[Peetwo]

Hoodlum disassociates the ATSB from drones -

Fantastic article and great research by the Cranfield crew. It's just a pity that the inept, incompetent and incapable CAsA won't have their eye on the ball when it comes to this issue as they are always 10 years behind the rest of the world!

And shhhhhh, don't tell Hoody about this study, he will be thinking that Drone impact upon aircraft is just a 'light touch', a 'gentle caress'.

TICK TOCK

To late mate, Hoody already has his head up his own proverbial. Here he is in his own words courtesy of the ATSB submission... :

ATSB investigation of RPAS accidents and incidents

The ATSB is currently resourced to investigate around 140 aviation accidents and incidents per year from about 5,500 occurrences reported.

In determining which occurrences to investigate, in accordance with section 12AE of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (the TSI Act), the ATSB must have regard to the Government’s strategic direction set out in the Minister’s Statement of Expectations, including “to give priority to transport safety investigations that have the potential to deliver the best safety outcomes for the travelling public.”

As Australia is a member of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the ATSB must also take into account its international obligations. Standards and recommendations from Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Aircraft accident and incident investigation) specify:

5.1 The State of Occurrence shall institute an investigation into the circumstances of the accident and be responsible for the conduct of the investigation.

5.1.1 Recommendation. The State of Occurrence should institute an investigation into the circumstances of a serious incident.

5.1.2 The State of Occurrence shall institute an investigation into the circumstances of a serious incident when the aircraft is of a maximum mass of over 2 250 kg.
Note 3: In the case of investigation of an unmanned aircraft system, only aircraft with a design and/or operational approval are to be considered.

In Australia’s context, Note 3 would require investigation of all accidents where the remotely piloted aircraft was either above 2 kg or operated under CASA approval.
Australia has lodged exceptions with ICAO for Annex 13 standards 5.1 and 5.1.2 as historically, the ATSB has not had sufficient resources to investigate all accidents and serious incidents.

The ATSB can only investigate transport safety matters as defined by Section 23 of the TSI Act. These matters include accidents and incidents, as well as “something that occurred that affected, is affecting, or might affect, transport safety”.
As a result, the ATSB has published its investigation priority policy as follows:

1. Passenger transport—large aircraft
2. Passenger transport—small aircraft
3. Commercial (fare paying) recreation (for example, joy flights)
4. Aerial work with participating passengers (for example, news reporters, geological surveys)
5. Flying training
6. Other aerial work
7. High-risk personal recreation/sports aviation/experimental aircraft operations.
The ATSB will generally investigate accidents and incidents involving RPAS when there is:

• a third-party (person on the ground) injury or risk of injury, or third-party property damage; or Regulatory requirements that impact on the safe use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, Unmanned Aerial Systems and
associated systems.
• damage or the potential to damage another (manned) aircraft.

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&..


Consequence risk of a collision with a manned aircraft

While the exposure risk to manned aircraft is increasing, the consequence risk for a collision with an RPAS is unclear.

As previously mentioned, there have been no mid-air collisions in Australia involving RPAS reported to the ATSB. World-wide, there have been five known collisions and one suspected collision. Three of these resulted in no damage beyond scratches, including the suspected collision with an Airbus A320 at Heathrow Airport in April 2016. However, one collision with a sport bi-plane (Shpakow SA 750) in the US in 2010 resulted in a crushed wing. Fortunately, the aircraft landed safely. Less fortunately, a Grob G 109B motor glider had a wing broken by an RPAS collision in 1997, resulting in fatal injury to the two people on board (see Appendix C).

Due to the rarity of actual collisions, and very minimal actual testing, mathematical models have been used to predict damage expected from RPAS strikes. These are informed by abundant birdstrike data with about 2,000 birdstrikes recorded in Australia for 2015.

ATSB birdstrike analyses shows that 7.7 per cent of high capacity aircraft birdstrikes result in engine ingestions (20 per cent of which led to engine damage), with smaller aircraft having lower ingestion rates.

Aircraft damage from birdstrike analysis shows engines are most likely to be damaged in high capacity aircraft, followed by wings. For low capacity air transport aircraft, wings are most likely to be damaged, and to a much lesser extent, engines and propellers. For general aviation aircraft, again damage to wings is most likely, and to a much lesser extent, windscreens.

It should be noted that while only 6 per cent of high capacity aircraft birdstrikes result in damage, 25 per cent of birdstrikes to general aviation aircraft result in damage. This is a result of more fragile parts in general aviation aircraft including wings and windscreens.

As remotely piloted aircraft are rigid and generally heavier than most birds, the overall proportion of collisions resulting in aircraft damage is expected to be higher than for birdstrikes, and the distribution of damage across an airframe will probably also differ.

Without more information, it is difficult to thoroughly asses the risk of occurrence and the severity of the outcome for an RPAS collision. However, some observations based on the current literature and the ATSB analysis presented in Appendix C, include:

• While research has been done looking at birdstrikes, and collisions with rocket and satellite debris, it is unclear what the consequences would be for a collision between an RPAS and an air transport aircraft. Although the probability is likely to be low, RPAS components could conceivably penetrate the wing or fuselage of an air transport aircraft.

• Engine ingestion in high capacity air transport aircraft (mostly with large turbofan engines) can be expected for about eight per cent of RPAS collisions based on birdstrike data. The proportion of RPAS ingestions expected to cause engine damage and engine shutdown will be higher than for bird ingestion. However, loss of a single engine should have minimal consequence to the safety of the aircraft.

• RPAS collisions with a general aviation aircraft’s windscreen poses a high risk of penetration. The risk is considerably lower for an air transport aircraft, but the possibility of windscreen penetration is uncertain.

• RPAS have the potential to damage a general aviation aircraft’s flight surfaces (wings and tail), which could result in a loss of control.

• For a single engine (general aviation) aircraft, an engine ingestion could cause an engine failure, requiring a forced landing. However, the probability of ingestion is very low due to small engine intakes.

Of interest, a major RPAS collision study is currently underway in the UK. The study is a joint venture between UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA), Department of Transport (DoT), and British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA). Through testing and analysis, this research will provide a better understanding of the maximum remotely piloted aircraft mass that would result in minimal to no risk to manned aircraft. It will also assess the severity of impact of remotely piloted aircraft of masses of up to 4 kg against safety critical areas on selected civil and military aircraft. The project will include actual testing on representative windshields and modelling of tail rotor blades.

I think it is safe to assume from that and from this waffle piece...

...that Hoodlum and the ATSB have absolutely no idea about the real life safety implications of the interaction between drones and mainstream aviation - FDS...


MTF...P2