Accidents - Domestic
D’ya know – in  almost 50 years of flying – for real – I’ve never, ever heard of such a thing as the story above. I really, truthfully, have some problem actually believing it, particularly as the ATSB say it is so. There is a deep flaw in the logic from both industry and CASA on display here. Nothing in the rules – so pilots don’t do it – THINK about it.

Then let’s have a look at a normal, everyday situation; in terms of ‘logic’.

Bloggs is slated to fly today. A four hour ‘mission’ – charter, survey, medi-vac – whatever. Point is the total journey involves at least four hours ‘airborne’. The procedure is simplicity itself. Bloggs sits down, with pencil and paper and ‘nut’s-it-out’. Taxi, take-off, climb, cruise descent, approach, landing and taxi in. ALL totally calculable (ish). Armed with weather details, load and ‘other’ information – the flight and FUEL plan is structured.

Step 2 – Bloggs ambles out and CHECKS – the residual fuel of board – RFOB.

Step 3 – Bloggs decides that to stay legal – the maximum amount of fuel he can carry is X the job requires X +/- that amount. So the ‘flight plan’ is developed to suit the task. No problemo – unless fuel is not available; then a re-think is required…

Step 4 – Bloggs; as pilot in command (PIC) orders the fuel uplift.

Step 5 – Tanker turns up – fuel is loaded and A DOCKET IS ISSUED. This is SIGNED by the PIC. Bloggs wanted 500 litres – docket says 500 delivered; this plus the residual FOB should amount to the fuel required.

Step 6 – Bloggs (being conscientious) adds the fuel delivered to the RFOB and then – the big one – declares that he is ‘happy’. As in, he accepts command responsibility for the task.

This is a routine, daily occurrence. A cross check that there is sufficient fuel + reserves to complete the task – not only legally (which don’t signify) but SAFELY, which does.

The truly scary part is that because the regulations don’t say this must done – it’s not? Aw, FDS.

Well, bugger me. It would be a cold day in “K’s” workplace before I failed – dismally – to make sure required FOB equaled that already on board + uplift  = flight fuel required (+ reserves). WTD are they teaching these children?

The truly bad part is CASA are now required to ‘respond’. They will be obliged to spell out, in legal terms of strict liability – the things that every thinking airman should never need to be told about. Those that taught the pilot mentioned need to be tarred, feathered and run out of Dodge on a rail…………….FDS.

Are we now so completely dependent on; and, terrified of ‘the rules’ that we cannot, dare not  think for ourselves?   It seems to be so to me. Indeed it does.

“Yes, yes, a Jameson will chase that pint down very nicely; thank you."

What else can you do when lunacy rules. Cheers.

[Image: Untitled%2B2.jpg]
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Groundhog day - Fuel exhaustion. Dodgy

(08-03-2018, 08:33 PM)P7_TOM Wrote: D’ya know – in  almost 50 years of flying – for real – I’ve never, ever heard of such a thing as the story above. I really, truthfully, have some problem actually believing it, particularly as the ATSB say it is so. There is a deep flaw in the logic from both industry and CASA on display here. Nothing in the rules – so pilots don’t do it – THINK about it.

Then let’s have a look at a normal, everyday situation; in terms of ‘logic’.

Bloggs is slated to fly today. A four hour ‘mission’ – charter, survey, medi-vac – whatever. Point is the total journey involves at least four hours ‘airborne’. The procedure is simplicity itself. Bloggs sits down, with pencil and paper and ‘nut’s-it-out’. Taxi, take-off, climb, cruise descent, approach, landing and taxi in. ALL totally calculable (ish). Armed with weather details, load and ‘other’ information – the flight and FUEL plan is structured.

Step 2 – Bloggs ambles out and CHECKS – the residual fuel of board – RFOB.

Step 3 – Bloggs decides that to stay legal – the maximum amount of fuel he can carry is X the job requires X +/- that amount. So the ‘flight plan’ is developed to suit the task. No problemo – unless fuel is not available; then a re-think is required…

Step 4 – Bloggs; as pilot in command (PIC) orders the fuel uplift.

Step 5 – Tanker turns up – fuel is loaded and A DOCKET IS ISSUED. This is SIGNED by the PIC. Bloggs wanted 500 litres – docket says 500 delivered; this plus the residual FOB should amount to the fuel required.

Step 6 – Bloggs (being conscientious) adds the fuel delivered to the RFOB and then – the big one – declares that he is ‘happy’. As in, he accepts command responsibility for the task.

This is a routine, daily occurrence. A cross check that there is sufficient fuel + reserves to complete the task – not only legally (which don’t signify) but SAFELY, which does.

The truly scary part is that because the regulations don’t say this must done – it’s not? Aw, FDS.

Well, bugger me. It would be a cold day in “K’s” workplace before I failed – dismally – to make sure required FOB equaled that already on board + uplift  = flight fuel required (+ reserves). WTD are they teaching these children?

The truly bad part is CASA are now required to ‘respond’. They will be obliged to spell out, in legal terms of strict liability – the things that every thinking airman should never need to be told about. Those that taught the pilot mentioned need to be tarred, feathered and run out of Dodge on a rail…………….FDS.

Are we now so completely dependent on; and, terrified of ‘the rules’ that we cannot, dare not  think for ourselves?   It seems to be so to me. Indeed it does.

“Yes, yes, a Jameson will chase that pint down very nicely; thank you."

What else can you do when lunacy rules. Cheers.

[Image: Untitled%2B2.jpg]

Spot on excellent post P7 -  Wink 

Ref SAN Presser:

Quote:Air Operator Certificate holders operating aircraft not greater than 5,700 kg
Fuel policy requirements

The current legislation does not require commercial operators of aircraft not greater than 5,700 kg maximum take-off weight (MTOW) to provide instructions and procedures for crosschecking the quantity of fuel on board before and/or during flight. This increases the risk that operators in this category will not implement effective fuel policies and training to prevent fuel exhaustion events.

What happened
On 17 July 2016, at about 1039 Central Standard Time, a McDonnell Douglas Corporation 369D helicopter, registered VH-PLY, experienced fuel exhaustion and a collision with terrain while performing powerline inspections 36 km north-west of Hawker, South Australia. There were three crew on board the helicopter. One pilot in the front left seat, one line-worker in the front right seat and one line-worker in the rear left seat. The three crew members were seriously injured and the helicopter was substantially damaged.

Why did it happen
The ATSB found that the pilot was mistakenly told by ground staff that the aircraft had been refuelled and through distraction, omitted a crosscheck of the fuel quantity before flight. The pilot’s monitoring of the fuel in-flight was based on anticipated endurance, which resulted in him not detecting a low fuel level. The ATSB also found the requirements for the development of fuel policy by operators were dispersed throughout the aviation legislation—14 legislative and three guidance material requirements were found—but they did not require the operator to publish procedures for determining fuel on board before and during flight for commercial operators of aircraft not greater than 5,700 kg MTOW.

