Accidents - Overseas
#41

Interesting.
Just read it.
An "off-the-cuff" comment.

The common denominator, in my view, is that when shit happens, on total glass ships, both system managers (let's be honest - they are not aviators any more) up-front, become "individually focused" on mentally trying to figure out what is wrong.

They have to be "system centric" in their thinking, simply because that is the nature of the beast they are dealing with, especially when it goes nuts.

As a result, each one has to individually think independently to try to get on top of the problem, in their own head, first, "before" they can offer any "contribution' to the "other", who may or may not have yet got his own head around the problem.
If not, he will not be open to "inputs" that distract his thoughts, and even if he has "caught up", he still may not agree.

In short, the problem with the way the systems are designed and configured, is that they "force" each individual to "respond to the system(s)" first and foremost.

Thus, in a crisis, the crew "team" is instantly destroyed, right at the beginning.

Individually, they may, or may not, eventually sus-the-problem, but even if or when they do, the evidence of AF447 and QZ8501 (and the Air NZ test flight) clearly shows that they do not then adequately relay that to the other, if at all, let alone "act together".

Independent, uncoordinated action (or inaction) equals disaster.

In a computerised aeroplane, you can't have one guy using the keyboard, control-shifting and tabbing through the menu bar etc, whilst the other guy is simultaneously trying to do his own thing by useing the mouse !

On reflection, I suppose this is really the best argument for single pilot ops in computerised aircraft ever written !
The bean-counters will love it !

It is a global problem that will not go away.

Once upon a time, the man was the master of the machine. Not today. The machines are now the grand masters of the men.
Reply
#42

Normalised deviation and intentional, habitual non-compliance - A most disturbing tale, very well reviewed & condemned by two professional pilots.

First from Eddie Sez, courtesy code7700 Wink :
Quote:[Image: case_study_bedford.png]

[Image: joe_pilot.jpg]Eddie Sez: http://code7700.com/case_study_bedford.html

We are told that on May 31, 2014, the professional pilot world got a wake up call when two pilots crashed their Gulfstream IV and killed all on board. The NTSB rightfully calls their performance an act of "intentional, habitual noncompliance" but this is being charitable. As a pilot once qualified in the same aircraft type, I heard everything I needed to know within 24 hours, to know what had happened. The aircraft never rotated and the tire skid marks didn't begin until the last 1,500' of runway. But I didn't want to believe it.

The next week I spent five hours with a flashlight in my airplane and several manuals trying to really understand the airplane's gust lock system. (The G450 gust lock system is almost identical to that in the GIV.) I posted a lengthy page about how to really guard against mechanical failure of the gust lock: G450 Systems / Gust Lock. But I knew that wasn't it.

As the NTSB slowly but surely let details of the mishap come out, it became plainly evident that these were not professional pilots, at least not according to my definition. The incremental news releases were painful. They failed to disengage the gust lock prior to engine start. They failed to perform a flight control check after engine start and before takeoff. They failed to check elevator freedom of movement at 60 knots. They ignored a rudder limit message. They failed to reject the takeoff when takeoff thrust wasn't achieved.

When the report finally came out we learned these pilots attempted to disengage their flight control system while careening down the runway in a futile attempt to disengage the gust lock. We further learned that they did not run a single checklist (of four) between engine start and takeoff. And then we learned that in 98 percent of their previous 175 takeoffs they neglected to do a flight control check. I was speechless.

We are also told that this mishap will serve as a wake up call against pilot complacency and for stronger checklist discipline and compliance. I have my doubts. If you are reading this page you probably get it. You have been doing your flight control checks and you have been on guard against the forces of complacency that overtook this pilot team. I think about half of us get it. The other half? They aren't reading this page or any professional journals, they only give the news of this crew a passing glance. They don't believe they are at risk because nobody ever confronts them. There is a way to change that. Here's how.

This was not an act of intentional, habitual noncompliance that resulted in innocents dying, it was much worse. In the legal world there is a phrase for this (according to the Legal Online Dictionary):

Involuntary Manslaughter : The act of unlawfully killing another human being unintentionally.

I've heard from my readers that these two pilots did have their habitual, intentional noncompliance on full display with contract pilots. Contract pilots are in a difficult position. As a per diem employee, you are reluctant to point out these transgressions to the person responsible for your paycheck. But you are the leading edge in this fight. We need to shock the habitually, intentional noncompliant pilots into our world. They need to be ostracized and shamed into doing their jobs as professionals.

A word to trainers and auditors. These pilots were experts at deceiving others and that can be easy to do when you just have to put on an act for a few hours. It appears they played the role of professional pilots in the simulator and for an SMS audit. Having spent much of my career as a flight examiner and auditor I can say that you should be able to tell when the examinee is doing things by the book just for show. Maybe these guys were better actors but I think you can tell. Part of your job, I believe, is to figure this out and help us bring pilots like these back into the fold.

What follows are several pages that I think will illuminate the problem and a few steps to begin fixing things. You can start on any page, as your interest dictates, and you will eventually see everything. I would start with the mishap case study. But you will need a strong stomach.

[Image: n121jm_aerial_photograph_4_ntsb.png]

Mishap Case Study: Gulfstream IV N121JM
The NTSB report is quite good and worth reading, cover-to-cover. It spends a great deal of time on the aircraft's gust lock system, the airport's emergency response, and the survival aspects of the crash. All that is important, but for us pilots it is more important to look at professionalism, checklist philosophy, and complacency. Click the photo and we'll do that.

[Image: boeing_model_299_crash_30_oct_1935_usaf.png]

Checklist Philosophy
In 1935 a prototype of the B-17 bomber crashed on takeoff because the pilots forgot to disengage the elevator lock prior to takeoff. The program was temporarily cancelled because the Army Air Corps thought the airplane was too complicated for any pilot to operate. The Boeing Company came up with a novel idea to fix that problem: the checklist.

[Image: wild_bill_kelso.jpg]

Complacency
How do pilots of such caliber end up guilty of intentional, habitual noncompliance? They succumbed to complacency. We are all at risk. Those of us in small flight departments who fly with the same pilots over and over again are at greatest risk.

[Image: haskel_flight_examiner.png]
Line Operation Observations (LOOs)

There is a way to combat complacency and to find out if you are guilty of having become a less than professional pilot. It is simple, cost effective, and you can do it soon. All you need to do is invite another pilot, a pilot you respect, to fly along on a "live" trip (with passengers) and watch. Done correctly, this will yield more information than a simulator checkride or even a line check (14 CFR 135.299 or otherwise). You need to do this.

If you've read this far you are more than likely already in the fold, you are a professional pilot and this mishap gets under your skin. But it isn't enough to make pilots like us angry. We need to get to those that don't get it. If you have evidence someone you know is guilty of what the NTSB calls intentional, habitual non-compliance, you need to be aggressive. Confront them, present them the evidence. Shame them. If none of that works, ostracize them. Show them that this kind of behavior is worth ending a friendship. Perhaps that will shock them into the fold. Good luck.

[Image: s_choir.png]Eddie's Lawyer Advises:

Always remember that Eddie, when you get right down to it, is just a pilot. He tries to give you the facts from the source materials but maybe he got it wrong, maybe he is out of date. Sure, he warns you when he is giving you his personal techniques, but you should always follow your primary guidance (Aircraft manuals, government regulations, etc.) before listening to Eddie.

Please note: Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation has no affiliation or connection whatsoever with this website, and Gulfstream does not review, endorse, or approve any of the content included on the site. As a result, Gulfstream is not responsible or liable for your use of any materials or information obtained from this site.
     
Next from Ron Rapp, courtesy the House of Rapp  Wink :
Quote:Bedford and the Normalization of Deviance

by Ron Rapp on December 20, 2015 in Opinion Leaders • 139 Comments

Like many pilots, I read accident reports all the time. This may seem morbid to people outside “the biz”, but those of us on the inside know that learning what went wrong is an important step in avoiding the fate suffered by those aviators. And after fifteen years in the flying business, the NTSB’s recently-released report on the 2014 Gulfstream IV crash in Bedford, Massachusetts is one of the most disturbing I’ve ever laid eyes on.

If you’re not familiar with the accident, it’s quite simple to explain: the highly experienced crew of a Gulfstream IV-SP attempted to takeoff with the gust lock (often referred to as a “control lock”) engaged. The aircraft exited the end of the runway and broke apart when it encountered a steep culvert. The ensuing fire killed all aboard.

Sounds pretty open-and shut, doesn’t it? There have been dozens of accidents caused by the flight crew’s failure to remove the gust/control lock prior to flight. Professional test pilots have done it on multiple occasions, ranging from the prototype B-17 bomber in 1935 to the DHC-4 Caribou in 1992. But in this case, the NTSB report details a long series of actions and habitual behaviors which are so far beyond the pale that they defy the standard description of “pilot error”.

Just the Facts

Let me summarize the ten most pertinent errors and omissions of this incident for you:
  1. There are five checklists which must be run prior to flying. The pilots ran none of them. CVR data and pilot interviews revealed that checklists simply were not used. This was not an anomaly, it was standard operating procedure for them.
  2. Obviously the gust lock was not removed prior to flying. This is a very big, very visible, bright red handle which sticks up vertically right between the throttles and the flap handle. As the Simon & Chabris selective attention test demonstrates, it’s not necessarily hard to miss the gust lock handle protruding six inches above the rest of the center pedestal. But it’s also the precise reason we have checklists and procedures in the first place.
  3. Flight control checks were not performed on this flight, nor were they ever performed. Hundreds of flights worth of data from the FDR and pilot interviews confirm it.
  4. The crew received a Rudder Limit message indicating that the rudder’s load limiter had activated. This is abnormal. The crew saw the alert. We know this because it was verbalized. Action taken? None.
  5. The Pilot Flying (PF) was unable to push the power levers far enough forward to achieve takeoff thrust. Worse, he actually verbalized that he wasn’t able to get full power, yet continued the takeoff anyway.
  6. The Pilot Not Flying (PNF) was supposed to monitor the engines and verbally call out when takeoff power was set. He failed to perform this task.
  7. Aerodynamics naturally move the elevator up (and therefore the control column aft) as the airplane accelerates. Gulfstream pilots are trained to look for this. It didn’t happen, and it wasn’t caught by either pilot.
  8. The Pilot Flying realized the gust lock was engaged, and said so verbally several times. At this point, the aircraft was traveling 128 knots had used 3,100 feet of runway; about 5,000 feet remained. In other words, they had plenty of time to abort the takeoff. They chose to continue anyway.
  9. One of the pilots pulled the flight power shutoff handle to remove hydraulic pressure from the flight controls in an attempt to release the gust lock while accelerating down the runway. The FPSOV was not designed for this purpose, and you won’t find any G-IV manual advocating this procedure.  Because it doesn’t work.
  10. By the time they realized it wouldn’t work and began the abort attempt, it was too late. The aircraft was traveling at 162 knots (186 mph!) and only about 2,700 feet of pavement remained. The hydraulically-actuated ground spoilers — which greatly aid in stopping the aircraft by placing most of its weight back on the wheels to increase rolling resistance and braking efficiency — were no longer available because the crew had removed hydraulic power to the flight controls.

[Image: gust-lock-300x225.jpg]

Gulfstream IV gust lock (the red handle, shown here in the engaged position)


Industry Responses

Gulfstream has been sued by the victim’s families. Attorneys claim that the gust lock was defective, and that this is the primary reason for the crash. False. The gust lock is designed to prevent damage to the flight controls from wind gusts. It does that job admirably. It also prevents application of full takeoff power, but the fact that the pilot was able to physically push the power levers so far forward simply illustrates that anything can be broken if you put enough muscle into it.

The throttle portion of the gust lock may have failed to meet a technical certification requirement, but it was not the cause of the accident.  The responsibility for ensuring the gust lock is disengaged prior to takeoff lies with the pilots, not the manufacturer of the airplane.

Gulfstream pilot and Code7700 author James Albright calls the crash involuntary manslaughter. I agree. This wasn’t a normal accident chain. The pilots knew what was wrong while there was still plenty of time to stop it. They had all the facts you and I have today. They chose to continue anyway. It’s the most inexplicable thing I’ve yet seen a professional pilot do, and I’ve seen a lot of crazy things. If locked flight controls don’t prompt a takeoff abort, nothing will.

Albright’s analysis is outstanding: direct and factual. I predict there will be no shortage of articles and opinions on this accident. It will be pointed to and discussed for years as a bright, shining example of how not to operate an aircraft.

In response to the crash, former NTSB member John Goglia has called for video cameras in the cockpit, with footage to be regularly reviewed to ensure pilots are completing checklists.  Despite the good intentions, this proposal would not achieve the desired end. 

Pilots are already work in the presence of cockpit voice recorders, flight data recorders, ATC communication recording, radar data recording, and more.  If a pilot needs to be videotaped too, I’d respectfully suggest that this person should be relieved of duty.  No, the problem here is not going to be solved by hauling Big Brother further into the cockpit.

A better model would be that of the FOQA program, where information from flight data recorders is downloaded and analyzed periodically in a no-hazard environment.  The pilots, the company, and the FAA each get something valuable.  It’s less stick, more carrot.  I would also add that this sort of program is in keeping with the Fed’s recent emphasis on compliance over enforcement action.

The Normalization of Deviance

What I, and probably you, are most interested in is determining how well-respected, experienced, and accomplished pilots who’ve been through the best training the industry has to offer reached the point where their performance is so bad that a CFI wouldn’t accept it from a primary student on their very first flight.

After reading through the litany of errors and malfeasance present in this accident report, it’s tempting to brush the whole thing off and say “this could never happen to me”.  I sincerely believe doing so would be a grave mistake. It absolutely can happen to any of us, just as it has to plenty of well-trained, experienced, intelligent pilots. Test pilots. People who are much better than you or I will ever be.

But how? Clearly the Bedford pilots were capable of following proper procedures, and did so at carefully selected times: at recurrent training events, during IS-BAO audits, on checkrides, and various other occasions.

Goglia, Albright, the NTSB, and others are focusing on “complacency” as a root cause, but I believe there might be a more detailed explanation.  The true accident chain on this crash formed over a long, long period of time — decades, most likely — through a process known as the normalization of deviance.

Quote:Social normalization of deviance means that people within the organization become so much accustomed to a deviant behavior that they don’t consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed their own rules for the elementary safety. People grow more accustomed to the deviant behavior the more it occurs. To people outside of the organization, the activities seem deviant; however, people within the organization do not recognize the deviance because it is seen as a normal occurrence. In hindsight, people within the organization realize that their seemingly normal behavior was deviant.

This concept was developed by sociologist and Columbia University professor Diane Vaughan after the Challenger explosion. NASA fell victim to it in 1986, and then got hit again when the Columbia disaster occurred in 2003. If they couldn’t escape its clutches, you might wonder what hope we have. Well, for one thing, spaceflight in general and the shuttle program in particular are  specialized, experimental types of flying.  They demand acceptance of a far higher risk profile than corporate, charter, and private aviation.

I believe the first step in avoiding “normalization of deviance” is awareness, just as admitting you have a problem is the first step in recovery from substance addiction.  After all, if you can’t detect the presence of a problem, how can you possibly fix it?

There are several factors which tend to sprout normalization of deviance:
  • First and foremost is the attitude that rules are stupid and/or inefficient. Pilots, who tend to be independent Type A personalities anyway, often develop shortcuts or workarounds when the checklist, regulation, training, or professional standard seems inefficient. Example: the boss in on board and we can’t sit here for several minutes running checklists; I did a cockpit flow, so let’s just get going!
  • Sometimes pilots learn a deviation without realizing it. Formalized training only covers part of what an aviator needs to know to fly in the real world. The rest comes from senior pilots, training captains, and tribal knowledge. What’s taught is not always correct.
  • Often, the internal justification for cognizant rule breaking includes the “good” of the company or customer, often where the rule or standard is perceived as counterproductive. In the case of corporate or charter flying, it’s the argument that the passenger shouldn’t have to (or doesn’t want to) wait. I’ve seen examples of pilots starting engines while the passengers are still boarding, or while the copilot is still loading luggage. Are we at war? Under threat of physical attack? Is there some reason a 2 minute delay is going to cause the world to stop turning?
  • The last step in the process is silence. Co-workers are afraid to speak up, and understandably so. The cockpit is already a small place. It gets a lot smaller when disagreements start to brew between crew members. In the case of contract pilots, it may result in the loss of a regular customer.  Unfortunately, the likelihood that rule violations will become normalized increases if those who see them refuse to intervene.

The normalization of deviance can be stopped, but doing so is neither easy or comfortable. It requires a willingness to confront such deviance when it is seen, lest it metastasize to the point we read about in the Bedford NTSB report. It also requires buy-in from pilots on the procedures and training they receive.  When those things are viewed as “checking a box” rather than bona fide safety elements, it becomes natural to downplay their importance.

