Senate Estimates - 2017-18.
DEPARTMENT OF MUSHROOMS AND INCOMPETENT TROUGH SWILLERS

Thanks P2, you sure know how to poke the Gobbledock bear. And here is the moneyshot;

“The Parliamentary Library, who I have the greatest respect for, wrote back to us on 28 March and said: 'Short answer: claims about pilot shortages have been made widely for the last 10 to 15 years.'—yes, we've heard that—'There is no evidence that a shortage currently exists in Australia or overseas.”

And there you have it. These overpaid, under qualified, obsfucating carbuncles have absolutely no idea. This is the greatest admission of a disconnection from reality you will see. A bunch of archaic overpaid bureaucratic pen pushers sitting in plush offices and listening to only the words CAsA and the Murky Mandarins spin.

Dear Fu#kwits,

Get away from your mahogany desks and take a stroll in the real world. I know I know, it may be a little bit scary, but if you travel in groups you will be safe.

Tick Tock

P7 - "Choc Frog GD."
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Budget Estimates QON: Overdue miniscule 4G AQON?? 

Amazingly after making this post on miniscule 4G's popular thread - Point of difference: A captured Minister vs a Minister in charge? - the Dept AQON started rolling in - see HERE. -  Rolleyes 

So from an aviation safety agency (i.e the 'Three Stooges') perspective here is where we are at; via @AuSenate Wink :

ATSB QON:

182
Barry O'Sullivan
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
Identification of drones
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Answered
22/05/2018


Senate Estimates -  ATSB MH370 related AQON: 


Quote:Overdue No
Asked Of Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Proof Hansard Page/Written 58
Portfolio Question Number 246
Question

Mr Hood: There was also a program management board that oversaw the expenditure of the funds, and we had the processes and funds audited by KPMG. In terms of all the audit reports and the moneys in and out, that's certainly available if you'd like that. 
Senator PATRICK: Maybe it's worth tabling the KPMG report. 
Mr Hood: I'll take that on notice to provide that.

Answer
The ATSB’s financial statements are audited annually by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). For the financial years 2014–15, 2015–16 and 2016–17 the ANAO gave the MH370 program particular attention. The audit closing letters for each of these financial years is at Attachment A. In the 2016–17 closing letter ANAO specifically references MH370 advising:

We have concluded that ATSB’s revenues and expenses incurred for the search of flight MH370 are materially stated and have been disclosed appropriately in the financial statements.

KPMG, the ATSB’s internal auditor, also completed a ‘Health Check’ of the MH370 program in early 2016. This report is at Attachment B. The report acknowledged the governance structures in place including a Program Board with a representative from the Department of Finance. The report included some business improvement recommendations which were addressed.

Attachments

 Attachment A – ANAO Financial Audit Closing Letters

 Attachment B – MH370 Health-Check Report, KPMG, February 2016
Download question with answer 

Answer Attachment 
183 Attachment.pdf

Answered Date 
06/08/2018


Overdue No
Asked Of Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Proof Hansard Page/Written Written
Portfolio Question Number 366
Question

1. The ATSB has repeatedly said the satellite data shows MH370 was in a rapid and increasing rate of descent at the end. Larry Vance points out that in such cases, such as Swissair 111, the aircraft gets pulverised into two million smallish parts. How does the ATSB explain the fact that the flaperon and the flap were largely intact; there was nothing big or intact enough to be even recognisable as a flap or flaperon on Swissair 111?
2. Does the ATSB think the flap and flaperon fell off due to "flutter" in a high speed dive?

  1. If so, why was there no flutter damage to the leading edges?

4. Captain John Cox, a leading air crash investigator, says this of the satellite data when it comes to the speed of descent:The ATSB takes BFO data and derives a vertical profile between the 6th and 7th arc. This is very high (almost too high) indicating a extremely steep descent. However the 7th exchange is a "Power Up" exchange and the vertical information is not as accurate. Looking at the 1st Arc exchange, which was also a "Power Up" exchange the vertical date was determined to be spurious or so inaccurate it was not considered valid. If during a "Power Up" exchange the vertical data is less accurate then the 7th Arc exchange must be viewed with the same concern. Therefore, the vertical BFO derived data is less credible than other data points. This would support Larry's theory and weaken the ATSB position.
    1. Is Captain Cox wrong, and if so, why?
Answer
1. The ATSB has never performed analysis nor published any information in relation to the speed that the aircraft may have impacted the ocean surface. The analysis performed by scientists from the Defence Science Technology Group (DST Group) of the metadata associated with the final two satellite communications between the aircraft and the Inmarsat ground station concluded that the aircraft was in a high and increasing rate of descent over the eight second time period between the two transmissions.