Safety advisory notice
AO-2016-078-SAN-009: From 2003 to 2017, the ATSB has received 26 reports of fuel exhaustion events from Air Operator Certificate holders operating aircraft not greater than 5,700 kg MTOW. Two key contributing factors from these reports are pilots not crosschecking the fuel on board before and/or during flight. Aircraft greater than 5,700 kg MTOW are not represented in the ATSB fuel exhaustion reports. In accordance with CAO 20.2, operators of these aircraft are required to publish instructions and procedures in their operations manuals for the pilot in command to verify the fuel on board before flight. Additionally, CAAP 215-1(2) Appendix B includes guidelines for publishing operations manual procedures for inflight fuel management.

CASA 29/18 – Civil Aviation (Fuel Requirements) Instrument 2018, which contains proposed changes to the current fuel regulations and guidance material is scheduled to commence 8 November 2018. The ATSB considers that the implementation of these changes should address this safety issue.

Until the proposed changes to the current fuel regulations and guidance material are implemented, the ATSB advises Air Operator Certificate holders for aircraft not greater than 5,700 kg MTOW, to consider this safety issue and take action where appropriate.
Read more about this ATSB investigation: AO-2016-078.
 
Type:
Safety Advisory Notice
Investigation number:
AO-2016-078-SAN-009
Publication date:
2 August 2018

 

[img=110x0]https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4097574/share.png[/img][img=111x0]https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4097569/feedback.png[/img]

Last update 02 August 2018



& from the SAN:

Proactive Action

Action organisation:
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Action number:
NSA-008
Date:
02 August 2018
Action status:
Released


The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has started project CD 1508OS, which was published on their website 20 January 2016. The project contains the proposed changes to Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 234, the issuance of a CAR 234 Legislative Instrument, and revised Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1(2): Guidelines for aircraft fuel requirements, CAAP 215-1(2): Guide to the preparation of Operations Manuals, Volume 2, appendix B9: Fuel management, and the Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) handbook Volume 2 – Flying Operations – Section 6: Fuel policy and related requirements. Once made into law, the amendments to the existing CAR 234 will commence on 8 November 2018.

A key outcome of the amendment is providing clarity about the regulatory requirements that apply to fuel by having those requirements set out in a legislative instrument. This overcomes difficulties with the previous arrangement, where requirements were set out in guidance material ‘called up’ by regulation, in that the requirements were often not readily recognised as having the force of law. CASA 29/18 – Civil Aviation (Fuel Requirements) Instrument 2018 sets out the legislative requirements that:
  • specify the matters that must be referenced by the operator and the pilot in command in determining the quantity of usable fuel required for a flight
  • specify the quantities required to commence a flight and also to continue a flight
  • require that inflight fuel management be conducted, and
  • specify the contingencies to which additional fuel calculation must be applied.
[size=undefined]
To assist industry and CASA understanding of the changes to the fuel requirements in legislation, the amendment to guidance material CAAP 234-1(2) will be published. It will contain enhanced guidance on the generally applicable fuel related areas of the legislative instrument. CAAP 234-1(2) will differentiate between requirements and guidance.
 [/size]

ATSB response:
The ATSB has reviewed the draft project documents for CD 1508OS and considers that the implementation of the CAR 234 Legislative Instrument and CAAP 234-1(2), in conjunction with their requirements reflected in the AOC Handbook, should address the safety issue. The ATSB will continue to monitor the action by CASA. Until that time, the ATSB issues the following Safety Advisory Notice to AOC holders operating aircraft not greater than 5,700 kg.

What still gets me is how the hell it can take the ATSB 2+ years to get around to publishing this SAN. It also beggars belief that CASA, with the ATSB providing topcover, could honestly be promoting their timeline in the SAN as 'proactive action'. That is simply laughable at best and criminal negligence at worst. Besides the fact that the draft project (CD 1508OS) is still ongoing after 2.5 years, it should be remembered that this project is an adjunct of the original review of the CAR 234 legislative instrument  - i.e. Project OS 09/13 - Ref:  Project OS 09/13 - Fuel and Alternate requirements - which was originally approved in 2009: 

Quote:Project OS 09/13 - Fuel and Alternate requirements

Project approved. 21 Aug 2009

What makes it even worse is that project was finally approved after more than a decade of previous ATSB occurrence reports and safety recommendations that all pointed towards the need for urgent safety risk mitigation with review of CAR 234 and the rules surrounding mandatory fuel uptake. 

Disgusting -  Angry  I'll leave Ben Sandilands to posthumously comment on the issue, after all nothing has changed since (2015...err 1996):


Quote:ATSB forgets Pel-Air in study of fuel exhaustion accidents

Amnesia can now be again added to the failings of integrity and safety focus in ATSB reports on the repeated release today of  its study titled Starved and Exhausted: Fuel Management Aviation Accidents. It leaves out the fuel management related crash investigation of the century, the one in which a Pel-Air flight was ditched near […]
BEN SANDILANDS
 
FEB 09, 2015
 
[Image: Piper-Cherokee-Six-610x349.jpg]

APT ILLUSTRATION FROM TODAY'S BIZARRE ATSB RECYCLING OF OLD STUDY

Amnesia can now be again added to the failings of integrity and safety focus in ATSB reports on the repeated release today of  its study titled Starved and Exhausted: Fuel Management Aviation Accidents.
It leaves out the fuel management related crash investigation of the century, the one in which a Pel-Air flight was ditched near Norfolk Island in 2009.

But the notification of the study by the ATSB using Twitter is even stranger. It’s recycling the study it published according to the fly sheet in March 2013 and the web page the link to the download takes you was last edited in April 2014.

Among the illustrations in the study is the top of page photo of the retrieval of a Piper Cherokee Six that ditched while conducting inter-island charters between Mackay and the Whitsundays in April 2008.

So strange. If the ATSB can haul an entire Cherokee out of the Whitsunday waters, what really stopped it being sufficiently curious about the ditching the Pel-Air Westwind corporate jet from the water close to Norfolk Island to recover its flight data recorder?

What didn’t the ATSB want to know? Now, in 2015, we know that the ATSB and CASA variously withheld or dismissed serious findings about safety deficiencies in Pel-Air’s operations, owned by the generous Labor and Coalition political donor REX, who lavished completely unrelated and out of character gifts of money to both sides of politics in the same year that a discredited ATSB report into the crash was released.

The optics aren’t good. The ATSB re-releases a report that leaves out the most important fuel management accident in its history at the same time as it is trying to get away with conducting a new review of that Pel-Air rash report it insists is fault free.

This is pathetic.
    

MTF...P2  Cool
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QF cargo incident to be investigated by ATCB?  Rolleyes

From Ironsider, via the Oz:

Quote:Plane depressurises mid-flight

[Image: d64f6382316bf3477ecbfd7171862398]ROBYN IRONSIDE
An investigation is underway after a Qantas-owned cargo plane depressurised mid-flight, rendering one of the pilots unconscious.


