Hmmm!
“An on-board recorder would have provided valuable information to better understand the pilot’s in-flight weather-related decision-making and identify potential safety issues,” Dr Godley said.
I say Bollocks. But, would it have prevented the 'basic' cause? I think not. The weather in Southern end of Tasmania is on frequent occasions 'difficult' to manage and has been known to be so for a very long time. IMO, for the last decade it has been an easy matter to make 'video' recordings of the 'options' available for an aerodrome like Bathurst Island; to replace the time honoured written briefings and photographs. Back in the day - in 'awkward places' a series of briefings; and, as many sessions of 'hand holding' was required before a new pilot was signed off with a company 'route and strip' approvals. There was invariably a page in the briefing notes which defined (where possible) alternate routes which provided the 'best' option for various weather patterns and seasonal events. Cheap as chips - drafted by those whose experience was hard won. A most satisfactory system.
A quick look at the weather pattern for the day of the accident; the flight path selected and the possible alternate routes suggest to me that the items mentioned above may have prevented yet another VFR into IMC fatality. The ATSB have (IMO) once again failed to address the glaringly obvious cause and elected to recommend using a system which could provide a better understanding of the blindingly obvious rather than tackle one of the biggest known killers. This accident like many other similar events was totally avoidable; in no particular order the prevention could begin at company, ATSB and CASA level. I don't care who starts thinking like airmen rather than lawyers; just so long as it happens; and soon.
“An on-board recorder would have provided valuable information to better understand the pilot’s in-flight weather-related decision-making and identify potential safety issues,” Dr Godley said.
I say Bollocks. But, would it have prevented the 'basic' cause? I think not. The weather in Southern end of Tasmania is on frequent occasions 'difficult' to manage and has been known to be so for a very long time. IMO, for the last decade it has been an easy matter to make 'video' recordings of the 'options' available for an aerodrome like Bathurst Island; to replace the time honoured written briefings and photographs. Back in the day - in 'awkward places' a series of briefings; and, as many sessions of 'hand holding' was required before a new pilot was signed off with a company 'route and strip' approvals. There was invariably a page in the briefing notes which defined (where possible) alternate routes which provided the 'best' option for various weather patterns and seasonal events. Cheap as chips - drafted by those whose experience was hard won. A most satisfactory system.
A quick look at the weather pattern for the day of the accident; the flight path selected and the possible alternate routes suggest to me that the items mentioned above may have prevented yet another VFR into IMC fatality. The ATSB have (IMO) once again failed to address the glaringly obvious cause and elected to recommend using a system which could provide a better understanding of the blindingly obvious rather than tackle one of the biggest known killers. This accident like many other similar events was totally avoidable; in no particular order the prevention could begin at company, ATSB and CASA level. I don't care who starts thinking like airmen rather than lawyers; just so long as it happens; and soon.