The analysis by the ATSB and other members of the MH370 Search Strategy Working Group, which includes Inmarsat, Thales, Boeing the Air Accidents Investigation Branch of UK and National Transportation Safety Board of the USA, concluded it is most likely these final two transmissions were triggered by fuel exhaustion of the engines and a restart of the aircraft’s auxiliary power unit and would have occurred when the aircraft was still at an altitude of between 20,000 and 30,000 ft.

Boeing simulations (documented in MH370 – Search and debris examination update available at: http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5771773/ae-2014-054_debris-update_2nov2016.pdf) of the aircraft’s unpiloted glide behaviour after fuel exhaustion indicated that it is likely that the aircraft performed a series of phugoid motions, with periods of descent at differing rates and periods where the aircraft also gained altitude in the final minutes of the flight. Given the uncertainties associated with the final minutes of the flight it is not possible to conclude a speed at which it is likely the aircraft impacted the ocean surface.

The ATSB has studied many accidents where aircraft have impacted water. The damage to the aircraft and debris resulting from the impact is dependent on many factors including the aircraft’s speed both horizontal and vertical, the attitude of the aircraft at the point of impact and the type, size and construction of the aircraft. Some accidents where there was a high rate of descent led to aircraft debris which was in large sections, including Air France flight 447 which crashed off the coast of Brazil in 2009.

2. The ATSB has never published any analysis suggesting that the flap or flaperon separated from the aircraft due to aerodynamic flutter.

3. The analysis to which Captain Cox refers in this quote was performed by scientists from DST Group and is referred to in the answer to Question 1. A summary of this analysis was included in the ATSB report MH370 – Search and debris examination update (2 November 2016) (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5771773/ae-2014-054_debris-update_2nov2016.pdf). A more detailed analysis was published by the DST Group in MH370 Burst Frequency Offset Analysis and Implications on Decent Rate at End-of-Flight (15 January 2018) (Attachment A). The summary in the ATSB report explains that the DST Group analysis accounts for all possible errors in the satellite communication metadata due to system oscillator “warm up” transients and all possible speeds and headings of the aircraft.

The ATSB made contact with Captain Cox at the time his original assessment (quoted in the question) of DST Group’s descent analysis was used in an article in the Australian newspaper and provided him with a copy of DST Group’s full published analysis. He subsequently agreed that his original assessment, used in the newspaper article, was incorrect and the ATSB understands that Captain Cox has asked the Australian newspaper to print a correction.

Attachments

 Attachment A – MH370 Burst Frequency Offset Analysis and Implications on Decent Rate at End-of-Flight, 15 January 2018

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Answer Attachment 


184 Attachment.pdf

Answered Date 
06/08/2018

Airservices AQON so far:

Quote:
185
Richard Colbeck
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
Reactivation of VOR
Airservices Australia
Answered
22/05/2018

186
Rex Patrick
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
Airservices charges
Airservices Australia
Answered
22/05/2018




Overdue No
Asked Of Airservices Australia
Proof Hansard Page/Written 71
Portfolio Question Number 249
Question
Mr Harfield: No. We did this morning on questions that we could have got today referencing the safety incidents from the article of 19 May. 
Senator McKIM: By the way, do you intend to provide this to the community as part of the consultation? 
Mr Harfield: Probably not this particular chart, but a chart that would depend on what we're actually trying to consult with the community on. 
Senator McKIM: I've just sent it down to my office, so it's fair to say they're going to have a look at it very soon if they haven't already. I just want to ask about safety first. We all want to see safe airports; I'm sure we can all agree on that. Can you just confirm, firstly, there were no loss of separation incidents at Hobart airport in the nine years prior to the changes? 
Mr Harfield: No, I can't confirm that. I would say that there were; however, I'll have to take that on notice. 
Senator McKIM: Could you provide that on notice to the committee, please. 
Mr Harfield: Absolutely....
Senator McKIM: Thanks for that. How does that compare to perhaps a similar period of time prior to the changes? 
Mr Harfield: Prior to the changes, we did a comparison. We had a look at the same period of time but 12 months prior. There were not the two loss of separation events or a loss of separation assurance event during that time but, as I was saying to Senator Colbeck, we did see a reduction in the number of go-arounds. 
Senator McKIM: Post the implementation of the change? 
Mr Harfield: Post the implementation. In the incidents we saw beforehand, we saw more go-arounds than we did in this period after the implementation. 
Senator McKIM: Do you have the figures for that? 
Mr Harfield: Off the top of my head, it was 27 prior and 22 after; it was a difference of five. 
Senator McKIM: So a reduction of five for the same period in the previous year? 
Mr Harfield: Correct.
Senator McKIM: Do you have the data for the same period in the previous years? 
Mr Harfield: We can do that. I don't have it off the top of my head, but we can provide that. 
Senator McKIM: Maybe going back five years, if that's data that you keep. It's your assertion that the changes have made the Hobart airport safer-is that right? 
Mr Harfield: They improved the safety of flying in and out of Hobart airport, yes.+ Expand Question

Answer

Loss of Separation

Three loss of separation occurrences were reported in the vicinity of Hobart over the nine years prior to Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) implementation.