An investigation is underway after a Qantas-owned cargo plane depressurised mid-flight, rendering one of the pilots incapacitated.

The Boeing 737 operated by Express Freighters Australia was flying from Brisbane to Melbourne late Wednesday night when the crew received a wing body overheat warning near Narrendera in New South Wales.

According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the crew donned oxygen masks and descended to 20,000 feet but the First Officer was “subsequently incapacitated”.

“The Captain descended to 8000 feet and diverted the aircraft to Canberra,” said the ATSB report.

Both pilots were taken to hospital after landing in Canberra without incident.

A Qantas spokesman said both had since been discharged.

A wing body overheat warning is an indication of a leak in the corresponding bleed air duct which, if on the left hand side, provides air for pressurisation.

As part of the investigation, the ATSB will collect and examine information on the aircraft’s flight data recorders and interview maintenance and flight crew.

“Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify those affected and seek safety action to address the issue,” the ATSB report said.

The Qantas spokesman said the fault related to the on-board airconditioning system.

“We are conducting an investigation into the incident and the aircraft is being inspected by engineers,” he said.

Qantas was also providing assistance to ATSB investigators as required.


Quote:Summary
The ATSB is investigating an depressurisation and crew incapacitation involving a B737, VH-XMO, near Narrandera NSW, 15 August 2018.
During cruise, the crew of the cargo flight received a wing body overheat warning resulting in a reduction of cabin pressure. The crew donned oxygen and descended to 20,000 ft. The First Officer was subsequently incapacitated and the Captain descended to 8,000 ft and diverted the aircraft to Canberra.
As part of the investigation, the ATSB will collect and examine information from the aircraft’s flight data recorders and interview maintenance and flight crew.
A final report will be released at the end of the investigation.
Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify those affected and seek safety action to address the issue.

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2018-056/

MTF...P2  Cool
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Fire fighting helo fatality near Ulladulla - RIP Angel  

Via the Oz:

Quote:Chopper pilot dies fighting NSW blaze
  • Australian Associated Press
  • 2 hours ago August 17, 2018
A helicopter crash near Ulladulla on the NSW South Coast is the second fatal accident involving a firefighting aircraft in the area within five years.

Sydney Helicopters pilot Allan Tull died when his chopper crashed west of Ulladulla about 2pm on Friday while waterbombing the massive Mount Kingiman blaze.

A firefighting pilot crashed in similar circumstances nearly five years ago when his waterbombing plane went down while battling a blaze not far from the scene of Friday's crash.

David Black, 43, was killed when his Dromader plane crashed in the Budawang National Park, 40km west of Ulladulla, in October 2013.

Mr Tull was regarded as one of the most experienced in his field, according to his employer.

Friday's crash appears to have been caused when the water bucket became stuck in trees and pulled the 1994 Kawasaki helicopter down.

A Sydney Helicopters employee described Mr Tull as "an amazing guy".

"It's a massive shock ... we are absolutely devastated with the loss" the employee told AAP.

The company's Chief Pilot Mark Harrold said Mr Tull's loss would be felt by all in the industry.

"Tully had a wealth of aerial firefighting experience and his aviation knowledge and skills were of the highest standard," he said in a statement.

"He will be sadly missed and our thoughts are with his family, friends and colleagues at this difficult time."

The helicopter is a 1994 Kawasaki BK117 which has been registered to Sydney Helicopters since May 2015.

"Every year we supply aircraft to the NSW and ACT Fire Agencies as well as the National Aerial Firefighting Centre to assist with the combat of bushfires in NSW and interstate when required," the company states on its website.

Significant resources from emergency services including a rescue helicopter were dispatched to the area of the crash, a NSW Police spokesman said.

It's understood nearby naval base HMAS Albatross also provided assistance.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau will dispatch staff to undertake a full investigation, the agency said in a statement.

They will examine pieces of the wreckage and undertake interviews to piece together what went wrong.

"The pilot put his life on the line to protect and keep our community safe and he has paid the ultimate price," local MP Shelley Hancock said.

After Friday's crash the RFS grounded all aircraft fighting the Mount Kingiman bushfire.
"This is a tragic event and my deepest sympathies are with the pilot's family and friends," Emergency Services Minister Troy Grant said in a statement.
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ATSB FR: QLD Govt Airwing incident - A lesson perhaps?  Rolleyes

Via the Oz today:

Quote:Jet emergency sparks reform

[Image: fd85a4050e6fd5532eff55c761bc945c]ROBYN IRONSIDE
The Queensland Government Air Wing has introduced new training in the wake of an emergency involving the police jet.



The Queensland Government Air Wing has introduced new training for flight crews after an Australia Day emergency involving the police jet.

On January 26, the Cessna ­Citation 560 was carrying eight people, including Police Commissioner Ian Stewart, Police Minister Mark Ryan and Fire Chief Katarina Carroll, on a flight from Brisbane to Townsville.

About 350km north of Brisbane, a series of bangs was heard from the rear of the jet and the ­pilots made an emergency ­descent from 30,000 feet to 10,000 feet.

A request was made to air traffic control for an immediate ­return to Brisbane, with the pilots deciding to bypass Bundaberg and Sunshine Coast airports.

Although the flight crew donned oxygen masks due to a mist of “acrid smoke in the cockpit”, they did not deploy passenger oxygen masks.

At the time, Mr Ryan ­described the incident as a “frightening experience” and said he was grateful for the flight crew’s professionalism, skill, calmness and reassurance.

An Australian Transport ­Safety Bureau investigation found a tiny piece of broken metal from a compressor stage rotor in the engine caused the bangs.

“The aerofoil fractured as a ­result of a fatigue crack … the exact origin of the fatigue crack could not be determined,” the ­report says.

The investigation revealed the engine and rotor were manufactured in 2001, and had completed 3126 flight hours.

No other maintenance was required to be performed on the rotor until overhaul at 3500 hours of service.

The components were sent to engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney Canada, which formed a specialist engineering group to review the complete history of the boost rotor, and boost rotor distress.

The next meeting of the group is scheduled for next month.

The ATSB report also says the Queensland Government Air Wing has introduced a number of new training packages for flight crew, including crew resource management for all pilots and a future line operations safety audit program.

“Although some of this training was programmed, it was expedited following a review of the occurrence involving (the police jet),” the report says.

“The first tranche of crew ­resource management training was conducted prior to publication of this report.”



