Dots to elephant prints & the joining of -
On the BITN thread P9 drew attention to a UP thread dealing with Melbourne ATC procedures & aberrations:
Keeping in mind that COBT stands for 'calculated off block time", let's see if in Hoody's new age of 'data trend monitoring', we can start joining some dots.
On the theme of 'causal chains' and 'trend lines', remember this...
Yesterday:
- Wonder how long it will be before miniscule DDDD NFI Chester comes out swinging on behalf of Jet * saying that I'm merely scaring the travelling public -
[/quote]
From my calculation there is at least three outstanding loading event aberrations for one airline that are currently on the ATSB investigation list and the question of when these investigations will be completed is anyone's guess...
However will wonders never cease because on reading the latest desktop SIB (short investigation bulletin), I was surprised to find that there had been another 'loading duck-up' incident from the same airline that had actually been investigated and completed in just over 3 months...
Now this is where IMO the dots become elephant footprints because this yet again totally inadequate report actually states in the findings...
"..The short turnaround time combined with this being the last flight to Brisbane that night, along with the assumption there was a transcription error, resulted in the leading hand not requesting a new deadload weight statement and container card, and loading the incorrect container on the aircraft..."
What's the chances if you ran that statement, as a point of comparison, over the other three J* loading incidents being investigated; the taxi rash incidents; and some of the YMML ATC aberrations and even possibly some of the min fuel cock-ups; you might find a trend line in the data so far collated...
Just saying -
MTF...P2
Ps > 2 years to 3 months? - Yeah right and elephants might fly...
On the BITN thread P9 drew attention to a UP thread dealing with Melbourne ATC procedures & aberrations:
Quote:Kharon wrote: [/url]There is on Pprune a particularly good thread running; it kicked off as polite inquiry to a perceived decrease in Melbourne ATC performance. It is heartening to see that the ATCO and pilots can hold a civilised discussion, exchange views and demonstrate grown up behaviour. The ATCO responses proving, yet again, how essential it is for pilots to understand the ‘system’ both parties are lumbered with. Bloody good thread. Worth the time.
Toot toot.
Quote:Melbourne Air Traffic Control
What has happened to air traffic control in Melbourne? The performance has plummeted. You get a COBT (that system isn't particularly effective anyway) and then get holding. Some aircraft carry the required holding fuel and then have to divert as ATC gives them additional holding on top of that promulgated. The wind may be 150/10 and they are using one runway. The ATIS gives a ten knot tailwind (as do tower reports) but the tailwind isn't reflected on the TTF nor the windsocks. You get a delayed COBT by anywhere up to an hour then get track shortening and a high speed descent with the next closet aircraft ten miles ahead. The supposed congestion doesn't show on the TCAS nor on Flight Radar 24.
What is going on?
Originally Posted by Berealgetreal
Couldn't agree more with the above.
I'm normally in the camp that defends ATC but I'm over Melbourne and I'm over both MEL and SYD incessant ATIS changes. Its to the point where its actually is a distraction and adversely affects safety. Thought about starting an identical thread many a time.
No doubt the COBT followed by LIZZI and ARBEY times and holding in CAVOK light winds is about staffing levels. Regardless, the Airlines pay top dollar for a cut price service and it seems to me that unless you are a pilot flying the line everyday then it doesn't matter. Everyday, every sector 365 days a year its the same story. COBT's have benefited Air Services and just added yet another item for pilots to deal with.
The ATIS changes [i]has to be legal ar$e covering, as a 2 knot wind change unless a tailwind makes absolutely no difference whatsoever apart from the other pilot putting there head down to write it on a card thats covered in changes.
Another favourite on descent "reduce speed to 210 kts" at about 5 miles to a limiting altitude without offering a height waiver. We're over it. And don't talk to us when we're on the rollout with a fistful of max landing weight with yet another tailwind on a wet runway.
Maybe its just me..[/i]
Keeping in mind that COBT stands for 'calculated off block time", let's see if in Hoody's new age of 'data trend monitoring', we can start joining some dots.
(12-11-2016, 10:42 AM)Peetwo Wrote: [url=http://auntypru.com/forum/-The-search-for-investigative-probity?pid=5968#pid5968]Hoody: "Pick a trend any trend??" -
Perfect timing Ol'Tom, Gobbles & "K", look here at about 02:05...
Guess what Hoody if your 'key' responsibility is to pick up on 'safety trends' well your mob seem somewhat remiss in picking up on 'taxi rash' trends. Maybe your database desktop approach needs a few tweaks. After all if it took sixteen + years to discover an un-forecast WX related 'trend', which is still to be effectively risk mitigated. So one wonders how long will it take to risk mitigate the 'taxi rash' safety issue...
On the theme of 'causal chains' and 'trend lines', remember this...
(11-02-2016, 07:06 AM)Peetwo Wrote: Here we go again -
Headline: Jetstar find a un-manifested elephant in A320 cargo hold
Background
Courtesy Aunty Pru (search 4 IP), Planetalking, ABC AM & ATSB...
