ATSB ADD Estimates - AQON
For what it is worth here are the ATSB AQON: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...2-ATSB.pdf - again 'spot the disconnect?
Senator Rex Patrick asked:
Senator PATRICK: Or ever on that vessel? Thank you very much, that's very helpful. I'd like to move to the Pel-Air report that came out in November, quite a voluminous report. In reading that report—and obviously this is a second attempt at that report—there were some things that struck me. I've got a PPL licence, but I won't call
myself an expert. A lot of the report focused on fuel management. It's my understanding that when the pilot in command left the east coast of Australia to fly to Samoa, to Apia, he had enough fuel onboard to divert if Norfolk weather had closed in. On the way back, because of the distances involved, he only had 87 per cent fuel. But had he had 100 per cent, it would have made no difference in terms of his ability to divert once he'd
arrived on the scene in Norfolk. Would you agree with that assessment?
…
Senator PATRICK: Sure. Where I'm going with this, just to be completely transparent with you, is that I understand that there have been a whole range of different changes that have resulted from this report; however, weather didn't seem to get a lot of focus in the report. And yet we've seen situations in 2013 where we had a Virgin aircraft and a Qantas aircraft land at Mildura with basically no opportunity for go-round because they'd
run out of fuel. We had a situation on Lord Howe where someone on the ground wanted or was able to provide weather information to inbound aircraft but was prohibited because CASA wanted them to do a $20,000 training course—and this is just someone who's a volunteer. Where I'm going to with this—and we have talked with the committee on this—is that weather didn't seem to feature prominently in the report. In fact, it's my
understanding that the title of the draft report that came out talks about fuel management and weather, but in the first report weather wasn't mentioned in the title. Just going back to my original question, it's my understanding that, had the pilot in command had 100 per cent fuel in the tanks, it would have made no difference to the
outcome other than that he perhaps could have had a few more attempts at landing before he ditched. Would that be fair?
Mr Hornby: We're happy to take any questions on notice in relation to the technical elements of the report. As Chief Commissioner Hood mentioned, the investigator in charge is based in Brisbane, but we can take that on notice. But in the report itself it said that, if there had been maximum fuel on board and he had reached Norfolk Island, there would have been opportunities to make other decisions and spend more time.
Answer:
The analysis on page 298–299 of the ATSB report ‘Fuel planning event, weather-related event and ditching involving Israel Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124A, VH-NGA, 6.4km WSW of Norfolk Island Airport, on 18 November 2009 (AO-2009-072)’ addresses the question:
“…if the flight had departed with full fuel on this occasion, this would not have provided for alternate fuel given the upper-level wind conditions that existed on the night of the accident.
…
Nevertheless, departing with full fuel would have significantly reduced the risk associated with the flight. In general terms, extra fuel will:
‐ allow a flight to proceed closer to the destination aerodrome before the flight crew need to make a decision regarding a diversion, reducing the time and therefore the risk of weather or other conditions changing between the point of no return (PNR) and arriving at the aerodrome
‐ if the flight is continued to the destination aerodrome, allow the flight crew to have more time at or overhead the aerodrome to hold and consider the available options and/or wait for weather conditions to improve.
On this occasion, if the crew had departed Apia with full fuel, it is likely they would have arrived at the top of descent point with at least 2,400 lb, which is 1,040 lb more fuel than on the accident flight (see also Considerations regarding access to RVSM flight levels). This was sufficient fuel to divert to Noumea, New Caledonia or Auckland, New Zealand at that point. Given the weather reports at that time were consistently stating cloud was below the landing minima at Norfolk Island, it is very likely the crew would have diverted. Alternatively, arriving at the top of descent with about 2,400 lb would have allowed the crew to descend, conduct an instrument approach, hold at about 2,300 ft for about 60 minutes and then conduct another approach.”
Further information related to this topic is also provided on pages 155–156 and the last paragraph on page 296 of the ATSB report.
Senator Rex Patrick asked:
Senator PATRICK: There was a recommendation made, I believe in 2001, in an ATSB report that weather forecasting be improved at Norfolk. My understanding is that that wasn't actioned, and there's still no action in relation to that. Is something happening on that?
Mr Hornby: There was some safety action at Norfolk Island that the BOM did take, I understand, after the Senate inquiry—I think it was in 2012—regarding this investigation. The BOM did take some safety action to put in place new infrastructure there. So there was some safety action taken.