& via the ATSB: 

Investigation numberAO-2018-012

Quote:report
[DownloadPDF: 246KB]
 
 

What happened

On 26 January 2018, a Cessna Citation 560 aircraft, registration VH-PSU, was conducting a business flight from Brisbane to Townsville, Queensland. VH-PSU was operated by the State of Queensland, Public Safety Business Agency, with two flight crew and six passengers.
While passing through flight level (FL) 320[1], a loud noise was heard from the rear of the aircraft, along with the smell of smoke. The flight crew made a PAN PAN[2] call to air traffic control (ATC) and requested an emergency descent and return to Brisbane. The aircraft returned to Brisbane for an emergency landing and landed without incident.
An examination of the Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5D engine, using borescope inspection, revealed the low pressure (LP) compressor (boost) rotor had lost an aerofoil and sustained some damage.

Operator’s investigation

Passing through FL320 on climb, the flight crew experienced (both heard and felt) a series of bangs from the rear of the aircraft. The pilot monitoring[3] (PM) immediately saw and smelt a slight mist of ‘acrid’ smoke in the cockpit. The PM donned his oxygen mask, immediately made a PAN PAN call to ATC and requested an immediate return to Brisbane and emergency descent. An immediate examination of engine and other system parameters indicated no other abnormalities. The pilot flying (PF) commenced the descent and turn back in accordance with ATC instruction, however, as he did not sense any smoke he did not immediately don his oxygen mask. This was a decision made so that he could maintain communications with ATC. Once satisfied that any immediate communications were carried out, he donned his mask and both crew kept their masks on until an altitude of 10,000 ft above mean sea level was reached. The PF elected not to deploy the passenger oxygen masks as there was no indication of smoke subsequent to that first noticed by the PM.

During the descent, the crew discussed the options of landing at Bundaberg or Sunshine Coast airports, but they were discounted in favour of Brisbane.

It was likely that the reduction in power necessitated by the emergency descent eliminated the smell and visual evidence of the smoke. However, the PM reported a very brief re-occurrence of the odour when power was reapplied upon gear extension at commencement of the approach into Brisbane.

Interviews with the crew after the occurrence revealed some inconsistencies in their recollections of the event, including what actions were immediately taken by whom. The inconsistencies had no direct impact on the safe outcome of the flight.

Examination of the aircraft in Brisbane revealed that the cause of the loud bangs was the failure of one of the aerofoils of the integrally bladed LP compressor (boost) stage rotor, which then exited the engine via the usual gas flow. Small globules of molten metal were found in the exhaust.

The engine was removed from the aircraft and sent to the owner[4] for initial disassembly. The relevant sections of the LP compressor were forwarded to the manufacturer in Canada for further examination and determination of the blade failure mechanism.
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THE GHOSTS OF LOCKHART RIVER....

It seems the Transair misery and litany of injustices doesn’t get any better with time for the grieving loved ones of the ones who died in the crash. The owners and operators of the plane have launched legal action that could stop the victims' families ever getting answers.

Quote:[Image: lockhartrivercrash-fje79s5wf41d4cc96o2_ct1160x651.jpeg]
Police picture of the site of the plane crash at Lockhart River, Cape York. The Fairchild Metroliner III was on a May 7, 2005 flight from Bamaga to Lockhart River when it crashed, killing all 15 aboard
Fresh blow to air crash victims' families
by Vanessa Marsh and Vanda Carson
18th Sep 2018 9:15 AM

THE owners and operators of a commercial plane involved in one of Australia's worst air disasters have launched legal action that could stop the victims' families ever getting answers.

Two pilots and 13 passengers were killed in the May 2005 Lockhart River tragedy when an Aerotropics commercial flight crashed into a ridgeline and exploded in flames, killing all on board during a flight from Bamaga.

In the latest roadblock for victims' families, owners of the doomed aircraft have launched an appeal in a bid to block a wrongful-death lawsuit in the US state of Missouri, just weeks after the victims' families won a legal battle to allow the case to go to trial in July next year.

[Image: b88729774z1_20170503070158_000g3ojus622-..._t1160.jpg]
Yeppoon police officer Sally Urquhart was one of 15 people killed in the Lockhart River plane crash in 2005. Qld Police

Brisbane man Shane Urquhart lost his policewoman daughter Sally in the crash and said the long-running legal hurdles were "frustrating" and "ludicrous".

"We're talking about human lives here, ordinary people and they were all good people going about their daily business," he said.

"There's no such thing as closure, there's no closure when you lose someone but there may be justice but that certainly hasn't happened here."

[Image: imagev144a58756c91e2f2597fdb9af46a60739-...60x651.jpg]

Shane Urquhart Father of Sally Urquhart killed in Lockhart River Plane Crash. PICTURE: GLENN BARNES

The horror crash was the worst air disasters in Queensland in more than four decades and claimed the lives of a leading scientist, a popular policewoman, three key members of a football team, and a 25-year-old mother of six.

The families allege in the Missouri court action that the aircraft had several defects and that the crash was "the direct and proximate result" of one of more of those defects.

The alleged defects include claims the plane did not contain an effective ground proximity warning system, it was not equipped with autopilot and flight instruments were either hard to read, confusing, or not in proper view.

Lawyers for the plane's owners and operators who are being sued by 61 family members of the crash victims, the majority of whom live in Queensland, launched an appeal on September 6 against last months' Brisbane Supreme Court ruling allowing the Missouri case to go ahead.

The appeal argues the Supreme Court ought to rule that the Missouri action is "vexatious and oppressive" and that "nothing relevant" could be gained in the overseas action over and above what could be gained in Australia.

The families are pursuing legal action in Missouri where they claim the aircraft was delivered, inspected and placed into operation.

[Image: imagev17f993b9c85794230ffbad123c1be35bd-...60x651.jpg]
Remembered: Memorial to the victims of the Lockhart River air crash at Iron Range airport on Cape York.

The 61 family members are expected to fly to Missouri to give evidence or testify via video link.

In Missouri, a jury will determine the amount of damages awarded instead of a judge and there are no orders for costs as there are in Australia.

However it's not yet clear whether the US case will run according to Queensland or Missouri law.

Toowoomba lawyer Pat Nunan has been representing the victims' families for more than a decade and said the delays were difficult.

"It's terrible and it's had a great impact on the families of the victims," he said.

"Litigation is one of the great stressors of all time and it has been horrendous for them."

He said the families were desperate for answers.

"We're trying to get their day in court to determine what actually did go wrong and make sure it doesn't happen again," he said.

"It's like a hot dagger into a wound every time something comes up in these cases."

Brisbane man Shane Urquhart lost his policewoman daughter Sally in the crash and said the long-running legal hurdles were "frustrating" and "ludicrous".

"We're talking about human lives here, ordinary people and they were all good people going about their daily business," he said.

"There's no such thing as closure, there's no closure when you lose someone but there may be justice but that certainly hasn't happened here."

The appeal returns to the Court of Appeal tomorrow.


https://m.dailyexaminer.com.au/news/fres...s/3524225/

Oh well. No doubt CAsA and the FNQ field office will continue to operate unabated and with impunity. Ironic that one of the individuals from the FNQ office rose through CAsA and now serves as Board Chairman with CAsA PNG.