Many of you know I am not exactly a fan of the Part 121 airline scene, but it’s hard to argue with the success airlines have had in this area.  When I flew for Dynamic Aviation’s California Medfly operation here in Southern California, procedures and checklists were followed with that level of precision and dedication.  As a result, the CMF program has logged several decades of safe operation despite the high-risk nature of the job.

Whether you’re flying friends & family, pallets of cargo, or the general public, we all have the same basic goal, to aviate without ending up in an embarrassing NTSB report whose facts leave no doubt about how badly we screwed up.  The normalization of deviance is like corrosion: an insidious, ever-present, naturally-occurring enemy which will weaken and eventually destroy us.  If we let it.
Reply
#43

NTSB ANC14MA008 - A classic Reason model (causal chain). Undecided

Courtesy AvWeb:
Quote:NTSB: Chain Of Choices Behind Alaska Crash


By Mary Grady | February 29, 2016

[Image: p1acn6a1191bd615823l71us81b456.jpg]

A fatal crash in Alaska in November 2013 was initiated by one small mistake by the pilot -- a missed frequency change, which meant the lights failed to come on as expected at the destination airport -- but in the NTSB's final report, issued on Friday, the safety board said a chain of events and decisions by the pilot, the company he worked for and other company employees all contributed to the accident. "The pilot's decision to initiate a visual flight rules approach into an area of instrument meteorological conditions at night and the flight coordinators' release of the flight without discussing the risks with the pilot … resulted in the pilot experiencing a loss of situational awareness and subsequent controlled flight into terrain," the NTSB said. Witnesses found the airplane an hour after the crash, but the pilot and three passengers died, including an infant being carried by his mother. 


The pilot was flying a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan with nine passengers on board as a VFR scheduled commuter flight. The flight coordinator noted several risks -- instrument meteorological conditions, night conditions and contaminated runways at both destination airports -- but these were never discussed with the pilot, as company policy required, the NTSB said. About 18 miles from the first destination, the airplane encountered thick fog, and the pilot diverted toward an alternate airport. Post-accident examination of the pilot's radio showed that the Caravan's audio panel was still selected to the ARTCC frequency rather than the destination airport frequency, so the pilot-controlled lighting would not have activated. Witnesses on the ground saw the airplane fly over the airport at a relatively low altitude, about 300 to 400 feet. The airplane impacted the top of a ridge about 1 mile southeast of the airport at an elevation of about 425 feet MSL in a nose-high, upright attitude.
Probable cause(s), from NTSB summary:
Quote:The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:


  • The pilot's decision to initiate a visual flight rules approach into an area of instrument meteorological conditions at night and the flight coordinators' release of the flight without discussing the risks with the pilot, which resulted in the pilot experiencing a loss of situational awareness and subsequent controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were the operator's inadequate procedures for operational control and flight release and its inadequate training and oversight of operational control personnel. Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to hold the operator accountable for correcting known operational deficiencies and ensuring compliance with its operational control procedures.
 
For a point of comparison between ATSB/CASA v NTSB/FAA complimentary actions in AAI & regulatory oversights, here is the organisational & management section off the FR:
Quote:ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION


Hageland Aviation Services is a 14 CFR Part 135 air carrier that holds on-demand and commuter operations specifications and is authorized to conduct business exclusively under the business names "Hageland Aviation Services, Inc." or "Era Alaska." The company headquarters are located at the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The president, director of operations, and chief pilot in place at the time of the accident all resided in Anchorage. The director of maintenance resided in Palmer, Alaska.



At the time of the accident, Hageland operated 56 airplanes and employed about 130 pilots. The company had 12 bases located throughout Alaska at Anchorage, Palmer, Aniak, Barrow, Bethel, Deadhorse, Fairbanks, Galena, Kotzebue, Nome, St. Mary's, and Unalakleet.



According to the company's GOM, the flight coordinator had operational control for the accident flight, and the flight coordinator and pilot-in-command (PIC) were jointly responsible for preflight planning, flight delay, and release of the flight, which included the risk assessment process. Authority for operational control is specified in federal regulations, the company's operations specifications, and the procedures outlined in the GOM. In all, about 80 flight coordinators and 96 company pilots were allowed to release flights and exercise operational control on behalf of the company.



A review of the company's FAA-approved operations training manual revealed that flight coordinator training was required for personnel authorized to exercise operational control. Initial flight coordinator training consisted of 8 hours of classroom time, and recurrent training consisted of between 3 and 4 hours, depending on the student's experience. Both of the flight coordinators working at the time of the accident had completed the initial flight coordinator training.



In addition, the company used a basic risk assessment form containing a four-tiered numbered system to determine the level of operational control needed for a specific flight, with 1 being the lowest risk and 4 being the highest risk. A risk level of 1 required no risk mitigation, a level 2 required a discussion between the PIC and flight coordinator about the risks involved, a level 3 required a phone call to management for evaluation and approval, and a level 4 required canceling the flight. At the time of the accident, no signoff was required for flight coordinators or PICs on the risk assessment form, and the form was not integrated into the company manuals. According to the company, the risk assessment was part of its operational control and flight release system and was presented to and accepted by the FAA but was not incorporated into the GOM, training program, or other company manuals.



An FAA principal operations inspector in the Anchorage FSDO was assigned to oversee the company. He had been employed with the FAA for about 7 years at the time of the accident and had been temporarily assigned to the Hageland certificate from October 2012 to April 2013 and permanently assigned to the certificate in September 2013, about 3 months before the accident.



A query of the FAA Program Tracking and Reporting System found that from July 16, 2013, to October 22, 2013, FAA aviation safety inspectors conducted five operational control inspections of Hageland. The inspections noted deficiencies in the company's training, risk management, and operational control procedures.



ADDITIONAL INFORMATION



In the months following the accident, both the FAA and the operator initiated numerous safety improvements, including but not limited to, increased FAA surveillance, changes to company training programs, changes to company management, addition of established routes and increased limits for special VFR operations, and the establishment of a company operations control center to handle release and dispatch of flights.
 
Now compare that to the P9 Sunday ramble narrative on the strange, vindictive, embuggerance of Avtex sister companies Skymaster & Airtex intitiated by former CASA Bankstown Regional Manager Wodger & his dodgy mates - Second and final verse.  Dodgy  
MTF...P2 Cool
   
Reply
#44

Germanwings Final Report - Final Report - Accident on 24 March 2015 at Prads-Haute-Bléone (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, France) to the Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX operated by Germanwings

Quote:3 - CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings


General findings

..the aeroplane had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness;

..A review of the FDR and CVR data brought to light no aircraft system failures or faults that could have contributed to the accident;

..the aeroplane’s maintenance documentation did not mention any system failures that were incompatible with the flight as planned;

..the flight crew possessed the licences and ratings required to perform the flight;

..the co-pilot obtained his class 1 medical certificate without restrictions in April 2008, valid for one year;

..a depressive episode and the taking of medication to treat it delayed the renewal of the copilot’s class 1 medical certificate between April and July 2009;

..from July 2009, the co-pilot’s medical certificate was endorsed with the note « Note the special conditions/restrictions of the waiver FRA 091/09 -REV-»;

..the co-pilot’s MPL(A), issued in February 2014, was endorsed with the remark "***SIC**incl. PPL***";

..the co-pilot class 1 medical certificate was regularly revalidated or renewed from 2010 to 2014 at the Lufthansa AeMC. All the AMEs who examined him during that period were aware of the waiver FRA 091/09 and his history of depression;

..the waiver FRA 091/09 neither included the requirement for regular specific assessments by a psychiatrist nor reduced the time in-between two assessments;

..his last class 1 medical examination took place on 28 July 2014;

..no psychiatrist or psychologist was involved in the copilot’s class 1 medical certificate revalidation/renewal process after the issuance of the waiver FRA 091/09;

..the co-pilot had a loss of licence insurance that would have given him a one-time payment of about 60,000€ which corresponds approximately to his pilot training expenses, but he did not have any additional insurance covering the risk of loss of income resulting from unfitness to fly;

..peer support groups are available to Germanwings pilots.

Findings relevant to the period between December 2014 and the day of the accident

..the copilot suffered from a mental disorder with psychotic symptoms;

..anti-depressant and sleeping aid medication was prescribed to the co-pilot;

..the co-pilot did not contact any AME;

..no record was found that the co-pilot sought any support from peers;

..the co-pilot went on flying as a commercial pilot carrying passengers;

..the mental state of the co-pilot did not generate any reported concern from the pilots who flew with him;

..a private physician referred the co-pilot to a psychotherapist and psychiatrist one month before the accident and diagnosed a possible psychosis two weeks before the accident;

..the psychiatrist treating the co-pilot prescribed anti-depressant medication one month before the accident and other anti-depressants along with sleeping aid medication eight days before the accident;

..no health care providers reported any aeromedical concerns to authorities;

..no aviation authority, or any other authority, was informed of the mental state of the co-pilot.


Findings relevant to the first flight of the day of the accident (from Düsseldorf to Barcelona)

..the aircraft took off from Düsseldorf at 6 h 01;

..several altitude selections towards 100 ft were recorded during descent on the flight that preceded the accident flight, while the co-pilot was alone in the cockpit;

..the aircraft landed in Barcelona at 7 h 57.

Findings relevant to the second flight of the day of the accident (from Barcelona to Düsseldorf)

..the aeroplane took off from Barcelona bound for Düsseldorf at 9 h 00, with flight number 4U9525, and callsign GWI18G;

..the autopilot and autothrust were engaged during the climb;

..the Captain left the cockpit at the beginning of the cruise at FL380;

..the selected altitude changed from 38,000 ft to 100 ft while the co-pilot was alone in the cockpit. The aeroplane then started a continuous and controlled descent on autopilot;

..during the descent, the Marseille control centre called flight GWI18G on eleven occasions on three different frequencies, without any answer being transmitted;

..the French military defence system tried to contact flight GWI18G on three occasions during the descent, without any answer;

..the buzzer to request access to the cockpit sounded once during the descent, 4 min 07 s after the Captain had left;

..the intercom sounded in the cockpit, 4 min 40 s after the Captain had left;

..three other calls on the interphone sounded in the cockpit;

..none of the calls using the interphone elicited any answer;

..noises similar to violent blows on the cockpit doors were recorded on five occasions;

..the cockpit doors of the aircraft are designed for security reasons to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel and to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons;

..an input on the right sidestick was recorded for about 30 seconds on the FDR 1 min 33 s before the impact, not enough to disengage the autopilot;

..the autopilot and autothrust remained engaged until the end of the CVR and FDR recordings;

..the sound of breathing was recorded on the CVR until a few seconds before the end of the flight;

..before the collision with the terrain, warnings from the GPWS, Master Caution and Master Warning sounded;

..the aeroplane collided with the terrain at 9 h 41 min 06.

3.2 Causes

The collision with the ground was due to the deliberate and planned action of the co-pilot who decided to commit suicide while alone in the cockpit. The process for medical certification of pilots, in particular self-reporting in case of decrease in medical fitness between two periodic medical evaluations, did not succeed in preventing the co-pilot, who was experiencing mental disorder with psychotic symptoms, from exercising the privilege of his licence.

The following factors may have contributed to the failure of this principle:



..the co-pilot’s probable fear of losing his ability to fly as a professional pilot if he had reported his decrease in medical fitness to an AME;

..the potential financial consequences generated by the lack of specific insurance covering the risks of loss of income in case of unfitness to fly;

..the lack of clear guidelines in German regulations on when a threat to public safety outweighs the requirements of medical confidentiality.

Security requirements led to cockpit doors designed to resist forcible intrusion by unauthorized persons. This made it impossible to enter the flight compartment before the aircraft impacted the terrain in the French Alps.


4 - SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS


Note: in accordance with the provisions of Article 17.3 of Regulation No. 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, a safety recommendation in no case creates a presumption of fault or liability in an accident, serious incident or incident. The recipients of safety recommendations report to the authority in charge of safety investigations that have issued them, on the measures taken or being studied for their implementation, as provided for in Article 18 of the aforementioned regulation.

Due to the strong interdependency between matters related to the aeromedical certification of pilots, and matters related to the assistance to pilots in situations where there is risk of loss of licence, the following safety recommendations should be viewed as a single comprehensive package, and should be implemented together. Treating them in isolation, or implementing only part of them, could be counter-productive and would not generate the expected safety benefits.

4.1 Medical evaluation of pilots with mental health issues


Mitigation of the risks that pilot in-flight incapacitation represent to flight safety relies on the presence of a second pilot to take over all flying duties in the event of incapacitation of the other pilot. Mental incapacitation can make this principle fail, in particular when one pilot decides to purposely put the aircraft into an unsafe condition. This accident and other similar events identified during the investigation, including some with two crew members in the cockpit, illustrate this failure. Consequently, mental incapacitation should not be treated in the same way as physical incapacitation and a more stringent target for detecting potentially unsafe mental disorders should be targeted. Most aeromedical experts consider that in depth psychological testing to detect serious mental illness is inappropriate and that testing for psychological disorders as part of the routine periodic pilot aeromedical assessment is neither productive nor cost effective. However, it might be useful to regularly evaluate the mental health of pilots with an identified history of mental illness.

Identifying pilots who would require additional psychiatric evaluation would be improved if AMEs received additional training in mental health issues in aviation. This additional training has been already recommended by the AsMA Expert WG, UK DfT/CAA WG, BMVI WG, and the EASA Task Force.

The short time between the discontinuation of the medication and the issuance of the first medical certificate with a waiver may not have offered all the tangible elements to confirm that the mental state of the pilot was fully stabilised in July 2009. From 2010 to 2014, and in compliance with EU regulations, the co-pilot revalidated or renewed his class 1 medical certificate, which contained a limitation related to his past depressive episode, without any additional specific psychiatric evaluation.

Consequently the BEA recommends that:



EASA require that when a class 1 medical certificate is issued to an applicant with a history of psychological/psychiatric trouble of any sort, conditions for the follow-up of his/her fitness to fly be defined. This may include restrictions on the duration of the certificate or other operational limitations and the need for a specific psychiatric evaluation for subsequent revalidations or renewals. [Recommendation FRAN-2016-011]

4.2 Routine analysis of in-flight incapacitation


Currently available data does not provide accurate awareness of in-flight incapacitation risks, especially in relation to mental health issues. This lack of data, confirmed by the difficulties experienced during the investigation in collecting data on previous similar incidents or accidents, can be explained by the reluctance to report this type of event, by the lack of investigations being carried out, by ongoing judicial proceedings, and/or restrictions linked to medical confidentiality.
ICAO recommends that States should, as part of their State Safety Programme, apply basic safety management principles to the process of medical assessment of licence holders, to include as a minimum:

ˆˆa) routine analysis of in-flight incapacitation events and medical findings during medical assessments to identify areas of increased medical risk; and

ˆˆb) continuous re-evaluation of the medical assessment process to concentrate on identified areas of increased medical risk.
The Network of Analysts defined in article 14.2 of EU regulation 376/2014 may provide an appropriate forum for gathering and assessing data on medical risks at the EU level.
Consequently the BEA recommends that:

EASA include in the European Plan for Aviation Safety an action for the EU Member States to perform a routine analysis of in-flight incapacitation, with particular reference but not limited to psychological or psychiatric issues, to help with continuous re-evaluation of the medical assessment criteria, to improve the expression of risk of in-flight incapacitation in numerical terms and to encourage data collection to validate the effectiveness of these criteria. [Recommendation FRAN-2016-012]

EASA, in coordination with the Network of Analysts, perform routine analysis of in-flight incapacitation, with particular reference but not limited to psychological or psychiatric issues, to help with continuous re-evaluation of the medical assessment criteria, to improve the expression of risk of in-flight incapacitation in numerical terms and to encourage data collection to validate the effectiveness of these criteria [Recommendation FRAN-2016-013]


4.3 Mitigation of the consequences of loss of licence


The co-pilot was aware of the decrease in his own medical fitness and of the potential impact of his medication. However, he did not seek any advice from an AME, nor did he inform his employer. One of the explanations lays in the financial consequences he would have faced in case of the loss of his licence. His limited Loss of License insurance could not cover his loss of income resulting from unfitness to fly. More generally, the principle of self-declaration in case of a decrease in medical fitness is weakened when the negative consequences for a pilot of self-declaration, in terms of career, financial consequences, and loss of self-esteem, are higher than the perceived impact on safety that failing to declare would have.

Organisations, especially airlines, can reinforce self-declaration of a decrease in medical fitness of their staff, by acting on some of the consequences of unfitness, by offering motivating alternative positions and by limiting the financial consequences of a loss of licence, for example through extending loss of licence coverage.

