[Peetwo]

PelAir & the wx gotchas of the APAC FIRs etc.

After 8+ long years bizarrely debate continues to rage on the UP on the degree of culpability of the pilot. In particular the issue of the pilot not proactively requesting timely wx reports and/or forecasts in flight. Most of the "it's all pilot's fault" crowd seem not to have properly read the applicable sections of the re-investigation report...

Ref pg 177-178 (NB: My relevant OBs are in red bold) :

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Obtaining weather information during flight

Regulatory requirements and guidance

As noted above, CAR 239 and the AIP required a pilot in command to consider forecasts and observation reports during pre-flight planning. There was no corresponding guidance for application to flight crews’ in-flight planning. As a result, the ATSB sought clarification from CASA on the extent to which pilots are able to use observation reports (including METARs) for in-flight planning decisions, such as to continue to the destination or initiate a diversion.

CASA, in its response, stated ‘ultimately the decision [to continue to the destination or initiate a diversion] rests with the pilot in command, but only can be based on available forecasts (TAF), Aerodrome Weather Reports (METAR/SPECI), Aerodrome Weather Information Service (AWIS) or observations’. In addition, CASA clarified that there was no ‘strategic difference between an in-flight scenario and a pre-flight plan’ in relation to the use of forecasts.

In relation to the use of observation reports for in-flight planning, CASA noted ‘weather
observations are not a legal instrument to determine if an alternate should be held or for fuel planning, unless the observation has a trend appended to it (eg TTF202…)…’.

However, it further stated ‘…a pilot is able to use both a valid forecast and observation information’.

Further to the use of observation reports, CASA’s advice noted:

The usefulness of the observation is dependent directly on how far away the aircraft is from the aerodrome. For example, a report showing an improvement in the weather may be useful to an aircraft in the holding pattern directly overhead the aerodrome, to decide on whether or not to fly the approach or not. Conversely, if the aircraft is a distance away (eg one hour) the observation should be viewed with caution.

In terms of obtaining forecasts and weather reports in flight, as noted in Flight information service, the provision of flight information services in the Auckland Oceanic FIR and the Nadi FIR was subject to the workload of ATS personnel, with the provision of aircraft separation functions having priority over the provision of FIS. The same principle also applied in other countries (see ATSB report AO-2013-100).203

Accordingly, flight crews could not rely on being automatically provided with relevant information, and hence they were responsible for ensuring they requested sufficient information to make effective decisions. The Australian AIP section on FIS provided very specific statements regarding the responsibility of the pilot in command to obtain information (see Provision of flight information service in Australian FIRs).

There was no specific regulatory requirement for a flight crew to check whether there had been an amended TAF issued during a flight. There was also no published guidance material discussing how to weight the relative importance of TAFs or observations during in-flight decision-making.

Operator requirements and guidance

The operator’s OM contained no specific requirements or guidance material regarding the types of weather information to obtain during flight and when to obtain this information. A review of other air ambulance operators’ operations manuals found they also did not provide any specific guidance in this area.

Flight crew practice

Westwind pilots reported they would generally obtain weather observations during long flights, and they would certainly obtain updated weather observations prior to the PNR for flights where a PNR applied. They stated they would not routinely request updated TAFs for the destination aerodrome during flight, and they would generally expect ATS to notify them if the TAF had been amended.

Some pilots noted that if weather conditions started deteriorating, they would request additional information. This may include asking about updated TAFs as well as other pilot reports of the weather conditions.

In addition, some pilots noted they generally would not expect to be proactively provided with updated weather information in the Oceanic/South Pacific region, except perhaps from Australia and New Zealand ATS. Therefore they would assume they had to obtain any weather information they needed.
  
P2 comment - anyone else see the contradictions and potential "gotchas" in the above passage?

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Now let us reflect (once again) on this AP post: The 0739 key to the PelAir wx imbroglio

Starting from..."This brings me to another omission of fact...

&.. this extract (from The 0803 lost in White rabbit obfuscation. ) :



Next refer to this quoted text (reference post:  The tale of the little White lie & the snowball effect) from page 97 of the PelAir MK II report:

..CAAF advised it was not aware of the 0739 SPECI and the 0803 amended TAF until it received the ATSB’s investigation report in 2012. CAAF contacted the ATS provider, who advised it had provided CAAF with all the weather reports it had received at the time (in 2009). The ATS provider advised CAAF it no longer held the hard copy print outs and therefore CAAF could not verify whether the 0739 SPECI or the 0803 amended TAF had been received...

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...The above quoted passages would appear to indicate that even if DJ had of requested (from Nadi at least) the latest amended TAF or the earlier 0730 METAR/0739 SPECI they would not have been available from Nadi IFISO...

P2 comment - I still find it passing strange that not more attention/inquiries were made on why the first relayed wx report to VH-NGA at 0801 was the 0630 METAR, which was manually inputted by the duty NFI BOM officer prior to closing the Norfolk Island BOM office. This left a 1.5 hr window of possible trending auto METAR information (including the 0739 SPECI) totally lost to the PIC of VH-NGA...  
  
Finally I note that over on the UP there is several references to the fact that the PIC never included the FO, either prior to departure or inflight, in the fuel management and/or fuel planning process.

In the case of the inflight situation the FO as PF was conducting a 'cockpit nap' - apparently non-compliant with FRMS SOPs i.e. longer than 30 minutes and with headsets off - when the relay/non-relay of operationally critical wx reports and/or forecasts were/weren't transmitted.

On pre-flight the report said: "..The first officer reported that, prior to the refueller departing, she (the first officer) noted the aircraft had not been refuelled to full capacity (that is, full main tanks and full tip tanks). She asked the captain whether they should refuel to full fuel. [b][i]She recalled the captain said he had calculated the amount of fuel they needed and that full main tanks would be sufficient.[/i][/b]

The first officer recalled that the flight from Norfolk Island to Apia had taken 3 hours 16 minutes, and the return flight was expected to take 30 minutes longer due to the headwinds..."

Hmm...so why didn't the FO challenge the Captain and ask for a review of his fuel calculations and reasoning for not refilling the tip tanks? Especially when you consider that the FO was the designated PF and therefore technically ICUS.

MTF...P2

Ps IMO these 'normalised deficiencies' come back to the 'safety culture' of the company at that time. These types of 'safety deficiencies' should normally be captured by a properly functioning SMS. Therefore I will attempt to examine the company SMS in the context of the PelAir MKII final report over on the search 4 IP as I note P7 has given me a perfect leg-in...  : post #211 

P7 -"..Like feeling that the SMS is a lip service exercise; or, fatigue is only a figment of imagination; or, that company culture has no effect on the ‘upright’ pilot. There is more, lots more which, in the BRB opinion, shows clearly the deeply flawed approach ATSB is taking – without going into the Mildura bun fight or even the ATR events (now plural) and, heaven forbid we ever mention Essendon.."