FFS. No further comment
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NOK take the Montreal Convention to the High Court -  Huh

Very much related - to (yet again) the piss poor treatment by Governments and insurance companies etc..etc; of the victims of air crashes and their NOK - I note the following from the Oz two days ago... Confused

Quote:Grief goes to the High Court

[Image: 9d06ee4088ef5c95021dddd0611d757d]SAM BUCKINGHAM-JONES
The death of a man 12 years ago has snowballed from a small lawsuit into a case that could have global ramifications.


Family’s grief finds its way to the High Court

The death of a husband and father in country NSW 12 years ago has snowballed from a small lawsuit in the NSW District Court into a case with possible international ramifications, and will be considered in the High Court this year.

Ian Stephenson was 43 when, during an aerial survey of noxious weeds for Parkes Shire Council in February 2006, he, a colleague and a pilot were killed as their helicopter collided with powerlines.

This tragedy devastated the Stephenson family. “It’s a struggle every day to do ordinary things,” widow Ingrid Stephenson said.

“It’s like a part of us has been cut out and isn’t there.”

In 2009, three years after the accident, Ms Stephenson started a lawsuit that over a decade became a complex battle between the council, South West Helicopters, which provided the pilot and aircraft, and energy companies. As the family won in the NSW ­Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, their case exposed ­conflicts in how the Court of ­Appeal and the Federal Court ­approached aviation cases.

The council has special leave to ask the High Court to determine a crucial point in the legislation: can the immediate family of a passenger killed on a flight claim for psychiatric injury under federal and state civil aviation laws?

Barrister David Baran acted for the family, which is no longer ­directly involved in the landmark case the tragedy has prompted.

“You’ve got two appellate courts, the NSW Court of Appeal and the Full Federal Court, who are saying completely different things about the same subject,” he said. “It’s for the High Court to resolve this issue once and for all.”

The case is now between South West Helicopters and the council.

The latter, which has paid compensation to the family, has ­argued that immediate family are entitled to bring nervous shock claims under state liability laws and therefore South West should compensate the council for some of what it paid.

South West, represented by former Australian solicitor-­general Justin Gleeson SC, says federal aviation laws cover any ­action, and since the family did not bring a case until after the two-year window for claims, South West is not liable for any damages.

In commercial aviation, international conventions govern most of how the law interacts with ­people. On the back of plane ­tickets, there is a contract that ­details the legal relationship into which passengers enter by flying.

The Civil Aviation (Carriers Liability) Act is the federal vehicle through which international conventions operate. State and territory counterparts deal with dom­estic travel.

It will be argued in the High Court that the federal act does not specifically mention psychiatric injury to non-passengers.

If the High Court rules in favour of the council, it would mean relatives of future aviation disaster victims could independently sue through the NSW Civil Liability Act.

Mr Baran said he has had “many, many, many people” calling him about the case. “There are people involved in MH370, a lot of airline disasters, MH17, all sorts,” he said. “It really is one of the most important tort or common law cases to arrive on the steps of the High Court in years.”


MTF...P2  Cool
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HVH produces more fluff and pony Pooh

Regretfully I read through Toga boys Essendon report this morning. I can see why the accident investigation miraculously took only 7 months rather than the standard 4 years. What a load of waffle, piffle and folly. Naturally they mentioned the highly sensitive DFO building, knowing that the IOS were on to this. However HVH succinctly deflects discussion about the DFO onto the approval of the building, without implicating CAsA. So whether the focus for CAsA will now be to blame the building developer and Council remains to be seen. However you can be rest assured that Fort Fumble’s Iron Ring will be pumping out the overtime to keep the reputation of the Authority and the testicle deficient Miniscule looking squeaking clean and at arms length!

‘Safe pineapples for someone’
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The advertising towers ?

Note shadows for height, and the "framework" of the closest one.

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All repaired, all good, nothing to see here folks.

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Good catch "V"... Wink

Any idea whether the towers impinged the OLS?

Bye the bye Wannabe has brought my attention to today's Oz beat up of the pilot... Dodgy  

Quote:Crash pilot’s form raises questions
[Image: 7d01368af23fbed17f4a4482156600ae]ROBYN IRONSIDE
Essendon crash pilot Max Quartermain was involved in a near miss at Mount Hotham.




Questions have been raised about whether authorities should have taken stronger action against Essendon crash pilot Max Quartermain following his involvement in a near miss at Mount Hotham and his assertion to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau that he did not need to use a checklist.

The ATSB’s final report on the Essendon crash on February 21 last year found the pilot was unable to control the Beechcraft King Air B200 because the rudder trim had been fully wound to the left.

The rudder trim is supposed to be in the neutral position for takeoff, a condition the report found the pilot should have checked up to five times as part of pre-flight preparations.

With the aircraft veering left and losing altitude, and Quartermain apparently unsure of what the problem was, the B200 crashed into the DFO building adjacent to Essendon Airport within 10 seconds of takeoff.

All five people on board, including four American tourists, were killed.

The ATSB report on the Mt Hotham near miss on September 3, 2015, was not delivered until June 27 this year — four months after the Essendon crash.

In that incident, Quartermain was found to have struggled with a faulty GPS and poor weather, misreporting his location several times and coming within 1.6km of another aircraft, which changed its position to avoid a collision.

He eventually landed the B200 on the Mt Hotham runway from the wrong direction after an hour and 27 minutes in the air, on a flight that would normally take 38 minutes.

An incident report obtained by The Australian revealed the eight passengers refused to return to Melbourne with Quartermain later that day.

In response, Quartermain voluntarily suspended himself from flying until he underwent independent flight testing, which he passed at the second attempt.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority recommended he undertake remedial training in a B200 simulator but the ATSB had no evidence he had done so.

Yesterday a CASA spokesman said the recommendation to undertake simulator training was not mandated under civil aviation legislation.

The ATSB also noted in its report that Quartermain did not have an appropriate flight-check system in place for the B200 before the Essendon crash, and quoted previous correspondence in which the pilot said he did not need to use a checklist because he was doing it every day.

The ATSB refused to put a date on that correspondence or say whether any action was taken.

Yesterday, Central Queensland University safety scientist and former accident investigator Geoffrey Dell said the ATSB report on the Essendon crash revealed the very “different levels of safety standards in different parts of the aviation industry”.

“I found it interesting that CASA had issues with non-­compliance (by Quartermain) and months had gone by and nobody had gone to see if it had been corrected,” Dr Dell said.


MTF...P2 Cool
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Trivial and inaccurate.

Robyn Ironside usually pens reasonable articles on matters aeronautical; well, good enough for me to actually bother reading ‘em. So, enjoying the luxury of time to spare and a second coffee, I started to read her ‘take’ on the Essendon disaster. I got as far as this:-

Ironside – “The rudder trim is supposed to be in the neutral position for takeoff, a condition the report found the pilot should have checked up to five times as part of pre-flight preparations.”