Consequently the BEA recommends that:

.EASA ensure that European operators include in their Management Systems measures to mitigate socio-economic risks related to a loss of licence by one of their pilots for medical reasons. [Recommendation FRAN-2016-014]

.IATA encourage its Member Airlines to implement measures to mitigate the socio-economic risks related to pilots’ loss of licence for medical reasons. [Recommendation FRAN-2016-015]

4.4 Anti-depressant medication and flying status


The co-pilot did not seek any advice from an AME nor did he inform his employer in spite of his ongoing depression and associated medication.

In Germany, as in most European countries, depression is a clear reason for declaring a pilot to be unfit to fly. There is evidence of depressed professional pilots refusing medication because they would be grounded if they did so. There is also evidence of pilots taking anti-depressant medication without declaring it to aeromedical authorities, while continuing to fly.

ICAO recommends that pilots with depression, being treated with antidepressant medication, may be assessed as fit to fly if the medical assessor considers the applicant’s condition as unlikely to interfere with the safe exercise of the applicants licence and rating privileges. Similarly, (EU) regulations state that after full recovery from a mood disorder, if stable maintenance psychotropic medication is confirmed, a fit assessment should require a multi-pilot limitation. Some National Aviation Authorities allow aircrew to continue to fly while taking specific medication to treat depression. Such programs exist in Australia, the UK, Canada and the USA. The modalities differ between countries but all include specific medical assessment, a list of accepted medication (among selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors named SSRI), whose possible side effects have been shown to be compatible with flying duties, clinical reviews and requirements for mental stability before being allowed to return to flying duties. Authorising controlled medication ensures that pilots can be monitored more closely. It reinforces self-declaration by allowing pilots to declare any depression without fear being grounded for an excessively long time. This counteracts the possibility that pilots might choose, if left to their own devices, to fly while depressed, with or without adapted medication. However, even if allowed by EU regulations, not all European countries have clearly-established policies and technical guidance for the use by pilots of anti-depressant medication.


Consequently the BEA recommends that:

.EASA define the modalities under which EU regulations would allow pilots to be declared fit to fly while taking anti-depressant medication under medical supervision. [Recommendation FRAN-2016-016]

4.5 Balance between medical confidentiality and public safety

Medical confidentiality is a key principle in ensuring trust between doctors and patients. The fact that people are encouraged to seek advice and treatment, with the guarantee that their personal information will be kept confidential, benefits society as a whole as well as the individual. However, the public interest may also be served by disclosing information to protect individuals or society from risks of serious harm. Personal information should, therefore, be disclosed in the public interest even without patients’ consent, if the benefits to an individual or to society of the disclosure outweigh both the public and the patient’s interest in keeping the information confidential. The investigation has shown that provisions allowing health care providers to breach medical confidentiality exist in most States, in particular in Europe, under certain conditions and when it is in the interest of preserving public safety or preventing imminent danger. EU regulations authorize the processing of medical data if it is required for the purpose of medical diagnosis and if the person processing the data is under an obligation of secrecy. Some States have dedicated provisions applying to pilots whose health issues need to be reported to the relevant authorities if they threaten public safety. Other States, like Germany, have only general provisions applying to any citizen and to any imminent danger. In those States, such provisions are regularly outweighed, in the decision process of doctors, by provisions related to medical confidentiality, which are perceived as more important and which contain possible legal consequences if they are violated.

Furthermore, the absence of a formal definition of "imminent danger" and "threat to public safety" drives doctors to adopt a conservative approach and may lead them not to report their potential concerns to authorities.

The investigation has shown that a private physician referred the co-pilot to a psychotherapist and psychiatrist one month before the accident and diagnosed possible psychosis two weeks before the accident. It also showed that the psychiatrist treating him prescribed anti-depressant medication one month before the accident and other anti-depressants, along with sleeping aid medication, eight days before the accident. None of these health care providers reported any aeromedical concerns to authorities. It is likely that breaching medical confidentiality was perceived by these doctors as presenting more risks, in particular for themselves, than not reporting the co-pilot to authorities.


Combining the guarantee of knowing the occupation of their patients who are pilots, with regulations allowing and/or mandating health care providers to inform authorities in case pilot unfitness threatens public safety, would create an environment favourable for doctors to report to authorities. The various questions relating to the balance between public good and confidentiality favour a global approach that addresses every area of concern, in order to provide better protection for all parties (the patient, the doctor, the public). It is therefore important that evolutions in the regulations address the overall issue of medical confidentiality, but also the risks that pilots・ health issues may pose to public safety. Recommendations about the appropriate balance between patient confidentiality and the protection of public safety have already been made by the AsMA Expert WG, UK DfT/CAA WG, and the EASA Task Force.
Consequently the BEA recommends that:

The World Health Organization develop guidelines for its Member States in order to help them define clear rules to require health care providers to inform the appropriate authorities when a specific patient’s health is very likely to impact public safety, including when the patient refuses to consent, without legal risk to the health care provider, while still protecting patients’ private data from unnecessary disclosure. [Recommendation FRAN-2016-017]

The European Commission in coordination with EU Member States define clear rules to require health care providers to inform the appropriate authorities when a specific patient’s health is very likely to impact public safety, including when the patient refuses to consent, without legal risk to the health care provider, while still protecting patients’ private data from unnecessary disclosure. These rules should take into account the specificities of pilots, for whom the risk of losing their medical certificate, being not only a financial matter but also a matter related to their passion for flying, may deter them from seeking appropriate health care [Recommendation FRAN-2016-018]

Without waiting for action at EU level, the BMVI and the Bundesärztekammer (BÄK) edit guidelines for all German health care providers to:



remind them of the possibility of breaching medical confidentiality and reporting to the LBA or another appropriate authority if the health of a commercial pilot presents a potential public safety risk.

define what can be considered as "imminent danger" and "threat to public safety" when dealing with pilots’ health issues

limit the legal consequence for health care providers breaching medical confidentiality in good faith to lessen or prevent a threat to public safety [Recommendation FRAN-2016-019 and FRAN-2016-020]
 
4.6 Promotion of pilot support programmes


The investigation has shown that in spite of the onset of symptoms that could be consistent with a psychotic depressive episode and the fact that he was taking medication that made him unfit to fly, the co-pilot did not seek any aeromedical advice before exercising the privilege of his licence. This is likely the result of difficulties in overcoming the stigma that is attached to mental illness, and the prospects of losing his medical certification and therefore his job as a pilot. Self-declaration in case pilots experience a decrease in medical fitness or starting a regular course of medication can be fostered if psychological support programs are available to crews who experience emotional or mental health issues. Existing programs, overseen by peers, provide a "safe zone" for pilots by minimizing career jeopardy as well as the stigma of seeking mental health assistance. These programs are sometimes underutilized for reasons such as: employees questioning the confidentiality of the service; the perception that a stigma is attached to asking for professional help with personal matters; or lack of unawareness of the program and its capabilities. Management of a decrease in medical fitness can be optimized by including the intervention of peers and/or family members. AsMA recommends extending awareness of mental health issues beyond the physician to facilitate greater recognition, reporting and discussion. Peer support systems are well implemented in major airlines, particularly in North America, where just culture principles are well known. However, these types of systems may pose significant implementation challenges when they are applied to smaller sized organisations that are less mature and have a different cultural background. For these peer support groups to be efficient, crews and/or their families need to be reassured that mental health issues will not be stigmatized, concerns raised will be handled confidentially and that pilots will be well supported, with the aim of allowing them to return to flying duties. The promotion of pilot support programs has already been recommended by AsMA Expert WG, UK DfT/CAA WG, BMVI WG, and the EASA Task Force.

Consequently the BEA recommends that:

EASA ensure that European operators promote the implementation of peer support groups to provide a process for pilots, their families and peers to report and discuss personal and mental health issues, with the assurance that information will be kept in-confidence in a just-culture work environment, and that pilots will be supported as well as guided with the aim of providing them with help, ensuring flight safety and allowing them to return to flying duties, where applicable. [Recommendation FRAN-2016-021]
Courtesy of AVWeb summary of findings:
Quote:Germanwings Report: Airlines Should Track Pilots’ Mental Health


By Mary Grady | March 14, 2016

[Image: p1adr63pgh18or1qlhlniham1u3q6.jpg]

Officials at the Germanwings airline couldn’t have done anything to prevent last year’s fatal crash, according to the final report (PDF) issued yesterday, because they were not informed by anyone — “neither the co-pilot himself, nor by anybody else, such as a physician, a colleague, or family member" — that Andreas Lubitz was suffering from mental-health problems at the time of the flight. "In addition, the mental state of the co-pilot did not generate any concerns reported by the pilots who flew with him," according to the report. In the four months leading up to the crash, at least six doctors saw Lubitz for his mental-health problems, but none of them informed the airline. Changes should be made to patient confidentiality rules to ensure that authorities are informed when public safety is at risk, according to the analysis by France’s safety bureau, Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyses.

Also, aviation authorities need to do a better job of monitoring pilots with psychological problems and be clear about follow-up requirements, investigators said. The report also recommended that airlines should mitigate the risks taken by pilots who self-report disabling problems, by offering loss-of-income insurance. EASA also should routinely analyze all reports of in-flight pilot incapacitation and continuously re-evaluate its medical assessment criteria, the report recommended. The investigators also said EASA should ensure that airline operators provide peer-support groups to pilots and their families, where personal and mental-health issues can be discussed with an assurance of confidentiality, to help ensure that pilots will get help when they need it.

Investigators also found that after Lubitz was treated for a depressive episode in 2009, a note citing a special conditions/restrictions waiver was added to his medical certificate. However, no follow-up or specific assessment was required for subsequent medical checks. The certificate was revalidated or renewed annually from 2010 to 2014, but no psychologist or psychiatrist was involved in that process. Lubitz, the first officer on Germanwings flight 9525 on March 24, 2015, locked his captain out of the cockpit and deliberately flew the Airbus A320 into a mountainside, killing all 150 people on board.

MTF...P2 Sad
Reply
#45

Just a few ICAO documents:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/kjgb26y42vurh3...1.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/bh4r9hmqbq3oqc...n.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ob780bo9nf9tml...g.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ck4o0j3znj1j7h...s.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/5yr6mecyvetwdo...n.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/o27u4xp3uqlhrw...n.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/s6nu3a1lygkzo1...g.pdf?dl=0


https://www.dropbox.com/s/40ln796spbfsbw...l.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/k99d5z0hswba3u...n.pdf?dl=0
Reply
#46

ATC radar & blackbox records another hole in the cheese??

This article on the MH17 AAI & the continuing JIT criminal investigation (by Robert Parry courtesy of Consortium News), brings into question a growing concern that individual States & DIPs in authority, through domestic laws & international diplomacy (with self-interest and/or self-preservation), subvert their obligations as signatories to the Chicago Convention to uphold the intent & purpose of ICAO Annexures 13 & 19:
Quote:The Ever-Curiouser MH-17 Case

March 16, 2016
[/url][url=http://www.tumblr.com/share/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fconsortiumnews.com%2F2016%2F03%2F16%2Fthe-ever-curiouser-mh-17-case%2F&name=The+Ever-Curiouser+MH-17+Case]

Exclusive: The shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine has served as a potent propaganda club against Russia but the U.S. government is hiding key evidence that could solve the mystery, writes Robert Parry.

By Robert Parry

The curious mystery surrounding the shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014, gets more curious and more curious as the U.S. government and Dutch investigators balk at giving straightforward answers to the simplest of questions even when asked by the families of the victims.

Adding to the mystery Dutch investigators have indicated that the Dutch Safety Board did not request radar information from the United States, even though Secretary of State John Kerry indicated just three days after the crash that the U.S. government possessed data that pinpointed the location of the suspected missile launch that allegedly downed the airliner, killing all 298 people onboard.

[Image: malaysia-airways-boeing777-300x200.jpg]

A Malaysia Airways’ Boeing 777 like the one that crashed in eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014. (Photo credit: Aero Icarus from Zürich, Switzerland)

Although Kerry claimed that the U.S. government knew the location almost immediately, Dutch investigators now say they hope to identify the spot sometime “in the second half of the year,” meaning that something as basic as the missile-launch site might remain unknown to the public more than two years after the tragedy.

The families of the Dutch victims, including the father of a Dutch-American citizen, have been pressing for an explanation about the slow pace of the investigation and the apparent failure to obtain relevant data from the U.S. and other governments.

I spent time with the family members in early February at the Dutch parliament in The Hague as opposition parliamentarians, led by Christian Democrat Pieter Omtzigt, unsuccessfully sought answers from the government about the absence of radar data and other basic facts.

When answers have been provided to the families and the public, they are often hard to understand, as if to obfuscate what information the investigation possesses or doesn’t possess. For instance, when I asked the U.S. State Department whether the U.S. government had supplied the Dutch with radar data and satellite images, I received the following response, attributable to “a State Department spokesperson”: “While I won’t go into the details of our law enforcement cooperation in the investigation, I would note that Dutch officials said March 8 that all information asked of the United States has been shared.”

I wrote back thanking the spokesperson for the response, but adding: “I must say it seems unnecessarily fuzzy. Why can’t you just say that the U.S. government has provided the radar data cited by Secretary Kerry immediately after the tragedy? Or the U.S. government has provided satellite imagery before and after the shootdown? Why the indirect and imprecise phrasing? …

“I’ve spent time with the Dutch families of the victims, including the father of a U.S.-Dutch citizen, and I can tell you that they are quite disturbed by what they regard as double-talk and stalling. I would like to tell them that my government has provided all relevant data in a cooperative and timely fashion. But all I get is this indirect and imprecise word-smithing.”

The State Department spokesperson wrote back, “I understand your questions, and also the importance of the view of these families so devastated by this tragedy. However, I am going to have to leave our comments as below.”

Propaganda Value
This lack of transparency, of course, has a propaganda value since it leaves in place the widespread public impression that ethnic Russian rebels and Russian President Vladimir Putin were responsible for the 298 deaths, a rush to judgment that Secretary Kerry and other senior U.S. officials (and the Western news media) encouraged in July 2014.

[Image: vladimirputin-208x300.jpg]

Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Once that impression took hold there has been little interest in Official Washington to clarify the mystery especially as evidence has emerged implicating elements of the Ukrainian military. For instance, Dutch intelligence has reported (and U.S. intelligence has implicitly confirmed) that the only operational Buk anti-aircraft missile systems in eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014, were under the control of the Ukrainian military.

In a Dutch report released last October, the Netherlands’ Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) reported that the only anti-aircraft weapons in eastern Ukraine capable of bringing down MH-17 at 33,000 feet belonged to the Ukrainian government.

MIVD made that assessment in the context of explaining why commercial aircraft continued to fly over the eastern Ukrainian battle zone in summer 2014. MIVD said that based on “state secret” information, it was known that Ukraine possessed some older but “powerful anti-aircraft systems” and “a number of these systems were located in the eastern part of the country.”

The intelligence agency added that the rebels lacked that capability: “Prior to the crash, the MIVD knew that, in addition to light aircraft artillery, the Separatists also possessed short-range portable air defence systems (man-portable air-defence systems; MANPADS) and that they possibly possessed short-range vehicle-borne air-defence systems. Both types of systems are considered surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Due to their limited range they do not constitute a danger to civil aviation at cruising altitude.”

One could infer a similar finding by reading a U.S. “Government Assessment” released by the Director of National Intelligence on July 22, 2014, five days after the crash, seeking to cast suspicion on the ethnic Russian rebels and Putin by noting military equipment that Moscow had provided the rebels. But most tellingly the list did not include Buk anti-aircraft missiles. In other words, in the context of trying to blame the rebels and Putin, U.S. intelligence could not put an operational Buk system in the rebels’ hands.

So, perhaps the most logical suspicion would be that the Ukrainian military, then engaged in an offensive in the east and fearing a possible Russian invasion, moved its Buk missile systems up to the front and an undisciplined crew fired a missile at a suspected Russian aircraft, bringing down MH-17 by accident.

That was essentially what I was told by a source who had been briefed by U.S. intelligence analysts in July and August 2014. [See, for instance, Consortiumnews.com’s “Flight 17 Shoot-Down Scenario Shifts” and “The Danger of an MH-17 Cold Case.”]

But Ukraine is a principal participant in the Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team (JIT), which has been probing the MH-17 case, and thus the investigation suffers from a possible conflict of interest since Ukraine would prefer that the world’s public perception of the MH-17 case continue to blame Putin. Under the JIT’s terms, any of the five key participants (The Netherlands, Ukraine, Australia, Belgium and Malaysia) can block release of information.

The interest in keeping Putin on the propaganda defensive is shared by the Obama administration which used the furor over the MH-17 deaths to spur the European Union into imposing economic sanctions on Russia.

In contrast, clearing the Russians and blaming the Ukrainians would destroy a carefully constructed propaganda narrative which has stuck black hats on Putin and the ethnic Russian rebels and white hats on the U.S.-backed government of Ukraine, which seized power after a putsch that overthrew elected pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych on Feb. 22, 2014.

