Missed the (above) CW post (busy scribbling) : nevertheless, it raises some interesting points. Clearly, the prescription offered has been SOP for an operator. Perhaps not an operator who ‘routinely’ needs to make a ‘strip inspection’ when (importantly for this event) a ‘strip report’ is not provided. Scheduled services, such as ‘mail runs’ require that should a strip report not be available, then the pilot is required to conduct an assessment – prior to landing. SOP, (how to) writ in stone. Fair and reasonable stuff.
While I doubt the ‘practical’ value in the procedure described; it is at least a ‘SOP’ based on previous, though limited experience of ALA operations.
The operation being examined differs in one respect – it was a beach landing. This, believe it or not, is not a task for the ‘inexperienced’. In fact, I’d go as far as to say it is a unique ‘skill set’ which demands careful and extensive training. There is a need to ‘get down’ close and personal with ‘the beach’ for things may have changed; such as the slope of the beach, or even the reliability of the surface. To see the changes, one must get a little lower than 500’ and, importantly, one must be able to ‘read’ those changes as they can affect to landing.
Specialised operations require, no demand, clearly defined SOP and training. No doubt the accident pilot was experienced in such operations; but, was the operation conducted within the restraints of ‘sensible’ stated operating policy? It leaves two questions begging answers.
Did CASA approve/ accept the ‘operating policy? Was the accident pilot in compliance with that policy? You may even ask, “was there a policy?” If not, why not? Where was our watch-dog?
Cheers CW. Thought provoking appreciated.
P9 – “ATSB - During the period immediately prior to the engine power loss, the indicated fuel quantity was about one quarter full on the left tank gauge and slightly above half full on the right tank gauge.”
Not being ‘familiar’ with the type, that statement of fact puzzles me. Assumptions are in order here. (i) the operators stated policy on re-fuel seems to indicate that there would be an almost equal quantity of fuel in each tank. (ii) The stated operational policy was to operate with a ‘fuel feed’ from both tanks. (iii) It would, from dim, distant memory seem sensible to manage the fuel supply in such a way as to ‘balance’, within the limitations of the fuel gauges, the quantity in each tank: just common sense.
Why was the quarter tank discrepancy mentioned in the ATSB report?
Sure, it was based on the best information available to ATSB; and, in all probability, has bugger all to do with the engine quitting – but it is a part of the ‘mystery’.
Too many decades have gone by since my days in single engine Cessna aircraft for memory reliability; however, I can’t recall any warning about an ‘unbalanced’ fuel load leading to engine failure. But, it seems to be out of ‘consistency’ with either operating practice or normal system function. No idea, except it sticks out; awkward like. No doubt ATSB covered it off, just seemed “passing strange” to my addled old head.
Yes boy, shut up and sup up is a good ideal; adopted instanter. Cheers.
While I doubt the ‘practical’ value in the procedure described; it is at least a ‘SOP’ based on previous, though limited experience of ALA operations.
The operation being examined differs in one respect – it was a beach landing. This, believe it or not, is not a task for the ‘inexperienced’. In fact, I’d go as far as to say it is a unique ‘skill set’ which demands careful and extensive training. There is a need to ‘get down’ close and personal with ‘the beach’ for things may have changed; such as the slope of the beach, or even the reliability of the surface. To see the changes, one must get a little lower than 500’ and, importantly, one must be able to ‘read’ those changes as they can affect to landing.
Specialised operations require, no demand, clearly defined SOP and training. No doubt the accident pilot was experienced in such operations; but, was the operation conducted within the restraints of ‘sensible’ stated operating policy? It leaves two questions begging answers.
Did CASA approve/ accept the ‘operating policy? Was the accident pilot in compliance with that policy? You may even ask, “was there a policy?” If not, why not? Where was our watch-dog?
Cheers CW. Thought provoking appreciated.
P9 – “ATSB - During the period immediately prior to the engine power loss, the indicated fuel quantity was about one quarter full on the left tank gauge and slightly above half full on the right tank gauge.”
Not being ‘familiar’ with the type, that statement of fact puzzles me. Assumptions are in order here. (i) the operators stated policy on re-fuel seems to indicate that there would be an almost equal quantity of fuel in each tank. (ii) The stated operational policy was to operate with a ‘fuel feed’ from both tanks. (iii) It would, from dim, distant memory seem sensible to manage the fuel supply in such a way as to ‘balance’, within the limitations of the fuel gauges, the quantity in each tank: just common sense.
Why was the quarter tank discrepancy mentioned in the ATSB report?
Sure, it was based on the best information available to ATSB; and, in all probability, has bugger all to do with the engine quitting – but it is a part of the ‘mystery’.
Too many decades have gone by since my days in single engine Cessna aircraft for memory reliability; however, I can’t recall any warning about an ‘unbalanced’ fuel load leading to engine failure. But, it seems to be out of ‘consistency’ with either operating practice or normal system function. No idea, except it sticks out; awkward like. No doubt ATSB covered it off, just seemed “passing strange” to my addled old head.
Yes boy, shut up and sup up is a good ideal; adopted instanter. Cheers.