Before muttering OFFS and flicking the article, seeing as Ms Ironside has some cred with AP, rather than demolish this ridiculous, ignorant twaddle, we shall as a courtesy, call it uneducated. I’ll dip my thumb nail into the tar pot once again and scratch out a short paragraph (or two) on why this statement is, on balance of probability, bollocks.

From the very first time a trainee pilot sits in a cockpit – the importance of pre take-off checks are drummed into their wooden heads; repeatedly emphasised, continually monitored until those basic checks become ‘second nature’: checking the trim setting becomes an automatic, almost a subconscious default setting. Why? Well because keeping an aircraft ‘in-trim’ forms an essential part of routine flying, from day one. The junior pilot, realises the importance of this from the first lesson, it is further emphasised during  ‘touch and go’ (circuit and landing) training. The very first landing ever done involves the use of almost all the ‘nose up’ elevator trim; the aircraft lands and almost immediately takes off again (touch and go) the drill is simple enough – landing flap Up, TRIM reset for the take off range – power up and airborne. This is a lesson hammered home, every flight, from minute one. With progress through to multi-engine aircraft the imperative of resetting rudder and elevator trim, quickly and accurately, is further reinforced. Hardly requiring conscious thought; it is as routine as making a coffee.  

Another important early lesson is ‘setting up’ for the configuration required. The pre flight checks are another routine hammered home, early in the piece. Pilots quickly learn that early, careful preparation and cockpit set up save time and trouble early in the flight i.e. on take off. Take off is a busy time, lots to consider, much can go wrong and it is no time to be caught with your pants down. So the habits and rituals are instilled and learned from almost the very first moment of flight. Experienced pilots, even on a turn around will routinely re-set or check set the basics; even if there is other stuff to do. Smart blokes use the checklist – even if its just to check their scan flow. You can see it everyday – the essentials are done from memory (scan) then the check list is called – routine, mundane everyday essential survival stuff.

I find it hard to believe that any experienced pilot would, on the first flight of the day, by-pass the pre flight setup and check list; even if in a rush – the basic habits and ingrained training would (to a reasonable man) prevent an unsafe, inefficient, amateurish debacle on departure. Even if – and it is a big IF – Quartermain had skipped through the pre flight; the trim settings are called up another four times – between engine start and power up for take off. Even if he just did what 99% of all pilots do – have a last minute, pre line up ‘look around’ to make sure all was as it should be, before shovelling the coals into the boilers in anger he would spot a thing like ‘full’ rudder bias. Five official calls for trim check, followed by a habitual check, followed by an experienced bloke not twigging to a serious out of trim condition by halfway through a take-off roll? No, sorry Sweetie, it don’t stack up. It may be possible, I grant you that; but, logically - it remains highly improbable. The ATSB really need to pull their socks up; it is becoming embarrassing.


"Yesterday, Central Queensland University safety scientist and former accident investigator Geoffrey Dell said the ATSB report on the Essendon crash revealed the very “different levels of safety standards in different parts of the aviation industry”.

The quoted Dell  bollocks (above) ain’t anywhere near accurate either; but we’ll let that slide away into the gutter, where it belongs - for the time being.

Coffee finished – me too; ramble over.

Toot toot.
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From the Age..

Quote:Man fighting for life, flights grounded after Stawell crash

A Sydney man is fighting for his life and another man from Melbourne has suffered serious head injuries after a light plane crash near Stawell, in Victoria's west.

Emergency crews were called to the scene of a light aircraft crash at Black Range about 12.45pm on Friday.

A witness told the ABC he saw the aircraft in a spin before it disappeared behind trees.

A 28-year-old man from Kellyville in Sydney was flown by air ambulance to The Alfred hospital in a critical condition, an Ambulance Victoria spokeswoman said.

He remained in a critical condition on Saturday afternoon, a hospital spokeswoman said.

The second man, age 40, was flown to Royal Melbourne Hospital with suspected head and facial injuries. The Altona Meadows man was in a stable condition on Saturday afternoon.

It is believed the fixed-wing aircraft crashed just north of the Stawell airfield shortly before 1pm.

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has been notified of the incident and the investigation into the cause of the crash is ongoing.

The single engine aircraft has been identified as belonging to Soar Aviation, a training school for pilots.

According to the flight school's website, Soar Aviation is based out of Moorabbin Airport, Melbourne and Bankstown Airport, Sydney & Bendigo Airport.

The company has grounded it's entire fleet at all bases, a statement on its Facebook page said.

"The incident that occurred at Stawell has activated a comprehensive emergency response, " it read.

"Soar Aviation and emergency response teams have incident response management and procedures in place in the event of an incident of this nature."

"Soar Aviation’s priority is the safety and security of our employees, students, visitors, and those involved in the incident."

Here's a video of a similar - but different - crash of a Bristell NG5 (the same type that crashed at Clyde earlier this year, and at Stawell the other day..)
Stall/spin, and into the ground.

A bit of background on the Clyde crash:
I flew that same aircraft when I did my RAAus AFR.  I was told by the CFI that stalls were not performed in that aircraft, but wasn't given a reason why.  Never flew it again - I switched to the Sling II.

In the Stawell crash, the aircraft had a different wing design.  Not sure why, but it was adopted by Bristell at some point.
I have heard around the traps that stalls weren't performed in the Soar Bristells either.  Still no reason given..

So, do we have an aircraft that, in spite of what the POH says, you cannot stall lest it kill you?

Note para 2.8 page 2-8:

Airplane Category: ELA, LSA
The BRISTELL LSA is approved for normal and below listed maneuvers:
 Steep turns not exceeding 60° bank
 Lazy eights
 Chandelles
 Stalls (except whip stalls)

WARNING
Aerobatics and intentional spins are prohibited !

And para 3.7 page 3-8:

WARNING
Intentional spins are prohibited!

There is no an uncontrollable tendency of the airplane to enter into a
spin provided the normal piloting techniques are used.
Unintentional spin recovery technique:
1. Throttle - idle
2. Lateral control - ailerons neutralized
3. Rudder pedals - full opposite rudder
4. Rudder pedals - neutralize rudder immediately when
rotation stops
5. Longitudinal control - neutralize or push forward
and recovery dive.


I know it's just an LSA, and not a real aircraft, but if this is what the next generation of pilots are being trained on...
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Back to Essendon.

I note, with some amusement, that the ‘experts’ on the UP are finally catching on. Shan’t bother you all with the posts – but, to further elaborate the abysmal ATSB performance in support of only the gods know what; a quote directly from the Be20 bible.

