Transair. 

In short, it was not part of CASA’s processes to require Transair to undertake a formal risk assessment or make out a safety case for the inclusion of Lockhart River as a new port although it did require Transair to revise performance charts.

I find that senior CASA management failed to provide sufficient guidance to its staff to enable them to fully and effectively evaluate risk management issues associated with Transair’s application to add Lockhart River to its air operator’s certificate as an interim port on the Cairns – Bamaga route. That guidance may have been as straight forward as requiring Transair to engage an independent specialist to conduct an assessment of, and provide a report on, all safety issues that were pertinent to the operation proposed.

It is also strange that two sources of relevant information were apparently not accessed by the regulator. 

I refer to the newspaper articles indicating that an operator who did not have an appropriate AOC[Aerotropics(sic)] was about to commence an RPT passenger service into Bamaga and later, Lockhart River. I would have thought an agency as large and well funded as CASA would subscribe to a clipping service that would bring such information to its attention for routine checking. 

Similarly, it is of concern if CASA did not access the inquest findings and transcript in relation to the death of the pilot Mr Short. [Died at TI in January 2002 (sic)]

Had it done so I would have expected that the evidence given in those proceedings by Mr Hotchin might have caused it to raise a query with Transair about aspects of his flying.

I-ron-Bar(tsch)

Maybe a quote from the Trans-Air Ops Manual, CAR, CAO or AIP would be more worthwhile.

My "take" does not include any comment about CASA. If you choose to operate an aeroplane in a reckless and negligent manner it will end badly. Regardless of any amount of CASA supervision.

Get over it numbskull, there is no good to be achieved here.

Frank Arouet.. 

Why would anybody possibly want to quash further comment on this matter?

Why would this tragedy not be a worthwhile example for future pilots and operators to learn from the experiences of others and;

Why would anybody except someone with a vested interest take such a stance. Except of course unless he were a lawyer or a government stooge placed on a committee or board or a tribunal who had an interest in the matter just disappearing?

Why call someone a numbskull and tell him or her to get over it? 

Why?

No good can be achieved here... phooey!

I-ron-Bar(tsch)

Apart form embarrassing dickheads like you, the investigation of this matter has disappeared and no further comment is necessary. 

Why don't you concentrate on chemtrails instead. 

Please lock the thread.

Frank Arouet

Oh! my goodness. Dickheads, numbskulls, chemtrails, and tin hats no doubt.

Did somebody hit a nerve? Perhaps the AAT should be asked to investigate and rule on the matter. Or maybe the Regionals can whip the hat around and give a donation to the "Laborials' to hush it all up?

I'm guessing business is crook in the shyster profession and you are off your medication. I'll make a point in sticking the pin in my AAT doll to help annoy you.

I'll ask again for sensible comment, (not you mate), Why would anybody possibly want to quash further comment on this matter? and now ask for the thread to be shut down. 

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Last edited by Frank Arouet; 2nd May 2015 at 07:42. Reason: Shyster got mixed up with another word. Sorry.

Oh well done Frank.. 

MTF...P2 

Also for the record here is a couple of links of interest - http://www.avlaw.com.au/team.php

  "...has wide ranging senior management and operational experience in the aviation industry, occupying positions as Head of Safety and Regulatory Compliance at Qantas Airways Limited and Manager of Air Transport Operations with the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)..."   

& "...Manager Airline Operations

Civil Aviation Safety Authority

March 1996 – June 2007 (11 years 4 months)Sydney Area, Australia

Regulatory and safety oversight of all airline AOCs and MROs based in Sydney including Qantas Airways, Regional Express, QantasLink..."     

Finally a list of suspects specialists for the ID line up..  

http://www.avlaw.com.au/AvLaw_Specialist.pdf

MTF...you bet! - P2