Senator PATRICK: Could you provide me with that, perhaps on notice?
Mr Hornby: It's in the report. Safety action is towards the back.
Mr Hood: We're still happy to provide that on notice.
Answer:
Safety action was taken by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) following the ATSB’s February 2000 safety recommendation and further action has been taken since that time.
Page 303 of the ATSB Report ‘Fuel planning event, weather related event and ditching involving Israel Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124A, VH-NGA, 6.4km WSW of Norfolk Island Airport 18 November 2009 (AO 2009-072), provides a summary of some of the action following the recommendation made in the February 2000 report:
“Unforecast low cloud had previously been identified as an issue for aircraft arriving at Norfolk Island in 1999. BoM subsequently initiated several activities to improve its forecasting ability, including the installation of a weather radar, ceilometer and visibility meter, access to minute-by minute data, and the introduction of processes to ensure forecasters were provided with more timely information on discrepancies between observations and forecasts.
These changes improved BoM’s capabilities for forecasting at Norfolk Island. Data from BoM’s TAF verification system indicated forecasting reliability improved from 2003 to 2009. Data from ATSB’s predictive weather analysis algorithm indicated that in 2009 there were 296 hours of conditions below the landing minima for a Category C aircraft (such as a Westwind), which equated to 3.4 per cent of the total time. However, unforecast weather below the landing minima (that is, where the TAF was forecasting conditions above the alternate minima) was rare, occurring for a total of 10.5 hours or
0.12 per cent of the time. Overall, the amount of unforecast weather below the landing minima was comparable to the average for remote islands and capital city airports (average of 0.13 per cent per year).
This relatively low level of unforecast weather appeared to be due at least in part to BoM using a more conservative approach to forecasting at remote islands compared to capital city airports, consistent with the difficulties in forecasting at such locations. Such an approach is also compatible with the inherent risk of operations to remote locations.”
Detailed information is at:
‐ Pages 80–86 which address the reliability of forecasting at Norfolk Island, including action taken by BoM during 2000–2004 (see page 82).
‐ Pages 381–383 which provide details of the changes associated with forecasting at Norfolk Island for the period from 2010 to the release of the ATSB re-opened investigation report.
MTF...P2
For what it is worth here are the ATSB AQON: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...2-ATSB.pdf - again 'spot the disconnect?
Senator Rex Patrick asked:
Senator PATRICK: Or ever on that vessel? Thank you very much, that's very helpful. I'd like to move to the Pel-Air report that came out in November, quite a voluminous report. In reading that report—and obviously this is a second attempt at that report—there were some things that struck me. I've got a PPL licence, but I won't call
myself an expert. A lot of the report focused on fuel management. It's my understanding that when the pilot in command left the east coast of Australia to fly to Samoa, to Apia, he had enough fuel onboard to divert if Norfolk weather had closed in. On the way back, because of the distances involved, he only had 87 per cent fuel. But had he had 100 per cent, it would have made no difference in terms of his ability to divert once he'd
arrived on the scene in Norfolk. Would you agree with that assessment?
…
Senator PATRICK: Sure. Where I'm going with this, just to be completely transparent with you, is that I understand that there have been a whole range of different changes that have resulted from this report; however, weather didn't seem to get a lot of focus in the report. And yet we've seen situations in 2013 where we had a Virgin aircraft and a Qantas aircraft land at Mildura with basically no opportunity for go-round because they'd
run out of fuel. We had a situation on Lord Howe where someone on the ground wanted or was able to provide weather information to inbound aircraft but was prohibited because CASA wanted them to do a $20,000 training course—and this is just someone who's a volunteer. Where I'm going to with this—and we have talked with the committee on this—is that weather didn't seem to feature prominently in the report. In fact, it's my
understanding that the title of the draft report that came out talks about fuel management and weather, but in the first report weather wasn't mentioned in the title. Just going back to my original question, it's my understanding that, had the pilot in command had 100 per cent fuel in the tanks, it would have made no difference to the
outcome other than that he perhaps could have had a few more attempts at landing before he ditched. Would that be fair?
Mr Hornby: We're happy to take any questions on notice in relation to the technical elements of the report. As Chief Commissioner Hood mentioned, the investigator in charge is based in Brisbane, but we can take that on notice. But in the report itself it said that, if there had been maximum fuel on board and he had reached Norfolk Island, there would have been opportunities to make other decisions and spend more time.