“The engine driven fuel pump (high pressure) is mounted on the accessory case in conjunction with the fuel control unit (FCU). Failure of this pump results in an immediate flame-out.” The primary boost pump (low pressure) is also engine driven and is mounted on the drive pad on the aft accessory section of the engine. This pump operates when the gas generator (N1) is turning and provides sufficient fuel for start, take-off all flight conditions except operation with hot aviation gasoline above 20, 000 feet altitude, and operation with cross-feed.

The minister should be asking his experts to clearly define what actually happened that day, at Essendon. They could, in turn, ask the ATSB what the hell they are playing at. Better yet, he could bring in the IIC and ask him; on oath, (in camera) if he can – hand on heart – provide a little more ‘fact’ than the Hood faery story. I’d expect some folk in the USA would value anything a little better than the current Wild Ass Guess (WAG) which claims, without any convincing supporting data or proof, 100% Pilot error.

The simple truth minister is the ATSB management have NFI; the ‘tin-kickers’ might; but there is not enough evidence here to support any claim other than supposition. The bloody aircraft hit a building and burned, killing 5; that is fact – after that – well, you pay your money and take your chances.

“Yes please – life is too short for a less than half full glass".

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Like chalk & cheese -  Dodgy

Today the HVH led ATCB released the final report into the REX SAAB 340 in flight loss of a propeller: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2017-032/

Media coverage, via the Oz:
Quote:Why plane lost propeller in air
[Image: 59781ff3b8adb78eefa757926876594c]ROBYN IRONSIDE
An aeroplane’s propeller which fell off during a flight above Sydney last year was “an extremely rare event”, the ATSB says.

The final report on the mid-flight loss of a propeller by a Regional Express (Rex) aircraft over Sydney last year has found fatigue cracking in the propeller shaft went unnoticed because maintenance engineers were not told to look for it.

The March 17 flight from Albury to Sydney had 19 people on board, when it experienced vibrations from the right engine.

As the pilots went through the checklist the vibrations worsened, so the decision was made to shut down the engine.

A short time later the propeller came off about 19km southwest of Sydney Airport, landing in dense forest and luckily missing any houses or vehicles.

The Rex crew alerted Air Traffic Control and the Saab 340 landed safely in Sydney without injury to any passengers or crew.

Inspections subsequently found the propeller shaft had fractured due to a crack in a crucial mounting bracket.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau report delivered today, found the engine manufacturer’s maintenance documents did not include specific inspection procedures to detect fatigue cracking of the propeller shaft.

In addition, the ATSB investigation found Rex’s inspection worksheets did not provide for the recording of inspection findings.

“Consequently, this may not have provided for the best opportunity to ensure potential defects were identified, recorded and monitored,” the report said.

Since the incident, engine maker General Electric has changed maintenance manuals to include more ongoing detailed inspections of the propeller shaft.

The United States’ Federal Aviation Administration also issued an airworthiness directive, requiring repetitive visual inspection of the main propeller shaft for affected engines.

Rex also undertook a variety of measures in response to the incident including a review of maintenance practices for propeller removal and installation, which identified several areas of improvement.

The report noted that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority had audited Rex twice since the incident, looking specifically at the airlines’ propeller maintenance practices.

ATSB chief commissioner Greg Hood described the propeller loss as an “extremely rare event” and commended the Rex crew for their response to the emergency.

“The captain and the first officer demonstrated a high level of professionalism in their airmanship, communication, co-ordination and application of the safety checklist procedures in their response,” Mr Hood said.

He said the safety actions undertaken by General Electric and Rex, would reduce the risk of such a thing ever happening again.

Reading the ATCB report - see https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2017-032/ - I cannot ignore the bizarre difference in process/methodology, dichotomy and disassociation in the final report findings of the REX propeller serious incident (above link) and the YMEN DFO accident final report, especially under the 'findings' and 'contributory factors' sections of the reports... Rolleyes 

Spot the difference in methodology?


Quote:Findings

From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the propeller separation event involving a 340B aircraft, registered VH-NRX (NRX), which occurred about 10 NM south-west of Sydney, New South Wales (NSW) on 17 March 2017. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

Safety issues, or system problems, are highlighted in bold to emphasise their importance. A safety issue is an event or condition that increases safety risk and (a) can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations, and (b) is a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operating environment at a specific point in time.

Contributing factors
  • The propeller shaft failed as a result of a fatigue crack that had initiated at the dowel pin hole and propagated through the shaft until it could no longer transmit the required loads.
  • The engine manufacturer did not have specific inspection procedures in the maintenance documents of the propeller shaft to detect a fatigue crack originating from the dowel pin hole. [Safety Issue]
[size=undefined]
Other safety factors[/size]
  • The form used by Regional Express during a propeller removal and installation, HM-26 Revision 5, included the task to inspect the propeller gearbox, but did not provide for recording of inspection findings as defined within documented procedures. Consequently, this did not provide for the best opportunity to ensure potential defects were identified, recorded and monitored.
[size=undefined]
Other findings[/size]
  • The flight crew used checklist management and crew resource management effectively. These factors combined to contribute to a positive outcome for the aircraft.
  • The ATSB and the engine manufacturer, General Electric, were unable to determine conclusively the reason for the fatigue crack initiation and propagation.
  
 &..


Quote:Findings

From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the collision with terrain involving Beechcraft B200 King Air, registered VH-ZCR that occurred at Essendon Airport, Victoria on 21 February 2017. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

Contributing factors
  • The aircraft's rudder trim was likely in the full nose-left position at the commencement of the take-off.
  • The aircraft's full nose-left rudder trim setting was not detected by the pilot prior to take-off.
  • Following a longer than expected ground roll, the pilot took-off with full left rudder trim selected. This configuration adversely affected the aircraft's climb performance and controllability, resulting in a collision with terrain.
[size=undefined]
Other factors that increased risk[/size]
  • The flight check system approval process did not identify that the incorrect checklist was nominated in the operator’s procedures manual and it did not ensure the required checks, related to the use of the cockpit voice recorder, were incorporated.
  • The aircraft's cockpit voice recorder did not record the accident flight, resulting in a valuable source of safety related information not being available.
  • The aircraft's maximum take-off weight was likely exceeded by about 240 kilograms.
  • Two of the four buildings within the Bulla Road Precinct Retail Outlet Centre exceeded the obstacle limitation surface (OLS) for Essendon Airport, however, the OLS for the departure runway was not infringed and VH-ZCR did not collide with those buildings.
[size=undefined]
Other findings[/size]
  • The presence of the building struck by the aircraft was unlikely to have increased the severity of the outcome of this accident.
  • Both of the aircraft’s engines were likely to have been producing high power at impact.

