[Peetwo]

ToARE: Part IV 

(Lead into: Timeline of miniscule corruption...err duplicity??   )

Reference posts:

There are posts which are worthy of cribbing – then, there are posts which, in a nutshell, say all that needs to be said. Lead Sled, at cobbed throttle; spot on:-

Sunfish. This is one time I am going to have to disagree with you, and I am speaking from the point of view of "being there". As "on the spot", "in the room" (or wherever we were), often with the only notes taken by the Minister and/or me, or a colleague with me.

Both Sharp and Vaile set things up so the real decisions were made without the "benefit" of set-piece formal meeting with "industry", the basic program was set before the end 1996 elections. Look up "Soaring into Tomorrow.

Interestingly, John Anderson followed the same pattern, with a "big bang" shakeup of CASA planned, but he got blown out of the water by OPM&C politics, John Howard got cold feet, even though Kim Beazley supported the plan, he had no time for CASA either, based on his Ministerial experiences.

I have a far better opinion of Anderson as a Minister than most, because I know what he wanted to do would have sorted the CASA KULTCHA once and for all --- essentially a "scorched earth" and start again approach.

Interestingly Martin Ferguson, and principal and aviation advisors agreed, that the problems in CASA were so intractable and so entrenched, that anything less drastic would fail. How do I know, because I discussed the matter at length with them.

And look where we are, all these years later!!

Tootle pip!

John Sharp is running rings around ‘the system’ – could not beat it, so now he exploits it. Lessons learnt; well done that man.

A matter of some interest.

“The Australian understands another scheduled flight training session at Soar was cancelled because of unsuitable weather conditions.”

The average student has not got a blind clue about what the current ‘weather’ conditions mean. Traditionally, it has always been up to the student’s mentor to decide if Bloggs should or should not be let loose in the prevailing conditions. For example; the ‘hate-sheet’ reflects more practice at cross-wind landings – before solo operations. "Sorry mate, too much wind today" end of....Commercial considerations never, not ever, entered into that decision.

"At the time of the crash, just before 10am on Thursday the winds were between 10 and 12 knots, with a 12 knot crosswind."

10 to 15 knots across a runway ain’t a problem – for an ‘experienced’ student. Not one who has had the X-wind landing box ticked – but one who can actually manage such a thing. It ain’t difficult – but it requires training and practice. The decision to send a fellahin out in a gusty X-wind is subjective, based on the instructors assessment of progress – not a bloody box ticked; but competency – tested, proven and documented…..


Another crash involving a Soar student pilot and training instructor remains under investigation by the ATSB.

It is of concern that a first class operator like Buckley is fighting for survival after attempting to bring in a system which would not have allowed the injured child out alone in a breeze he could not handle. Yet this ‘Soar’ thing, using airspeed, weight and CoG ‘critical’ aircraft to mass produce ‘legally’ qualified (tick a box) pilots is allowed to continue? WTD?

CASA, part 61 and Part 141/2 have a lot to answer for; before the operator gets to answer some fairly prickly questions. It seems to me that the aircraft being used, whist ‘cheap’ are intolerant of the fumbles new pilots make – does a speed, weight and centre of gravity critical aircraft really suit a training environment; despite a CASA ‘tick’? I think not. Great for the weekend warrior – but as a suitable platform for training? Seems there are some deeper questions which demand answers here.

Toot - hate AP night shift – toot.  {P7 has matters ‘Christmas’ related to attend}. Hurrumph!

Have been tasked by AP to dredge through the cyber dustbins to pull together the many related dots and dashes that are starting to form a disturbing picture of miniscule favouritism &/or duplicity in aviation safety administration...

However before I start digging, I refer to this recent P7 post     
 

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Of Priests, lawyers and suchlike.


> I know – I know; there is a call to do away with the lot of ‘em. But just about now, I’m wishing I was one – they have indemnity when a crime is confessed – I don’t. I have however just completed a list, a fairly long one, detailing ‘information’ gathered related to SOAR. No bloody evidence, just a lot of hearsay without tangible proof. That said, smoke usually indicates fire.

