[Peetwo]

Senate Inquiry: Airport & aviation security - What's the delay?

From Jamie Freed AFR article - Australian government should put domestic airport security in its sights:

In December 2014, a Senate inquiry into airport and aviation security was started to help determine if further measures were needed to enhance airport security and the safety of the travelling public, after a report by Seven Network found there had been 282 security breaches at Australian airports between January 2012 and April 2014. However, the initial reporting date for the inquiry of April 2015 has been postponed several times and is scheduled now for May 19, more than a year after submissions and testimony were given.

In the fast-moving world of aviation security, much of the information presented to the inquiry is now dated. But, notably, an Australian Federal Police submission did raise concerns that although it is an offence to use a false identity on a domestic flight, police have no authority to demand identification until after the event or unless another offence is being committed...

...If Australia wants to close gaps in its domestic airport security it is important the report by the inquiry examining such issues does not continue to be postponed.

I must admit to switching off somewhat with this inquiry, because it seemed to be missing the point that the whole aviation security system needed to be audited from the top down. It is a basket case and achieves very little in effective aviation security while placing significant impost on industry where it can least afford it and where it is quite obviously overkill.

However there is no excuse for this inquiry (with one public hearing February 2015) to have its reporting date deferred for over a year, the original reporting was supposed to be 26 April 2015...

Airport and aviation security


On 4 December 2014, the Senate moved that the following matters be referred to the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee for inquiry and report by 26 April 2015.

Airport and aviation security.

Submissions should be received by 16 January 2015. The reporting date is 26 April 2015. On 26 March 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 21 May 2015. On 14 May 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 12 August 2015. On 12 August 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 9 September 2015. On 9 September 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 2 December 2015. On 12 November 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 19 May 2016.

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Committee Secretariat contact:
Committee Secretary
Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport
PO Box 6100
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

Phone: +61 2 6277 3511
Fax: +61 2 6277 5811
rrat.sen@aph.gov.au

I would suggest that this inquiry for whatever reason has placed the Department, the Minister & the Committee in somewhat of a dilemma - I wonder why?

While in this inquiry I confess to having missed some excellent evidence given at the one and only public hearing from the RAAA, so in an effort to redeem myself (& maybe provide a clue to where the dilemma may lie), here is most of the Hansard from the RAAA session:

EAVES, Mr Stuart, General Manager Safety, Security and Quality Assurance, Regional Aviation Association of Australia TYRRELL, Mr Paul, Chief Executive Officer, Regional Aviation Association of Australia

[11:19]

...CHAIR: I invite you to make a brief opening statement.

Mr Tyrrell : Thank you. It will be brief. The RAAA and it members support a robust risk based, cost-efficient security environment. We do not have any problems on that front. We would like to see—and the committee has discussed this—benchmarking with other countries just to make sure that we are not out on a limb. As you are probably aware, regional aviation, while it has a high turnover, has fairly slim profit margins. We are somewhat 'customers' of the security environment and so we try to keep things as cost efficient as possible while, at the same time, keeping our passengers safe. The last comment is more an economic one. In the last two years, we have lost four longstanding regional airlines. I am not blaming security but I am just pointing out the environment we live in.

CHAIR: You are have financial pressures. That is what we are talking about?

Mr Tyrrell : Yes. That is correct.

CHAIR: It is not as though they have won Lotto and just taken off for the Whitsundays.

Mr Tyrrell : Not at all, Senator.

CHAIR: In your opening statement you said that you would like to see Australia benchmarking with other countries.

Mr Tyrrell : Yes.

CHAIR: As a bit of a preamble, I have had the pleasure of visiting New Guinea, where I was not allowed on a domestic flight from Mount Hagen to Port Moresby because my suitcase was a little bit big, but I was allowed to take the stone axe that I was given and the arrows that I had bought to support the local economy. But in America they make you take off your thongs. I like to travel with thongs because I don't know what I might smuggle in in a half-inch piece of rubber! Anyway, that is fine. We have heard about New York and how tight security is there. I am not going to belittle the argument, but I really dread flying domestic around America because they are really, really stringent. What countries do you reckon we should benchmark against and in what areas?

Mr Tyrrell : It is more a general point. I take the personal things you have experienced, Senator. You mentioned the USA and the UK. These are large complex industry environments, with complex security arrangements. My argument is that we should not try and exceed these areas. If we can learn from them, great. If we can benchmark against them, that is terrific, as long as we do not come up with peculiar or particular arrangements, unless they are necessary. There may be Australian situations that call for it. I am saying: in general, are we benchmarking and do our arrangements have consistency with the rest of the world? Maybe it is a question for OTS rather than this committee.