Go-arounds

Post SID/STAR implementation:

14/09/2017 to 6/06/2018 – 21 occurrences.

Pre SID/STAR implementation:

14/09/2016 to 6/06/2017 – 26 occurrences

14/09/2015 to 6/06/2016 – 28 occurrences.

14/09/2014 to 6/06/2015 – 45 occurrences.

14/09/2013 to 6/06/2014 – 15 occurrences.

Download question with answer 

Answered Date 
06/08/2018

188
Nick McKim
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
Internal review of the new flight paths
Airservices Australia
Answered
22/05/2018



Overdue No
Asked Of Airservices Australia
Proof Hansard Page/Written 73
Portfolio Question Number 252
Question
Senator McKIM: Is it your contention that air traffic control staff at Hobart were also thoroughly consulted about the change? 
Mr Harfield: The air traffic control staff would have been consulted in our normal change process that we do for any procedures or air route changes within the operation. 
Senator McKIM: All of them? Does that include all air traffic controllers or a part? 
Mr Harfield: Technically, they wouldn't be operating under their licence if they weren't deemed to be competent or understand the changes that they shouldn't be- 
Senator McKIM: No, I'm asking about the consultation. 
Mr Harfield: There's a normal change process that we have in the operations. That would have been carried out. 
Senator McKIM: I'm asking: did that normal change process involve consulting all air traffic control staff at Hobart about the change? 
Mr Harfield: It would depend on your definition of 'consultation'. I'm not trying to be-
CHAIR: Mr Harfield, it's a pretty simple question. You've got X number of air traffic controllers; you've got a change coming down the pike; you have processes of consultation. The senator's question is quite clear. 
Mr Harfield: No, no. The thing is that they would be made aware of the change, and they would have- 
CHAIR: That's not consultation. The burden of his question is consultation. 
Mr Harfield: So they would have been made aware through our normal operational change processes, and they would have had the ability to object to the change or raise any issues that they had with the change, which is our normal process- 
Senator McKIM: After the change had been made?
Mr Harfield: No, Senator. Our requirements are that we do a safety assessment and people have the ability to raise issues associated with that safety assessment, and that's our normal operational change process. 
Senator McKIM: That includes all air traffic controllers in Hobart? 
Mr Harfield: There is an ability for all controllers-the reason I'm saying that is that I can't say that all controllers were applied, but it's available to them. I'd have to take it on notice to find what the process actually was....
Mr Harfield: The normal process is that somebody from Hobart would have been involved in that. 
CHAIR: There we go. 
Senator McKIM: I understand that to be true, but 'somebody' is obviously nowhere near all of the control staff at Hobart. Perhaps I could just ask you to take on notice how many of the air traffic control staff at Hobart were consulted and the nature of that consultation. Can you take that on notice? 
Mr Harfield: Yes.+ Expand Question

Answer All eight Hobart Tower controllers had an opportunity to provide input to the change. They were initially advised in July 2016 of the implementation of Hobart SID/STARs to take effect in September 2017. Regular updates were provided on the progress of the SID/STAR design, a feedback process was established and input was encouraged and captured.
Download question with answer 

Answered Date 
06/08/2018

190
Nick McKim
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
Alternative suggestions at Hobart Airport
Airservices Australia
Answered
22/05/2018

191
Chris Ketter
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
Passenger threshold at Whitsunday Coast Airport
Airservices Australia
Answered
22/05/2018

192
Chris Ketter
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
Number of arffs fire stations built in the last five to 10 years
Airservices Australia
Answered
22/05/2018

193
Jonathon Duniam
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
Environmental assessment decision-making process
Airservices Australia
Answered
22/05/2018

194
Jonathon Duniam
Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities

From there on (through to CASA) the QON are still yet to be answered but I have been assured from the RRAT Committee Secretariat that the answers will be published over the next couple of days -  Wink


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Budget Estimates - CASA AQON.

