[Peetwo]

The Can'tberra disease -

While the Mandarins, Ministers & Minions recover from the excesses of Xmas and the year that was in the backstabbing, self-serving, self-preserving world of politics, it is worth taking the time in the hols to contemplate what Sandy dubs the 'Canberra disease':

"Recommendation 1. (Copy as reported from Nick Xenophon)

That the Government establish, as a matter of urgency, the role of Inspector‑General of Aviation Safety, with the necessary powers, resources and expertise to oversee and independently review the activities of CASA, the ATSB and other relevant organisations to an appropriate level."

The plot has been lost. The Senator is seriously proposing yet another independent body to oversee the other independent bodies that deal with aviation. This is the Canberra disease, completely illogical. "with....resources and expertise..." The word farcical comes to mind. This extra "independent" costly creature will have no more incentive to cause common sense reform than those extant "Government Business Enterprises" have amply demonstrated.

The only way towards improved governance and any hope of regeneration for General Aviation is for the Parliament to take the lead and be responsible, not try to hide behind this mythical concept of a pure font of impartial wisdom and genius;  The Independent Public Servant (within a GBE).  The Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Infrastructure must take control. The dishonestly titled GBEs are a failed concept, responsibility lies with the Senators and Members, no amount of sideways shoving can alter the fact.

Latest Finance Dept definition of a GBE:

Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) A GBE is a Commonwealth entity or Commonwealth company that is prescribed by the rules (s8 of the PGPA Act)...

Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) | Department of ...
www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/governance/gbe/

'Government Business Enterprises' seem to be a popular concept of accountability & governance within government agencies. However is the concept, as Sandy suggests, a complete and abject failure; or is it a case that the failure lies within the corporate structure; and/or embedded in the corporate & Mandarin culture itself - i.e. rotting from the head. After all there are many examples of where the GBE concept is a success and notable examples where the more traditional concepts of Departmental governance are also abject failures.

A classic example of which is the Defence Department, whose governance is reliant on a public service chain of command that dates back to the Romans. However in a modern democracy where in the 'public interest' or public accountability & transparency, is seen as far more important to the proper function of the State and to maintaining the 'rule of law', this governance through chain of command, to broach the military & civilian government world, is decidedly outdated.

From Senator David Fawcett 'Additional Comments' to 2012 Senate FADT Inquiry into Defence Procurement:

..I have four key areas of concern, however, that I believe could have been addressed more thoroughly in respect to both scope and depth: Governance; Strategy; Sovereignty; and Industry.

Governance of the Australian Defence organisation (ADO) is dysfunctional. Civil control of the military should occur through the decisions of a well-informed, elected Minister who is connected into the governance processes of the ADO in an ongoing manner analogous to the Board Chair of a publically listed company. This is not currently the case due to the policy of ―one voice‖ to Government and the unintended consequences of two decades of Government initiated measures aimed at reducing costs (well documented by Kinnaird, Mortimer, Black, Rizzo and Coles). Defence procurement does not occur in a vacuum and lasting improvement in this area will require changes to Governance of the whole ADO, the component parts of its system including the nature of their interaction with each other and Executive Government...

   
And from a paper authored by Senator Fawcett and published in the 'Strategist' - Minister, mandarins and the military - it can be seen that DF is fairly enamoured with the concept of governance & accountability through a governing Board:

Is there a better way? Certainly most successful public, not-for-profit, and even private companies seem to think so. Most of them adopt the construct of a governing board. This provides a proven framework for structured engagement between key elected stakeholders (directors) and the executives who have operational control. Through the board, the Chair is able to provide strategic guidance to the organisation, and hold executives to account for performance, and compliance with relevant regulations. The board doesn’t run the organisation on a day-to-day basis, but it has insight into the internal and external environments that shape the CEO’s challenges and decisions. Some private companies also choose to have a board of reference, which provides a structured means of retaining corporate memory, as well as obtaining a broader perspective on current issues and strategic direction...

...In the Australian context, a Defence Board wouldn’t replace the role of the NSCC. The Board would provide a structured, regular forum for the Minister to engage with, and be informed by, a range of voices within Defence. It would enable him to be a more effective decision maker when dealing with the Department, and speak with more confidence and authority in NSCC when advocating for the Department...

DF does add that certain 'made to suit' tweaks would necessarily need to be added for the concept to work successfully, one of those would include the Minister being the Chair of the Board:

..For the Board concept to be effective in Australia, we’d need to redefine the roles of some senior appointments. This would include empowering the Service Chiefs to have command and control over all the resources they need to do their job—a pre-requisite for accountability to the Minister as Chair of the Board. A consequence of the increased control for the Service Chiefs would be a corresponding decrease in the number of groups within the Defence Organisation. This would be balanced by making the Secretary responsible for overseeing compliance both with strategic guidance and with policies relevant to achieving best-practice in non-operational matters across the three services. The Minister would then be in a position to make informed decisions on what should be done, to hold Service Chiefs accountable for subsequent outcomes, and to judge their efficacy in the task. Where exigencies require changes, trade-offs or exceptions to guidance, the Board provides a framework for these issues and the related flow-on effects to be assessed, debated and implementation coordinated.


The structured framework of the Board would also provide some degree of quality assurance for the taxpayer when the personalities, interests, or competence of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), Secretary and Minister did not align as well as we might hope or expect. To return the rotting fish analogy, the Defence Board and the associated changes in senior roles would see the head of the organisation model the approach that must be adopted at all levels within Defence: informed decisions by accountable individuals.

The Defence Board in and of itself would not be a silver bullet to address the oft-lamented failures in the Defence Organisation. It is, however, the right place to start fixing the rot—at the heady interface of Minister, Mandarins and Military... 

So maybe the GBE concept as an ideology is not at fault but it is the internal accountability/structure (i.e. Minister, to Mandarin, to Board, & to agency) that may need to be tweaked.

The authors of Submission 160 of the Forsyth Review (ASRR) were also enamoured with the Board concept and suggest that it should be expanded to include the ATSB:


&..from pg 2:


&..for possible suggestions for tweaking the CASA Board chain of command & accountability (see bottom of paragraph 2, ref pg3-4):



{P2 comment: The separation of powers issue IMO (& many others) is a fundamental flaw with the structure of CASA; and is the single most influential factor in why industry stakeholders have such a profound fear & distrust with the big "R" regulator. This issue needs to be urgently addressed before any meaningful reform of CASA can occur} 


&..finally for Sandy's benefit Prof Middleton & Mr Horton believe the Board concept - tweaked for CASA & added to the ATSB corporate structure - would make Senator Xenophon's call for a Inspector General, to oversee CASA & the ATSB, redundant once properly implemented:



All good food for thought & discussion on the first sleepy Sunday ramble of the year...



MTF...P2