(08-23-2016, 07:48 PM)Peetwo Wrote: [quote pid='4286' dateline='1463186985']
(12-05-2015, 09:51 AM)Peetwo Wrote: AAI in a parallel universe - Will Aviation Safety again be the victim of Bureaucratic obfuscation & Political expediency..
Quote:Two serious Jetstar incidents under ATSB investigation
From the 'Closing the safety loop' thread & yesterday's ABC radio 'World
Yesterday:
Quote:Loading related event involving Airbus A320, VH-VQC, Sydney Airport, NSW, on 29 October 2016
Investigation number: AO-2016-145
Investigation status: Active
Summary
The ATSB is investigating a loading related event involving a Jetstar Airbus A320, VH-VQC, at Sydney Airport, New South Wales, on 29 October 2016.
While unloading the aircraft, ground crew detected a baggage container in the cargo hold which had not been recorded on the loading manifest.
As part of the investigation, the ATSB will interview the flight and ground crew and gather additional information.
A report will be released within several months years -
General details
Date: 29 Oct 2016
Investigation status: Active
Time: 15:25 ESuT
Investigation type: Occurrence Investigation
Location (show map): Sydney Airport
Occurrence type: Loading related
State: New South Wales
Occurrence class: Operational
Occurrence category: Incident
Report status: Pending
Highest injury level: None
Expected completion: Feb 2017
Aircraft details
Aircraft manufacturer: Airbus
Aircraft model: A320-232
Aircraft registration: VH-VQC
Serial number: 3668
Operator: Jetstar Airways
Type of operation: Air Transport High Capacity
Sector: Jet
Damage to aircraft: Nil
Departure point: Gold Coast, Qld
Destination: Sydney, NSW
Last update 01 November 2016
- Wonder how long it will be before miniscule DDDD NFI Chester comes out swinging on behalf of Jet * saying that I'm merely scaring the travelling public -
Quote:DARREN CHESTER: No, I don’t think that at all, Fran. I think it’s quite irresponsible and inaccurate to be scaring the travelling public with unfounded claims about safety issues. Now…
[/quote]
From my calculation there is at least three outstanding loading event aberrations for one airline that are currently on the ATSB investigation list and the question of when these investigations will be completed is anyone's guess...
However will wonders never cease because on reading the latest desktop SIB (short investigation bulletin), I was surprised to find that there had been another 'loading duck-up' incident from the same airline that had actually been investigated and completed in just over 3 months...
Quote:Final Report
Final Report
Download Final Report
[ Download PDF: 474KB]
Listen to this PDF
Alternate: [ Download DOCX: 1.83MB]
On 8 September 2016, at about 1900 Eastern Standard Time, an Airbus A320-232 aircraft, registered VH-VFN, was being loaded at Sydney Airport, New South Wales, to operate Jetstar flight JQ820 from Sydney to Brisbane, Queensland.
The leading hand assigned to loading the aircraft had received the deadload weight statement (DWS) for the cargo from the cargo terminal operator (CTO), and printed out a copy to refer to while loading the aircraft. The DWS listed three containers of freight and the CTO had previously delivered three containers to the loading bay from their facility.
The leading hand checked the containers with those listed on the DWS. Two of the three listed containers were correct, however, the third was listed on the DWS with number 4183 and a gross weight of 240 kg, while the container on the bay was number 1483, which was subsequently found to have had a gross weight of 900 kg.
The container card associated with, and attached to the container also had number 4183 on it. The leading hand assumed that the freight handler had inadvertently transposed the first two digits of the container number from 14 to 41, entered that onto the card and transferred the error onto the DWS. The leading hand therefore amended the card and the DWS with the actual number of the container (1483), and entered that container number onto the underfloor load advice (ULA) as it was loaded onto the aircraft.
At about 1915, the leading hand completed loading the aircraft and took the paperwork, including the DWS and ULA, to the flight deck. The captain sighted the amendments and the leading hand affirmed, as they believed at the time, that the weight was correct and the container number was now correct on the DWS and ULA.
The aircraft departed on time at about 1925. The flight crew were not aware of the discrepancy during the flight and did not encounter any handling or control issues on take-off or receive any abnormal indications.
This incident highlights how being service oriented to increase efficiency can inadvertently bypass safety-related risk controls.
Now this is where IMO the dots become elephant footprints because this yet again totally inadequate report actually states in the findings...
"..The short turnaround time combined with this being the last flight to Brisbane that night, along with the assumption there was a transcription error, resulted in the leading hand not requesting a new deadload weight statement and container card, and loading the incorrect container on the aircraft..."
What's the chances if you ran that statement, as a point of comparison, over the other three J* loading incidents being investigated; the taxi rash incidents; and some of the YMML ATC aberrations and even possibly some of the min fuel cock-ups; you might find a trend line in the data so far collated...
Just saying -
MTF...P2
Ps > 2 years to 3 months? - Yeah right and elephants might fly...