Accusations against Russia have also been fanned by propaganda outlets, such as the British-based Bellingcat site, which has collaborated with Western mainstream media to continue pointing the finger of blame at Moscow and Putin – as the Dutch investigators drag their heels and refuse to divulge any information that would clarify the case.

Letter to the Families
Perhaps the most detailed – although still hazy – status report on the investigation came in a recent letter from JIT chief prosecutor Fred Westerbeke to the Dutch family members. The letter acknowledged that the investigators lacked “primary raw radar images” which could have revealed a missile or a military aircraft in the vicinity of MH-17.

[Image: buk-missiles-300x225.jpg]

Russian-made Buk anti-aircraft missile battery.

Ukrainian authorities said all their primary radar facilities were shut down for maintenance and only secondary radar, which would show commercial aircraft, was available. Russian officials have said their radar data suggest that a Ukrainian warplane might have fired on MH-17 with an air-to-air missile, a possibility that is difficult to rule out without examining primary radar which has so far not been available. Primary radar data also might have picked up a ground-fired missile, Westerbeke wrote.

“Raw primary radar data could provide information on the rocket trajectory,” Westerbeke’s letter said. “The JIT does not have that information yet. JIT has questioned a member of the Ukrainian air traffic control and a Ukrainian radar specialist. They explained why no primary radar images were saved in Ukraine.” Westerbeke said investigators are also asking Russia about its data.

Westerbeke added that the JIT had “no video or film of the launch or the trajectory of the rocket.” Nor, he said, do the investigators have satellite photos of the rocket launch.
“The clouds on the part of the day of the downing of MH17 prevented usable pictures of the launch site from being available,” he wrote. “There are pictures from just before and just after July 17th and they are an asset in the investigation.” According to intelligence sources, the satellite photos show several Ukrainian military Buk missile systems in the area.

[Image: kerry-rt-presser-4-24-14-300x196.jpg]
Secretary of State John Kerry denounces Russia’s RT network as a “propaganda bullhorn” during remarks on April 24, 2014.

Why the investigation’s data is so uncertain has become a secondary mystery in the MH-17 whodunit. During an appearance on NBC’s “Meet the Press” on July 20, 2014, three days after the crash, Secretary Kerry declared, “we picked up the imagery of this launch.

We know the trajectory. We know where it came from. We know the timing. And it was exactly at the time that this aircraft disappeared from the radar.”

But this U.S. data has never been made public. In the letter, Westerbeke wrote, “The American authorities have data, that come from their own secret services, which could provide information on the trajectory of the rocket. This information was shared in secret with the [Dutch] MIVD.” Westerbeke added that the information may be made available as proof in a criminal case as an “amtsbericht” or “official statement.”

Yet, despite the U.S. data, Westerbeke said the location of the launch site remains uncertain. Last October, the Dutch Safety Board placed the likely firing location within a 320-square-kilometer area that covered territory both under government and rebel control. (The safety board did not seek to identify which side fired the fateful missile.)
By contrast, Almaz-Antey, the Russian arms manufacturer of the Buk systems, conducted its own experiments to determine the likely firing location and placed it in a much smaller area near the village of Zaroshchenskoye, about 20 kilometers west of the Dutch Safety Board’s zone and in an area under Ukrainian government control.

Westerbeke wrote, “Raw primary radar data and the American secret information are only two sources of information for the determination of the launch site. There is more. JIT collects evidence on the basis of telephone taps, locations of telephones, pictures, witness statements and technical calculations of the trajectory of the rocket. The calculations are made by the national air and space laboratory on the basis of the location of MH17, the damage pattern on the wreckage and the special characteristics of the rockets. JIT does extra research on top of the [Dutch Safety Board] research. On the basis of these sources, JIT gets ever more clarity on the exact launch site. In the second half of the year we expect exact results.”

[Image: n-QUINN-SCHANSMAN-628x314-300x150.jpg]
Quinn Schansman, a dual U.S.-Dutch citizen killed aboard Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, 2014. (Photo from Facebook)

Meanwhile, the U.S. government continues to stonewall a request from Thomas J. Schansman, the father of Quinn Schansman, the only American citizen to die aboard MH-17, to Secretary Kerry to release the U.S. data that Kerry has publicly cited.

Quinn Schansman, who had dual U.S.-Dutch citizenship, boarded MH-17 along with 297 other people for a flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur on July 17, 2014. The 19-year-old was planning to join his family for a vacation in Indonesia.

In a letter to Kerry dated Jan. 5, 2016, Thomas J. Schansman noted Kerry’s remarks at a press conference on Aug. 12, 2014, when the Secretary of State said about the Buk anti-aircraft missile suspected of downing the plane: “We saw the take-off. We saw the trajectory. We saw the hit. We saw this aeroplane disappear from the radar screens. So there is really no mystery about where it came from and where these weapons have come from.”

Although U.S. consular officials in the Netherlands indicated that Kerry would respond personally to the request, Schansman told me this week that he had not yet received a reply from Kerry.

Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s. You can buy his latest book, America’s Stolen Narrative, either in print here or as an e-book (from Amazon and barnesandnoble.com
 
Perhaps the time has come to review certain provisions of the ICAO SARPs, to oblige ICAO signatory States to protect & preserve all ATC radar, satellite,  CVR/FDR and/or operational cyber records to a secure standard that ensures no outside contamination/alteration/redaction until the State AAI authority has completed their investigation.
MTF...P2 Tongue
      
Reply
#47

From the article;

"Secretary of State John Kerry denounces Russia’s RT network as a “propaganda bullhorn” during remarks on April 24, 2014"

Firstly, I wouldn't believe a word that comes out of Kerry's oblong dribbling face. What, does he expect us to believe himself and CNBC?? Ha.

Secondly, don't be too quick to dismiss RT News. I don't believe it is a full propaganda station at all. They have some brilliant news pieces, the type of stories that expose the truth and shame the charlatans. One example is how American media is always bullshitting about how well they are doing financially....cough...cough...splutter. That's CNBC for you. On the other hand listen to what RT News Max Keiser and guests like Gerald Celente have to say about both the American and world economy - a completely different story. This is just one example.

I'm not a supporter of all things Putin, and I've thought all along that the Ruskys armed Ukranian factions with some high tech kit, equipment that was too complex for a bunch of Ukranian rednecks who knew not what they were shooting at on that fateful day. Their target in their minds was not a Malaysian aircraft. It was a mistake. That doesn't absolve them from murdering all on board that Malaysian aircraft, not one little bit. But you won't convince me that those hacks in the Ukraine deliberately plotted, planned, targeted and intended to specifically take out MH 17 on that fateful day. Bollocks.
Reply
#48

FlyDubai 737 crash


No Aussies aboard crashed plane in Russia

March 19, 2016 5:59pm
AAP

Authorities say no Australians were aboard a plane that crashed in Russia, killing 62 people.
No Aussies aboard crashed plane in Russia

The Department of Foreign Affairs has confirmed no Australians were aboard a plane that crashed in southern Russia, killing all 62 aboard.

"We extend our condolences to the families of those involved in the FlyDubai Boeing 737 plane crash which occurred in Rosov-on-Don, Russia," a spokesperson said in a statement.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Saturday that assistance to the relatives of those killed was the priority, local news agencies cited Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying.

"The head of the state said that now the main thing is to work with the families and the loved ones of those who had died," Peskov was quoted as saying.

The Investigative Committee of Russia said it is looking into pilot error or a technical failure as the most likely causes for the crash, Russian news agencies reported.

CCTV footage;

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=9OtRZvwfAgA

I tried to view the footage a few times in slow motion, looking at the aircraft lights/beacon position in the air and in the reflection on the ground. It is only a split second so for me with my eyesight it is very hard to gauge. But it looks like she had quite a steep nose down attitude, wings rolling slightly from side to side. The crew might have been really struggling with her, doesn't look like a stall due to the nose down pitch. Weather was also poor and it was her second attempt.

I won't speculate anymore from here but I don't think it will be a protracted investigation.

R.I.P all 62 souls. In gods speed.
Reply
#49

(03-19-2016, 09:29 PM)Gobbledock Wrote:  FlyDubai 737 crash


No Aussies aboard crashed plane in Russia

March 19, 2016 5:59pm
AAP

Authorities say no Australians were aboard a plane that crashed in Russia, killing 62 people.
No Aussies aboard crashed plane in Russia

The Department of Foreign Affairs has confirmed no Australians were aboard a plane that crashed in southern Russia, killing all 62 aboard.

"We extend our condolences to the families of those involved in the FlyDubai Boeing 737 plane crash which occurred in Rosov-on-Don, Russia," a spokesperson said in a statement.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Saturday that assistance to the relatives of those killed was the priority, local news agencies cited Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying.

"The head of the state said that now the main thing is to work with the families and the loved ones of those who had died," Peskov was quoted as saying.

The Investigative Committee of Russia said it is looking into pilot error or a technical failure as the most likely causes for the crash, Russian news agencies reported.

CCTV footage;

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=9OtRZvwfAgA



P2 comment - The rate of descent is scary stuff in those video clips, it would also appear that the aircraft was already on fire before smashing into the ground:

Quote:FlyDubai plane was on fire before it crashed in Russia (video)

Plane circled for two hours before it crashed

By Roshina Jowaheer  Mar 20, 2016
[url=http://travel.aol.co.uk/2016/03/20/flydubai-plane-on-fire-before-crash-airport-russsiasia-video/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter#comments][/url]
Updated: Mar 20th 2016 11:06 AM

[Image: 1plane1.jpg]YouTube


I tried to view the footage a few times in slow motion, looking at the aircraft lights/beacon position in the air and in the reflection on the ground. It is only a split second so for me with my eyesight it is very hard to gauge. But it looks like she had quite a steep nose down attitude, wings rolling slightly from side to side. The crew might have been really struggling with her, doesn't look like a stall due to the nose down pitch. Weather was also poor and it was her second attempt.

I won't speculate anymore from here but I don't think it will be a protracted investigation.

R.I.P all 62 souls. In gods speed.
Reply
#50

(03-21-2016, 07:01 AM)Peetwo Wrote:  
(03-19-2016, 09:29 PM)Gobbledock Wrote:  CCTV footage;

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=9OtRZvwfAgA



P2 comment - The rate of descent is scary stuff in those video clips, it would also appear that the aircraft was already on fire before smashing into the ground:


Quote:FlyDubai plane was on fire before it crashed in Russia (video)

Plane circled for two hours before it crashed

By Roshina Jowaheer  Mar 20, 2016
[/url]
Updated: Mar 20th 2016 11:06 AM

[Image: 1plane1.jpg]YouTube



R.I.P all 62 souls. In gods speed.

Update - Courtesy NY Times:
Quote:[url=http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/world/europe/flydubai-crash-russia.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&smtyp=cur&_r=0]Possible Pilot Error Is Cited in FlyDubai Crash in Russia

By IVAN NECHEPURENKOMARCH 26, 2016

MOSCOW — An error by a crew member committed during adverse weather conditions may have been responsible for the crash of a passenger jet last week in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don that killed 62 people, a report broadcast by Russian state television said.

The Rossiya-1 television channel said late Friday that it had obtained a transcript of the pilot interactions a minute before the FlyDubai passenger jet nose-dived to the ground, killing all the passengers and crew members onboard. A source in the investigative commission with access to flight recorders provided the channel with the transcript.

The channel emphasized that its interpretation of the transcript could not be considered the official version of what had happened.

Flying from Dubai, the plane was not able to land on its first attempt because of heavy rain and wind, and it entered a holding pattern for two hours. On the second landing attempt, the crew decided to pull up and try again, but 40 seconds after beginning the ascent, one of the pilots switched off the autopilot, possibly in response to sudden turbulence, the report said. Seconds after the autopilot was turned off, the plane plunged to the ground.

“Don’t worry,” one of the pilots says, according to the transcript, which was translated into Russian, seconds before saying, “Don’t do that!” The last words recorded were repeated calls to “Pull up!” Only “inhuman screams” could be heard for the last six seconds.

The television channel cited experts who suggested that by turning off the autopilot, the pilots were trying to pull the plane back to a horizontal position. But at that moment a stabilizing fin at the jet’s tail was switched on.

With the fin activated, “the elevator is no longer working and the plane practically does not react to the pilot’s control panel,” the report said. The channel suggested that the pilot could have accidentally hit the button that activated the fin because of his reported “chronic fatigue.”

Russian investigators have opened a criminal inquiry into the crash. On Thursday, the investigative commission said that the flight recorders were in good condition and were being deciphered. The first preliminary reports of the commission could be made public within the next two weeks, they said.

MTF...P2 Angel
Reply
#51

(03-27-2016, 03:13 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  Update - Courtesy NY Times:

Quote:Possible Pilot Error Is Cited in FlyDubai Crash in Russia

By IVAN NECHEPURENKO MARCH 26, 2016

MOSCOW — An error by a crew member committed during adverse weather conditions may have been responsible for the crash of a passenger jet last week in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don that killed 62 people, a report broadcast by Russian state television said.

The Rossiya-1 television channel said late Friday that it had obtained a transcript of the pilot interactions a minute before the FlyDubai passenger jet nose-dived to the ground, killing all the passengers and crew members onboard. A source in the investigative commission with access to flight recorders provided the channel with the transcript.

The channel emphasized that its interpretation of the transcript could not be considered the official version of what had happened.

Flying from Dubai, the plane was not able to land on its first attempt because of heavy rain and wind, and it entered a holding pattern for two hours. On the second landing attempt, the crew decided to pull up and try again, but 40 seconds after beginning the ascent, one of the pilots switched off the autopilot, possibly in response to sudden turbulence, the report said. Seconds after the autopilot was turned off, the plane plunged to the ground.

“Don’t worry,” one of the pilots says, according to the transcript, which was translated into Russian, seconds before saying, “Don’t do that!” The last words recorded were repeated calls to “Pull up!” Only “inhuman screams” could be heard for the last six seconds.

The television channel cited experts who suggested that by turning off the autopilot, the pilots were trying to pull the plane back to a horizontal position. But at that moment a stabilizing fin at the jet’s tail was switched on.

With the fin activated, “the elevator is no longer working and the plane practically does not react to the pilot’s control panel,” the report said. The channel suggested that the pilot could have accidentally hit the button that activated the fin because of his reported “chronic fatigue.”

Russian investigators have opened a criminal inquiry into the crash. On Thursday, the investigative commission said that the flight recorders were in good condition and were being deciphered. The first preliminary reports of the commission could be made public within the next two weeks, they said.

Further update - 28 March 2016

Quote:FlyDubai air crash in Russia: Pilots fight in cockpit before crash

28.03.2016 | Source:
Pravda.Ru
 
[Image: 57642.jpeg]


AP photo
The analysis of flight recorders of the Boeing 737-800 passenger jetliner that crashed in Russia's Rostov showed that the pilot error was the most plausible version of the tragedy that killed all 62 on board.

 
The Boeing-737-800 of Fly Dubai airline crashed in Rostov-on-Don in Russia's south on March 19. The aircraft crashed while landing, killing all 55 passengers and seven crew members.

During an attempt to take the plane higher after an unsuccessful landing approach, the  pilot apparently lifted the nose of the aircraft too much, thus making the plane lose speed and altitude. A conflict sparked in the cockpit; one pilot shouted at his partner: "Where are you flying? Stop!" Yet, his attempts to "win" the wheel only made matters worse.

According to experts, the aircraft made two landing approaches in an automatic mode. Strong winds interfered into the so-called autothrottle system of the aircraft that ensures the flight of the airplane on the predetermined path of descent or take off during autopiloting.

The crew decided to switch to the manual mode for another landing approach. While flying at an altitude of about 270 meters, about 6 km far from the runway, one of the pilots pressed the TOGA key (Take off. Go around) that commands the aircraft to go for another approach and turned off the autopilot, taking full control of the aircraft. 

According to the data obtained from flight recorders, the pilot did not take into account the specific transition of the Boeing 737 from landing into climb mode.

When the speed of the aircraft started plummeting, a conflict between the pilots occurred in the cockpit. The first pilot tried to get up to speed and put the engines into the takeoff mode. His partner believed that one should lower the nose of the Boeing first. He was shouting: "Stop. Where? Stop! Stop!" while trying to stop the climb, pushing his wheel away. 

As a result, the on-board computer of the aircraft started receiving electrical impulses from the manipulations that the pilots were making at both wheels. The crew began to act in concert only when the uncontrollable Boeing with 62 people on board was diving to the ground at the speed of 325 km/h, at an angle of about 45 degrees. The pilots were only screaming during the seconds before the aircraft hit the ground.
 