Via the RRAT Estimates webpage: 
Quote:Asked Of Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Proof Hansard Page/Written 80
Portfolio Question Number 236
Question
Senator PATRICK: So these photographs are of the state of a tyre for a Qantas aircraft that landed in Brisbane. It was transiting through Townsville, this was in 2016, and the log of events shows that, due to insufficient manpower available to carry out the wheel change, the aircraft was sent on: 'The tyre may continue in service without safety concerns but must be replaced at the next check.' The bottom line is that there were not enough engineers on the ground to change the tyre, so they sent the aircraft on to the next location-possibly under commercial pressure; I don't understand the reasons why. But you would I'm sure appreciate, Mr Carmody, the seriousness of having an aircraft take off with a tyre in that state, noting in extremis the Concorde, when it took off from Paris, shed a tyre which went through the fuel tanks, with a tragedy at the end of that. So I suspect you would be concerned about an aircraft that might take off with a tyre like that? 
Mr Carmody: I'm aware of the matter because it was 18 months ago. It's been referred to us. It's been referred to the Industry Complaints Commissioner, and the Industry Complaints Commissioner has reviewed the matter. So it's gone through our internal processes. I will make a couple of points: I saw the document, which hasn't been tabled but which you read out, that the tyre was released. So an engineer certified that the tyre was okay. I don't know, therefore, what damage occurred on subsequent landing. I assume that's not take-off damage; that's landing damage. An engineer certified it was suitable for take-off. 
Senator PATRICK: I've talked to a number of engineers who have suggested that that sort of damage to a tyre couldn't happen on a single landing; you might get an isolated location; the point of the two photographs is they show that it's all around the tyre. But, in general, would that not concern you at all? 
Mr Carmody: I was concerned, but, as I said, the matter was raised, it went to the independent Industry Complaints Commissioner and it was reviewed. So, as far as I'm concerned, any matters have been resolved. 
Senator PATRICK: That's noted. 
Mr Carmody: There is a completely independent mechanism; it's independent of me. 
CHAIR: I appreciate that. I often have a plumber come to my house and the tap is still leaking afterwards. If that's the case, then I'd be concerned about the independence or the attention paid by an independent-
Senator PATRICK: Can I just stop, because I think there is a step in the middle that you are missing. That is that this gets investigated by CASA, and in this instance it was. There were concerns over the investigation and it then went on to the complaints commissioner. The role of the complaints commissioner is not to conduct an investigation. The complaint was that CASA had not conducted its job properly. 
Mr Carmody: So it was investigated by CASA and it was then peer reviewed by another office, so a different part of the organisation, to see whether the investigation was well founded, which we do quite often in contentious cases. We put inspectors from a different location on to review the matter so that we have a different set of eyes-an independent set of eyes. That was done in the process. Then it went to the industry complaints commissioner.
CHAIR: We could spar around all day here-I hope I don't mow your lawn, Senator-I'd like you to take on notice to supply the committee with the entire file, cover to cover: any artefacts; any photographs; any interviews, whether audio or otherwise; any files that are held, IT, however it does. You know the drill. From A to Z, supply it to the committee so that we can have a look at this. 
Mr Carmody: Certainly, Senator....
Senator Scullion: Can I just get a point of clarification. For the interests of completeness, the body is slightly independent from you. So the material of the committee you are going to provide includes their deliberations as well? 
CHAIR: Absolutely. 
Senator Scullion: Just for clarification. 
CHAIR: Thank you for that, Minister-A to Z.- Collapse Question

Answer 
The information requested has been provided to the Committee under a covering letter from the CASA Chief Executive Officer and Director of Aviation Safety of 8 June 2018.


Asked Of Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Proof Hansard Page/Written 81
Portfolio Question Number 307
Question
Senator PATRICK: I'll mention another incident as well that you are probably aware of, a TCAS incident on a Qantas flight. The aircraft arrived into Sydney on 19 November 2016. The tech crew reported that, 'TCAS: some targets displayed in wrong position last three sectors-that is, aircraft landing in Melbourne appeared 90 degrees out on final.' Are you familiar with or have you heard-
Mr Carmody: I'll have to take that on notice. I haven't got the documentation in front of me.