The problem is a complex one: for those who have information to offer – in one way or another; no matter how the ‘breach’ came about, in many cases the informants signature is on the paperwork – making them complicit, in law.

I guess it is a perennial problem for the law enforcement agencies. I have no knowledge of how it works in practice, but I understand that in some cases an amount of relief is available. IMO the SOAR case demands ‘indemnity’ in some cases, to facilitate a clear view of ‘what’ was going on.

For example: I have listened to two pilots who admit that their signature was ‘forged’ onto approval paperwork and said nothing. Three admit to accepting supervisory roles without having met the mandatory requirements, accepted the role, signed the paperwork and went ahead in the role.

I have no names, no documented evidence or even a blind clue to the veracity of these claims. Sure, they were ‘confessions’ (to which I cannot grant absolution). Under the existing regime, ‘true confessions' are unlikely to be offered, considering the ‘criminal record’ element. However; for the greater good and operational integrity going forward; I believe that an ‘indemnity’ and anonymous (in camera) reporting would be of great benefit.

I will leave it there – not my puzzle nor responsibility. There are some good kids out there who deserve a break and a stern warning. The information they could provide, given opportunity without dire penalty – would greatly improve the integrity of flight training in Australia. Only my opinion of course; but, young, ambitious, cost conscious people have no real knowledge of just how evil some folk in this world can be. They are easily lead and if the deviance becomes normalised, through group acceptance that this is the ‘way things are done’ – when one of ‘em dies through flawed, faulty, fraudulent training – who carries the can (or coffin)?

The current system has created this environment – time to look deep and clear.

That’s it – I’ll have the BRB working on it – maybe even draft a submission – for what that’ll be worth. Ale, lots of please, much to consider when keeping a government honest.

DiD I just say ‘honest? Oh dear!

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Although still hearsay (at this point in time -  ) this modus operandi IMO is a standard 'tell' for a dodgy operator.  It should also be recognised that the warning signs (for a dangerous and dodgy operator) not being heeded by the oversighting regulator are also historically SOP normalised deficiencies...

Related to the ToARE (above post) and in light of the very sad 15 year anniversary of the Lockhart River disaster coming up this year, the following is a archived Fairfax article posted 2 weeks after the tragedy:

...Transport Minister John Anderson has opened the way for two pilots to give off-the-record statements to safety investigators looking into the Cape York plane disaster.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is investigating the crash of the Trans Air Fairchild Metroliner III commuter aircraft on May 7.

All 15 people died when it crashed into a hillside on approach to Lockhart River in far north Queensland.

The ATSB yesterday urged two former pilots understood to have information about alleged safety breeches by the airline to give formal statements about their claims.

The former pilots are only prepared to give off-the-record statements to the ATSB, which are virtually useless to investigators.

The former pilots apparently have no faith in the industry regulator, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), but the ATSB has offered to act as a mediator.

Mr Anderson today said he would ask the ATSB to review whether they could accept the pilot's statements off the record and pleaded with them to come forward.

"I don't know why they're reluctant," Mr Anderson told the Nine Network.

"I understand that it centres on concerns about their relationship with CASA and that's why I say, if they have that concern, then I plead with them to come forward and talk to the ATSB itself.

"If they really don't want to put it in writing then I'll ask the ATSB to again consider that," he said.

"It's a no-fault accident investigator. That's what it's there for.

"And in the interests of maximising the safety of the travelling public, if there's something of value that somebody has to contribute, we really do want that information."

CASA said yesterday it could treat the information from the pilots confidentially.

The twin-engined plane crashed while trying to land in rain, low clouds and strong wind on a stopover at Lockhart River on a flight from Bamaga near the tip of Cape York Peninsula to Cairns.

It was the worst civil aircraft accident in Australia since 26 people died in a crash near Port Hedland in Western Australia in 1968...