FlyDubai airline was founded seven years ago by the government of the United Arab Emirates. The airline is based at the Dubai International Airport. The low-cost airline has not had air disasters  before. The company started with a few aircraft before it expanded its fleet to 50 Boeing 737-800 aircraft. In November 2013, FlyDubai ordered another 111 Boeing aircraft.
- See more at: http://www.pravdareport.com/news/hotspot...mV9rI.dpuf
 

Reply
#52

(03-29-2016, 07:05 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  
(03-27-2016, 03:13 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  Update - Courtesy NY Times:



Quote:Possible Pilot Error Is Cited in FlyDubai Crash in Russia

By IVAN NECHEPURENKO MARCH 26, 2016

MOSCOW — An error by a crew member committed during adverse weather conditions may have been responsible for the crash of a passenger jet last week in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don that killed 62 people, a report broadcast by Russian state television said.

The Rossiya-1 television channel said late Friday that it had obtained a transcript of the pilot interactions a minute before the FlyDubai passenger jet nose-dived to the ground, killing all the passengers and crew members onboard. A source in the investigative commission with access to flight recorders provided the channel with the transcript.

The channel emphasized that its interpretation of the transcript could not be considered the official version of what had happened.

Flying from Dubai, the plane was not able to land on its first attempt because of heavy rain and wind, and it entered a holding pattern for two hours. On the second landing attempt, the crew decided to pull up and try again, but 40 seconds after beginning the ascent, one of the pilots switched off the autopilot, possibly in response to sudden turbulence, the report said. Seconds after the autopilot was turned off, the plane plunged to the ground.

“Don’t worry,” one of the pilots says, according to the transcript, which was translated into Russian, seconds before saying, “Don’t do that!” The last words recorded were repeated calls to “Pull up!” Only “inhuman screams” could be heard for the last six seconds.

The television channel cited experts who suggested that by turning off the autopilot, the pilots were trying to pull the plane back to a horizontal position. But at that moment a stabilizing fin at the jet’s tail was switched on.

With the fin activated, “the elevator is no longer working and the plane practically does not react to the pilot’s control panel,” the report said. The channel suggested that the pilot could have accidentally hit the button that activated the fin because of his reported “chronic fatigue.”

Russian investigators have opened a criminal inquiry into the crash. On Thursday, the investigative commission said that the flight recorders were in good condition and were being deciphered. The first preliminary reports of the commission could be made public within the next two weeks, they said.

Further update - 28 March 2016



Quote:FlyDubai air crash in Russia: Pilots fight in cockpit before crash

28.03.2016 | Source:
Pravda.Ru
 
[Image: 57642.jpeg]




AP photo
The analysis of flight recorders of the Boeing 737-800 passenger jetliner that crashed in Russia's Rostov showed that the pilot error was the most plausible version of the tragedy that killed all 62 on board.

 
The Boeing-737-800 of Fly Dubai airline crashed in Rostov-on-Don in Russia's south on March 19. The aircraft crashed while landing, killing all 55 passengers and seven crew members.

During an attempt to take the plane higher after an unsuccessful landing approach, the  pilot apparently lifted the nose of the aircraft too much, thus making the plane lose speed and altitude. A conflict sparked in the cockpit; one pilot shouted at his partner: "Where are you flying? Stop!" Yet, his attempts to "win" the wheel only made matters worse.

According to experts, the aircraft made two landing approaches in an automatic mode. Strong winds interfered into the so-called autothrottle system of the aircraft that ensures the flight of the airplane on the predetermined path of descent or take off during autopiloting.

The crew decided to switch to the manual mode for another landing approach. While flying at an altitude of about 270 meters, about 6 km far from the runway, one of the pilots pressed the TOGA key (Take off. Go around) that commands the aircraft to go for another approach and turned off the autopilot, taking full control of the aircraft. 

According to the data obtained from flight recorders, the pilot did not take into account the specific transition of the Boeing 737 from landing into climb mode.

When the speed of the aircraft started plummeting, a conflict between the pilots occurred in the cockpit. The first pilot tried to get up to speed and put the engines into the takeoff mode. His partner believed that one should lower the nose of the Boeing first. He was shouting: "Stop. Where? Stop! Stop!" while trying to stop the climb, pushing his wheel away. 

As a result, the on-board computer of the aircraft started receiving electrical impulses from the manipulations that the pilots were making at both wheels. The crew began to act in concert only when the uncontrollable Boeing with 62 people on board was diving to the ground at the speed of 325 km/h, at an angle of about 45 degrees. The pilots were only screaming during the seconds before the aircraft hit the ground.
 
FlyDubai airline was founded seven years ago by the government of the United Arab Emirates. The airline is based at the Dubai International Airport. The low-cost airline has not had air disasters  before. The company started with a few aircraft before it expanded its fleet to 50 Boeing 737-800 aircraft. In November 2013, FlyDubai ordered another 111 Boeing aircraft.
- See more at: http://www.pravdareport.com/news/hotspot...mV9rI.dpuf
 

Update 09 April 2016: Reuters article via ABC online

Quote:FlyDubai plane crash: Russian investigation suggests pilot error

Posted yesterday at 8:05pmFri 8 Apr 2016, 8:05pm
[Image: 7260804-3x2-340x227.jpg]
Photo:
Still picture of CCTV footage showing a FlyDubai plane crashing at Rostov-on-Don airport in southern Russia. (YouTube)

Related Story: FlyDubai plane crashes at Russian airport, killing 62
Related Story: Russia opens criminal investigation into FlyDubai crash

Map: Russian Federation
Investigators say a FlyDubai passenger plane crashed in Russia last month after being flown in a contradictory manner minutes before, suggesting pilot error was to blame.

Key points:

  • 55 passengers, 7 crew members were killed in Flydubai plane crash
  • Russian investigation says plane flew in contradictory manner before crash
  • Poor weather conditions made landing difficult

The Boeing 737-800, operated by a Dubai-based budget carrier, came down in the early hours of March 19 at Rostov-on-Don airport in southern Russia on its second attempt to land, after flying from Dubai.

All 62 people on board were killed.

Poor weather conditions, including strong winds and rain, made landing difficult.
In a statement the Moscow-based Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC), which is investigating the crash, said the plane had been flown in a contradictory manner in the minutes before it crashed.

It said the crew had decided to abort landing and circle round again.

[Image: 7260668-1x1-340x340.jpg]

Photo:
A screen shot from a flight tracking website shows FlyDubai flight FZ981 circling a number of times. (www.flightradar24.com)


They had begun to gain altitude when the controls of the plane were abruptly pushed away, pushing its nose lower.

That, combined with the angle of the tail fin, sent the plane into a steep dive, which the pilots were unable to pull out of, the IAC said.

It stopped short of saying the pilots were definitely to blame, noting they had the necessary experience and training, but said their condition and actions were being evaluated.

The IAC said it now needed to complete work on deciphering the pilots' final conversations in the hours leading up to the crash before it could wrap up its investigation.

Unnamed sources have told Russian newspapers that an initial read-out of the plane's flight recorders had suggested the two pilots argued about the right course of action to take in the minutes before the crash.

Reuters

Somewhat related apparently the Russkies may soon fall under the umbrella of the Montreal Convention (MC99). However there is general legal disagreement on whether the provisions of MC99 may need further revision in a rapidly developing & more affordable aviation world.

Last week in the Oz:
Quote:The Feds Legal Counsel on Montreal & LCCs.


As some of the initial findings with the tragic FlyDubai 737-800 prang in Rostov-on-Don Russia filter out, it would appear that fatigue may well be a factor in the causal chain.

 "significant and obvious risk"

The knock on effect of course is that fatigue & the relationship to aviation safety suddenly becomes topical in the MSM. Which also happens to be coincidental because FRMS & the controversial CASA CAO 48.1 is currently topical in the Australian aviation safety stakeholder scene (above & - To Disallow or not to Disallow; that is the Q?

Therefore I found the following article from the AFAP's official legal counsel Joseph Wheeler of particular interest because he not only joins the dots between fatigue but other safety issues related to the travelling public's love affair with LCCs... [Image: confused.gif]

Quote: Wrote:Montreal Convention needs universal support


Joseph Wheeler

The Australian

April 1, 2016 12:00AM

Without certain fixes our “air safety privilege” as passengers will forever sit uneasily with our insatiable demand for lower airfares. And, for the crew and passengers of the doomed FZ981 flight from Dubai to Rostov-on-Don, those occasionally incompatible demands can and do sometimes manifest as failures in the safety systems and compensation regimes designed to protect us all.

The Flydubai crash in Russia on March 19 regrettably typifies air disasters in many respects, and inevitably will lead to an official report that makes many in the aviation industry and regulators admit “we should have heeded the warnings”.

It also exemplifies why all states must ratify the Montreal Convention of 1999 or the patchwork of liability laws that exist will continue to guarantee that those who need appropriate compensation most won’t get it.

Let’s consider one well known safety risk (or “warning”) within the aviation world, cumulative fatigue — the convergence of several realities for international aviators: shiftwork, night work, irregular work schedules, unpredictable work schedules, and time zone changes.

Fatigue management, or rather how it was addressed in rostering, was raised by Russian media as a potential contributing cause of the Flydubai crash.

There is little escape for pilots who genuinely feel unable to perform because of tiredness.

Employment ramifications for pilots who “go sick” together with continuing uncertainty over impending regulations, which some argue prefer air operators’ ability to roster pilots to the edge of the law, resonate with Australia’s pilots.

This includes concerns that commercial imperatives will outweigh safety once new Australian fatigue management rules come into force next year.

The upshot of this is that we know, and have known for years, that fatigue management is a topic that has major safety implications if handled improperly by regulators and airlines.

If the allegations are right that Flydubai has mismanaged safety to its own detriment (knowing the risks), then the legal retribution from passengers’ and crew members’ families should fairly reflect that knowledge.

And that brings us to why universal ratification of the Montreal Convention of 1999 is necessary.

This international law places a strict liability system at the heart of providing compensation to air disaster victims.

It is a system that uses a passenger’s contract of carriage to determine the available choices of jurisdiction of a legal case against an airline for injury or death, including where you live permanently, where the airline calls home, or where you were ticketed to start or conclude your journey.

Thus, the system works to ensure justice as intended only if every country accedes to it — and at last count, out of 191 sky-faring nations, only 119 had ratified Montreal.

The significance of this is in the composition of the 119 nations.

Many populous and far-reaching aviation states such as the Russian Federation and, closer to home, Indonesia do not protect their citizens with Montreal in the way Australia does.

This is important because it means that for most people on flight FZ981, and likewise on AirAsia flight QZ8501, which crashed in late 2014, the law (and courts) of Russia or Indonesia will apply for the purposes of assessing compensation for death, rather than the more forward-thinking Montreal Convention choices.

The lack of choice of jurisdiction is significant for affected families and represents the loss of a pragmatic way to ensure that those responsible for the organisational, regulatory, mechanical and human factors causing the crash face justice at a time and place that suits the surviving family members, rather than just the airline and its insurers.

Joseph Wheeler is aviation special counsel to Maurice Blackburn Lawyers and the Australian Federation of Air Pilots.

Ps While your at it JW: Q/ What about the PelAir/Ziggy exposed holes in the Montreal Convention, which all started because of yet another uniquely Australian definition of 'commercial air transport'? That also still needs to be fixed doesn't it?? [Image: dodgy.gif] 
  
&.. this week in the Oz.. Big Grin
Quote:Montreal Convention to have universal support
  • David Hodgkinson, Rebecca Johnston
  • The Australian
  • April 8, 2016 12:00AM
From 1929 to 1999, states have variously signed up to a patchwork quilt of international agreements — mostly treaties — that govern the liability of air carriers for the transport of passengers, their baggage and cargo.

The first of these was the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the latest (and probably last in a long line) is the 1999 Montreal Convention, or MC99. Each successive treaty has been more friendly to passengers.

For example, the 1929 agreement (as amended by 1955 and 1975 agreements) provides that air carrier liability for each passenger is limited to just under $31,000. MC99 provides for compensation of about $210,000 and the possibility of unlimited liability in certain circumstances.

Joe Wheeler, of Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, argued in these pages last Friday that all states must ratify MC99. It’s a relatively uncontroversial argument given that most states recognise this and that one of the express purposes of the treaty is to “modernise and consolidate” the Warsaw regime and related agreements.

From the date on which the treaty was opened for signature in May 1999, 119 state parties have signed up — almost two-thirds of all states across a decade and a half.

This is quite the achievement. And it’s likely to have near-universal if not universal reach. Exhortation — such as that from Mr Wheeler — to ratify given the exceptional take-up so far could be viewed as unnecessary.

It’s also open, of course, to carriers to voluntarily raise their passenger compensation limits outside of any treaty framework — which carriers can do, they just can’t go lower than the applicable treaty amounts. This, in turn, calls into question the assertion in Mr Wheeler’s piece that “the system works to ensure justice … only if every country accedes to it”.

That assertion is also called into question when one looks at a passenger’s ticketed journey. For example, in the tragic case of the FZ981 flight from Dubai to Rostov-on-Don — a focus of Mr Wheeler’s article — it’s possible that flight for a number of passengers might well have been part of a longer journey that included a point of departure and a point of final destination in Montreal Convention states (although the majority of the passengers were Russian).

In that case, MC99 might well apply to some FZ981 passengers, given the great majority of states that have signed up to MC99. On any one international flight different liability regimes may well apply to different passengers.

Mr Wheeler rightly bemoans the potential lack of MC99 compensation levels for FZ981 passengers, in part because Russia is not a party to that treaty. It should be noted, however, that the Russian Ministry of Transport did publish in 2013 the draft Federal Law on the Accession of the Russian Federation to MC99.

If the law is adopted — and it likely will be — Russia will become a party to MC99 60 days after the instrument of accession is lodged with International Civil Aviation Organisation.
Finally, Mr Wheeler lists three jurisdictions in which a passenger action for damages can be brought against an airline — there are five, of course, with the final jurisdiction being added by MC99. That jurisdiction is the territory of a party to MC99 in which at the time of the accident the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence and to or from which the carrier operates services.

David Hodgkinson and Rebecca Johnston are partners with aviation and aerospace law firm HodgkinsonJohnston.

It is all very well this tit for tat legal bollocks on the original Warsaw Convention & MC99 but at the end of the day you can bet that the real obfuscation & liability minimisation strategies are being conducted in the board rooms of the fat cat multinational insurance  companies totally oblivious to the suffering of the victims & NOK of air crash tragedies - Angry


MTF...P2 Angel   
Reply
#53

Update FlyDubai accident: Preliminary report released - suspected somatogravic illusion part of contributory factors.

Quote:Crash interim report out; Flydubai following up

Carrier welcomes publication of report
By
  • Joseph George
Published Thursday, April 21, 2016
 
On March 19, an accident involving flight number FZ981 at Rostov-on-Don resulted in 62 fatalities including 55 passengers (33 women, 18 men and 4 children) and 7 crew members.

The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) investigating the accident has released an ‘Interim Report on Accident Investigation’ with five key recommendations.

The proposed five prompt safety recommendations are:

1. Inform the flight and maintenance personnel operating Boeing В737-800 airplanes on the accident.

2. Have additional training on elements of go-arounds in various conditions, in manual control mode with two engines operative from various heights and with insignificant flight weights.

3. To study the possibility of introduction into the FFS training program scenarios of go-arounds in various conditions, in manual control mode with two engines operative from various heights.

4. Repeatedly study and analyse the implementation of safety recommendations issued by investigation teams of accidents involving the Boeing 737-500 that crashed at Kazan airport on November 17, 2013.

5. Repeatedly analyse the applicability of recommendations to prevent accidents and incidents during go-around, developed by the BEA based on the safety study related to Aeroplane state awareness during go-around (ASAGA). Depending on the results of the analysis, take applicable safety measures.

The IAC said the information in the interim report is preliminary and subject to clarification and amendment based on pertinent examinations. The investigation will be completed with a final report, it adds.

In a statement, Ghaith Al Ghaith, CEO, flydubai, welcomed the report and said that the carrier meets the highest safety, operating and training standards and was already following the recommendations outlined in the report.

The statement follows:

“Flydubai welcomes the publication today of the Interim Report (Preliminary Reference Information) on Accident Investigation by the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC).  We would also like to thank the investigating authorities for their continued commitment to investigate this tragic accident.

“With regard to the five initial flight safety recommendations Flydubai has, as part of the ongoing communications within our emergency response plan, continued to update our crew and engineers with the information published by the IAC.

“With regard to the recommendations 2 and 3, these same procedures for go-around and flight simulator training have been in place since the airline was launched in 2009 and form part of standard operating procedures in line with industry best-practice.

“In relation to the fourth and fifth recommendation, as standard practice we review safety recommendations in the industry. 
 