CHAIR: Sure. That is fine. I now take what you are saying. It was said earlier that security can be a show. It can be put out there where it looks like a lot of things are being done and maybe the perception could be a little different. You just mentioned that four regional airlines have gone belly up. I should not use that terminology, should I? Unfortunately, they have shut their doors because of cost imposts. So it is not just a case of a reaction of: 'Crikey, let's tighten it all and let's follow what America does.' That is where you are coming from.

Mr Tyrrell : That is true. I have written about this a little bit. Perceptions are sometimes reality in security. From our side of the fence, we feel that maybe in the past security has gone up with alacrity; it is very quick to go up. People get very busy. As customers of those security guidelines, we have to respond. But if the security environment changes, like it diminishes, our perception is that maybe it is glacial in bringing some of the arrangements down. It is more perception rather than science. I just share that with you.

CHAIR: I will put you in the spotlight. If you cannot or do not want to answer, I fully understand. Where do you think the excesses in the security regime are in our regional airports?

Mr Tyrrell : 'Excess' is an interesting word. Maybe where we would have a debate—

CHAIR: I am talking about costs. If sense—God help us using that word between government departments!—were to prevail and it were not just a case of rushing out there and saying, 'Let's do this because it looks good'. If we were actually consulting with stakeholders and benchmarking and bringing in the experts, and not those that can see a quick quid if they get called in to write a new program, could you give us some examples of where, lately, it has just been financial overkill?

Mr Tyrrell : I will probably get my colleague to help here, too. There are two I would probably mention. One is at the minor end, where you have commercial operations and private operations on an airfield—say at Wagga. You all have to have an ASIC card if you are commercial or private. Also, some of the smaller GA people have to have an ASIC.
This is a cost to them. They live in a different part of the airfield and they have to pay for an ASIC. They have to have certain arrangements in place. Maybe in those instances we could allow the bigger commercial operations to have the full security environment and the smaller operators—the private and commercial—a lesser security environment. I am sure OTS have some ideas on the details of that. That is an opening point.

The second has been going for years. Checked-bag screening and passenger screening, some years ago, was lowered from a maximum takeoff weight of 30,000 kilo aircraft to 20,000 kilo aircraft. It was brought in fairly quickly and was based, apparently, on scientific research. We pressed and pressed to try to get an explanation of what this science was, because they are quite different aircraft—as you would appreciate—from 30,000 kilos to 20,000 kilos. So, by lowering the maximum takeoff weight you captured smaller aircraft. There was a hike—economies of scale—and the costs went up. All we were simply asking was: what were the major threats that caused the policy change? That was never explained to us.

CHAIR: I know you said that you wanted to go to Mr Eaves to help out too, but just on this: who made that decision?

Mr Tyrrell : I believe it was OTS at the time—the people running OTS some years ago.

CHAIR: Sure. I thought that could be the answer, but I just wanted to test it. Did the industry—you guys and other stakeholders—actually have the opportunity to comment? I know you said that you asked but you did not receive. Do they ever come to you and say, 'Look guys, what do you reckon? You're the ones that do it. This is what we've got; here's the scientific research.' Or is it just typical: 'Bang! This is what you cop'?

Mr Tyrrell : We had four meetings on this. What was explained to us was that this was research done, I believe, by RMIT. I might be corrected there. We asked to see the research. Some of it was classified; we understand that. We were given a summary in a briefing. There were holes in the argument and they just basically said, 'There's the research, there's the change. Live with it.' That was, kind of, where it went.

CHAIR: That is a common trend, no matter what area of expertise we all work in. Mr Eaves, did you want to add something?

Mr Eaves : As Paul just discussed, as an airline, we are the end user of the security product. Obviously, the intelligence and OTS mandate the requirements and provide the intelligence that the airports—as was discussed earlier—are doing the security screening for. Ultimately, the airline is the last line of defence. So we really are relying on OTS.

CHAIR: Okay; sure. This is the cracker question—here we go! If these imposts of security are placed on you as the end user, do you have the ability to flow that on to the airlines so that it is the travelling public that pays? Is it that simple?

Mr Tyrrell : That is correct. It is that simple. I am not saying that they pass on every cent. As you know, we are very sensitive to price. The airline might have to wear a little bit. For regionals it just hurts them a bit more.