Answer As indicated in Committee Question number 209 the information requested has been provided to the Committee under a covering letter from the CASA Chief Executive Officer and Director of Aviation Safety of 8 June 2018.
Download question with answer 

Answered Date 
07/08/2018



Asked Of Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Proof Hansard Page/Written 84
Portfolio Question Number 237
Question
Senator PATRICK: There's a detailed set of concerns that the federation has laid out as to what did not occur in the investigation of the tyre matter and in the TCAS matter, and hence the relation to what I've tendered to the committee. I don't know where we go from here, Chair. I'm disturbed by that and maybe they need some time to look at it and respond. Could we also get the TCAS file? 
CHAIR: I'm satisfied that Mr Carmody and his team will mull over this for a little bit, and we'd look forward to a further conversation soon and not after waiting for next estimates. When you think you've satisfactorily had a look and talked to the commissioner, you might contact Dr Thompson and we can just have a meeting for 15 minutes- 
Mr Carmody: Chair, that would be fine. I'd also be happy to provide you with a specific written response on the issues that you've raised surrounding this so you would have something formal, if that would suit the committee as well? 
CHAIR: Yes, I think that's suitable for the committee.

Answer 
The information requested has been provided to the Committee under a covering letter from the CASA Chief Executive Officer and Director of Aviation Safety of 8 June 2018.

Download question with answer 

Answered Date 
07/08/2018



Asked Of Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Proof Hansard Page/Written 84
Portfolio Question Number 238
Question
Senator KETTER: I have a follow-up question. The issue that gave rise to the problem is the manpower shortage at Townsville Airport, as I understand it. Was that investigated as part of CASA's processes, and what was the result of that? Has that been rectified? 
Mr Crawford: That would ultimately be a matter for the SMS at Qantas. Their safety management system should follow-up on that. What we do is we review the effectiveness of their SMS. 
Senator KETTER: Sorry, I can't hear you, Mr Crawford. 
Mr Crawford: That should have been followed up with the operator's safety management system. What we do is we do surveillance on the operator; we look at the effectiveness of their safety management system. 
Senator KETTER: Is the answer to my question that- 
Mr Crawford: The issue is that, at the end of the day, we cannot determine from the photograph taken at the other airport whether that tyre was serviceable or not. We can't by looking at that photograph. But the maintenance engineer says that the tyre was safe to go, so he is saying it was serviceable. That's what we have to work with.
Senator KETTER: That's not the issue I'm raising. I'm talking about the assertion in that log that there were manpower shortages which gave rise to the fact that the tyre couldn't be changed. 
Mr Crawford: We'll take that on notice.+ Expand Question

Answer
The information requested has been provided to the Committee under a covering letter from the CASA Chief Executive Officer and Director of Aviation Safety of 8 June 2018.

Download question with answer 

Answered Date 
07/08/2018

At this point in time it would appear that the Carmody 'covering letter' referred to in QON 207 to 209 is still yet to be tabled.


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KISS, (Liverpool type) it's the only way.

Just spent a half hour going back over the many posts relating to public safety around aerodromes. There is a lot, a serious lot of good information there, all of which has been totally ignored by our politicians. Perhaps we have been too ‘technical’ or too academic; or, is it just too difficult a subject for politicians to grasp. Perhaps we weren’t clear enough. Or perhaps the politicians are just too ducking dumb to read joined up writing; or too bloody lazy; or, just too happy to be led about by the foreskin by their ‘expert’ advice; maybe, just maybe, they are completely deceived by clever manipulation of ‘wording’. Below is a classic example:-

Senator PATRICK: Are you looking at public safety zones around Sydney Airport?

Mr McRandle: We're looking at public safety zones generally across Australian airports as part of the National Airports Safeguarding Framework. A consultation process commenced a little over a week ago with the community around public safety zones. It will include all airports. Queensland has already incorporated the public safety zone approach to their airports. There are others around Australia that haven't adopted it.

Then this:-

In March 2018 the Transport and Infrastructure Senior Officials' Committee (TISOC) agreed to the National Airports Safeguarding Advisory Group (NASAG) publicly consulting on the draft new National Airport Safeguarding Framework (NASF) GuidelineManaging the Risk in Public Safety Zones at the Ends of Runways.

FDS – The buildings at Essendon, those that were slammed into by a 5.7 ton aircraft, carrying a ton of fuel – (remember the fire ball) infringed the  SIDE of the runway ‘safety zones’. Not the approach and departure safety zones. You must not confuse the two. The Senators asking questions are being merrily led down a very smooth path to deception.

I’ll make it crystal clear – through manipulation and sleight of legal hand, there are building which impinge on the ‘SIDE OF RUNWAY’ safety zones. The places where shopping outlets and passenger terminal buildings are located. There are minimum runway WIDTH parameters specified - for bloody good reasons – Essendon providing the quintessential example of why. What’s next FDS – coffee and fast food outlets along the taxi-ways?.

FDS Senators – get your act together before there is mass carnage; look at Archerfield – then watch again as the aircraft which landed in a Moorabin street busts into flames. Watch the Essendon fire ball again.   You got to ask yourself – are you feeling lucky Punk?



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