“Flydubai is audited by the regulator and meets the highest safety, operating and training standards

&..via Popular Mechanics:
Quote:An Illusion Made FlyDubai Pilots Crash Their Plane Into the Ground


How a pilot's body and brain can lie to them, making them turn a safe situation into a deadly crash.
[Image: landscape-1461593604-gettyimages-516638828.jpg]

Getty STR
[/url] Author Copy Created with Sketch.    
[url=http://www.popularmechanics.com/author/7057/jeff-wise/]

By Jeff Wise
Apr 25, 2016

Even as Flydubai Flight 981 took off from Dubai on March 18, the pilots knew they'd be in for a difficult flight. Bad weather lay ahead at their destination, the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don. As the plane skirted the Caspian Sea and crossed over the Balkans, the situation stayed iffy. By the time the plane approached Rostov airport, a landing looked challenging, but manageable, with rain and winds gusting to 40 mph. 

Setting up for an approach from the northeast, the Boeing 737 broke through the cloud base at 1,800 feet and had the airport in sight directly ahead. But gusty conditions meant a risk of windshear—a sudden tailwind could cause the plane to drop out of the sky.

Playing it safe, the flight crew did a "go-around," increasing engine power and climbing away from the runway. For the next hour and a half the plane flew holding patterns, waiting for a break in the storm, but none came. Finally the pilots decided to bring it around for a second try. Once again they descended through the clouds, got the runway in sight, and set up to land. Once again, wild winds forced them to abort. The plane accelerated and nosed back up into the sky. 

"Once you get into the clouds, your senses start to play on you"

Later, security cameras on the ground would show the plane disappearing into the overcast sky—and then, mere seconds later, zooming back out of the clouds at a steep angle and impacting the runway in a fireball, instantly killing all 62 people aboard.
The reason for this tragedy, we now know, was not wind nor rain nor simple pilot error. It was an illusion.

For obvious reasons, initial speculation about what went wrong centered on the weather. Perhaps the plane had been hit by lightning or suffered particularly severe turbulence. Mechanical failure might have played a role, too. In several recent accidents, autopilot malfunction has caused planes to dive unexpectedly. And then there were potential psychological factors. Having already flown nearly two hours longer than they expected, with much of that time spent in turbulence, amid the stressful uncertainty of not knowing how and when they would get their passengers on the ground, the flight crew must have been tired. Pilot fatigue and challenging weather make a dangerous combination.

The picture became clearer this past Wednesday with the release of the official preliminary report (pdf) on the accident by Russian aviation officials.  Data recovered from the plane's black boxes ruled out mechanical failure or a violent weather event. The problem, most likely, was that the pilots fell victim to a pernicious form of disorientation called "somatogravic illusion."

During a go-around after an aborted landing, a plane tends to be lighter than normal since it's at the end of its flight and has burned up most of its fuel. That means its thrust-to-weight ratio is relatively high, so when the pilot pushes the throttle forward from idle to full thrust the plane accelerates with unusual alacrity. This acceleration pushes pilots back in their seats, which to the inner ear feels exactly the same as tilting upward.

In this case, the plane really is tilting upwards as it climbs away from the runway. But this weird sensation can throw off even seasoned pilots. As long as they can see the ground below them, the true orientation is clear. "When you initiate the go-around and still have some visual reference, you're fine," says aviation analyst Gerry Soejatman, "but once you get into the clouds, your senses start to play on you."

Black-box data show that as the plane started to enter the cloud after the second go-around, the flight crew briefly pushed the controls forward so that its rate of climb decreased, as if the pilots were momentarily disoriented. Then the plane returned to its previous rate of climb. For a few seconds, all was normal. The flight crew members were almost certainly following their instruments, as years of experience had taught them to do. Then, as if suddenly disoriented and unable to believe their instruments were correct, the flight crew pushed the stick far forward. "It takes time for someone to go from 'Oh, the instruments are saying this,' to 'No, no, no, this is all wrong!' and start pushing," Soejatman says.

The pilots probably believed they were preventing the plane from getting too nose-high, which could cause the plane to stall and crash. But in reality they were taking a safe situation and turning it deadly. The lurch downward would have caused them to rise up in their seats as though on a roller-coaster zooming over the top of a hill. By the time they rocketed out of the bottom of the cloud and gained a visual sense of their orientation, they were in a 50 degrees vertical dive at more than 370 mph and just a few seconds from impact. There was no time to pull out.

The violence of the resultant impact can be gauged by the by the condition of the remains recovered. From the 62 people aboard the plane, 4295 "samples of biological matter" were collected.

Somatogravic illusions don't cause plane crashes often, but a 2013 study by the French transportation safety agency identified 16 similar incidents. One crash that happened just two and a half years prior to the FlyDubai crash was eerily similar. Coming into Kazan, Russia, Tatarstan Flight 363 aborted a landing amid low clouds and gusty winds, started to climb out, then suddenly pitched down and plunged into the ground at a steep angle and high speed. All 50 people aboard that 737 were killed.

Wednesday's report was only a preliminary finding, meaning that investigators' findings may change. For the time being, however, they're recommending that pilots undergo fresh training in how to conduct go-arounds under different conditions and study how somatogravic illusions can occur.
MTF...P2 Angel
Reply
#54

On ABC Foreign Correspondent tonight:
Quote:Indonesia AirAsia plane flew for 12 months with mechanical fault before deadly crash

Foreign Correspondent

By Indonesia Correspondent Samantha Hawley and Suzanne Smith
Updated about 4 hours agoTue 3 May 2016, 7:22am
[Image: 6032722-3x2-340x227.jpg]
Photo:
Wreckage of AirAsia flight QZ8501 which crashed into the Java Sea in 2014. (AFP: Yudha Manx)


Related Story: Poor pilot emergency training, negligence behind AirAsia plane crash: analysts
Related Story: Investigation details numerous faults of downed AirAsia plane


An Indonesia AirAsia plane that crashed into the Java Sea in 2014 killing all on board had carried thousands of Australian passengers while flying with a mechanical fault for the 12 months before the tragedy.

Key points:
  • Foreign Correspondent reveals details of flight's path in 12 months before crash
  • Calls for Indonesian arms of airline to be suspended from flying to Australia
  • Some airlines that fly to Australia don't meet international standards, aviation expert says

Aviation experts were asked by Foreign Correspondent to track the plane 12 months before the crash while it had the mechanical fault. The details of the aircraft's flight path over that period have been uncovered with disturbing questions raised about the role of Indonesia's aviation regulator, including allegations of corruption.

There are now calls for the Indonesian arms of AirAsia to be suspended from flying to Australia until they pass an international safety audit.

All 162 passengers and crew died when the Airbus 320 stalled at high altitude during a flight from Indonesia's second largest city Surabaya to Singapore on December 28, 2014.

The final report into the crash, released in December last year, found the aircraft had a fault with its rudder limiter which went unfixed for 12 months before the crash.

Foreign Correspondent has revealed thousands of Australians had flown on the same aircraft while it had the fault.

Perth-based aviation expert Geoffrey Thomas said airlines like Qantas would never a fly a plane with that sort of defect.

"I believe there's evidence around that some airlines that fly to Australia don't meet international standards and they should be banned," he said.

"It's simply not good enough that you've got aeroplanes flying around with potentially catastrophic faults with them."

The crash investigation report says the rudder limiter defect did not in itself cause the crash, but instead the flight crew's reaction to a warning alarm about the fault was to blame.

Further, Indonesia AirAsia was not even approved to fly the route to Singapore on that day.

CASA increased spot checks on Indonesian planes

Directly after the crash, the Australian Transport Workers Union called for all Indonesian AirAsia flights to be suspended.

[Image: 5705750-3x2-340x227.jpg] Photo: Peter Gibson said CASA believed the Indonesian safety system met required operational standards. (ABC News)

The union raised the concerns again in a letter to Federal Transport Minister Darren Chester last week.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) increased spot checks of Indonesian planes in Australia directly after the 2014 AirAsia crash.

CASA's spokesman Peter Gibson said it would not be appropriate to give a running commentary on individual airlines.

"But rest assured if any airline has issues remaining that need to be watched carefully then we continue to watch," he said.

CASA confirmed the so called "ramp checks" on Indonesian planes are continuing.

'Uncoordinated' pilot bribed inspector to receive licence

There are also allegations that staff of the Indonesian equivalent of CASA, known as the DGCA (Director General of Civil Aviation), have engaged in corrupt activities.

Among the claims is that one Indonesian pilot who failed a flight simulator test in Australia because he was deemed to be too "uncoordinated" to fly went on to receive his flying licence in Indonesia after a bribe was paid to an inspector.

That allegation was raised with both the Indonesian and Australian Transport Ministries at the time.

Mike, a whistleblower pilot and senior captain with 28,000 hours flying experience, also raised concerns about pilots' qualifications during the program.

"We had an Indonesian co-pilot who we failed outright, he'd been with us a number of years, but we failed him outright and he came back and he joined one of the local airlines," Mike told Foreign Correspondent.

All Indonesian operated airlines are banned from flying into the United States, while Europe has also black listed most carriers with some exceptions.

CASA clears Indonesian airlines to fly to Australia

Indonesia's national carrier Garuda can fly to Europe but not the US.

In contrast Australia's aviation watchdog, CASA clears Garuda, Indonesian AirAsia and Indonesia AirAsia X to fly to Australia.

"We have made our own assessments of the airline, of the Indonesian safety system and we believe that they are meeting the required international operational standards," Mr Gibson said.

"If other parts of the world don't do that then of course that's a matter for them."

The DGCA and AirAsia declined to be interviewed by Foreign Correspondent.
AirAsia says it has improved pilot training and maintenance standards since the crash.

A special extended episode of Foreign Correspondent airs at 8:40pm tonight on ABC TV, directly after the budget coverage.
The comments from Pinocchio Gobson and the parallels & dichotomies with the coverage by Planetalking on the ATSB final report into a Cobham AVRO 146-RJ100 engine fire incident on departure out of Perth, are fascinating:
(05-03-2016, 10:57 AM)Peetwo Wrote:  CASA & 'just culture' Dodgy  - Fantasy or fact? 

...Now back to what is IMO the central issue to Ben's article that is now causing debate & contention in the ensuing commentary. 

First the background. Ben Sandilands has witnessed for many decades the administration of the Oz aviation safety system being manipulated, obfuscated, abused, historically tarnished, neglected etc..etc; by a rampant, seemingly untouchable bureaucracy that governments of either colour totally abscond from proper oversight or governance.

So naturally, like much of industry (refer ASRR report), Ben's trust quotient & 'bollocks' alert will be rapidly pinging when it comes to the regulator making comments like..

"...We also have system based on just culture to ensure open reports such as are made to the ATSB and mistakes rectified..."  

Until proven otherwise "just culture" & CASA in the same sentence will be met with much scepticism from an industry (including some aviation journos) that have been bullied, belittled, badgered and embuggerised by the "Iron Ring" big "R" regulator and supporting department for the best part of three decades... Angry

Seaview...Lockhart...PelAir cover-up...Mildura Fog duck-up...VARA ATR bird strike abberration...the list & the bollocks continue - miniscule Chester please take note of what IMO is the most important part of Ben's article:



Quote:The new Minister Darren Chester is meeting the grass roots aviation industry in Tamworth this Friday, one hopes before the government goes into caretaker mode on the calling of a general election.

It is an important meeting. It is also important for the Minister to note that his predecessors were treated with arrogant contempt by his department in relation to aviation matters and public safety, and that taking visible control of his portfolio and remembering he is a representative of the people, not unaccountable bureaucrats or corporate entities, is a prerequisite for being held in respect.
 

&..
Quote:Gobson - "We have made our own assessments of the airline, of the Indonesian safety system and we believe that they are meeting the required international operational standards...If other parts of the world don't do that then of course that's a matter for them."
 
The sheer bloody arrogance & the hazy, lack of factual evidence are typical of the spin'n'bulldust that seems to float with ease from this trough feeding parasite's mouth.
 
That the CASA assessment was in anyway as comprehensive as the FAA, who are tasked by ICAO to audit all signatory States under the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), is simply laughable and smacks yet again of regulatory capture in the interest of the tourism industry, plus Indonesian & Canberra relations.
 
Hollow words from the Hollow (wooden) Men: "Aviation Safety is our No1. priority" - yeah right, BOLLOCKS! Dodgy

MTF...P2   Tongue    

  

  
Reply
#55

An outbreak of Just Culture.

I don’t know why, although I shouldn’t be, but I’m always surprised when I see a ‘report’ on the TV about something I know a bit about which is waste of good resources and not quite right.  Four Corners I find I can believe and accept the points made, and so it was with Foreign Correspondent until last evening.  If other FC stories are reliant on such ‘expert’ commentary, then you have to wonder just how ‘real’ their other ‘tales’ are.  FWIW they lost me, for ever; not that it will keep ‘em awake nights.  Every time I happen to see a FC story from now on the ‘bollocks’ meter will register full scale.  How any intelligent producer for the national broadcaster could base story line, research and commentary to an important aviation disaster on the likes of GT has me beat.  It’s a shame, because the message gets lost; there are (or were) important, serious matters related to passenger safety which must be addressed lost in the shabby, pointless little exhibition broadcast last evening.  

Not only do we get Thomas, but Gibson to boot.  I had to laugh – just culture indeed.  CASA would not know ‘just culture’ if it jumped up and bit ‘em on the arse, but suddenly, overnight, miraculously ‘just culture’ is here, live and real.  Bollocks.  The only reason Cobham is not being prosecuted is that to prove their case CASA would be taking on a fairly hefty, well supported operation which could, and rightfully would vigorously defend their argument – and probably win.  So just culture is trotted out into the smoke and mirrors to score some cheap brownie points in an attempt to stem the internal haemorrhaging.  There are no depths to which the new DAS and his ducking ‘tiger team’ will not descend in order to convince the political halfwits, all is well.

I note this outbreak of ‘just culture’ has not been extended to any of the cases currently being prosecuted by CASA; take the CEO of Barrier Air for example.  Not only were CASA very happy to destroy his business on some of the most dodgy grounds I have ever read. But one man, with an axe to grind decided that was not enough.  Killen was harried from pillar to post and back again; business, health, self respect and money – all gone.  Still not enough, he’s back in court, defending himself against ‘criminal’ charges.  So much for ‘just’ culture. It is becoming a marked feature of the current regime; the smiling crocodile, sizing up it’s next juicy morsel, playing nice while the grown up’s are watching, all the while planning to snatch a child, by stealth the moment backs are turned and making sure someone else takes the blame.  CASA won’t challenge the Indonesians, even if the politicians would allow it.  Nope, cowardice wears a new cloak – ‘just’ culture.  Ayup - but Just when it suits them though.

Yours in vomit: 'K'.

Toot toot.
Reply
#56
Information 

EgyptAir flight MS804 disappears on flight from Paris to Cairo

http://www.smh.com.au/world/live-egyptai...oyu10.html Exclamation
Reply
#57

(05-19-2016, 03:15 PM)snorky Wrote:  EgyptAir flight MS804 disappears on flight from Paris to Cairo

http://www.smh.com.au/world/live-egyptai...oyu10.html Exclamation

Update to MS804 (now accident) tragedy - Angel

First from PT:
Quote:EgyptAir crash is lost in a sea of doubt and fear

Almost everything you might have thought was known about missing EgyptAir flight MS804 in the last 24 hours was wrong, fictional, or under serious doubt
[Image: Crikey_Website-Author-Ben-Sandilands.jpg]Ben Sandilands


[Image: Egyptair-Facebook-610x316.jpg]Egyptair’s Facebook cover photo blacked out after MS804 went missing

Updated 0730: EgyptAir has now retracted as a mistake its statement five hours ago that wreckage from the flight had been located near the Greek island of Karpathos.
Almost every material statement about wreckage, radar swerves and other colourful reports have now been repudiated or remain under severe doubt.

Updated 0550 May 20 eastern Australia time: Confusion has increased over conflicting claims made about the location and nature of wreckage found in different locations in the Mediterranean Sea.

There has been no unambiguous  finding of bodies or wreckage from the EgyptAir jet, and an Egyptian claim that a locator beacon signal had been heard some hours after contact with the A320 was lost has been withdrawn.

Previous post: The loss of EgyptAir flight MS804 has entered that terrible place where an airliner has clearly crashed, but nothing has been found by way of wreckage and very little is known about the circumstances.

One of the most responsible and informative live blogs on the situation is being run by The Guardian here.

What can be said? It is certain that the flight from Paris to Cairo has crashed, and in the general area of the Mediterranean where it had just entered Egypt’s air space shortly before its intended arrival.

It isn’t unreasonable to fear that it was brought down by a terrorist act, but there are other possibilities.

There are unconfirmed reports of a fireball being sighted from a Greek island, and of a distress call being heard just before it disappeared off ATC radar, and of a locator signal that could have been deployed automatically on impact being detected some hours after the A320 with 66 people on board was due to have landed.