CHAIR: You said there were four regional airlines. Could any regional airports that you know of seriously get to the stage where they ask whether it is worth opening if any more of these imposts come upon you, without the opportunity to have the input and to check the scientific research?

Mr Tyrrell : It sounds a simple question but it is actually quite complex. We are particularly worried about barriers to entry. You asked a question about current airlines. Regionals, as always, are the canary in the cage in terms of the economics. We are really concerned. We want new players to come into the environment.

CHAIR: Sure.

Mr Tyrrell : I have to say it would probably be quite frightening for someone to have a crack now, with the current security environment. I am not saying that they would not—

CHAIR: You mean an airline?

Mr Tyrrell : Yes, that is what I am talking about...

..Senator BACK: Sure. I also support that, and I want to come to that question. Obviously we are always measuring risk against opportunity and risk against benefit. Am I being unduly optimistic when I think about airports like Mt Gambier in South Australia, our own Esperance, Albany, Geraldton and Kalgoorlie even? Is there a risk commensurate with the cost now? Everyone knows each other. The likelihood of somebody wanting to create a maleficence is not high and the number of people on these aircraft is so small when we think about the risk if something did happen out of Geraldton or out of Esperance or Albany. I can accept in major metropolitan airports all of the risks. I can accept even the notion that a suitcase might start out at Wagga and end up in Sydney on its way to Los Angeles. But this does create regional employment. You go through a scanning in Esperance airport and you count eight, 10 or 12 people where previously there were not eight, 10 or 12 people carrying out this role. Are we over the top? Indeed, if it is driving regional airlines out of existence or from servicing these small regional airports, where is the benefit to the community? Is there a more pessimistic and realistic view I am not seeing?

Mr Tyrrell : Are you referring to your concern about security being raised at certain airports?

Senator BACK: Yes, I am. I am concerned that we have gone over the top.

Mr Tyrrell : I would just reflect again on that change from 30,000 to 20,000—which, as you say, creates employment, because we have to check the bags and we have to check the passengers. That is a significant cost. The Regional Aviation Association has not been able to determine from government sources what the level of risk was and what benefit we have gained. Unfortunately, I am answering you question with a question, because I do not have the answer.

Senator BACK: Before I go to Mr Eaves: the reality is that at a city airport, as we know, you have flights coming in all the time, so the percentage of time that these people are actually surveying passengers or luggage is high. At the Esperance airport, where Skywest or Virgin fly in twice a day at the maximum and the airport is 25 or 30 kilometres out of town, the time and cost taken for those people to turn up to oversight those passengers and then go back seems to me to be an absolute overkill.

Mr Tyrrell : I will let Stuart speak of course, but in general we feel there has been some overkill on the point that I raised. Again, we are the end users here. We are not open to the intelligence that is given to the government. They get intelligence and they develop their security measures. The trouble is, we are only part of that conversation.

Senator BACK: Sure.

Mr Tyrrell : It is just our observation that in certain instances it has gone too far.

Mr Eaves : All I can add is that if we are talking about decreasing that limit from 20,000 to other aircraft, for the requirement to do mandatory airport screening, using the scenario of the airline that I work for—they operate Metroliner III and 23 aircraft, 19-passenger configuration—if you were to introduce screening for that type of aircraft, you would capture the items that you ideally would not want on an aircraft; however, going that next step, there is not actually a flight deck door on an aircraft of that size. The regulatory requirements in Australia are for a reinforced cockpit door on an aircraft of 30 passenger seats or above. So if someone had sinister intentions and wanted to take over control of an aircraft security screening would not stop that, because someone could quite simply overpower a pilot to achieve that objective.

CHAIR: Senator Xenophon?

Senator XENOPHON: Thank you for your evidence. Essentially, you are saying that the trigger, or the maximum take-off weight, should go back from 20,000 to 30,000—from 20 to 30 tonnes.

Mr Tyrrell : We are asking, 'Why not?'

Senator XENOPHON: We have a situation now that if it is presumably, say, a Saab, that would be under 30,000?

Mr Tyrrell : Yes, it is. It is under 20,000.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay. It might be a Dash8. You will have different aircraft with different security screening requirements.

Mr Tyrrell : Given that you are drilling into this particular issue, the 20,000 actually splits a fuselage grouping. If it does not bore the committee: the Dash300s were just under 20,000, operated by Qantas, and the Fokker50 was just over 20,000, operated by people like Alliance and Skippers. They got divided down the middle. We asked, not so much 'This is unfair commercially'; we just asked, 'Hang on—why don't you make it 19; or, if you are going to do it, put it somewhere that makes sense.' We are still grappling with what the security issue is here.