The HVH REX in flight loss of prop final report aside, Ventus has kindly forwarded to me some interesting links in regards to USA regulation of airports, aviation safety and the appropriate urban development around airports... Winkhttp://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/planning/aerona...ndbook.pdf


Quote:...3.2.3 Safety

Compared to noise, safety is in many respects a more difficult concern to address in compatibility policies. A major reason for this difficulty is that safety policies address uncertain events that may occur with occasional aircraft operations, whereas noise policies deal with known, more or less predictable events that do occur with every aircraft operation. Because aircraft accidents happen infrequently and the time, place, and consequences of their occurrence cannot be predicted, the concept of risk is central to the assessment of safety compatibility. From the standpoint of land use planning, two variables determine the degree of risk posed by potential aircraft accidents:

 Accident Frequency: Where and when aircraft accidents occur in the vicinity of an airport; and
 Accident Consequences: Land uses and land use characteristics that affect the severity of an accident when one occurs...

....To assist ALUCs in delineation of safety zones for a given airport, this Handbook provides sets of generic zones intended to serve as a starting place for the exercise. A total of seven examples of different safety zone configurations are delineated in a series of diagrams shown in the figures on the following pages. Figure 3A includes safety zone examples for five different types of general aviation runways. Figure 3B presents examples for runways at a large air carrier and military airports. The diagrams divide the airport vicinity into as many as six safety zones in addition to the immediate runway environs (defined by the FAR Part 77 primary surface):

 Zone 1: Runway protection zone and within runway object free area adjacent to the runway;
 Zone 2: Inner approach/departure zone;
 Zone 3: Inner turning zone;
 Zone 4: Outer approach/departure zone;
 Zone 5: Sideline zone; and
 Zone 6: Traffic pattern zone (not applicable to large air carrier airports).

The intent of the set of zones depicted for each example is that risk levels be relatively uniform across each zone, but distinct from the other zones. For the most part, the shapes and sizes of the zones were established based upon mathematical analyses of the accident location data presented in this and Appendix E. Not clearly stated in past editions, though, was that another factor also played a part in the zone delineation and is important to acknowledge here: flight parameters. More specifically, as an aircraft approaches for landing or climbs out after takeoff, how is it being operated? Where is it normally flying relative to the runway, and at what altitude? Is it flying straight and level or turning and climbing or descending? What actions pose the greatest stress on the aircraft and greatest potential for loss of control or fewest options for recovery if the unexpected occurs? Where are conflicts between aircraft in flight most likely to happen and potentially create risks for the land uses below?... 
   
&.. http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acr...ntData.pdf 

Quote:Introduction

Establishing appropriate land use and development controls in areas near the ends of airport runways or under the arrival and departure flight paths requires an understanding of the risk of being killed or injured in an aircraft accident that occupants of those areas would be exposed to as a result of the aircraft operations at the airport. In addition, there is some risk of property damage resulting from an aircraft accident, although this is generally considered a less serious concern than the potential for fatalities or serious injuries. The risk to those on the ground from an aircraft accident is referred to as third-party risk.

The analysis of third-party risk requires detailed data on the location and other relevant characteristics of aircraft accidents occurring in the vicinity of airports. Since the risk will vary with the types of aircraft using the airport, as well as the composition of the traffic and the number of annual operations using each runway, the accident data used for the risk analysis needs to be detailed enough to identify all the relevant factors. In particular, account should be taken of the occurrence of factors in a given accident that are likely to vary with the specific conditions at a given airport. For example, accidents due to aircraft icing are not likely to occur at an airport in a tropical climate, while accidents due to a collision with high terrain are not likely to occur at an airport located on a relatively flat plain. Therefore, the reliability of any analysis of third-party risk is critically dependent on the quality and comprehensiveness of the accident data used to perform the analysis...

MTF...P2  Cool
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Update (not from the ATSB) to Sydney Seaplanes Hawkesbury fatal accident -  Huh

From Ironsider, via the Oz:
 
Quote:‘Passenger caused fatal crash’
[Image: 68c10a7dab3c79eb173f312bda8c8419]ROBYN IRONSIDE
A fatal seaplane crash outside Sydney may have been caused by a passenger accidentally knocking out the pilot.

The new part-owner of Sydney Seaplanes has suggested the fatal crash involving the company on New Year’s Eve may have been caused by the front-seat passenger accidentally knocking out the pilot.

Six people were killed, including five members of one British family, when the de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver floatplane veered off the planned route, made a sharp right turn and nosedived into Jerusalem Bay on the Hawkesbury River, 30km north of ­Sydney.

The victims included Canadian-born pilot Gareth Morgan, 44, British food service multi-­millionaire Richard Cousins, 58, his magazine editor fiance Emma Bowden, 48, and her daughter Heather, 11, and Cousins’s sons William, 25, and Edward, 23.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is investigating the crash, which took place in clear conditions just after 3pm. A final report is due early next year.

Hotelier Jerry Schwartz, who this week announced his new partnership with Sydney Seaplanes, said he had complete confidence in the company’s safety record despite the crash.

“The investigation has shown that safety is good and it’s actually believed to not be pilot error,” Mr Schwartz said.

“The current belief is the passenger at the front actually knocked out the pilot.”

The imagined scenario involved the passenger moving about to take photographs of the river and accidentally striking the pilot in the head with his elbow.

Pilot incapacitation has previously been raised by Sydney Seaplanes managing director Aaron Shaw as a possible reason for the crash, because of the ­inexplicable turn the aircraft took beforehand.

“Something definitely happened to the pilot to incapacitate him,” Mr Shaw told The ­Australian, but he said he would await the outcome of the ATSB ­investigation before commenting further.

Among the avenues of investigation being explored by the ATSB, were the “pilot’s qualifi­cations, experience and medical ­information, in addition to several other lines of inquiry”, a spokesman said.

“As this is an active investi­gation, the ATSB is unable to make any comment on specific aspects of the investigation,” he said.

The preliminary report found the aircraft had no obvious mechanical defects or fuel contamination, maintenance was up to the date and the pilot was well qualified with a high standard of health.

Although there was no cockpit voice recorder or flight data ­recorder on the aircraft, the ATSB hoped to find other recorded information from mobile phones, iPads or GoPros.

Once the ATSB investigation is completed, the NSW Coroner is expected to hold an inquest, but no date has been set.

An inquest may also be held in Britain, where the causes of death of five of the victims were made public in February.

Senior Coroner Peter Bedford said post-mortem examinations conducted in Australia found the five British passengers died of ­either head injuries or drowning or a combination of both.

The cause of death of the pilot has not been released.

Mr Bedford suspended his ­investigation to await the outcome of the NSW coronial inquest.

Once that is finished, he will consider whether to hold a full ­inquest in Britain.

Cousins and Bowden lived with her young daughter in Tooting, South London.

The couple was due to be married in July.

Cousins, who was the chief executive of the Compass Group catering firm, left his $75 million fortune to charity group Oxfam.

A year before his death, he added a common tragedy clause to his will, specifying how the estate should be divided in the case that he died alongside his intended beneficiaries.

The bequest is believed to be the largest ever given to Oxfam.

MTF...P2  Cool
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