There is nothing unusual about its being at 37,000 feet at the moment radar contact was lost. There is nothing unusual about there being three security people on board.
Beyond that, nothing is known, and some of what has been reported may not prove to have been accurate.
 
Next from the AP via the Oz:
Quote:EgyptAir flight MS804: plane vanishes with 66 people aboard
  • Jacquelin Magnay
  • The Australian
  • May 20, 2016 12:00AM
[Image: jacquelin_magnay.png]
European correspondent

 


[Image: 9da7648d72c84a391c512fc293575618?width=650] 
[Image: 3d6049bc89142d47884ac06738383591?width=650]A relative of the victims of the EgyptAir flight 804 reacts as she makes a phone call at Charles de Gaulle Airport outside of Paris.

An EgyptAir flight from Paris to Cairo with 66 people on board vanished from radar screens ­yesterday with reports of a flame in the sky over the Mediterranean.
Terrorism has not been ruled out as the cause of the crash of flight MS804, which plunged into the Mediterranean 130 nautical miles from the Greek island of ­Karp­athos, near Crete.

AS IT HAPPENED: How yesterday unfolded

Egyptian Civil Aviation Minister Sherif Fathi said last night the possibility of a terror attack as the cause of the crash of the Airbus A320 was “stronger” than technical failure.
Earlier Prime Minister Sherif Ismail said it was too early to say whether a technical problem or a terrorist attack caused the crash.

“We cannot rule anything out,” Mr Ismail said at Cairo airport.

MS804 lost contact with air traffic control 20 minutes before it was due to land at Cairo airport in the early hours of the morning.

EgyptAir said MS804 vanished 16km after it entered Egyptian ­airspace, about 280km off Egypt’s coastline north of Alexandria.

The airliner fell 22,000 feet and swerved sharply before it disappeared from radar screens, Greek Defence Minister Panos Kammenos said. “The plane carried out a 90-degree turn to the left and a 360-degree turn to the right, falling from 37,000 to 15,000 feet and the signal was lost at around 10,000 feet,” Mr Kammenos said.

[Image: 9da7648d72c84a391c512fc293575618] 
Egypt’s state-run newspaper Al-Ahram quoted an airport ­official as saying the pilot did not send a distress call.

“I saw a flame in the sky,” a Mediterranean merchant ship captain reported to the Greek ­defence ministry.

EgyptAir vice-chairman Ehab Mohy El-Deen told The New York Times there had been no SOS or loss of altitude. “They just ­vanished,’’ Mr El-Deen said.

Egyptian officials said the plane had crashed and Greek officials said search vessels had detected debris about 80km from MS804’s last reported location.

Twenty-six foreigners were among the 56 passengers, including 15 French citizens, a Briton and a Canadian, EgyptAir said.

The A320 was still in the cruise phase of the flight at 37,000 feet, having just moved from Greek airspace into Egyptian ­airspace when all contact with the plane was lost at 2.45am (10.45am AEST).

Greece Civil Aviation Authority director Konstantinos Lintzerakos said air traffic controllers had been in contact with the pilot, who reported no problems as the aircraft cruised at 830km/h.

According to flight-tracking website Flightradar24, MS804 was flying a course consistent with other flights bound for Cairo from Western Europe. Data from Flightradar24 shows the plane’s altitude and speed did not change significantly in the minutes leading up to its ­disappearance from radar. One aviation expert said that given the sudden disappearance of the aircraft from radar, it was “highly unlikely” a mechanical failure was at fault. Only a sudden, catastrophic failure that resulted in a depressurisation incident would have prohibited the pilot from sending out a distress call.

French President Francois Hollande has been in contact with Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the two have pledged to work together to investigate the crash.
Mr Hollande held an emergency meeting at the Elysee Palace.

France is still in a state of emergency after the devastating November Paris attacks, and security at all French airports is extremely tight.

In Cairo, Mr el-Sisi convened an emergency meeting of ­the National Security Council, the country’s highest security body.

Airbus was aware of the disappearance, but “we have no official information at this stage of the certitude of an accident”, the company’s spokesman Jacques Rocca said.

Military and government officials have been scouring all military activity in the area, although officials had ruled out a land-launched missile attack because the flight was 280km from the coast, unlike Malaysian Airlines MH17 which was shot out of the sky by pro-Russian rebels at 33,000 feet over Ukraine in July 2014, killing 298 people, including 38 Australians.

MS804, which had left Paris’s Charles de Gaulle Airport at 11.09pm, had earlier travelled to Tunisia and Eritrea, and the passenger list reflected this.

There were 12 different nationalities on board, which was only a third full with 56 passengers and 10 crew.

EgyptAir said there were 30 Egyptians, 15 French, two Iraqis and one each from Britain, Canada, Portugal, Belgium, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Chad and Algeria. Two of the passengers were babies and one was an older child. The 10-strong crew included three security officials.

The A320 is one of the most common aircraft used across Europe.

Tourism to Egypt plummeted after a bomb was smuggled on board at Sharm El-Sheikh airport by Islamic State sympathisers, bringing down a Russian Metrojet plane over the Sinai last October, killing 224 people. Then in March, an EgyptAir plane from Alexandria to Cairo was hijacked and forced to land in Cyrpus by a man who had worn a fake suicide belt.

RIP those 66 souls & condolences to the families - Sad
Reply
#58

Update: 21/05/2016 23:40 UTC

Courtesy AvHerald:
Quote:Crash: Egypt A320 over Mediterranean on May 19th 2016, aircraft found crashed, ACARS messages indicate fire on board
By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, May 19th 2016 03:35Z, last updated Friday, May 20th 2016 18:23Z

An Egyptair Airbus A320-200, registration SU-GCC performing flight MS-804 (dep May 18th) from Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) to Cairo (Egypt) with 56 passengers and 10 crew, was enroute at FL370 over the Mediterranan Sea about 130nm north of Alexandria (Egypt) and about 210nm northnorthwest of Cairo when the transponder signals of the aircraft ceased at 02:33L (00:33Z). The aircraft was located crashed in the Mediterranean Sea, there were no survivors.

Search and Recovery

On May 19th 2016 France is joining the search and rescue efforts dispatching ships and aircraft into the search area, which is already being scanned by Greek and Egypt aircraft and ships.

On May 19th 2016 a good number of civilian ships in the area have, according to MarineTraffic, veered off their intended courses and are now steaming towards a common position at approximately N33.4 E29.7 approximately 30nm eastnortheast of the last ADS-B position. A first ship "Oceanus" has already reached that position and is nearly stationary there.

On May 20th morning Egypt's Military announced, Egyptian naval aircraft and vessels found debris from the A320 aircraft as well as personal belongings of passengers about 290km (156nm) north of Alexandria (Egypt).

On May 20th European Space Agency (ESA) reported Sentinel-1A radar satellite images showed a 2km long slick at position N33.5333 E29.2167, about 40km/21.6nm from the last transponder position, coinciding with the suspected area of impact of flight MS-804. The photo was taken on May 19th 2016 at 16:00Z. Image below.

In the afternoon of May 20th 2016 Egyptair reported that more debris has been found during the day including body parts, passengers' belongings, aircraft seats.

Statements

On May 19th 2016 at 05:00L (03:00Z) the airline reported, that flight MS-804, estimated to land in Cairo at 03:10L (01:10Z), is missing and so far has not landed at any airport in reach of the aircraft. Egyptair subsequently tweeted that the aircraft was enroute at FL370 about to enter Egyptian Airspace when radar contact with the aircraft was lost at 02:45L (00:45Z). A search and rescue operation has been launched. The airline further corrected initial statement of 59 passengers to 56 passengers actually on board of the aircraft. The commander had accumulated 6,275 hours with 2,101 hours on type, the first officer has accumulated 2,675 hours. The aircraft had been manufactured in 2003. The airline has opened hotlines for relatives at +202 25989320 (outside Egypt) and 080077770000 (landline in Egypt).

On May 19th 2016 at about 07:40L (05:40Z) Egyptair updated their statement saying, that the contact with the aircraft was lost 280km (151nm) from the Coast of Egypt at 02:30L (00:30Z). The crew comprised the captain, first officer, 5 cabin crew and 3 sky marshals. Amongst the passengers there were 30 Egyptians, 15 French, 2 Iraqis, 1 British, 1 Belgian, 1 Kuwaiti, 1 Saudi, 1 Sudanese, 1 Chadian, 1 Portugese, 1 Algerian and 1 Canadian.

On May 19th 2016 Greece's Civil Aviation Authority reported radar contact with the aircraft was lost about 2 minutes after the aircraft was handed off from Greek to Egyptian Air Traffic Control. The crew did not report any problems up to hand off. The CAA subsequently clarified, that the crew was talking to air traffic control in Greek when the aircraft entered the Greek control zone. When ATC attempted to hand the aircraft off to Egypt the crew did not respond, radar contact was lost 2 minutes after the first attempt to raise the crew for hand off, the aircraft was 7nm past mandatory reporting point KUMBI (N33.7139 E28.7500), boundary between Greek and Egyptian control zone.

On May 19th 2016 at 08:25L (06:25Z) Egypt Air reported that search and rescue have picked up an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal. Dawn in the area was at 04:26L.

On May 19th 2016 at 10:15L (08:15Z) Airbus posted "Airbus regrets to confirm that an A320 operated by Egyptair was lost at around 02:30 am (Egypt local time) today over the Mediterranean sea. The aircraft was operating a scheduled service, Flight MS 804 from Paris, France to Cairo, Egypt. The aircraft involved, registered under SU-GCC was MSN (Manufacturer Serial Number) 2088 delivered to Egyptair from the production line in November 2003. The aircraft had accumulated approximately 48,000 flight hours. It was powered by IAE engines. At this time no further factual information is available."

On May 19th 2016 at 12:30L (10:30Z) France's President Hollande announced that the aircraft has crashed while flying over the Mediterranean Sea in Egyptian Airspace.

On May 19th 2016 Egypt's Civil Aviation Minister said in a press conference, Egypt continues to call the aircraft "missing". The Government does not rule out any cause as of yet, neither mechanical failure nor terrorism.

On May 19th 2016 at 14:55L (12:55Z) Greek Authorities reported that search aircraft have spotted two objects floating on the sea surface about 50nm south of the last transponder position and about 230nm southsoutheast of Crete (Greece). The objects were white and red and appeared to be made of plastics. Authorities subsequently reported two orange objects also seen appear to be aircraft life vests, position near N33.3 E29.9 (about 40nm east of last transponder position).

On May 19th 2016 at 19:10L (17:10Z) Egyptair confirmed that according to Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (parts of) the wreckage have been located crashed in the Mediterranean Sea. Families of passengers and crew have been informed, the airline expresses their deepest sympathies. The Egyptian Investigation Team continues to search for other remains of the aircraft.

On May 20th 2016 about 00:00L Christiane Amanpour (CNN) tweeted that Egyptair's Vice President retracted the statement, that debris of the aircraft had been found and said they were mistaken. However, Egyptair did not retract such statements on all their official outlets, on their main website the statement was reposted instead with timestamp May 20th 2016.

Investigation

On May 19th 2016 the responsible Paris states attorney has opened an investigation into the disappearance of the aircraft but cautioned, that a mechanical failure or other causes besides terrorism have not been ruled out at this point. No credible claims of downing the aircraft have been made so far.

On May 20th 2016 Egypt's Authorities reported that an accident investigation commission has been formed to investigate the crash.

On May 20th 2016 the French BEA reported 3 investigators have been dispatched to Egypt by the BEA to join the investigation led by Egyptian Authorities.

Data available

On May 20th 2016 The Aviation Herald received information from three independent channels, that ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) messages with following content were received from the aircraft:

00:26Z 3044 ANTI ICE R WINDOW
00:26Z 561200 R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
00:26Z 2600 SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
00:27Z 2600 AVIONICS SMOKE
00:28Z 561100 R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
00:29Z 2200 AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
00:29Z 2700 F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
no further ACARS messages were received

Sentinel-1A radar satellite image showing 2km long slick (Photo: ESA):
[Image: egypt_a320_su-gcc_mediterranean_160519_4.jpg]

Debris seen from search ship Maersk Ahram (Photos: Tarek Wahba):
[Image: egypt_a320_su-gcc_mediterranean_160519_3.jpg]

[Image: egypt_a320_su-gcc_mediterranean_160519_2.jpg]

[Image: egypt_a320_su-gcc_mediterranean_160519_1.jpg]

A number of ships left intended course towards a common position (Graphics: MarineTraffic):
[Image: egypt_a320_su-gcc_mediterranean_160519_marine.jpg]

Infrared Satellite Image Seviri May 19th 2016 00:00Z (Photo: AVH/Meteosat):
[Image: egypt_a320_su-gcc_mediterranean_160519_sat_0000z.jpg]

Map and flight trajectory based on Mode-S transponder signals (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
[Image: egypt_a320_su-gcc_mediterranean_160519_map.jpg]




Reader Comments:

Fire on board
By Tibi Gabany on Friday, May 20th 2016 22:29Z

I am thinking of the last set of diagnostic data from the plane. It looks fire ripping through the sensor cables and electronics? On-board fire would explain why the pilots tried to quickly lower altitude.

A thought to consider...I personally don't think 'full glass' cockpits are a good idea as the most important backup equipment become useless in a fire situation that causes cascade short circuits. There should be enough good old fasion mechanical backup equipment on any plane to allow it to safely fly.


On board fire
By ChristineH on Friday, May 20th 2016 22:27Z

I just read the report on Swissair Flight 111 on Wiki, and I recommend it. Not from the point of view of pinpointing similarity of cause, but for understanding the major recovery operation that it was.... and the years of painstaking effort to put it back together and find out what happened. All of which could be even more difficult with MS804 if reports on the depth of the Sea there are correct. It's going to be a long time and a lot of work for a lot of people to really know what happened, always bearing in mind ensuring it can't happen again. Jumping to conclusions is the last thing the people who solve this mystery will be doing.




@Mikie
By Fanfwe on Friday, May 20th 2016 22:22Z

ACARS messages are not transmit only, they can be both ways.
ACARS is a cockpit datalink protocol, can be carried over VHF (VDL mode 2), or Satcom (Inmarsat Classic or Iridium SBD).
This is used for many different things which are triggerred by the crew, such as "SMS-like" messaging between aircraft and operations/dispatch/maintenance on ground, ATC clearance requests/replies, flightplan download, ...
But also automatic messages, aircraft systems can be configured to send some maintenance messages automatically while in flight to maintenance services for example, so that they can plan some maintenance tasks upon aircraft arrival should some kind of event occur during a flight, and without having to wait for the aircraft to be at the gate, therefore minimising grounding time.


Interesting...
By Mark C on Friday, May 20th 2016 22:15Z

Obviously an incendiary device is still possible, as it could have been left in the electronics bay by a cleaning crew or other ground personnel with sufficient knowledge. However I think we may be finally witnessing the first time lithium-ion batteries in the plane itself has caused an accident. If you guys see the videos from when they were testing the large lithium cobalt batteries for the 787 those things were basically incendiary devices themselves. It was shocking, to be honest, how fierce the flames and gasses were that could come out of those batteries during tests of unusual conditions. True, the A320 does not have nearly as large or as dangerous batteries as a 787 but it does still have some. Loss of control of flight surfaces, loss of radio and transponder, and loss of the aircraft would follow rather quickly from a fire within the electronics.

This also goes to show how pointless all this conjecture is, however. We're just going to have to wait to get any satisfying answers. 
 

Decompression
By Rob on Friday, May 20th 2016 22:07Z

Mostly armchair speculation from me. As I work for a being airline, but could it be possible these acars messages be interpreted as the following possibility.

With the window faults could indicate a failure of the window leading to a decompression (appears right side) if the fo was not belted in he could have been ejected also damaging another window. Which could also explain the lav smoke detector because some aircraft have either a photosensitive detector which the fogging from a rapid decompression could trigger or if it is the 02 sensor type the lack of oxygen at 37000 can trigger. Problem is it doesn't explain the auto flight or flight control faults. It could explain the initial left turn and dive as you turn of course and get to ten, but from there I'm out of explinations.


Aeroplanes Status
By Batreeq on Friday, May 20th 2016 22:04Z

Once the coop occupied Egypt, Egypt Air is kidnapped by military persons who are never been qualified. As a consequence:
1-Lots of technical & operational professionals either migrated overseas or having low arousal.
2-Lots of non-announced incidents are there from day to day including rejected take-offs & abnormal landings.
3-Lots of accidents already started and is continuing due to accumulation of technical issues over time.
4-Where is the Flight Data Recorder and the Cockpit Voice Recorder of the aircraft?
Thank you.


Pax Malevolence?
By Chris R on Friday, May 20th 2016 22:02Z

We bully passengers because they are the most abundant. Hordes of them a pilot I won't name called them.
But are the pax the only malevolent people? How about a bomb in the avionics bay? Who will we blame then? A security breach?
Well yes, blame the airliner! Let's speculate, it kills time and we may have our 15 minutes of fame and glory!!!