Senator XENOPHON: In terms of Mr Seymour's stories, have you seen those or read the transcripts of those?

Mr Tyrrell : Not in detail, but I know some of it.

Senator XENOPHON: That was, in my view, the trigger for this inquiry. Can you at least comment in respect of those? I think it largely relates, not to regional airports, but to metropolitan, capital city airports. Are you able to comment? It does seem disturbing that there are things like box cutters, tasers and even a firearm that apparently got onto an aircraft.

Mr Tyrrell : I think any thinking person is a fan of sound security at major airports. Major airports, big aircraft, lots of people—you want a robust system. If something has got through—and I do not want to criticise them—it needs to be looked at. What went wrong?

Senator XENOPHON: Can we just go to the issue of cost. One of the other witnesses said that if the costs are too great in terms of security screening, that could affect the viability of regional carriers. Can you give a ballpark figure of what the additional cost would be per passenger per flight if, for instance, there were security screening applied to all aircraft of 30 passengers or more?

Mr Tyrrell : I would like to take it on notice, if I could?

Senator XENOPHON: If you could. It is just that I was quite alarmed to hear that the issue of viability of regional carriers could be affected by virtue of additional screening.

But, in context, I think that if passengers know that one or two dollars of their fare—three dollars of their fare—per sector might relate to enhanced security measures then I think that people may cop that.

Mr Tyrrell : It is the cup-of-coffee argument. I respect that security will not bring down an airline on its own, but we have many discussions with many—

CHAIR: Red ties being worn by the pilots nearly did!

Senator XENOPHON: Right—

CHAIR: I am having a real dig there at Qantas!

Mr Tyrrell : Yes, I know.

CHAIR: The management, not the staff!

Mr Tyrrell : It is a cumulative effect, Senator, but I will take your question on notice.

Senator XENOPHON: Sure. With incidents, how does the reporting method work? There is a dispute as to whether as a result of the FOI request by the Seven Network, there has now been a lessening of voluntary reporting. The airports say, 'No,' effectively, but that they will look into that. The deputy secretary of the department said that there was a lessening of reporting. How does it actually work, if there is a security concern at one of the regional airports? How does that filter through the system for the department to know about it?

Mr Eaves : Through a safety management system, all staff—from ground handlers through to flight crew—have the opportunity to, and are encouraged to, report any security concerns.

Senator XENOPHON: And where does that go to the department?
Mr Eaves : That would go into the security department of each airline, which would then pass that information on to the OTS.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay. So, any report under the safety management system would find its way back to the department eventually?

Mr Eaves : Correct.

Senator XENOPHON: Right. And would your association know how many safety concerns are listed? They would not just be security concerns—there might be a maintenance issue or whatever.

Mr Eaves : Correct. The safety management system can categorise everything into maintenance, flight operations and security, so we have a separate security category.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay, so there is a separate security category. Are you able to provide us on notice—and you may want to consider whether you want to have it in camera or not—the number of security concerns that have been reported under the safety management systems for regional carriers?

Mr Eaves : I can take that on notice. I could only answer that on behalf of the airline that I work for.

Mr Tyrrell : I could take it on notice on behalf of the association.

Senator XENOPHON: Yes, that is fine. And, again, if there is some sensitivity you may want to ask that it be put in camera.

Mr Tyrrell : I probably will ask that.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay, thank you.

CHAIR: Mr Tyrrell, are there any different levels of security in regional airports where there is mining? What I am trying to allude to is the mining area, where explosives could be used. I know of Kalgoorlie, for example—I will not try to speak about other areas of Australia. Are there different levels, or are they the same system?

Mr Tyrrell : You are not talking about FIFO? You are talking—

CHAIR: FIFO own their own airstrips.

Mr Tyrrell : That is right, they do own the field. You are talking about—

CHAIR: Yes, regional.

Mr Tyrrell : As far as I know—and I am not an airport expert—we at the airlines follow the guidelines that the airport lays out for us. They have their government guidelines, and sometimes they have their own peculiar ones. But, mostly, they stick to the guidelines and we follow those.

CHAIR: Yes, okay. No further questions for Mr Tyrrell and Mr Eaves? No? Thank you very much for your time, gentlemen.

Mr Tyrrell : Thank you very much.

   
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