Answer:
The analysis on page 298–299 of the ATSB report ‘Fuel planning event, weather-related event and ditching involving Israel Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124A, VH-NGA, 6.4km WSW of Norfolk Island Airport, on 18 November 2009 (AO-2009-072)’ addresses the question:
“…if the flight had departed with full fuel on this occasion, this would not have provided for alternate fuel given the upper-level wind conditions that existed on the night of the accident.
…
Nevertheless, departing with full fuel would have significantly reduced the risk associated with the flight. In general terms, extra fuel will:
‐ allow a flight to proceed closer to the destination aerodrome before the flight crew need to make a decision regarding a diversion, reducing the time and therefore the risk of weather or other conditions changing between the point of no return (PNR) and arriving at the aerodrome
‐ if the flight is continued to the destination aerodrome, allow the flight crew to have more time at or overhead the aerodrome to hold and consider the available options and/or wait for weather conditions to improve.
On this occasion, if the crew had departed Apia with full fuel, it is likely they would have arrived at the top of descent point with at least 2,400 lb, which is 1,040 lb more fuel than on the accident flight (see also Considerations regarding access to RVSM flight levels). This was sufficient fuel to divert to Noumea, New Caledonia or Auckland, New Zealand at that point. Given the weather reports at that time were consistently stating cloud was below the landing minima at Norfolk Island, it is very likely the crew would have diverted. Alternatively, arriving at the top of descent with about 2,400 lb would have allowed the crew to descend, conduct an instrument approach, hold at about 2,300 ft for about 60 minutes and then conduct another approach.”
Further information related to this topic is also provided on pages 155–156 and the last paragraph on page 296 of the ATSB report.
Senator Rex Patrick asked:
Senator PATRICK: There was a recommendation made, I believe in 2001, in an ATSB report that weather forecasting be improved at Norfolk. My understanding is that that wasn't actioned, and there's still no action in relation to that. Is something happening on that?
Mr Hornby: There was some safety action at Norfolk Island that the BOM did take, I understand, after the Senate inquiry—I think it was in 2012—regarding this investigation. The BOM did take some safety action to put in place new infrastructure there. So there was some safety action taken.
Senator PATRICK: Could you provide me with that, perhaps on notice?
Mr Hornby: It's in the report. Safety action is towards the back.
Mr Hood: We're still happy to provide that on notice.
Answer:
Safety action was taken by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) following the ATSB’s February 2000 safety recommendation and further action has been taken since that time.
Page 303 of the ATSB Report ‘Fuel planning event, weather related event and ditching involving Israel Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124A, VH-NGA, 6.4km WSW of Norfolk Island Airport 18 November 2009 (AO 2009-072), provides a summary of some of the action following the recommendation made in the February 2000 report:
“Unforecast low cloud had previously been identified as an issue for aircraft arriving at Norfolk Island in 1999. BoM subsequently initiated several activities to improve its forecasting ability, including the installation of a weather radar, ceilometer and visibility meter, access to minute-by minute data, and the introduction of processes to ensure forecasters were provided with more timely information on discrepancies between observations and forecasts.
These changes improved BoM’s capabilities for forecasting at Norfolk Island. Data from BoM’s TAF verification system indicated forecasting reliability improved from 2003 to 2009. Data from ATSB’s predictive weather analysis algorithm indicated that in 2009 there were 296 hours of conditions below the landing minima for a Category C aircraft (such as a Westwind), which equated to 3.4 per cent of the total time. However, unforecast weather below the landing minima (that is, where the TAF was forecasting conditions above the alternate minima) was rare, occurring for a total of 10.5 hours or
0.12 per cent of the time. Overall, the amount of unforecast weather below the landing minima was comparable to the average for remote islands and capital city airports (average of 0.13 per cent per year).
This relatively low level of unforecast weather appeared to be due at least in part to BoM using a more conservative approach to forecasting at remote islands compared to capital city airports, consistent with the difficulties in forecasting at such locations. Such an approach is also compatible with the inherent risk of operations to remote locations.”
Detailed information is at:
‐ Pages 80–86 which address the reliability of forecasting at Norfolk Island, including action taken by BoM during 2000–2004 (see page 82).
‐ Pages 381–383 which provide details of the changes associated with forecasting at Norfolk Island for the period from 2010 to the release of the ATSB re-opened investigation report.
MTF...P2