Or why not wait and see?



ignorant ?
By NoNe on Friday, May 20th 2016 21:56Z

if this is correct, from NYT linking this piece:

How do the two severe shifts in direct previously reported jive with the computer failure.

Can flight controls and communication be taken over from outside an aircraft?




Validated ACARS information?
By Louise on Friday, May 20th 2016 21:43Z

How do we know this information is legitimate? How easy is it to get this information?

I am a little sceptical with regards to theories because these investigations usually take many turns and have two or three contributing factors to any one accident. Point being we wont know until we get to see the actual investigation report. On the same token I am not completely debunking this ACARS report as it looks very realistic and could be true.

In my opinion (which is not of an aviation expert - just an aviation fan) if this ACARS report is real it could signal an explosion as the messages are all close together, the smoke originated from the toilets (suggesting passenger malevolence), spread quickly and then other system faults were recorded quickly. I am quick to point out that I do not want to be another random person saying this is terror related without knowing any real facts yet.


Failure?
By suszykuba on Friday, May 20th 2016 21:35Z

Look. Last radar contact was on 2:33 last contact with pilot was on 2:27. First ACARS message arrived on 2:26 last on 2:29. And during that 3 minutes between last ACARS message and last radar contact everything happened... It doesn't seems to be failure...


Not pre, but during
By Tom on Friday, May 20th 2016 21:33Z

Probably these alerts are not warnings of something developing, but signaling a full collapse during freefall of the fuselage in extremely increasing speed just before the crash with the sea. If so, it will not explain much.


ACARS
By AILERON on Friday, May 20th 2016 21:28Z

We have to be careful to interpret the ACARS Information which is present here.

ACARS is sending a block of information of past and not just in time each individual of each sensor.

The block which is presenting here is about 3 Minutes before, but not the last information in the last second of the disaster.



90 degrees turn
By Jose Silva on Friday, May 20th 2016 21:14Z

On Portuguse television a airbus pilot being interviewed,stated that in case of a emergency descent,the crew is required to make a 90 degree turn left or right in order not to disturb traffic. So that explains the first turn and that effectively the pilots had some degree of control over the aircraft in the beginning of the event.


cycles
By Sho on Friday, May 20th 2016 21:09Z

I've seen the age of the aircraft, etc. Is there a figure on cycles?


Aircraft
By chudlychudson on Friday, May 20th 2016 21:05Z

Anyone else ask why MS-804 every other day runs on a B737-800, but the day of the crash was run on this A320?


Trouble shooting manual
By Jack "the Engineer" Flyboy on Friday, May 20th 2016 20:31Z

Found an example manual for troubleshooting. Does not really lead to any conclusions.



@Uninformed reader
By Marcel on Friday, May 20th 2016 20:30Z

Correct - there is no wood used in the A320 Wink. Using "fire proof" materials is part of the certification specifications in aircraft design. This is against the theory of a fire especially a quick development.

On the other hand a fire starting in this area below the cockpit is much more dangerous than a fire in the cabin. In the cabin a fire is usually easier to detect (also earlier noted) and easier to fight (by portable fire extinguishers and automatic extinguisher in the lavatory waste bin).



By Susanna on Friday, May 20th 2016 20:16Z

Dr K, the oil slick means there is some sort of fuel spillage on the surface of the water.

It's not smoke or similar, it's oil or fuel, which would remain after an aircraft impacted and broke up.


ECAM
By Peter on Friday, May 20th 2016 20:16Z

Had their cabin altitude passed above 9550ft, there would've been an ECAM alert in red letters saying CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT. That would also be sent over on ACARS.


Wouldn't a fire leave at least some time to give off an emergency signal?
By Uninformed reader on Friday, May 20th 2016 20:15Z

I mean, the avionics bay etc. are built somewhat fire-resistant, so I would think that if a fire developed, this could be noticed and there would be enough time to at least give off an emergency message, don't you think?
I would be very surprised if a serious fire could develop so quickly onboard, that there is no time to change squawk, no time to send off a mayday, no time to start a controlled emergency descent, no time for anything.
But then again, I am just an uninformed reader, and will await official results. Just my two cents on the fire theory... P2 comment - some excellent questions asked by the Uninformed reader, I guess all will be revealed if/when the CVR/FDRs are recovered, however this does have the hallmarks of a sudden, spontaneous catastrophic failure.   
&..from PT Wink :
Quote:EgyptAir flight MS804 found, now the real work begins

Unlike MH370, the causes of the crash of EgyptAir flight MS804 seem certain to be determined faster than any conspiracy theories as to what happened can take hold

[Image: Crikey_Website-Author-Ben-Sandilands.jpg]
Ben Sandilands
 



[Image: EgyptAir-crash-jet-a-month-earlier-610x397.jpg]This is an old photo of the EgyptAir Airbus A320 that crashed on Wednesday as it neared the end of a Paris-Cairo flight

Update: There are unconfirmed but plausible reports that automated ACARS data sent from MS804 indicate smoke alerts shortly before the jet crashed

After more than a day of false leads wreckage from missing EgyptAir flight MS804 has been found.

The debris and passenger belongings located 295 kms off Egypt’s Mediterranean coast today match the point at which the EgyptAir jet disappeared early on the morning of Thursday, May 19 local time.

The A320 with a light load of 56 passengers, three security personnel and seven crew including two pilots and cabin attendants, was nearing the end of its flight from Paris to Cairo when something went terribly wrong at 37,000 feet and just inside Egypt’s air space.

It took well into the second day of daylight searching in fine weather to find the first signs of debris, which might have escaped from the sunk wreckage, or been on the surface since the jet struck the water in darkness.

[Image: MS804-tweets-610x337.jpg]

There are many, many questions which can now begin to yield answers in what looks like an air crash which will have plenty of hard evidence to work on, including if they are found, the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder.

There are in the many news reports from Egypt and Europe several interesting consistently mentioned elements that may prove to be very important as the crash investigation proceeds.

One element is that Greek ATC tried unsuccessfully to make radio contact with MS804 some two minutes 40 seconds before losing radar contact, and that this call was being made as a normal procedure when a flight was about to cross from their airspace to that of another country, in this case, Egypt.

As mentioned in considerable and useful detail in this BBC report, Greek ATC had initially spoken to the pilots of MS804 at 23:48 GMT when all seemed routine, and then not attempted to speak to them again until 00:27 GMT when they were minutes away from crossing over to air traffic control in Egypt.

Why didn’t the pilots respond, and for how long prior to that call, in the 39 minutes since Greek ATC had spoken to them, might they have been unable or unwilling to respond? That could be an important question, or totally irrelevant, depending on what else the crash investigation discovers.

The other much reported element quotes Greek Defence Minister Panos Kammenos as saying that before it had disappeared from ‘radar’, the plane made two abrupt turns and suddenly lost altitude.

The reports do not (yet) make it completely clear that this loss of altitude and changes in heading would have been registered on military not civil ATC radar, since the latter sees airliners as transponder identified objects until for whatever reason, the transponder ceases to work.

Those who follow the MH370 saga might reflect that Greek military radar therefore appears to have been far more competently managed or better equipped than Malaysian military radar.

But caution needs to be used in considering these matters. It is very early in the procedures that could be expected to be followed by the MS804 crash investigation.
It has already been argued that the abrupt change of course seen on Greek radar and the puzzling radio silence just before the flight disappeared would be consistent with some sort of struggle for control in the cockpit of the A320.

However tempting it might be to jump to conclusions about an attempted hijacking of MS804 the truth of the matter would be solved by the successful reading out of the cockpit sounds recorder and the multi channel flight data recorder. These so called ‘black boxes’ lie somewhere on the floor of a sea that is shallower and less challenging to deal with than the mid Atlantic or the south Indian Ocean.

If there is any logic to a hijacking attempt, given the range available to MS804, it might have been to force it to fly to a terrorist organisation controlled airstrip in Libya.  That might also be too fanciful a scenario, although downright ordinary as such fantasies go considering some of the theories advanced to explain the disappearance of MH370.

Assuming Egypt pursues a thorough air crash investigation that complies with the internationally agreed rules of an ICAO Annex 13 inquiry, the truth about the causes of the the loss of MS804 will be determined, and it won’t become a perhaps never solved riddle like that posed by the missing Malaysia Airlines flight.
MTF...P2 Angel
Reply
#59

Latest on MS-804: “It says we have more questions than we have answers.”

While the search for the wreckage of MS804 continues, the speculation mounts on those ACARS recorded messages minutes before the aircraft plunged uncontrollably into the Mediterranean Sea.

This time via Bloomberg - Wink
Quote:Egypt Sends Submarine to Join Search Efforts of Doomed Flight
Andrea Rothman  AEROisme
Alan Levin  AlanLevin1
Tarek El-Tablawy

May 22, 2016 — 3:03 AM AEST Updated on May 22, 2016 — 11:45 PM AEST
  • Radio messages about cabin smoke before crash add to mystery
  • Plane was en route from Paris to Cairo with 66 people on board
President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi said Egypt will dispatch a submarine to help search for debris and data records from a doomed EgyptAir flight and warned against jumping to conclusions about why the aircraft crashed.

“All scenarios are open,” El-Sisi said in a televised speech on Sunday. “It’s important that we don’t assume that a certain scenario happened.”

The president’s public comments were his first since Flight 804 carrying 66 people went down Thursday en route to Cairo from Paris with no obvious explanation. A day earlier, France’s accident investigator, BEA, said the plane generated automatic radio messages about smoke in the front portion of the cabin minutes before controllers lost contact with it over the Mediterranean Sea.

The electronic signals offer a puzzling twist to what may have happened to the flight, which crashed about 290 kilometers (180 miles) off the Egyptian coast. The aircraft had smoke in the front part of the cabin, BEA said Saturday. Two error messages, the first at 2:26 a.m. local time, suggested a fire on board, while later alerts indicated some type of failure in the plane’s electrical equipment.

El-Sisi said a submarine belonging to the Oil Ministry would help in the search, which now focuses on retrieving the aircraft’s voice and data recorders, known as black boxes despite their bright orange color.

The push for caution is critical for Egypt, whose tourism industry suffered a major blow after a Russian passenger jet crashed into the Sinai peninsula in October. Islamic State took credit for that crash, even as Egyptian investigators have resisted ascribing it to terrorism pending the completion of the probe. There have been no claims of responsibility from any militant group in the case of Flight 804.

The few clues that have surfaced so far from the wreckage offer no clear direction. The initial investigation report will be released in a month, Egypt’s state-run Al-Ahram newspaper reported, citing probe head Ayman El-Mokadem.

While similar signals have preceded air accidents in the past, the warnings aren’t associated with a sudden disappearance from radar as occurred with the Airbus A320 over the Mediterranean. A Malaysian Airlines flight shot down over Ukrainian airspace in July 2014 broke apart so quickly that on-board systems didn’t have time to send distress messages.

“It’s too long for an explosion and too short for a traditional fire,” said John Cox, a former A320 pilot who is president of the Washington-based consultancy Safety Operating Systems. “It says we have more questions than we have answers.”

[Image: -1x-1.png]

Spanning three minutes, the warnings were followed by alerts that fumes were detected by smoke detectors, one in a lavatory and the other in the compartment below the cockpit where the plane’s computers and avionics systems are stored, according to the Aviation Herald.

In the case of a mid-flight fire, the pilots would have been expected to radio a distress call and begin attempts to divert, Cox said. No such radio calls came from the EgyptAir plane.

The transmissions, which are automatically sent to ground stations so airlines can monitor whether a plane needs maintenance, will probably provide valuable clues once they’re matched up against the plane’s crash-proof flight recorders. 

El-Mokadem said the cockpit voice and flight-data recorders had not been found, refuting a CBS News report on Saturday that they had been located. It took salvage crews years to locate and recover the devices from the Air France AF447 flight that went down in the Atlantic Ocean in 2009. Malaysian Airlines MH370 still hasn’t been found more than two years after it disappeared.

Debris Images

Egypt’s army has released both images and video footage of Flight 804 debris that show an intact yellow life jacket lying beside wrecked seat cushioning, tattered clothes and EgyptAir-branded metal plane parts, quashing hopes of finding any survivors.

The condition of those remains and the way debris was found scattered may offer some clues about how the plane went down, with a wide field of small pieces pointing to a mid-air breakup. Large chunks of wreckage might suggest the aircraft hit the water largely intact.

The flight lost contact in the middle of the night in the wider area of the Strabo trench in the so-called Hellenic Arc in the seas south of Greece, where waters are as much as 3,000 meters (9,800 feet) deep. The wreckage was discovered about 290 kilometers (180 miles) north of the Egyptian city of Alexandria, authorities said.
MTF...P2 Cool
Ps Bye the Bye and on the subject of 'on-board' fires it is good to see the Qantas PR machine works seamlessly, some 4 days before the MS804 tragedy occurred the ATSB was in receipt of a 'serious incident' report:
Quote:Aviation safety investigations & reports

Investigation title
Smoke event involving Airbus A380, VH-OQD, en route 3,000 km WSW of Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, United States, on 16 May 2016
 
Investigation number: AO-2016-051
Investigation status: Active
 
[Image: progress_1.png] Summary
The ATSB is investigating a smoke event involving a Qantas Airbus A380, VH-OQD, en route to Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, United States, on 16 May 2016.

During cruise, smoke was detected in the cabin. It was subsequently determined that a mobile phone battery was the source of the smoke.

As part of the investigation, the ATSB will gather information from the aircraft operator.
A report will be released within several months.
 
General details

Date: 16 May 2016
 
Investigation status: Active
 
Time: 15:35 UTC
 
Investigation type: Occurrence Investigation
 
Location   (show map): 3,000 km WSW of Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, USA
 
Occurrence type: Smoke
 
State: International
 
Occurrence category: Serious Incident
 
Report status: Pending
 
Highest injury level: None
 
Expected completion: Sep 2016 
 
Aircraft details

Aircraft detailsAircraft manufacturer: Airbus
 
Aircraft model: A380-842
 
Aircraft registration: VH-OQD
 
Serial number: 0026
 
Operator: Qantas
 
Type of operation: Air Transport High Capacity
 
Sector: Jet
 
Damage to aircraft: Nil
 
Departure point: Sydney, NSW
Destination: Dallas, USA
 
 
 
[Image: share.png][Image: feedback.png]

Last update 19 May 2016
   
Oh it was just another 'smoke' event courtesy of a mobile phone - "..nothing to see here move along.." - hmm...so why a 'serious incident'??
ICAO definition of a 'serious incident':
Quote:Serious incident. An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred.

Note 1.— The difference between an accident and a serious incident lies only in the result.

Note 2.— Examples of serious incidents can be found in Attachment C of Annex 13 and in the Accident/Incident Reporting

Manual
(Doc 9156).

Oh but that's right the ATSB has a notified difference on the definition of a serious incident - see MH370: ATSB & the search for IP going global :

Quote:Forwarding

4.1 The State of Occurrence shall forward a notification of an accident or serious incident with a minimum of delay and by the most suitable and quickest means available to:

....e) the International Civil Aviation Organization, when the aircraft involved is of a maximum mass of over 2 250kg.

& also..Pg 5. Ch 5 - 5.1.1 to 5.4

"..Australia may not institute an investigation into all foreign or Australian-registered aircraft involved in serious incidents. Decisions on whether a particular serious incident will be investigated will depend on resources and the likely benefit to future safety..."

There are many examples of where the ATSB has defined on their database a 'serious incident', that has subsequently escaped being forwarded to the ICAO international accident & serious incident database (e.g. LOSA or BOS incidents).

There has also been several cases where a 'serious incident', as defined by the ATSB, has subsequently had no investigation initiated, even under the ICAO definition the ATSB would have been obliged to do so... [Image: dodgy.gif]    

Too confused to comment - Confused
Reply
#60

Has ET claimed another aircraft? It’s a sneaking suspicion which keeps popping up in the back of my conscious. I know most think that by ET I mean the Extra Terrestrial movie star; and, I’ll own that I was quite happy for that notion to exist, but it’s not what I meant.

Electronic Transmogrification (ET) in the form of ‘virus’ or corrupt data creating problems is much more believable than some of the complex ‘conspiracy’ theories floating about. You can, without to much trouble have your computer ’infected’ and made useless; your ‘details’ and identity can be stolen, government and industries spend millions, if not billions on computer security. The ‘Black hats’ demonstrated a couple of years back that ‘aeronautical’ systems can be ‘hacked’.

So I arrive at the parallels between MH 370 and MS 804 and a ‘what if’ question which, IMO, needs an answer. This is not a ‘theory’ which I will defend to the death; just a simple, stray notion which intrigues me in quiet moments. What say you?
Reply




Users browsing this thread: 4 Guest(s)