Now we reference the Durkin thesis (from page 138):

The ATSB report indicated that evidence strongly suggested that Captain
Hotchin was the handling pilot for the fateful flight from Bamaga to Lockhart
River. This would be consistent with the company policy for the Captain and
first Officer flying sector about, and the First Officer had flown the preceding
sector into Bamaga. As the cockpit voice recorder was inoperative during the
flight a certain amount of supposition was engaged in to try to determine why
the pilot in command had flown the aircraft into the ground. Expert witnesses
were examined, including those who were familiar with the 'modus operandi'
of Captain Hotchin from having flown with him in the past. The coroner came
to the conclusion that Captain Hochin, at some stage during the approach,
decided he could 'eyeball' his way through the cloud and become visual, as he
had previously described doing whilst giving evidence in a 2002 inquest.

… and so you look for a break in between the – the clouds so you can see a very white
light coming through the darkness of the clouds, so you aim for that point and you go
aiming for that point and then all of a sudden you notice that you‟re enclosed by two
cells on either side, but the only thing you can do once you‟ve made that decision is
keep going straight ahead because you know that at some stage before hand you saw
light beyond there.107

On evidence presented to him by other Transair pilots who had operated as copilots
with Captain Hotchin, the coroner concluded that Captain Hotchin was
at times inclined to engage in 'a dangerous departure from appropriate
approach procedures'.108

The coroner was critical of CASA's regulatory oversight of Transair. He
considered that the extent of CASA's assessment of Transair was well
documented, however it highlighted a number of inconsistencies between its
oversight of the company and its regulatory policies and surveillance
guidelines. He considered that CASA should have been in a position to know
that all was not well with the company Transair. It overlooked two pieces of
information that were in the public domain. The first piece of information
relating to newspaper articles had apparently been published locally,
indicating that there was an operator in the area who did not have an
appropriate Air Operating Certificate who was about to commence a Regular
Public Transport into Bamaga and later Lockhart River. The second piece of
information was the fact that CASA did not access the inquest and findings of
the transcript, into the death of the pilot of the aircraft that crashed on
Thursday Island in 2002. 'Had it done so I would have expected that the
evidence given in those proceedings by Mr Hotchin might have caused it to
raise a query with Transair about aspects of his flying'.109 The coroner
highlighted a number of deficiencies he considered relevant in CASA's
surveillance and audit of Transair, as well as drawing attention, on a number
of scores, to CASA's departure from its own procedures.110

Similarly the ATSB was quite critical of the role played by CASA as far as
safety oversight was concerned.

Given the significance of the problems within Transair, and the amount of interaction
CASA had with the operator, it is reasonable to conclude that some of these problems
should have been detected by CASA.111

Chapter six of this thesis will endeavour to look more closely at these
criticisms.

One interesting outcome that eventuated from this inquest, was that the
coroner was concerned enough about the friction in the relationship he
observed during this and several earlier coronial inquests between CASA and
the ATSB, that he wrote to the then Minister for Transport and Regional
Services, the Hon Mark Vaile, on 12 September 2007 recommending that the
Minister undertake a review to assess whether high level intervention was
required to ensure 'that there is a productive, collaborative focus on air safety
between the ATSB and CASA'.112 The Minister subsequently commissioned a
review, which was far reaching and comprehensive considering it had a very
limited time frame for completion. It involved examining the relationship
between the ATSB and CASA to identify the likely causes of friction between
them, including friction evident in the Lockhart River Inquest. It also focused
on positive recommendations designed to remove unnecessary impediments
legislative and organisational, to both agencies working together in the
interests of aviation safety.113

As they say the rest is now ancient history and supposedly the CASA oversighting systems (surveillance, audit etc.) and the ATSB/SSP early identification with proactive mitigation of safety deficiencies in the system have been thoroughly addressed. However I would suggest the overwhelming evidence, since the Lockhart River disaster (reference PelAir vs Airtex, APTA vs Soar..etc..etc), is that the system has gotten worse with the added topcover complicity of both the ATSB and a totally captured, duplicitous Minister...

Much MTF...P2